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Within Filipino migrant domestic worker circles, Sherry would be considered one 
of the lucky few. An unmarried woman in her early twenties with a bachelor’s degree in 
computer science, she had worked as a “medical secretary” in an exclusive clinic in 
Makati City in the Philippines for a few years after her college graduation before 
deciding to leave the country. Many of her relatives were already living overseas: On her 
mother’s side, her aunts and uncles were all professionals working in Canada; Sherry’s 
brother had been sponsored by his wife, a US citizen, for permanent residency in the US; 
and Sherry’s sister, a nurse, had first worked in the UK for seven years and now lived in 
Australia with her husband, also a nurse. With so many of her family members scattered 
around the world and possessing citizenship in various Western countries, Sherry aspired 
to emigrate to the West as well.  
Sherry knew however that she lacked the professional qualifications and work 
experience needed to secure a white-collar job in a Western country. So Sherry decided 
to pursue a position in Canada as a live-in caregiver (LIC) instead. The owner of the 
clinic where she worked had established a training center in Manila that provided 
caregiver training to aspiring migrant domestic workers. As a clinic employee, Sherry 
was eligible for a steep discount in the tuition fee rate. She enrolled in a six-month 
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training course and after she received her certificate of completion, she sent her résumé to 
her aunt in Canada who knew someone working in a Toronto maid agency. It took three 
months before she was able to secure a Canadian employer and then another year and a 
half before her Canadian work visa was approved. An uncle of hers who was also a 
Canadian citizen paid more than US$8,000 to cover the agency fees and plane ticket from 
Manila to Toronto. And thus, through the benevolence of her overseas relatives and her 
connections in the Philippines, Sherry was eventually able to secure a job in Canada and 
put herself on a path to becoming a Canadian citizen.  
Sherry is what migration scholars would call a “direct migrant,” travelling from 
her home country, the Philippines, to her preferred destination, Canada, in a single 
journey without any lengthy stops in intermediate countries. Such point-to-point journeys 
are the primary focus of most migration studies. The majority of our models of 
international migration are based on the notion of a single origin country and a single 
destination, similar to Sherry’s case. It is assumed that the journey itself between these 
two points is completed relatively quickly, within hours or days at the very most. In 
migration studies, the journey is rarely the destination. 
Unlike Sherry, few migrant domestic workers from the Philippines are so 
fortunate as to be able to secure jobs in and visas to Western countries like Canada on 
their first try. Out of the 105,875 newly-hired migrant domestic workers who left the 
Philippines in 2010, the majority (58%) traveled to countries in the Middle East. Asia 
was the second largest market for these workers with 37% of new hires finding work in 
Asian countries like Hong Kong and Singapore. Less than 2% traveled directly to Canada 
from the Philippines (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 2011). But in this 
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dissertation, I show how alternative migration patterns have emerged in recent decades 
that have increased the odds of these migrant workers being able to gain eventual entry 
into countries in the West like Canada. Instead of a single destination country, these labor 
migrants work for lengthy periods of time in multiple destination countries, moving from 
one intermediate destination country to the next as they attempt to climb their personal 
destination hierarchy. Ramona is one such “multinational maid.” 
Ramona was 20 years old when she first decided to leave the Philippines. With an 
associate’s degree in computer science, the only job she had been able to secure in the 
Philippines was as a cashier in a local fast food chain. After two years of this type of low-
paid work and no success securing a different kind of job that would better utilize her 
qualifications, she was desperate to leave the country for greener pastures overseas. She 
decided to seek out a job as an LIC in Canada after friends told her that Canada provided 
foreign caregivers a path to permanent residency. Her friends, who were already working 
as migrants domestic workers overseas, also informed her that attempting to travel 
directly to Canada was out of the question “because when you go directly from 
Philippines to here, and you don’t have any relatives that will gonna help you, it takes 
years. And it takes a lot of money too.” Ramona’s friends suggested an alternative 
migration strategy: Apply for a job in Hong Kong first, and then “cross country” to 
Canada from Hong Kong. 
Ramona found a recruitment agency in the Philippines and applied for a job in 
Hong Kong, paying just over US$1,700 in agency fees. She borrowed the money from 
her parents who sold some of their land to raise the necessary funds. Within three 
months, she had found a Hong Kong employer willing to hire her and received her Hong 
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Kong visa. Her employers turned out to be a sweet, elderly couple with whom Ramona 
built a strong, trusting relationship. She ended up working with them for six years. Happy 
with her job and her relationship with her employers, she almost shelved her plans to 
move to Canada, but her friends—many of whom had already made the jump from Hong 
Kong to Canada and become permanent residents in Canada—convinced her to follow 
them. In 2009, she submitted a job application to a Canadian maid agency along with a 
US$2,500 fee payment. Thanks to her Hong Kong work experience, and because she 
applied for her visa through the Canadian High Commission in Hong Kong, she was 
matched with an employer and issued a Canadian visa within two months.  
All in all, it took Ramona just over US$4,000—less than half of what Sherry had 
paid—and six years of employment in a “stepping stone” country before she was able to 
gain access to Canada. But there had never been much chance of Ramona being able to 
travel directly to Canada. Unlike Sherry, she lacked the family connections to citizens of 
Western countries who could sponsor her for a visa or cover the exorbitant fees charged 
by migrant recruitment agencies to Philippines-based migrants seeking jobs in Canada. 
Ramona also felt that she did not have the luxury of time to simply wait in the Philippines 
for a year or more while her Canadian work visa was processed. For all these reasons, 
Ramona’s multistate migration trajectory was the most efficient and effective way for her 
to gain access to her preferred end-destination, Canada.  
A comparison of migration statistics from the Philippine and Canadian 
governments reveals that over 80% of Filipino migrant domestic workers arriving in 
Canada on temporary work permits could potentially fall into this category of “multistate 
migrants.” I define these migrants as individuals who have lived/worked in an 
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intermediate destination country for at least a year before moving on to a new destination 
higher up their personal destination hierarchy. Other recent studies have found similar 
migration patterns adopted by other groups of aspiring migrants who were unable to gain 
access to their preferred destination on their first try (Biao 2007; Gold 2007; Konadu-
Agyemang 1999) but there have been few attempts to define this emergent pattern of 
international migration. This dissertation is an attempt to explain the emergence of 
multistate migration among capital-constrained migrants such as Filipino migrant 
domestic workers and also to develop a comprehensive conceptual model of multistate 
migration that can be applied to all resource-strapped migrant populations that engage in 
such migration behavior.  
Through in-depth interviews with 160 Filipino migrant domestic workers in five 
countries (the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada and the United States), I find 
that multistate migration is a direct response to various macro-structural factors:  
(1) The increasingly strict barriers to permanent entry imposed by these migrants’ 
preferred destination countries which are often in the West;  
(2) The growing demand for paid domestic workers in high-income countries around the 
world which has pushed these countries’ governments to set up specific labor 
importation programs to bring in foreign domestic workers on short-term work visas; 
and 
(3) The emergence of a transnational labor market for migrant domestic workers which 
allows them to leverage the capital they have acquired while working in one overseas 
market to secure a better-paying job in another overseas market. 
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At the meso-level, multistate migration is fostered in part by the growing 
community of overseas Filipinos who provide substantive migration assistance to their 
relatives and friends in the home country and, once they are already overseas, advise 
them about the merits of new destination countries to move on to, and also encourage the 
adoption of a stepwise migration trajectory in order to reach their preferred destination. 
The withholding of help by overseas migrant contacts can also at times encourage 
aspiring migrants to undertake a multistate migration trajectory, if they find themselves 
unable to muster up enough resources to support a direct migration to their preferred 
destination.   
Multistate migration is also fostered by a different kind of migration network: The 
network of interconnected recruitment and maid placement agencies in host and sending 
countries. The mushrooming of this for-profit migration industry within the Philippines 
and elsewhere encourages aspiring migrants to secure overseas jobs but at increasingly 
exorbitant prices, thus directing migrants towards less-expensive destinations and away 
from more-expensive ones. But these overseas agencies also promote multistate 
migration by using migrant labor markets in selected destination countries as recruitment 
pools for other countries higher up the destination hierarchy. 
Lastly, at the micro-level, I show how multistate migration is a byproduct of an 
under-recognized side-effect of migration: The acquisition of additional capital (human, 
social, financial and cultural) which expands an individual migrant’s capacity for agentic 
action, including further migrations to more-preferred but harder-to-enter destinations. 
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In the following sections, I outline the various gaps and contradictions within the 
literature that are addressed by this dissertation and some of the themes that ensuing 
chapters will explore. 
 
Multistate Migration in the Migration Literature 
 The subfield of migration studies that looks at migration trajectories spanning 
multiple destination countries has grown considerably in the last two decades, but it 
remains disorganized, as evidenced by the variety of terms that abound to describe this 
type of migration: secondary migration, tertiary migration, onward migration, stepwise 
migration, serial migration, multiple migration, multistage migration, triangular migration 
and re-migration (see Paul 2011a; Aydemir and Robinson 2008; King and Newbold 
2007; Ossman 2007; Biao 2007; Siu 2005; DeVoretz and Ma 2002; Lam 1996, 1994). All 
these terms refer to the process of migrants undertaking legal stops of substantive 
duration in multiple destination countries as part of a migration journey spanning years, 
rather than days or weeks.  
Some scholars who study this process focus on how such a migration journey can 
inform an individual’s sense of self and home and their views of the world (Ossman 
forthcoming, 2007; Siu 2005, 2004). Siu calls this migration pattern “serial migration” 
and situates it within diasporic studies, focusing on the Chinese diaspora in Panama.
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Bhachu (1985) studies Indian Sikh migrants from East Africa who have resettled in Great 
Britain, whom she calls “twice migrants” and “multiple migrants.” Likewise, Cohen 
                                                 
1 Some studies of serial migration look at diasporic migration that spans generations. That is not what I am 
discussing here. This study focuses on migration journeys spanning multiple countries within a single 
lifetime. 
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(2007) uses the trope of the “wandering Jew” to analyze her own serial migration through 
the US, the UK and Morocco. 
Given that their primary emphasis is on the lived experience of multiple 
migrations and its effects on the serial migrant, these scholars have paid less attention to 
the social forces behind this phenomenon. Siu writes that a “combination of social 
circumstances, geopolitical contingencies, and individual choice frame the practice of 
serial migration” (2005:89), without systematically outlining what these factors are. She 
does mention, however, that among the Chinese migrants she interviewed in Panama, 
women and working-class individuals are less likely to be serial migrants, as compared to 
middle-class men. Likewise, Bhachu (1986) finds that the “twice migrants” in her study 
of Indian Sikhs from East Africa who have resettled in Great Britain are, on average, of 
high social standing, possessing relative wealth and a university education. Among these 
scholars, there is less discussion about how the act of migration itself can allow a migrant 
to acquire new capital that can facilitate further migrations. Ossman (2004) does note that 
the serial migrants she interacts with have acquired a veneer of cosmopolitanism, a 
valuable form of cultural capital in certain quarters of the global economy. But there is no 
discussion of other forms of capital (financial, human or social) that these migrants may 
have accumulated. Finally, serial migration, as these scholars understand it, is almost 
always organic and unplanned, and very rarely, a strategic response to a migrant’s 
inability to reach their preferred destination. 
 Taking a more agentic and neoclassical view of multistate migration, Canadian 
economist Don DeVoretz has popularized the term “triangular migration” to describe the 
immigration of individuals from around the world to what he calls “entrepôt” countries 
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(such as Canada) where they accumulate additional human capital, before they move on 
to a third country (most often the US). DeVoretz, Ma and Zhang (2003) apply this 
“triangular migration model” to Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong who move to 
Canada to take up Canadian citizenship but then, feeling economic dissatisfaction in their 
adopted country, move on to the US. DeVoretz and his co-authors argue that migrants are 
initially attracted to Canada because it offers them “subsidized human capital” (such as 
English language training programs or specific technical skills for themselves or their 
children) and various free/low-cost public goods (such as safety, security, a welfare 
system, a stable government, etc.). However, after a period of time, some of these 
migrants might feel less than satisfied with their experience in Canada, especially if their 
new employment circumstances are less favorable than what they had expected or what 
they had previously enjoyed in their home country. Some of these disappointed migrants 
might choose to return to their home country; others might decide to continue living in 
Canada because they appreciate other aspects of life there. But DeVoretz proposes that 
still others might instead choose to use the capital they have acquired to secure admission 
into a new destination country such as the US where they imagine their life chances will 
finally improve.  
A handful of studies have found evidence that supports DeVoretz’s theory 
regarding triangular migration with Canada being used as an “entrepôt.” Aydemir and 
Robinson (2008) calculate that 35% of young, working-age, male immigrants to Canada 
permanently leave the country within 20 years of their arrival. However, due to the 
paucity of cross-national data on migration inflows and outflows, the authors were unable 
to determine how many of these migrants returned to their home country and how many 
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moved onward to a new destination. King and Newbold (2007) took a different tack and 
focused exclusively on the population of onward migrants who move from Canada to the 
US. By combining data from the 2001 Canadian Census with data from the 2000 United 
States Census, these authors find that onward Canadian immigrants who move to the US 
are more likely to be young, married, possess a bachelor’s degree, and earn an income of 
US$100,000 or greater. These findings highlight how the re-migration decision is also 
constrained by an individual’s access to capital, particularly human and financial capital. 
These findings also buttress the arguments of those who have claimed that Canada is 
experiencing a “brain drain” with the highly-skilled (both native-born and immigrant) 
choosing to move on to countries like the US where they believe their human capital will 
be better rewarded. (DeVoretz and Laryea [1998] and Stewart-Patterson [1999] make this 
claim while Helliwell [1999] denies it.)  
The picture thus presented about triangular migrants is that of rational individuals, 
objectively weighing the (economic and non-economic) costs and benefits of staying in 
their adoptive country versus moving to a new destination. DeVoretz and Ma (2002) 
briefly consider the possibility that these migrants had engaged in strategic behavior, 
consciously using their initial destination as a stepping stone to their preferred 
destination. But these authors largely reject this possibility, noting that each migration 
decision involves significant transaction costs and is usually not made lightly, effectively 
rejecting the likelihood of such long-term, multistage planning on the part of triangular 
migrants. But DeVoretz and Ma are discussing so-called permanent immigrants who 
move with their families to a new location, taking all their worldly possessions with 
them. Unattached migrants and individuals whose families remain behind in the home 
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country should be in an easier position to undertake such strategic planning as they are 
the sole bearers of most of the social and emotional costs of each migration.  
Migrants possessing relatively large amounts of financial, social and migrant 
capital should also be better positioned to think strategically about onward migration. 
This hypothesis is partially supported by Aydemir and Robinson’s (2006) finding that the 
onward migration rates of immigrants from Hong Kong who arrived in Canada between 
1990-1994 were as high as 45% within the first year of their arrival. This was a period 
when there was a great deal of uncertainty over the likely future of Hong Kong after its 
planned 1997 handover to China. Many of these Hong Kong immigrants to Canada 
entered under business class visas—indicating their access to large amounts of financial 
capital. The authors posit that a significant percentage of these arrivals were motivated by 
the desire to secure Canadian citizenship—a valuable form of geopolitical capital—rather 
than any intention to settle down in Canada. The most likely scenario is that they returned 
to live in Hong Kong but now armed with Canadian citizenship as a backup plan in case 
conditions in Hong Kong worsened after the 1997 handover. If this is the case, then these 
migrants do not qualify as multistate migrants given that they returned to their home 
country. But the larger point these authors are making—that strategic migration and 
destination decision-making among migrants is possible—still holds true.  
DeVoretz’s triangular migration model focuses primarily on immigrants to a 
country who are able to acquire a new citizenship or residency status that eases their 
subsequent migrations. A broader view of triangular migration could easily include 
temporary migrants who also can acquire additional capital with each move they make, 
though perhaps not the geopolitical capital of a new citizenship status. This is an 
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important point because most studies of migration only focus on how the act of migration 
is constrained by the amount of capital a potential migrant can access. Little attention has 
been paid to the fact that migration also creates the opportunity for migrants to acquire 
new migrant capital. DeVoretz and Ma discuss how migrants in Canada can accumulate 
additional human capital such as “language, knowledge of labor market channels, cultural 
conventions, […] programming skills, retraining for certification, and access to modern 
technology (2002:59). Migrants can also acquire other types of migration-relevant 
capital: Financial capital through higher wages and increased savings, social capital in the 
form of new network contacts both in their new location but also in other countries, and 
finally, cultural capital in terms of the cosmopolitanism (real and performative) that 
comes from having lived and worked overseas. All these types of capital can help ease 
the process of re-migrating to a new location.  
There are other examples of multiple migrations that fit the mold of triangular 
migration. Gold writes that Israel may have been seen as a “location of temporary 
residence” (2007:290) to many Jews from the former Soviet Union, North Africa, 
Argentina and South Africa who immigrated to Israel after World War II because it 
offered them immediate asylum, but then sought what they considered to be greener 
pastures in the United States and other Western countries. Biao (2007) finds that many 
Indian IT workers accept overseas jobs in what he calls “global gateways”—countries 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and the Middle East—to use as springboards to secure 
temporary work visas to the United States. In effect, these highly-skilled migrants are 
attempting to increase their human capital even further so that they will be more 
attractive to US employers. 
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In summary, the existing literature on multistate migration teaches us that this 
migration pattern involves a migrant’s progression through a series of countries with 
stays of substantive duration in each stop. These movements across multiple countries are 
at times intentional and mapped out from the start, or they can be more organic in nature. 
This journey is motivated by a migrant’s desire to climb their personal destination 
hierarchy to find a country where they are most satisfied with their living and working 
conditions. This movement across countries is made possible by an oft-overlooked 
quality of migration: Its ability to allow migrants to accumulate new migrant capital 
(human, social, financial and cultural) while overseas which facilitates further migrations.  
 What this literature does not adequately address is the ability of capital-
constrained migrants to undertake multistate migration. To date, the studies that have 
looked at multistate migration patterns have focused on high-capital migrants, many of 
them white-collar professionals who trade on their already high levels of human capital to 
gain access to various countries. This dissertation focuses on a very different population 
of migrants: Foreign domestic workers from the Philippines, who are generally seen as 
low-capital migrants, and the factors that encourage and enable them to engage in such a 
capital-intensive process.  
 
Women’s Independent Migration from the Patriarchal Philippines 
Among labor-exporting countries, the Philippines is regarded as an innovator and 
role model in its marketing and management of its migrant citizens. Over the last 40 
years, it has built a vast government apparatus focused on all aspects of migration 
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management, including the authorization, regulation, marketing, training, recruitment and 
placement of Filipino migrant workers overseas (Rodriguez 2010; Agunias 2008; Tyner 
2004). However, out-migration from the Philippines is very much a public-private 
partnership, sustained not only by the government but also by the private sector that 
profits tremendously from the overseas placement of migrant Filipino labor (Agunias 
2008).  
There are over 1,300 private recruitment agencies in the Philippines licensed by 
the government to match prospective labor migrants with overseas employers.
2
 These for-
profit agencies handle the vast majority of all recruitment and placement of Filipino 
workers overseas. In contrast, the Government Placement Branch placed just 2% of all 
newly-hired land-based workers in 2009 (Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 
2010b:11). The Philippine government has consciously tried to limit its involvement in 
the direct recruitment, placement and even training of workers overseas, leaving these 
functions to the private sector. It has done so partly because it was unable to efficiently 
handle the large volume of Filipinos leaving the Philippines each year, and also so as not 
to create the impression that it is actively involved in the commoditization and export of 
its people (Tyner 2009).  
While this migration infrastructure plays an important role in fostering out-
migration from the Philippines, so too do the continuing dire economic straits that many 
Filipino families find themselves in. In 2009, the individual poverty rate in the 
Philippines was 26.5%. The female unemployment rate was 7.4%. Among employed 
women, 46.1% were characterized as holding “vulnerable employment” as unpaid family 
                                                 
2 As of January 21, 2011, there were 1,372 active, accredited recruitment agencies in “good standing” listed 
on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration website. (http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-
bin/agList.asp?mode=all)  
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workers or own-account workers.
3
 Employed women are also heavily concentrated in 
low-paying sectors of the Philippine economy—24% in agriculture and another 66% in 
services (such as domestic work)—with limited opportunities for career development. 
These negative wage pressures make it hard for locally-employed Filipino women to 
sufficiently support their families and set the stage for their consideration of temporary 
labor migration as a solution to their financial woes. But the continuing economic 
doldrums of the Philippines means that, even at the end of their two-year contract, 
overseas migrant workers are likely to decide to continue overseas (though not 
necessarily in the same host country). 
For various structural and cultural reasons, migrant domestic work is the most 
popular exit strategy for prospective women migrants who desire to leave the Philippines. 
In 2010, 28% of newly-hired, land-based migrants leaving the Philippines were domestic 
workers, constituting the single largest occupational bloc of labor migrants leaving the 
Philippines. Of these 105,875 newly-hired migrant domestic workers, 98% were women 
(Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 2011). Considered another way, of all 




Despite these social forces pushing Filipinas to leave the country to work 
overseas, there are other forces that may hinder these women’s independent migration. 
                                                 
3 All labor and security statistics for the Philippines were sourced from the World Bank’s website at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/philippines and the Annual Labor and Employment Estimates of the 
Philippine Government’s National Statistics Office at 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/lf101103_ar.pdf. Retrieved on March 28, 2012 
4 Women represented 55% of all newly-hired migrants leaving the Philippines in 2010. This relatively even 
gender distribution is typical of the outflow of migrants leaving the Philippines each year. However, these 
numbers mask the heavily gendered occupational distribution of this outflow. As mentioned earlier, almost 
all migrant domestic workers leaving the Philippines are women. Likewise, most nursing professionals 
leaving the Philippines are women, while most electricians, construction workers, welders and plumbers 
are men (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 2011).  
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Most Philippine households have a patriarchal authority structure with men seen as the 
natural heads of households (Lan 2006; Chant and McIlwaine 1995). And Philippine 
society as a whole is still largely conservative with women viewed as the primary 
caregivers within the family, responsible for looking after the children and elderly, and 
handling most domestic chores, even if they have a job outside the home (Eder 2006; 
Roces 2000; Chant and McIlwaine 1995; Eviota 1992).
5
 Prospective Filipino women 
migrants have been found to encounter resistance from family members when they 
broach the idea of their independent migration, especially when they mention that they 
will be working abroad as live-in domestic workers, which is typically seen as a low-
status occupation (Parreñas 2001; Lan 2006).  
And yet, women’s independent migration out of the Philippines and other 
patriarchal and traditional societies continues to occur at an increasing rate (Strozza, 
Gallo and Grillo 2003; Parreñas 2001; Afsar 2003; White 1976; Oishi 2005; Lauby and 
Stark 1988; Liang and Chen 2003; Bardhan 1977; Oishi 2005). At different points in time 
and in different countries, patriarchal households have even seemed to support their 
womenfolk’s departure from the ancestral home in order to seek work in the nearest 
urban area or in another country, with the understanding that these women would remit a 
large portion of their earnings back to their families (Scott and Tilly 1980; Lauby and 
Stark 1988; Bardhan 1977; White 1976).  
I attempt to reconcile these contradictory reports by showing how familial 
resistance to Filipino women’s independent labor migration is not necessarily a given. 
Within the present study, women who were unmarried, widowed or separated, did not 
                                                 
5 The female labor force participation rate, calculated as a percentage of the female population of the 
Philippines over the age of 15 years, was 50% in 2010. (Source: The World Bank website. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS)  
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have any children and who possessed a college degree were less likely to encounter 
resistance from their families. Women with female relatives already working as migrant 
domestic workers overseas were also less likely to face resistance. And in households 
where women were already out-earning their husbands, the balance of power in the 
household had swung sufficiently in the woman’s direction that there was little to no 
resistance to her independent migration decision. Other macro-structural factors (such as 
the culture of migration within the Philippines and the high cost of tertiary education) 
also act as a counterweight against the resistance to women’s independent migration. 
For those women who did encounter familial resistance, I find that these aspiring 
migrants often deployed gendered negotiating tactics, manipulating their ascribed 
gendered roles as dutiful daughters and supportive wives to justify why they needed to 
work overseas. They framed the benefits their out-migration could provide in a gendered 
manner and constructed their independent migration decision as an exclusive act of love, 
filial loyalty and self-sacrifice, rather than an individualistic decision. In order to win 
over these women’s resistant relatives, the more self-oriented objectives behind their 
migration decision were carefully filtered out. In other words, these women display 
significant agency in successfully negotiating the gendered and generational hierarchies 
in which they live. I argue that this same agency is what they deploy to climb their 
destination hierarchies through multistate migration. 
 
Destination Biases and Aspirations 
One of the primary reasons behind the popularity of paid domestic work as an exit 
strategy from the Philippines is the wide range of destination countries that accept 
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migrant domestic workers (see Lan 2006; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Parreñas 
2001; Anthias and Lazaridis 2000; Yeoh, Huang and Gonzalez III 1999). Since the 
1970s, many countries around the world have instituted migrant domestic worker 
programs to import foreign guest workers who can provide cheap live-in childcare, 
eldercare and/or housework to their native populace.
6
 Even as many of these countries are 
now tightening their immigration restrictions to prevent “undesirable” foreigners from 
entering their borders (Cornelius, Tsuda, Martin and Hollifield 2004; Castles and Miller 
2003), they have continued to import foreign domestic workers on temporary work 
contracts to meet their national-level social reproduction needs. In effect, a transnational 
labor market for migrant domestic workers has emerged. 
However, despite migrant domestic laborers performing similar types of work in 
various countries, these countries’ guest worker programs are not equivalent (both in 
terms of policy and praxis). In this dissertation, I propose a simple rating system for 
different countries’ migrant domestic worker regimes, using only two broad criteria: the 
degree of employment rights and the degree of migrant rights granted migrant domestic 
workers. I apply this system to seven of the more common destinations in Asia, Europe, 
North America and the Middle East for Filipino migrant domestic workers. Western 
countries like Canada and Italy rate the highest, offering both relatively decent living and 
working conditions and the possibility of permanent residence. East Asian countries like 
Hong Kong and Singapore constitute a second tier of destinations, where working 
                                                 
6 At the turn of the 20th century, newly arrived immigrants in countries like the US, Canada and the UK, 
often turned to waged domestic service as a way to earn an income. Irish women coming to work as 
domestic servants in 19th century America are probably one of the best-known examples in the United 
States (Lynch-Brennan 2009; Diner 1983). However, it was only in the 1960s and ‘70s that large-scale, 
government-led projects to specifically import temporary migrant domestic workers were initiated on a 
widespread basis.  
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conditions are sometimes manageable but no migrant rights are extended to foreign 
domestic workers. Finally, countries in the Middle East (such as Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates) perform the worst, offering no migrant rights whatsoever and also 
providing few workplace protections and rights to domestic workers. It is these stark 
differences between host countries that propel migrant domestic workers to leave one 
destination and seek out work in another where they hope to find better working and 
living conditions.  
But how much of these country differences are these migrant domestic workers 
cognizant of? To date, studies that try to explicate the destination decision-making 
process have focused on identifying objective differences between destination options in 
an attempt to understand how prospective migrants make their destination decision. 
These studies assume, first, that prospective migrants are fully aware of these factual 
differences across destinations and, second, that migrants rationally and objectively 
weigh the costs and benefits of different countries when making their destination 
decision. These studies rarely recognize that migrants arrive at their destination decisions 
using information that may not be entirely accurate.  
I attempt to shed light on the more subjective side of destination decision-making. 
I first highlight how prospective migrant domestic workers from the Philippines are 
broadly familiar with the pros and cons of different destination options. These individuals 
also share a common destination hierarchy socially constructed out of accounts heard 
from friends and relatives (both in the Philippines and overseas) and mass media reports. 
At the same time, however, their mental maps of the world are also influenced by 
cognitive biases and heuristics that can cause them to overvalue certain countries and 
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undervalue others. These biases impact their short- and long-term destination decisions, 
and I find that they can also encourage migrants to undertake multistate migration despite 
the significant investment of time, effort and money required.    
 
The Role of Capital in Multistate Migration 
One of the underlying reasons for the adoption of multistate migration is the 
aspiring migrant’s initial lack of migrant capital. Migrant capital refers to the resources 
needed to facilitate an aspiring migrant’s entry into a chosen destination country. Some 
prospective migrants may lack the necessary educational qualifications or work 
experience to secure an automatic space in the immigration quotas that high-income, 
migrant-receiving countries have set aside for highly skilled “economic” immigrants. 
They also may not possess sufficient funds to cover the costs of migration or to qualify as 
“investor” immigrants, a category of independent, entrepreneurial migrant that several 
high-income countries also seek to attract.
7
 Or they lack the overseas connections that 
would allow them immediate legal entry through “family class” immigrant visas. They 
may have relatives—perhaps even siblings or aunts and uncles—who live overseas in 
desired destination countries; but, because they do not qualify as their relatives’ 
immediate dependents or their relatives do not hold citizenship or permanent residence 
status overseas, they cannot utilize these connections to gain immediate, direct entry 
under a permanent immigrant class of visa into these destinations. For instance, US 
citizens over 21 years of age can sponsor their siblings for a “family preference 
                                                 
7 “Investor” immigrants are required to invest significant sums of money (800,000CAD in Canada and 
between 500,000-1,000,000USD in the US) in a business venture in order to receive a long-term visa to 
their desired destination. See http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1323.html#fifth for the US 
guidelines and http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/business/index.asp for the Canadian guidelines.   
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immigrant visa” but only 65,000 of such visas are issued each year
8
 and the backlog of 
applications is so large that, at the end of 2010, the State Department was only just 
starting to review sponsorship applications for Filipino siblings filed in April 1991, 
almost 20 years earlier.
9
 Finally, these individuals may lack the luxury of time to wait for 
an alternative (more comfortable) exit opportunity from their home country, one that 
would take them directly to their preferred destination. They may be under so much 
pressure to start earning money for their families that, rather than waiting in their 
homeland for a visa to their preferred destination to materialize, these potential migrants 
might choose to immigrate elsewhere in the near term just so they can start earning some 
foreign exchange immediately. 
While the lack of migrant capital can act as a constraint on migrants’ initial 
migration and destination decisions, I find that the acquisition of new migrant capital can 
create opportunities for additional migration. There are four categories of migrant capital 
that are useful in supporting such journeys:  
(1) Migrant human capital refers to both information about the process of immigration to 
a desired destination—the visa categories to apply under, the paperwork required, the 
particular immigration laws—as well as more personal characteristics such as an 
aspiring migrant’s work experience, language skills, educational qualifications, 
gender and even age that can facilitate securing a job in the desired country.  
(2) Migrant social capital refers to the assistance received through network connections 
(particularly, current migrants) to reduce the costs and risks of migration. This 
                                                 
8 http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1306.html. Accessed on February 14, 2011. 
9 http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/Cut-off_Dates_Philippines_online.pdf. Accessed on February 14, 2011. 
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assistance can take forms such as information sharing, employer matching, the 
recommendation of a trustworthy recruitment agency, and loans or gifts of money. 
(3) Migrant financial capital refers to the funds needed to pay the necessary agency fees, 
visa application fees, travel expenses and other ancillary costs involved in gaining 
access to a desired destination. When discussing migrant financial capital, I am 
referring only to funds that the prospective migrant directly possesses. Migrant social 
capital, meanwhile, includes funds received through social network connections. 
(4) The above three forms of migrant capital are the ones that are most often highlighted 
within the migration literature. But there is a fourth category of migrant capital that 
can also be useful in supporting multistate migration: cultural capital. Cultural capital 
refers to the forms of knowledge, skills, education and other advantages embodied 
within an individual that provide them with a higher status in society (Bourdieu 
1986). All Filipino migrant domestic workers possess some cultural capital by simple 
virtue of their nationality and the efforts of the Philippine government to frame 
Filipina domestic workers as intrinsically more loving, nurturing and better qualified 
than other nationality groups (Tyner 2009). But these migrants may also acquire new 
cultural capital after working overseas for a period of time, especially if they work in 
countries that themselves have a higher standing in the world order. In my 
dissertation, I report how countries like Hong Kong and Singapore were seen as 
excellent recruiting grounds and credentialing sites by maid agencies in Canada. 
These agencies appear to view migrants with prior work experience in these Asian 
countries as being more competent than migrants from other intermediate destinations 
such as the Middle East. In this manner, Filipino migrants’ new cultural capital 
23 
(acquired through their decision to work in select countries like Singapore and Hong 
Kong) can support their multistate migrations up their destination hierarchy.  
 
An Overview of the Dissertation 
 In the following chapters, I describe and then theorize the emergence of multistate 
migration among Filipino migrant domestic workers over the last 20 years. But first, in 
Chapter Two, I lay out the methods I used to gather my data. Chapters Three and Four 
then delve into the initial migration decision of Filipino migrant domestic workers. 
Helping to set the stage for the rest of the dissertation, Chapter Three focuses on the 
factors that push so many Filipinos to leave the Philippines each year to work overseas as 
short-term contract workers and the institutionalized private-public migration industry 
that facilitates and manages the out-migration of over one million Filipino labor migrants 
each year. I pay special attention to answering the question of why so many Filipinas 
choose migrant domestic work as their exit strategy. Chapter Four shows how the 
migration decision—made at the individual level—is only the beginning of a negotiation 
with family members who are sometimes reluctant to let their female relatives work 
overseas and as live-in domestic workers to boot. These women’s ability to overcome this 
familial resistance is an indicator of the degree of agency these women migrants possess. 
Having dealt with the migration decision, Chapters Five and Six address the 
destination decisions of aspiring migrant domestic workers. Chapter Five paints a picture 
of the transnational labor market for migrant domestic workers that has emerged in recent 
decades, focusing on the policy regimes of seven common/preferred destinations for 
Filipino migrant domestic workers: Canada, Italy, the United States, Hong Kong, 
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Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This chapter highlights 
differences between living and working conditions in these seven countries and the 
varying barriers to entry into each of these markets. The entry barriers and differences in 
conditions across these destinations are a driving force behind multistate migration.  
Chapter Six looks at these countries through the eyes of migrant domestic workers 
themselves, assessing how these migrants construct their personal destination hierarchies 
and destination aspirations. I argue that these aspirations play a critical role in 
encouraging these migrants to keep moving “onward and upward” to new countries 
higher up their destination hierarchies. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the mechanics of multistate migration and presents a 
model of how multistate migration may be adopted by capital-constrained migrants. It 
outlines what makes for a successful multistate migrant, by highlighting the differences 
between multistate migrants and direct migrants who move directly to their preferred 
destination country, and between multistate migrants and single-stage migrants who 
move only once, to a less-preferred destination country and no further. It also discusses 
the different kinds of migrant capital that fuel the adoption of multistate migration 
trajectories. Finally, Chapter Eight drills down to one particular type of migrant capital—
migrant social capital—and discusses how the differentiated mobilization of migrant 
social capital can encourage the adoption of multistate migration trajectories as well.  
 In the concluding chapter, I focus on the questions that remain unanswered: How 
does multistate migration impact the migrants who undertake such journeys? What are 
other likely occupations where multistate migration might emerge? And what does 






Data and Methods 
 
The selection of multistate migration as the focus of my dissertation was an 
accident. A happy accident, but an accident nonetheless. I traveled to Asia in the summer 
of 2008 intent on studying the process of destination decision-making among Filipino 
migrant domestic workers. I had chosen this topic and this study population for a variety 
of reasons. Though I was born in India and am an Indian citizen, I spent more than 10 
years in Singapore, first as a high school student, then an undergraduate at the National 
University of Singapore and, finally, on the managerial track at Singapore Airlines. 
During this time, I became familiar with the ubiquitous presence of foreign domestic 
workers in Singaporean homes, seeing them go about their daily chores: washing their 
employers’ cars, taking out the garbage, walking their employers’ children to and from 
school, purchasing groceries, and on Sundays, going to church and picnicking in parks. 
Foreign domestic workers are positioned near the bottom rung of Singapore’s social 
hierarchy and often treated as such. There were a handful of occasions when I was out in 
public with some of my Chinese Singaporean friends who had young children, when 
strangers would assume that I was my friends’ Indian domestic worker and treat me with 
disdain or as if I were completely invisible. Those few instances gave me some 
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appreciation of the marginalization experienced by migrant domestic workers in 
Singapore and other Asian countries on a daily basis.  
After leaving Singapore and beginning my doctoral studies at the University of 
Michigan, my focus returned to this migrant population as I was searching for a research 
topic for my third-year candidacy paper. Given that the Philippines had been the primary 
source of migrant domestic workers for Singapore in the 1990s when I lived there, I 
started to delve into the literature on Filipino migrant domestic workers. I was stunned by 
the wide variety of countries where Filipino domestic workers can be found. In 2006, 
over 91,000 newly-hired Filipino domestic workers traveled to roughly 70 countries and 
territories around the world.1 Though Hong Kong and Kuwait were the most common 
destinations in 2006, attracting over 19,000 newly-hired migrant domestic workers each, 
Filipinos also traveled in significant numbers to countries as disparate as Canada, Italy, 
Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Singapore. I became 
fascinated by the question of how these migrants chose between their myriad destination 
options, but I could not find any study that addressed the destination decision-making 
process of Filipino migrant domestic workers. More broadly, while there are plentiful 
theories of migration, less scholarly attention has been paid to the destination decisions of 
migrants. I saw an opportunity to build new theory by attempting to explain the 
destination decisions of these migrant workers.  
In early 2008, I began to craft a study design to address this research question. At 
the end of April, I left for Asia with a plan to conduct interviews with Filipino migrant 
domestic workers first in Singapore and then the Philippines and Hong Kong. My very 
first interview was conducted in the waiting area of a maid agency in the Lucky Plaza 
                                                
1 http://poea.gov.ph/stats/Skills/Skill_Country_Sex/2006.pdf 
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Shopping Center in Singapore’s downtown shopping district, a popular hangout of 
Filipino migrant workers during their rest-days. Inside the agency’s waiting area, there 
were a couple of Filipinas sitting and chatting on the sofa and, after receiving permission 
from the agency manager to approach them, I introduced myself and asked if either of 
them was a domestic worker and, if yes, would they be willing to be interviewed by me.  
One of the migrants, a middle-aged woman with a calm and confident air about 
her, quickly agreed. With little prompting from me, Winola started to talk about the years 
she had spent in Saudi Arabia working as a private tutor for a well-to-do Saudi family, 
her return to the Philippines and her subsequent failed attempt to find a job as a live-in 
caregiver (LIC) in Canada. As I probed further about her migration plans, she mentioned 
in passing the job offer she had received for work in Cambodia and the other offer that 
had recently appeared out of the blue which she had just accepted: A job as a domestic 
worker for a Saudi family in Italy. The Singapore maid agency where we were 
conversing was the one that had brokered the deal and they had offered her the Italian 
position primarily because of her prior work experience in Saudi Arabia.  
As I listened to Winola, I experienced one of those eureka moments treasured by 
all scientists. Until that point, it had never occurred to me that migrant domestic workers 
might work in multiple overseas destinations over the course of their migratory lifetimes. 
It seems obvious in retrospect but I had never before considered the implications of 
having so many overseas markets for migrant domestic workers. From that point forward, 
I made sure to ask all my interviewees if they had worked in multiple destinations and the 
process by which they had made each destination decision.  
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From the interviews I conducted in Asia, I came to the realization that Filipino 
migrant domestic workers carry in their heads a cognitive map of the world and that they 
rate and rank the countries they are aware of to construct a “hierarchy” of destination 
options that drives their destination decisions. I also discovered that, though they are 
considered “low-capital” migrants, these migrant domestic workers are still able to 
agentically and strategically map out a multistage, multistate migration trajectory to 
climb that hierarchy (Paul 2011a). It became clear from my interviews that countries in 
the West, and particularly Canada and the US, sat at the top of most of these migrants’ 
destination hierarchies. However, only four of my interviewees in Asia had managed to 
secure jobs in the West at the time of their interviews. I knew that if I wanted to confirm 
my hypotheses about what it took to complete a successful multistate migration journey 
to the West, I would have to conduct another round of research in the countries at the top 
of migrants’ destination hierarchy. Thus was born the second phase of this study: 
Interviews with Filipino migrant domestic workers in Canada and the US. In the 
following sections, I outline in greater detail the various aspects of my study design for 
both the Asian half of the study and the subsequent North American half. First, however, 
I describe the methodological principles that grounded this project from the start. 
 
Methodological Principles 
 The methodological approach I adopted for this study was primarily driven by the 
twin goals of discovery and exploration. Kleining and Witt have outlined several 
heuristic rules that can help to “optimize the explorative potential” (2001:8) of any study, 
qualitative or quantitative. The first two of these are: 
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“Rule One: ‘The researcher should be open to new concepts and change his/her 
preconceptions if the data are not in agreement with them.’ 
Rule Two: ‘The topic of research is preliminary and may change during the 
research process.’ It is only fully known after being successfully explored.” 
These “rules” share commonalities with Glaser and Strauss’ (1986) grounded theory 
approach and the reflexive ethnographic approach in general (Burawoy 1998). All these 
scholars recommend an open mindset when first approaching one’s data, but at the same 
time, they do not argue for researchers to enter the field tabula rasa. In addition, they 
suggest that a “dialectic” needs to occur between the researcher and her data until a 
hypothesis has been formed that successfully incorporates the “answers” the data 
provides to the researcher’s questions (Kleining and Witt 2001; Burawoy 1998). This was 
the philosophy I embraced when initiating my study and it also explains my willingness 
to change my research focus upon entering the field. 
 A second key principle in this study’s design and execution is my comparative 
analysis of Filipino migrant domestic workers in different destination countries who 
followed different migration trajectories upon leaving the Philippines. Comparative 
analysis is a foundational tool for the building of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) and Kleining and Witt (2001) also recommend such an approach to allow for 
greater opportunities for discovery. Within migration studies, Alejandro Portes (1997) 
has lamented the shortage of such “cross-national comparisons” of international 
migration. Rhacel Parreñas’ (2001) study of Filipino domestic workers in Italy and the 
US was one of the first studies that took an international comparative approach to this 
migrant population. Her objective was to understand how Filipino domestic workers in 
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these two countries with very different “contexts of reception” still experienced similar 
dislocations. Since the publication of her book and Portes’ exhortation for more 
comparative studies of migration, there have been other monographs and articles based 
on qualitative research that compare the experiences of Filipino migrants in different 
destination countries (see Banfi 2008; Pe-Pua 2003) or the experiences of migrant 
domestic workers of different nationalities working in the same destination country (Lan 
2006). My study follows in the footsteps of these earlier studies with a comparative look 
at the migration journeys of Filipino domestic workers in four very different destination 
countries (the US, Canada, Singapore and Hong Kong).  
This comparative international approach achieved three purposes: it (1) 
“establish[ed] the generality of a fact” (Glaser and Strauss 1986:24)—in my case, the 
prevalence of multistate migration (as both strategy and action) among Filipino migrant 
domestic workers across multiple destination countries—, (2) generated new theory and 
(3) verified existing theory. The first half of the study in Asia generated new substantive 
theory about migrants’ multistate migration trajectories through an inductive process 
grounded in interview data and a comparative analysis across different destination 
countries. From this research emerged various conceptual categories, including the 
distinct categories of “multistate” and “single-stage” migrants, and the factors (such as 
migrants’ degree of access to capital prior to their migration and their ability to 
accumulate additional capital while overseas) that distinguishes one from the other. The 
data collected during the first half of the study highlighted how migrants who were able 
to accumulate additional capital while overseas were in a better position to become 
multistate migrants, moving onward and upward to climb their destination hierarchy.  
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Another conceptual proposition that emerged from the Asian half of this study 
was that of the “transnational labor market” for migrant domestic workers and how 
certain immigration and labor policies needed to be in place in a destination country in 
order for overseas migrants to be able to leverage their newly-acquired capital to move to 
that destination. This set the stage for the second half of the study which focused on 
verifying these theories. By comparing the US and Canada—two popular destinations for 
Filipino migrants but with starkly different policies regarding migrant domestic 
workers—I aimed to test the hypotheses I had developed from my Asian interviews.  
A third guiding principle in my study was the adoption of Bourdieu’s 
“structuralist constructivism” or “constructivist structuralism” (Wacquant 1992:11). This 
approach to sociological methodology recognizes that social structures exist both as 
objective phenomena (such as the unequal distribution of different types of capital, laws 
and regulations that discriminate against particular groups of migrants, etc.) that directly 
and concretely impact individuals’ ability to act, but also as subjective representations 
within individuals’ minds, shaping how they choose what action to take. Recognizing the 
bidimensional nature of social structures calls for a twin focus on both hard facts and 
symbolic meanings. When applied to the case of migrant domestic workers, this “double 
reading” requires, first, a mapping out of the various external factors/forces that can 
constrain and shape an individual migrant’s migration and destination decisions. But this 
must be followed by an assessment of how each individual perceives the world of 
destination options around them and how these subjective interpretations influence their 
decisions as well. For this reason, my study design focused on collecting data on 
participants’ actual access to capital (human, financial and social) and other objective, 
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macro-level data, but also on collecting participants’ subjective impressions of different 
destination countries, their migration dreams and their destination aspirations.  
This dual approach is apparent in the interview protocols used for this study (see 
Appendices A and B) but also in how the rest of this dissertation is structured. For 
instance, in discussing how Filipino migrant domestic workers come to make their 
destination decision, I outline the macro-level factors (immigration and labor policies, 
labor market conditions, human capital pre-requisites, financial entry barriers, etc.) that 
constrain prospective migrants’ decisions in Chapter Five. I draw upon primary data such 
as different countries’ published regulations and reports concerning their internal 
domestic worker market, as well as secondary data including academic and UN case 
studies of particular countries’ policies, newspaper articles concerning the latest changes 
to the domestic worker programs of these countries, and the country-specific 
investigations by human rights groups interested in the welfare of foreign domestic 
workers. Together, this material helps paint a comprehensive picture of each country’s 
programs and its ease of entry (both in terms of the financial cost involved and the human 
capital prerequisites). But, in the subsequent chapter, I describe how individual migrants 
view each of these countries and how their destination perceptions shape their destination 
preferences and eventual destination decisions. In this manner, I recognize the role played 
by both objective and intersubjective factors in shaping destination outcomes. Such an 





Selection of Study Sites 
For the first half of my study, I elected to conduct my field research in three Asian 
countries: Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines. Hong Kong was selected because 
it had been the largest receiver of newly-hired Filipino domestic workers in six of the 
eight years between 2000 and 2008.2 There were over 150,000 Filipino migrant domestic 
workers living and working in Hong Kong in 2000 (Robles 2002). Singapore, meanwhile, 
represented a much less popular destination, ranking only eighth in terms of migrant 
volume2 and with approximately 80,000 Filipino migrant domestic workers residing in 
the country in 2000 (Sayres 2007). I wanted to explore the reasons behind this divergence 
in migration flows to these two countries in an inductive manner, without any predefined 
hypotheses about the reasons for this difference. 
I also chose to interview returned and prospective migrants in Manila, in the 
National Capital Region (NCR) of the Philippines, to broaden my participant base to 
include migrant domestic workers who may have worked or were planning to work in 
other countries in other parts of the world. The NCR is the single largest sending region 
for newly-hired migrant domestic workers from the Philippines, consistently sending 
25% or more of all newly-hired overseas domestic workers (Sayres 2007). In addition, 
most Philippine recruitment agencies are based in Metro Manila so prospective migrants 
from other parts of the Philippines often travel to Manila to visit agencies and apply for 
overseas jobs. My strategy paid off as I was able to interview several women who had 
worked or were about to work in various Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Iraq and Lebanon) and also women who were about to leave 
for work in various Western countries including Italy, the US and Cyprus. 
                                                
2 http://poea.gov.ph/stats/2008_stats.pdf. Table 28. 
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For the second phase of my study, two countries were chosen as study sites: the 
US and Canada. My interviewees in 2008 most frequently cited Canada and the US as 
their “dream destinations” so I sought to interview migrants who had managed to gain 
entry into either country in order to understand the migration strategies and trajectories 
they had adopted in order to do so. There were an estimated 640,000 Filipino migrants 
(permanent, temporary and irregular) living in Canada in December 2009, making 
Canada the third largest destination for Filipino migrants after the United States and 
Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi’s population of 1.16 million Filipino migrants was 
overwhelmingly comprised of temporary contract workers with only a meager 350 
permanent immigrants in the entire group. In contrast, 86% of Canada’s Filipino 
population held permanent residency or Canadian citizenship.  
But Canada’s Filipino population was still dwarfed by that of the US, which 
totaled 2.9 million individuals in December 2009 (though the proportion of permanent 
Filipino migrants in the US at 90% was similar to that of Canada) (Commission on 
Filipinos Overseas 2010). In 2010, Filipinos constituted the second largest Asian ethnic 
group within the US.3 
Though both the US and Canada possess a large stock of Filipino migrants and 
both have similar immigration policies when it comes to family reunification, on the issue 
of migrant domestic workers, these two countries have starkly different policies. Canada 
has an active migrant domestic worker program that issues four-year work visas to 
qualified foreigners and allows them to apply for permanent residency once they 
complete two years’ worth of full employment. The US, meanwhile, has no program to 
import foreign domestic workers though it does allow foreign diplomats and some 
                                                
3 http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-11.pdf 
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foreign businesspersons to bring their personal servants with them when they are posted 
to the US. (More details about both countries’ programs are provided in Chapter Five.) A 
cross-country comparison between the US and Canada allowed me to understand how 
these differences in policy regimes directly and indirectly impacts migrants’ destination 
decisions and strategies. I also hypothesized that I would find a higher proportion of 
multistate migrants in Canada versus the US given that Canada’s program created an 
access point for aspiring capital-constrained migrants that the US lacked. 
Within these two countries, however, I had to choose specific field locations so as 
to narrow my recruitment efforts. In Canada, I chose to recruit participants from Toronto, 
and, for the US, I chose both San Francisco and New York City. Toronto was chosen 
because it is the largest immigrant gateway in Canada and there were almost 180,000 
Filipinos living in the Toronto Metropolitan Area as of the 2006 Canadian Census 
(Statistics Canada 2007). Almost one out of every two Filipinos in Canada lives in or 
around Toronto. Many Filipino Canadian cultural, social and religious organizations are 
also based in Toronto, providing what I imagined would be plentiful opportunities to 
recruit participants. 
Within the US, I chose San Francisco as a field site because the Golden State 
alone holds 43% of all Filipinos living in the US (US Census 2012:18). It should be noted 
though that, within California, the San Francisco Metropolitan Area does not boast the 
largest number of Filipinos; that honor goes to Los Angeles County followed by San 
Diego County. But I hypothesized that the robust public transportation system within the 
San Francisco Bay Area and San Francisco’s reputation as a sanctuary city would be an 
important draw for Filipino migrant domestic workers who lacked a driver’s license or 
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were undocumented. When Parreñas interviewed Filipino domestic workers in Los 
Angeles, she reported that only 35% of them were working legally, having entered 
through family reunification visas or after being directly sponsored by US-based 
employers (2001:265, Appendix B, Table 7). The remainder had entered on tourist visas 
or through clandestine border crossings. I hypothesized that for such undocumented 
migrants, San Francisco would hold significant appeal. 
In contrast to the West Coast, the Filipino community on the East Coast is 
younger, less established, and much smaller. On the East Coast, New York State holds 
the largest stock of Filipino Americans with most of them concentrated in New York 
City.4 (See Table 2.1 for a comparison of population statistics between the New York and 
San Francisco Metropolitan Areas.) Filipinos started migrating to the West Coast and 
Hawaii in the early 1900s as plantation workers and farmers; they started migrating 
directly to the East Coast only after the 1965 immigration reforms and many of them 
were professionals who encountered a reduced degree of racism than their West Coast 
counterparts had experienced earlier. Bergano and Bergano-Kinney (1997) notice 
differing patterns of assimilation between East and West Coast Filipino Americans and I 
hypothesized that this might result in differences between the Coasts when it came to 
migrants’ willingness to help their relatives in the Philippines immigrate to the United 
States. Having observed in Asia how the activation of migrant social capital among 
overseas migrant networks was not always a given, I wanted to assess if there existed 
different patterns of helping between the Filipino migrant communities on both coasts, 
and if this in turn affected the flows of Filipino migrant domestic workers to the US. 
                                                
4 New York State holds 3.7% of all Filipinos living in the United States, behind California (44%), Hawaii 




The Filipino Community in the San Francisco and New York  
Metropolitan Areas, 2010 
 San Francisco  Metro Area# 
New York  
Metro Area$ 
Total Population Estimate 287,879 217,349 
Foreign-born Population 55% 65% 
 Source: US Census Bureau 
# The San Francisco Metro Area comprises the cities of San Francisco, Oakland and Fremont counties. 
$ The New York Metro Area comprises New York City, Northern New Jersey and Long Island. 
 
The Study Sample 
The study population was limited to subjects who were at least 18 years old, had 
been born in the Philippines and who had worked in the past or were currently working as 
domestic workers or caregivers.5 In keeping the study’s participation criteria so loose, I 
was aiming to attract as wide a pool of interviewees as possible. However, the “domestic 
workers” I advertised for during my recruitment efforts include both the “migrant 
domestic workers” who were the primary focus of my study and “foreign-born domestic 
workers” who are a slightly different category of migrant. Both types of workers are 
employed in private homes to carry out various domestic chores such as cleaning, 
cooking, childcare and eldercare. Both can be foreign-born individuals. But I define 
“migrant domestic workers” as individuals who choose the occupation of paid domestic 
work as an exit strategy to leave their home country and work overseas. Foreign-born 
domestic workers, in contrast, are migrants who left their home country through a variety 
                                                
5 In the US and Canada, I also advertised for and recruited 13 Filipino nurses who had immigrated to these 
two countries and were now working or had previously worked as nursing professionals in either country. 
My objective was to assess whether or not multistate migration patterns were emerging among this migrant 
population as well and to set the stage for a potential follow-up project focusing on the migration strategies 
of higher-skilled migrants from the Philippines. I will discuss the findings from this pilot study in Chapter 
Nine, the concluding chapter.   
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of means (including tourist visas and family reunification visas) and then, only after their 
arrival overseas, when they were unable to find any other source of employment, decided 
to take up paid domestic work. This distinction may not always be clear to the individual 
migrants themselves so I intentionally chose to recruit both types of migrants with the 
plan of distinguishing between them during the analysis phase of my study. However, 
this difference is important because a migrant domestic worker from the Philippines has 
typically undergone more socialization within her chosen occupational field, is more 
deeply embedded within an international network of other migrant domestic workers, and 
is more aware of the existence of a transnational labor market for foreign domestic 
workers. All these factors can greatly aid their adoption of multistate migration 
trajectories. As I will discuss later, study participants in Canada were almost all migrant 
domestic workers, while those in the US fell more into the category of foreign-born 
domestic workers. 
Different naming conventions across the various study sites also resulted in 
terminological differences used in the flyers and promotional materials for each 
country/city. In Asia, I advertised for Filipino “maids and domestic helpers” because that 
was the more subservient language used to describe these workers in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and the Philippines. In Canada, I called for Filipino “domestic workers and 
caregivers.” The term “live-in caregiver” is what the Canadian government uses to 
describe these workers even though their expected duties often went beyond the provision 
of emotional/physical care to their employers’ children or aged relatives. In New York, I 
asked for Filipino “babysitters, nannies and housekeepers” because this was how these 
migrants described their particular occupation. These women seemed to prefer the 
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specificity of these terms compared to catch-all terms such as “domestic helper” or 
“domestic worker.” On the West Coast, meanwhile, “caregiver” was the most common 
phrase migrants used to describe themselves given that many of them were providing 
live-in eldercare services and, in California, these tasks have become synonymous with 
the term “caregiver.” 
 I did not restrict participation in the study on the basis of gender. However 
because of the heavily gendered nature of this occupation, I interviewed only two Filipino 
men who were employed as domestic workers in Hong Kong. All other study recruits 
were women. I also did not restrict participation on the basis of immigration status or visa 
category. In the US, where many Filipino domestic workers are undocumented, I made 
sure not to ask participants about their visa status and visa category. Instead, I intuited 
their status from remarks they made about entering the country on a tourist visa, not 
having visited the Philippines for years since their arrival in the US, or asking their 
employers to sponsor them for a work visa. 
 
Recruitment 
 Over the summer of 2008, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 95 
Filipinos in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines about their decision to leave the 
Philippines and work overseas as migrant domestic workers (see Table 2.2 for basic 
demographic information about all study participants, organized by study site). During 
the recruitment process, I introduced myself as a student researcher from the United 
States conducting a study on the migration and destination decisions of Filipinos who at 
some point had been employed as domestic workers overseas. Participants were offered a 
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token payment for their time—10 Singapore dollars (SG$), 100 Philippine pesos (PHP) 
and 10 Hong Kong dollars (HK$) in each respective country, amounting to less than 
US$10 in each case.  
Participants were recruited for the interviews using multiple methods. In all three 
countries, I approached local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that aim to 
improve the welfare of migrant workers and asked for their assistance in finding potential 
interviewees. I also randomly approached Filipino domestic workers in Singapore and 
Hong Kong during their off-days when they gathered in downtown shopping centers 
(Lucky Plaza in Singapore and Worldwide House in Hong Kong) and other locations 
(such as the Catholic Centre and Central District in Hong Kong) that had a well-known 
reputation as gathering spots for Filipino migrants during their rest days. In both 
countries, I visited NGO- or church-affiliated shelters where migrant domestic workers 
lived after having run away from their employers or while they were arguing a breach of 
contract in court.  
In the Philippines and Singapore, I visited several recruitment agencies and 
interviewed their domestic worker clients who were either first-time migrants or migrants 
between contracts. In the Philippines, I accompanied NGO welfare officers on their visits 
with returned migrants living in the Tondo slum area of Metro Manila. After these visits 
had concluded, I would stay behind in the migrants’ homes and interview them. These 
women then took me to meet neighbors had also been or were considering becoming 
migrant domestic workers. In this manner, I would be passed around from neighbor to 
neighbor, allowing me to conduct multiple interviews on a single, but exhausting, day. I 
used a similar method of recruiting in Singapore: Interviewing one Filipino migrant 
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domestic worker outside her employer’s condominium in a private housing estate, and 
then afterwards, asking her to introduce me to other domestic workers employed in the 
same estate. In this manner, snowball sampling was vital for my recruitment efforts.  
 Over the course of 2010 and 2011, I interviewed 65 Filipino migrant domestic 
workers in Canada and the US (see Table 2.2). I had initially hoped to conduct 70 
interviews, with 30 in Canada and 20 each from my two US locations. However, very 
quickly into this phase of my study, I determined that most Filipino migrants to the US 
entered on tourist and family reunification visas and only chose to become domestic 
workers after their arrival in the US. The interviews and surveys I conducted in the US 
confirmed my hypothesis that US immigration and labor policies made it almost 
impossible for aspiring multistate migrant domestic workers to gain a work permit to 
enter the US, let alone first-time migrant domestic workers from the US.  
For all but three of my interviewees in the US, migrant domestic work was never 
their exit strategy from the Philippines, but rather something they fell into after their 
entry into the US and subsequent inability to secure a higher-status position. For these 
US-based domestic workers, my questions about their migration strategies and 
destination decisions held little relevance because they had only ever considered 
migrating to the US and had only left the Philippines when their US relatives were able to 
sponsor them. Given my primary goal of studying “migrant” domestic workers, I decided 
to refocus most of my efforts to recruit more study participants from Canada who had 
used migrant domestic work as their exit strategy from the Philippines. As a result, I 
eventually interviewed 44 Filipino domestic workers in Canada and only 21 in the US (11 
in New York City and 10 in San Francisco).  
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Recruits were paid 10 Canadian dollars (CA$) and 10 US dollars (US$) in each 
respective country. Similar to the Asian half of the study, I adopted a multi-pronged 
approach when it came to recruiting subjects in these two Western countries. In both the 
US and Canada, I approached NGOs that served the local Filipino immigrant community, 
the local domestic worker community, or both, and asked for their help to advertise my 
study to their membership. In San Francisco and New York City, I also posted flyers 
advertising my study at various Filipino American establishments (restaurants, hair 
salons, remittance centers, shopping centers and offices). In San Francisco, I posted flyers 
at the Philippine consulate and asked consulate officials if they knew anyone who would 
be willing to be interviewed by me.  
In the case of Canada, I asked the NGO contacts I had made in Hong Kong to 
introduce me to friends of theirs in Toronto who might be willing to be interviewed. 
These personal recommendations did wonders as I was introduced to several multistate 
migrants who had worked in Hong Kong before coming to Canada and they agreed to 
share their migration stories with me. One participant was taking an English-as-a-Second-
Language weekend course that was popular among Filipino LICs and she publicized my 
study among her classmates allowing me to recruit a diverse set of study participants out 





Characteristics of Study Population (Survey Respondents and Interviewees), by Country 
  Hong Kong (n = 28) 
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(n = 38) 
 Migrant Characteristics Percentage of Population  
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One additional recruitment device that I used in my North American study was 
the deployment of online surveys to be emailed out to members of various Filipino NGOs 
in both the US and Canada. These surveys were meant to collect basic information about 
a migrant’s migration trajectory to the West and then, at the end, ask survey respondents 
if they would be willing to answer more questions about their migration and destination 
decisions in an interview (see Appendix C). My goal was to collect 200 such surveys, 
100 in the US and another 100 in Canada, to help me get a sense of the extent of 
multistate migration amongst a larger sample. This plan came to naught when none of the 
NGOs I contacted agreed to send an email with a link to the online survey to their 
members.  
Two NGOs in New York City did agree to let me hand out hard copies of the 
surveys during some of their community events and, in this manner, I collected 17 
surveys from Filipino domestic workers in New York. Three out of those 17 survey 
respondents indicated that they were multistate migrants, with the remaining 14 reporting 
that they had traveled directly to the US. Nine out of the 17 respondents also indicated 
their willingness to be interviewed. However, out of those nine, only two followed up 
with me, calling the number I had included in the survey. For those respondents who 
wrote down their contact details on the survey form, I called/emailed them several times 
to re-introduce myself and attempt to set up an interview date and time, but I never 
received a response, or the numbers/email addresses they had provided turned out to be 
incorrect. I hypothesize that many of these survey respondents were undocumented 
migrants and were reluctant to give me their real contact details because of their fear of 




In addition to the overall failure of the online survey approach, I encountered 
several other unexpected difficulties during the second half of my study that made the 
North American recruitment process a challenging experience. 
 
NGO Resistance 
As already mentioned, many of the NGOs in the US were reluctant to assist me 
with my research project and it took repeated emails, visits to their offices and 
participation in their community events before a handful of them agreed to advertise my 
research project to their members. One critical reason for their hesitation may have been 
the fact that many of the Filipino domestic workers who are their members (especially on 
the East Coast) are undocumented migrants or working illegally on a tourist visa. The 
fear of deportation was ever present within this population and that made many of these 
migrants (and their migrant organizations) less willing to trust non-Filipino outsiders like 
myself.  
But, even in Canada, where most domestic workers are documented migrants, 
most of the NGOs I contacted turned down my requests for assistance. In the case of 
Canada, my own personal issues made recruitment an uphill task. My initial plan to visit 
Toronto in 2010 was cancelled after I gave birth to my second child in August 2010. 
Subsequently, the vagaries of caring for two very young children made it difficult for me 
to contemplate a long-term immersion in the field.6 When combined with some visa 
                                                
6 I recognize the irony in my choosing not to leave my children behind for a lengthy period of time when 
those of my study participants who were mothers had chosen to live apart from their children for years at a 
46 
problems that unexpectedly cropped up, I was forced to conduct all my Canadian 
recruiting and interviewing efforts over Skype. I should note however that most of 
Canadian and American study participants preferred being interviewed over the phone, 
rather than face-to-face. Given their limited rest days, they treasured the few hours they 
had during the weekend to mingle with friends and relax. None of them wanted to spend 
two hours on a Sunday afternoon talking with me; they much rather preferred to talk with 
me in the evenings when they were in their rooms/apartments by themselves and had the 
freedom to talk as long as they liked without competing distractions. And, in general, 
once I finally managed to get them to agree to talk with me, the resulting interviews were 
lengthy, candid and wide-ranging.  
While I missed having the visual cues that come from a face-to-face interview, I 
recognize that with my particular study population, attempting to conduct only face-to-
face interviews would have resulted in a smaller number of interviews of shorter 
duration. However, I still regret not having been able to conduct any field research and 
face-to-face recruiting in Canada, and recognize it as an important flaw in my study.  
  
Interviews 
I chose the semi-structured interview format as my primary research method 
because it was the most effective means of probing study participants’ decision-making 
processes. While the migration trajectory of an individual migrant can be easily captured 
through a simple survey, open-ended, in-depth interviews are necessary to illuminate the 
thinking and motivations behind each destination decision made by the migrant. Given 
that there is often a gap between migrants’ initial intentions and their actual trajectories 
                                                                                                                                            
time. This speaks to the very different conditions faced by myself and by my interviewees.   
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(especially in the case of multistate migration), it is critical to employ a research method 
that allows migrants to share their dreams, assumptions and mistakes alongside their 
actual actions, and that encourages them to reflect on the role of chance, misfortune and 
larger social forces in shaping their migration decisions.  
Much of each interview was spent discussing the mechanics of participants’ 
migration and destination decision-making process, to understand the factors participants 
considered when making these decisions (see Appendices A and B for the interview 
protocols used for the Asian and North American studies). In both studies, the first major 
issue I explored was how the interviewee had arrived at the decision to migrate. Was it a 
decision made independently or in consultation with others? Did they have any 
preconceptions about what life abroad was going to be like? What was their pre-departure 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of migration? 
The interviews then focused on participants’ destination decision(s). Participants 
were asked about the factors that influenced their decision to migrate to a particular 
country and not any other destination. They were asked if they would have preferred to 
migrate to a different country but had chosen not to. A significant portion of the 
interviews was also devoted to discussing the pros and cons of various destination 
countries, to flesh out how much participants were aware of different destination options, 
what they knew of these countries prior to their departure and how they gained this 
information. These accounts provided a sense of how much knowledge prospective 
migrants actually possess about their destination options and if they make their 
destination decisions under conditions of incomplete information and bounded 
rationality.  
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Participants were also asked about the mechanics of their migration, for example, 
if they went through a recruitment agency or through family/friends. I also asked about 
the migration histories of other members of each participant’s extended family in case 
these relatives’ migration journeys had influenced the participant’s migration decision, or 
if the participant had relied on their network of friends and family to help secure access to 
a particular destination. Participants who indicated that they had lived and worked in 
multiple destination countries (or desired to do so), were questioned about each of their 
decisions to move on to another destination, and the resources they mobilized to obtain 
visas and jobs. They were also asked why they adopted (or wished to adopt) such a 
migration trajectory instead of any other.  
Given the evolution in my thinking on multistate migration that occurred between 
the end of the Asian half of my project and the start of the North American half, there are 
several key differences between the interview protocols used for the two studies. For the 
North American study, I made a concerted effort to retain all the questions asked in the 
Asian interview protocol and only add new questions. In most cases, both protocols 
covered the same topics (though in a different order) but the North American interviews 
also explored each issue in significantly more depth. Table 2.3 shows the topics covered 




Topics Covered in the Asian and North American Interview Protocols 
 Asian Interview Protocol 
North American 
Interview Protocol 
Migration Decision X X 
Destination Decision(s) X X 
Destination Information X X 
Destination Dreams X X 
Mechanics of Migration X X 
Family Migration Patterns X X 
Migrant Social Capital X X 
Migration Resistance X X 
Migrant Financial Capital X X 
Multistate Migration X X 
Post-Migration Experience X X 
Migration Regrets X X 
Providing Migration 
Assistance X X 
Migration Strategies X X 
Future Plans X X 
US/Canada Comparisons  X 
Immigration Policy  X 
 
All the Asian interviews were conducted face-to-face and lasted 45 minutes on 
average. As mentioned earlier, in North America, participants lived in more dispersed 
locations. In addition, when I first met them, they were outside their homes, often 
gathering with friends, and so were reluctant to engage in a lengthy interview with me on 
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the spot. Face-to-face interactions were usually limited to recruitment while most 
interviews were conducted late at night over the phone. This gave participants a window 
of uninterrupted time when they could talk at length about their migration experiences. 
This is reflected in the average length of the North American interviews, which was well 
over 90 minutes. All phone interviews were conducted using the Skype software program 
and recorded for subsequent transcription.  
The interviews frequently veered off-script as participants’ answers to one 
question took the conversation in unexpected directions. As far as possible, I allowed 
interviewees to set the direction of the interview, stopping every so often at natural 
pauses in the conversation to see if there were questions from the protocol that had yet to 
be answered. But, for the most part, the interviews were loosely-structured conversations 
about participants’ migration histories and their lives overseas.  
Given the delicate and personal nature of the topics being discussed and the 
memories stirred—about leaving behind their families in the Philippines, their long-
distance relationships with their spouses and children, etc.—the interviews were 
frequently emotional. It was common for participants to break down and sob as they 
talked about their children they had not seen for years at a time, or their husbands who 
had cheated on them, or abuse they had suffered at the hands of their employers. At such 
moments, whether face-to-face or over the phone, I made it a practice to stop my 
questioning and allow the interviewee to recover her composure. I would then ask if she 
wanted to stop the interview or would prefer to continue. On every occasion, participants 
indicated that they wanted to continue the interview. They would often apologize 
profusely for this break in their composure and it is possible that their guilt and 
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embarrassment may have pushed them to want to continue the interview. At the same 
time, I got the sense that participants appreciated the opportunity to share their migration 
story with an attentive and sympathetic listener. There were several times when 
participants would tell me at the start of their interview that they could only talk for an 
hour, but the one-hour mark would come and go, and when I would ask them if they were 
able to continue talking, they inevitably said that they had more time.   
 
Interviewing Challenges 
My choice of in-depth interviews as my primary research method, my own 
identity as a non-Filipino researcher from the United States and my inability to meet all 
my study participants face-to-face, created certain challenges that I was very much aware 
of both during the interviews and, later, during the analysis of the interview data.  
 
Retrospective Interviewing 
I understood from the start the risks associated with using interviews—and 
retrospective interviews at that—to uncover study participants’ past migration and 
destination decision-making process and the original intentions behind each decision they 
had made. Given that their initial migration decisions had typically been made several 
years earlier, participants may have simply forgotten some of the deciding factors that 
influenced this decision. Or, during their interviews, they might forget to mention some 
of the factors that had shaped their migration journey. Even if they did remember, they 
might choose to selectively exclude any mention of negative or less than flattering events 
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from their past, in order to construct a narrative where all their past destination decisions 
were premeditated and above board.  
These are all expected issues that come with using retrospective interviews as a 
research method. To address these issues, I built into the interview protocol opportunities 
for participants to correct/revise their original accounts of their migration journeys. For 
instance, I would ask them if they had considered alternative migration strategies and 
trajectories, and mention specific destination countries that were popular among other 
Filipino migrants. These questions would often prompt revealing answers. Participants 
would remember that they had tried leaving the Philippines earlier than they had 
originally stated but that this first attempt had gone awry for various reasons. Or, they 
would recall that they had previously tried to find work in a different overseas country 
than the one they eventually traveled to. These revisions to their original migration 
narrative made the neat and straightforward trajectory they had initially described 
considerably more messy but also more authentic for a capital-constrained, aspiring 
migrant. 
During the interviews, I also asked participants to tell me if they had ever felt 
regret over any of their migration or destination decisions. I asked them to speak to the 
role played by fate or chance in their migration trajectory. While the evidence gathered 
through these methods could not confirm the account of any one interviewee, it did help 
elucidate the contingent and dynamic nature of their migration and destination decision-
making process.  
I also attempted to assess the veracity of interviewees’ statements about their 
migration plans and strategies through triangulating interviews with officers of local 
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migrant rights NGOs in all five countries. These individuals were more familiar with the 
long-term goals and ambitions of migrant domestic workers and could speak to the 
popularity of multistate migration amongst this population. Social workers, religious 
officials and activists in Asia confirmed that many Filipino migrants sought to use 
Singapore and Hong Kong as stepping stones to gain entry into the West. Likewise, the 
activists and immigration lawyers in Canada that I spoke with confirmed that most 
Filipino migrant domestic workers arriving in Canada in recent years had traveled 
through an intermediate destination. In the US, migrant rights activists and Filipino 
American community leaders told me that most Filipinos entering the US came through 
tourist and family reunification visas sponsored by their relatives, which corroborated 
what my interviewees had told me about their methods of gaining entry into the US.  
I also visually surveyed several recruitment agencies in Singapore and Hong 
Kong and took note of their advertisements offering caregiver positions in Spain, Italy 
and Canada for Filipino workers already employed in Singapore and Hong Kong. While 
the evidence gathered through these methods does not confirm the account of any one 
interviewee, it does give a sense that multistate migration is a growing phenomenon 
amongst this population and also highlights the critical role played by recruitment 
agencies in fostering the onward and upward re-migrations of migrant domestic workers.  
 
Interviewer Identity 
A second challenge I faced during both recruitment and the interviews themselves 
was bridging the social and cultural distance between study participants and myself. As 
an Indian national pursuing a doctoral degree from an American university, I was 
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removed by several degrees from the lives of the women I was interviewing. I am not 
Filipino, had never visited the Philippines before beginning my research, did not speak 
Tagalog (the national language of the Philippines) and had never been employed as a 
domestic worker. If I had brought up my story of being mistaken for a domestic worker, 
they would have probably scoffed at my thin skin.  
At the same time, there were aspects of my identity that did help to overcome 
some of the initial reluctance my study participants felt when I first approached them. 
The fact that I was a woman and Asian like them (but not Chinese7) and also a 
migrant/foreigner helped remove some of their initial hesitation. In Asia in 2008, I was 
almost six months’ pregnant with my first child and this inadvertently won the sympathy 
of many interviewees who were mothers themselves. In the US in 2010 and 2011, I 
brought, first my oldest child and then both my children with me on my visits to San 
Francisco and New York City. I suspect that the sight of my children helped humanize 
me in front of potential study participants and allowed for a connection to be formed 
between the interviewees and myself.  
In fact, my outsider status meant that many interviewees were patently curious as 
to why I was interested in studying their population in the first place and appreciative of 
the attention I was paying them. They would often start and end our interactions with 
questions about my research motivations. I would typically answer with the story of how 
I had lived in Singapore for 12 years before moving to the United States and how I had 
                                                
7 While some participants worked for expatriate employers who were White or Japanese, most 
Hong Kong- and Singapore-based participants’ employers were locals who were Chinese by race. 
By virtue of being neither White nor Chinese myself, I was able to avoid being cast by my 
interviewees as belonging to the employer class in either Singapore or Hong Kong. In this way, 
my outsider status was of assistance as participants confided in me what they saw as the pros and 
cons of working for different races and in different countries, and the characteristics of each race 
as employers (Paul 2011b). 
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been interested in the status of foreign domestic workers since that time. By highlighting 
my familiarity with the migrant domestic worker situation (especially as it pertains to 
workers in Asia), I was signaling my expertise and empathy to these prospective 
interviewees.  
Outside the Philippines, I made sure to mention my time in the field there, talking 
about my experiences living in a women’s hostel in Quezon City, visiting the Tondo 
slums, frequenting the Jollibee fast food chain, and getting around Manila on jeepneys 
and tricyles. Those stories earned me a modicum of respect from my interviewees and 
helped erase some of the power differential that existed between us. I also dressed 
casually and simply at all times, and when I introduced myself to potential study 
participants, I emphasized my status as a student to downplay any class distinctions 
between myself and study participants.  
In order to establish my trustworthiness, at the start of each interview, I would 
also describe the field research I had conducted in Asia in some depth. If my interviewee 
had previously worked in Singapore, my account would often prompt them to ask when I 
had lived there and we would talk a little while about our memories of Singapore. If they 
had worked in Hong Kong, interviewees would regularly ask me if I had been to 
“Central” and I would regale them with my first impressions of Hong Kong’s Central 
District on a Sunday morning when it is taken over by Filipino migrant domestic 
workers. Whatever hesitation or awkwardness these interviewees may have felt would 
begin to dissipate and, when the time came to start the interview, we were often on a 





 All interviews and surveys were conducted in English with the exception of two 
(in the Philippines) where the participants had a very limited command of English. In 
those instances, a companion of the participant was requested to help translate specific 
questions and answers. All interviews were audio-recorded to ensure a comprehensive 
capturing of participants’ remarks and recollections. For my Asian interviews, I 
personally transcribed all the interview transcripts. For my North American interviews, I 
benefited from a National Science Foundation dissertation improvement grant that 
allowed me to engage the services of a transcription company to transcribe most of my 
interview audio files. There were still a handful of interviews, primarily those with poor 
audio quality or heavily accented speech, that I transcribed myself. I checked all 
transcripts for accuracy, returning to the original audio file repeatedly to clarify a word or 
phrase.  
Since most participants had learned English as their second language, participants 
generally spoke in a casual manner with grammatical errors littered throughout their 
speech. During the transcription process, I transcribed the interviews verbatim, not 
attempting to edit or clean up any of the language used by respondents or myself. 
However, in the interview excerpts that I am including in this dissertation, I have edited 
the language to some extent to ensure that the underlying meaning of the sentences is 
clear. As far as possible, however, I have tried to preserve my interviewees’ linguistic 





After all the interviews were transcribed, they were imported into the 
HyperResearch software package for Macintosh computers and coded for recurring 
themes. I employed both open and closed coding in a heavily iterative process. The initial 
coding categories I created for the Asian half of the project were derived from my 
interview questions and included codes about the migration decision-making process, the 
destination decision-making process, multistage migration, destination perceptions versus 
reality, destination dreams, destination disconnects, the role of immigration policy and 
participants’ varying access to different types of capital. Additional coding categories 
were added as patterns or themes emerged from the data. For instance, in re-reading 
participants’ accounts of their cognitive maps of the world, it became apparent that 
migrants were consistently talking about different destinations in a relative and 
hierarchical manner. Because of this insight, I developed codes about participants’ 
destination hierarchies.  
When I began coding my North American transcripts, all these codes formed the 
initial coding schema I started with. Again, additional codes were added as new themes 
emerged from the data.  For instance, the concept of a “negotiated migration decision” 
(discussed in Chapter Four) emerged from the transcripts in a purely inductive manner. 
Once a new theme was identified, a second round of closed and open coding of 
transcripts was conducted to ensure that all interviews—Asian and North American—
were analyzed equally. Likewise, the writing of each research memo involved an 
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additional round of coding that was targeted towards the particular themes addressed by 
each memo. In this manner, each transcript was read and coded multiple times. 
 
Analysis 
As the coding was being completed, I combined some of the more quantifiable 
qualitative data derived from the interviews and the quantitative data derived from the 
demographic surveys into Microsoft Excel files in order to run frequency tables and 
cross-tabulations that could help confirm and/or visualize some of the patterns I was 
observing within the study sample. The task of populating these tables typically required 
me to pore through each transcript again and sometimes add additional codes as new 
themes emerged. I developed several Excel tables in this manner, including a charting of 
each participant’s migration trajectories (including the countries where they had worked, 
the years spent there and their occupation in that country), their patterns of giving and 
receiving migration help (including the source/recipient of migration assistance and the 
type of assistance received/given), and their perceptions of different destination countries 
(keeping a tally of words and phrases used to describe each country and then categorizing 
each distinct word/phrase as positive/negative/neutral). (Summarized versions of many of 
these tables have been reproduced in the following chapters.)  
 This data analysis was conducted at the level of the individual and city/country. 
For example, at the individual level, comparisons were made between participants who 
engaged in direct migration to their preferred destination country in the West and those 
who engaged in multistate migration (see Chapter Seven). Participants who were 
multistate migrants were also compared against participants who engaged in only one 
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migration journey but to a country lower down their destination hierarchy. This 
comparative analysis was conducted both qualitatively and quantitatively in order to 
identify specific differences between these groups in terms of their educational 
qualifications, prior work experience and overseas network connections. Likewise, both 
qualitative and quantitative comparisons were made between study participants who 
encountered familial resistance to their migration decision and those who did not. 
Cross-country comparisons were conducted among participants from different 
study sites to assess how participants’ migration profiles differed by country and the role 
played by each country’s immigration/labor policies in influencing participants’ 
migration and destination decisions. This analysis revealed, for instance, that the 
proportion of multistate migrants increased as one moved from Singapore to Hong Kong 
and then on to Canada, which speaks to how the barriers to entry to these countries 
increases in the same order. In Chapter Eight, I argue that there is a causal relationship at 
work here with capital-constrained migrants forced to adopt multistate migration in order 
to climb to the top of their destination hierarchy.  
 
Limitations 
Given that study recruitment was non-random and my overall sample size was 
small, I cannot speak to the statistical significance of any of the patterns/trends I 
observed. By relying so heavily on NGOs and snowball sampling to help identify and 
recruit study participants, the findings of this study may also not be representative of the 
general Filipino domestic worker population in any of the study sites. However, this was 
never the primary objective of this study. Instead, my main focus was on understanding 
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the macro-level forces and micro-level decisions that intertwine to lead to the emergence 
of multistate migration amongst Filipino migrant domestic workers. Future studies that 
are larger in scale and longitudinal in design are necessary to assess the true extent of 
multistate migration amongst this population of migrants and others. It is my belief, 
however, that my study helps outline the factors that contribute to the adoption of 
multistate migration among capital-constrained labor migrants. 
A second limitation is the lack of interviews with migrant domestic workers in the 
US. As mentioned earlier, out of the 21 Filipino domestic workers I interviewed in the 
US, only three had entered the country as migrant domestic workers. One, Cala, had 
previously worked in Guam and Kuwait before securing a job as a domestic worker for a 
Middle Eastern diplomat posted to the Philippines. She had intentionally accepted this 
position because she hoped that the diplomat would be transferred to a foreign country at 
a later point and that she would be able to travel overseas with the family. True enough, 
the diplomat was posted to his country’s UN Mission in New York City and he applied 
for a dependent work permit for Cala so that she could accompany the family to the US. 
Another participant, Lucia, had worked in Qatar for three years as a migrant 
domestic worker before returning to the Philippines to look after her daughters. Then, one 
of her distant relatives in New York called to say that she needed help to look after her 
children and asked Lucia if she would be interested in the position. After Lucia accepted 
the job, her relative sponsored her for a tourist visa to visit the US. As soon as she arrived 
in the US, Lucia went to work as a full-time nanny and housekeeper for her relative, 
earning US$300 a month.  
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Stories like Cala’s and Lucia’s were exceedingly rare. The vast majority of US 
study participants had come to the US without any concrete plans concerning their US 
employment. It was only after their arrival that they began looking for jobs and were 
funneled into part-time jobs as babysitters, housekeepers and caregivers for the elderly 
through their personal connections. The low number of migrant domestic workers in the 
US—both in terms of my study population but also for the country at large based on 
conversations with NGO officials—is indicative of how the new capital acquired 
overseas by migrant domestic workers does not easily translate into access to countries 
that do not have immigration provisions for such workers. 
But even though migrant domestic workers like Lucia and Cala form a tiny 
minority of the Filipino domestic worker population in the US, they are of critical 
importance because their multistate migration story has a very different ending from that 
of the multistate migrants I interviewed in Canada. Though not all live-in caregivers in 
Canada are able to secure permanent residency status, many of them do (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada 2007). This is the mirror image of those migrants in the US for 
whom a greencard is almost never in their long-term future. Both Cala and Lucia 
eventually ran away from their employers because of harsh working conditions and 
proceeded to work as undocumented domestic workers in the New York metropolitan 
area.  
Some undocumented domestic workers in the US are lucky enough to find 
employers willing to sponsor them for a work visa. Cala, for instance, married an 
American citizen who sponsored her for a green card. But many others (like Lucia) who 
arrived on tourist visas continue to toil in the shadows, separated from their children and 
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husbands whom they are unable to bring to the US.  I chose to refocus my recruitment 
efforts to emphasize Canada because the overwhelming majority of the people I was 
interviewing in the US did not fit the category of “migrant domestic worker.” But that 
does not mean that there are not migrant domestic workers in the US as well.8 It is my 
hope that future studies can do a better job of understanding how these migrants enter the 






                                                
8 Parreñas’ study of Filipino migrant domestic workers in the US and Italy faces a similar problem. While 
many of her study respondents in Italy fall into the category of migrant domestic worker, many of her US 






The Many Variants of Gendered Migration from the Philippines 
 
For several decades now, migration studies has been a fractured field riven by 
disciplinary differences. This is particularly true when it comes to the different theories 
that have been proposed to explain why some people migrate and others do not. 
Summing up the state of the field, Massey et al write that “at present, there is no single, 
coherent theory of international migration, only a fragmented set of theories that have 
developed largely in isolation from one another, sometimes but not always segmented by 
disciplinary boundaries” (1993:432). At the micro-level, there are neoclassical economic 
theory and the new economics of labor theory. At the macro-level, there are segmented 
labor market theory and world systems theory. At the meso-level, focusing on the reasons 
behind cumulative migration, there is the network theory of migration. In this chapter, I 
assess how well each of these disparate theories can explain the voluminous stream of 
female migrant domestic workers leaving the Philippines each year.  
From my analysis, both of participants’ own accounts of their migration decision-
making process and an examination of the migration history of the Philippines, it 
becomes clear that various causal factors operating at different levels in tandem resulted 
in the decisions by the individual participants of this study to seek work outside the 
Philippines. This finding parallels the arguments made by other migration scholars that 
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for a social process as complex as international migration, multiple theories operating at 
multiple levels need to be considered simultaneously (Massey et al. 1998; Massey and 
Espinosa 1997).   
 But, over the last few years, migration scholars have also called for more attention 
to be paid to the international migration patterns of women who may face very different 
drivers and opportunity structures than male migrants (Pfeiffer, Richter, Fletcher and 
Taylor 2008; Curran, Shafer, Donato and Garip 2006; Boyd and Grieco 2003). This first 
chapter, therefore, also attempts to answer two gendered migration questions—Why do 
so many women choose to leave the Philippines to work abroad? And why do so many of 
them choose to become migrant domestic workers?—using an intersubjectivity approach 
to understand participants’ personal interpretations of the factors underpinning their 
migration decision and occupational choice. From my analysis, I find a great diversity 
within the population of Filipina migrant domestic workers leaving the Philippines each 
year. At the macro-level, the same set of social forces—high underemployment for 
women, the spiraling cost of living expenses and tertiary education, a culture of 
migration, and a growing global demand for female migrant domestic workers—set the 
stage for all these women’s migration journeys. But, at the individual and household 
level, different women were motivated by different factors to make the same migration 
decision and the same occupational choice. Some study participants were mothers 
looking to fund their children’s university education. Others were unmarried women 
burdened by the responsibility of looking after their parents and younger siblings. A few 
women were running away from abusive relationships. Still others—most of whom were 
young and still single—were lured by the promise of adventure and modernity that 
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overseas work seemed to represent. Thus this chapter’s original contribution is in 
demonstrating that there is no monolithic motivation driving all women migrants from 
the Philippines. Rather, it shows how, given certain structural conditions, a broad swath 
of women may consider migration as a viable option for earning a higher income, leading 
to the diversity of Filipino women observed undertaking migrant domestic work as their 
exit strategy from the Philippines, and also the diversity of Filipinas who eventually 
engage in multistate migration.   
 The remainder of this chapter starts with a discussion of the major theories that 
attempt to explain why some people migrate and others do not. To give some context to 
readers, I then provide a brief history of migration from the Philippines and detail the 
Philippine migration bureaucracy that has developed over the last 40 years to foster out-
migration from the Philippines. I also paint a picture of the current socio-economic 
conditions in the Philippines, especially as they relate to women, to highlight existing 
macro-economic factors that might influence the migration decision of women. I then 
provide a qualitative assessment of how well existing macro-level theories of migration 
can explain the out-migration of Filipino migrant workers from the Philippines. After 
that, I shift gears and switch to participants’ accounts of their migration motivations. I use 
excerpts from the interviews to highlight the individual-, household- and neighborhood-
level factors that encouraged study participants to leave their homes and families. The 
insights gained from the interviews allow me to identify four categories of women 
migrants among study participants: the parent, the breadwinner, the aspirant, and finally, 




Theories of Migration 
Neoclassical Economic Theory 
One of the oldest theories of migration, neoclassical economic theory proposes 
that the wage differential between origin and destination is the primary driver behind the 
decision to migrate (Lewis 1954; Hicks 1932). Tied to this macro-level explanation for 
migration is the mirco-level assumption that potential migrants are utility-maximizing, 
rational and independent actors, weighing the costs and benefits of migration before 
making their decision. This theory was later modified by Todaro (1969) who argued that 
individuals decide to migrate only if the expected wages in their destination—the product 
of the actual wages in the destination and the probability of securing a job there—are 
higher than wages in the origin. He also argued that most potential migrants work on a 
relatively long time-horizon, willing to accept little or no income when they first arrive in 
their destination, as long as they expect to eventually find a job and earn a higher income 
in the long run (Todaro 1980).  
Economists have continued to tinker with this theory but its basic argument 
remains unchanged: that wage differentials drive migration. This straightforward 
argument can be reduced to a single equation comprising the average wages in origin and 
destination(s), the probabilities of employment in both locations and the costs of 
migration. Borjas outlines these migration costs as including “direct costs (e.g. the 
transportation of persons and household goods), forgone earnings (e.g. the opportunity 
cost of a post-migration unemployment spell), and psychic costs (e.g. the disutility 
associated with leaving behind family ties and social networks)” (1999:178). According 
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to this probability function, if the expected benefits of migration outweigh the costs, then 
the potential migrant will decide to migrate. In addition, individuals should choose to 
migrate to the country that provides the largest wage differential after having taken into 
account their travel costs and all other economic risks associated with international travel 
(Borjas 1990).  
 One of the oversights of neoclassical economic theory is its ignoring of non-
economic reasons for migration such as the desire for adventure, the cultural expectation 
to work overseas at some point in one’s life, the need to assert one’s independence from 
elders in the family, or to join relatives already overseas (Kothari 2008). While most 
migration scholars would agree that financial motivations drive much of the migration we 
see in the world, neoclassical economic theory has been widely criticized for its 
ahistorical and astructural nature. Critics point out that this theory also does not recognize 
the role played by immigration and labor policies, or other macro-level forces in initiating 
and restricting migration flows (de Haas 2008; Portes and Walton 1981). Instead, it is 
simply assumed that individuals have complete agency to decide whether or not to 
migrate. In the case of the Philippines, neoclassical economic theory would have 
predicted outflows of Filipino migrants much earlier and in higher numbers than what 
actually occurred.  
 
New Economics of Labor Migration 
Providing a more sophisticated picture of the individual migrant as decision-
maker is the new economics of labor migration (NELM) theory. According to NELM 
theorists, it is the household/family rather than the individual that makes the decision 
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whether or not the individual should migrate. In addition, NELM proponents argue that 
the decision to migrate is not only about maximizing income; it is also about reducing 
risk exposure by diversifying a household’s income streams and making up for 
imperfect/inaccessible credit markets in the home country (Taylor 1987; Katz and Stark 
1986; Stark and Bloom 1985). Low-income families in developing countries may opt to 
send one or more family members overseas, or at least to a different part of the country, 
to find work and remit their savings so that their family can gain access to much-needed 
capital and spread their risk (Lauby and Stark 1988; Findley 1987; Taylor 1987; Stark 
and Bloom 1985). In this manner, migration can be seen as a household livelihood 
strategy (Chant and Radcliffe 1992; Radcliffe 1986; Stark and Bloom 1985).   
 NELM theorists also argue that it is not simply absolute poverty levels or even 
risk diversification that push households to consider sending a household member 
overseas. A household’s relative position compared to other households in their reference 
group can also play an important role (Stark, Micevska and Mycielski 2009; Stark and 
Taylor 1989). In other words, households who are not worried about survival may still 
decide to send a representative overseas in order to increase their relative economic 
standing in their village or neighborhood. Katz and Stark (1986) find that rural-urban 
migration can still occur even if expected urban income is lower than current rural 
income. 
The most powerful support for a household approach to the migration decision is 
the staggering amount of remittances sent by overseas migrants to their families in the 
home country each year. An estimated US$325 billion worth of remittances was sent to 
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developing countries in 2010, dwarfing the total value of formal aid monies sent to these 
countries by the developed world (World Bank 2011).  
But several scholars have critiqued NELM’s presumed assumption of household 
unity and familial decision-making, especially when it comes to women’s independent 
migration. They point out that the unequal distribution of economic power between men 
and women (especially in patriarchal households), the ideological constraints on 
women’s independence and authority, and the gendered labor market available to 
potential migrants, can all significantly shape the decision-making process for 
prospective female migrants (Boyd and Grieco 2003; Chant and Radcliffe 1992; Folbre 
1986; Radcliffe 1986). As a case in point, ethnographic accounts of migration patterns 
out of Mexico have highlighted regular cases of reluctance on the part of men with 
migration experience to assist their female relatives leave for the US partly out of a belief 
that helping female migrants involved more work and responsibility (Kanaiaupuni 2000; 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). And among rural-urban migrants in Peru, over 70% were men 
because women were traditionally seen as being responsible for reproductive functions at 
home such as cooking, cleaning, and raising the children (Radcliffe 1986). Only when 
these women were widowed or when they faced dire poverty, did they typically consider 
migration as an option. Regular instances of gendered resistance to women’s independent 
migration have been reported in countries throughout the Global South, from Bangladesh 
and the Philippines, to Mexico and Brazil (Lan 2006; Afsar 2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo 
1994; Stichter 1990; Wong and Ko 1984; Arizpe and Aranda 1981; Aguiar 1975).1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These criticisms of NELM theory will be dealt with in more depth in Chapter Four which investigates 
how study participants “negotiated” their independent migration decisions with their families. In this 
present chapter, I focus more on the NELM proposition that there are household-level motivations behind 
an individual’s migration decision. 
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But despite it being a patriarchal and more conservative society, women make up 
the majority of all newly-hired migrants leaving the Philippines (Philippine Overseas 
Employment Agency 2011). The Philippines also ranks as the fourth largest recipient of 
migrant remittances, after India, China and Mexico (in that order), receiving US$23 
billion in remittances in 2011.2 This large flow of Filipino migrant workers’ earnings 
back to the Philippines lends some credence to the notion of migration as a household 
livelihood strategy.3 
 
Segmented Labor Market Theory 
The above two economic explanations of migration give a great deal of agency to 
individual migrants (or their families) who are seen as autonomously deciding whether or 
not to leave their home country for a more lucrative position overseas. However, critics 
have pointed out that micro-level theories fail to explain the non-migration of poor 
peoples from low-income countries (Portes and Walton 1981). As mentioned earlier, 
neoclassical economic theory does a poor job of explaining why it was only during the 
1970s that massive outflows of migrants began from the Philippines when the extreme 
wage differentials between the Philippines and other more developed economies predated 
those migrations. There are several structural-historical explanations for migration that do 
a better job at explaining the macro-level context from which those migration flows 
originated. One of these is segmented labor market theory proposed by Michael Piore.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The World Bank. Retrieved on April 25, 2012 from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1110315015165/RemittancesData_Inflows_Apr12(Public).xlsx 
3 It is also possible however that migrants make their migration decisions independently and then choose to 
send remittances to their families in the Philippines because of their strong sense of family loyalty and 
obligation. 
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Piore (1979) proposed that it was particular structural conditions in migrant-
receiving countries that were the primary driver behind most labor migration flows. He 
argued that in advanced industrial economies like those of the United States and 
Germany, rising education and income levels resulted in the native-born populace no 
longer wanting certain types of “3-D” (dirty, dangerous and degrading) jobs. These 
undesirable occupations included paid domestic, agricultural, sanitation and construction 
work, in countries where there were either no trade unions at all or where these particular 
jobs were not protected by unions. Given the low-wages, low status and non-existent job 
security attached to these occupations, they were typically shunned by native-born 
workers. The resulting absence of a cheap, internal labor force to fill these vacancies 
drove governments and employers in these advanced economies to enter the global 
marketplace and seek out cheap foreign laborers. Piore argued that it was these employers 
and receiving-country governments that created the impetus for out-migration, without 
which we would not observe labor migration flows to these countries.   
Segmented labor market theory offers a tidy explanation for much of the 
international labor migration flows that can be observed within Asia and the Middle East 
today (Massey et al. 1998). Starting in the 1970s in Asia, the rapidly industrializing 
economies of Hong Kong and Singapore instituted labor importation programs to bring in 
cheap migrant workers from surrounding countries to make up for labor shortages in their 
paid domestic work sectors (Parreñas 2001; Constable 1997). Taiwan introduced a 
similar program for migrant domestic workers in the 1990s (Lan 2006). Likewise, in the 
1970s and onwards, all the oil-rich countries of the Middle East began to import migrant 
labor to work as maids, janitors, construction workers, doctors, nurses and engineers. 
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These Middle Eastern countries initially sourced their labor from oil-poor, labor-surplus 
countries within the region (such as Egypt and Yemen), but shortly thereafter they 
diversified their labor pools and began to recruit more intensively from South and East 
Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines (Abella 1995). 
The Philippines is now a leading source of migrant domestic workers to all of these oil-
rich Arab states and Asian tiger economies. But while segmented labor market theory 
cogently explains why we see migration flows toward high-income countries in Asia and 
the Middle East, it does not explain why the Philippines (rather than, say, Mauritius) 
ended up being a major source country for migrant workers for the world economy.  
 
World Systems Theory 
Another macro-level theory of migration—world systems theory—goes some way 
towards addressing the above question, by focusing more on sending country drivers. 
According to world systems theorists, migration is initiated by the displacement 
experienced by workers in peripheral countries in the world system as these economies 
become increasingly integrated into the global capitalist economy (Sassen 1988; Portes 
and Walton 1981). This displacement can stem from various sources: The direct 
recruitment of labor migrants in origin countries (as outlined by segmented labor market 
theory), the dismantling of the traditional economy in the origin country through the 
introduction of foreign capital, and the establishment of labor enclaves or export-
processing zones where foreign capitalist companies can have their goods produced at a 
fraction of the cost they would have had to pay workers from high-income countries. 
These export-oriented jobs are typically very demanding, poorly paid, and unprotected by 
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any sort of labor standards or regulation, resulting in a high turnover of workers, most of 
whom are women because they are socially constructed as more docile and pliant by 
these foreign capitalist companies and by their own governments (Kang 1997). All of 
these factors create what Portes and Walton (1981) call “structural imbalances” in origin 
countries that induce individuals who no longer have the means to support themselves 
and their families to “voluntarily” adopt migration in order to earn a living wage.  
 As will be discussed in more detail later, all of these destabilizing factors apply to 
the Philippines. The foreign intrusion (originally from the Spanish, then the British, and 
eventually the United States) into the Philippines’ traditional economy resulted first in the 
internal migration of rural, agricultural workers to urban areas within the Philippines, 
particularly Manila. But starting in the early 20th century, as further economic 
displacements compounded the existing poverty and landlessness experienced by many 
Filipinos, international migration became an increasingly common choice (Tyner 2009; 
Asis 2006; Parreñas 2001). 
World systems theorists also argue that specific colonial, historical, military and 
ideological links between certain pairs of countries can predispose prospective migrants 
from particular origin countries to seek to immigrate to particular receiving countries 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Massey et al. 1998; Sassen 1988). The place reputations of 
certain destination countries within the world system, propagated through news and 
entertainment media channels, also shape prospective migrants’ imaginaries and their 
long-term destination preferences (Appadurai 2003, 1996). In the case of the United 
States, the American Dream of safety, security and freedom from want has drawn 
millions of immigrants to its shores since the country’s founding. In the 19th century, 
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European peasants, reeling from the displacement effects of capitalization and 
modernization, “learned with hope of the New World where land, so scarce in the Old, 
was abundantly available. Younger sons learned with hope that the portions which at 
home would not buy them the space for a garden, in America would make them owners 
of hundreds of acres” (Handlin 1973:29). This story of American bounty attracted hordes 
of immigrants in the past and continues to do so today. In fact, Sassen (1988) has argued 
that the US has such a stronghold in people’s imaginations that any foreign direct 
investment in a developing country will initiate a process of “westernization” that 
ultimately promotes emigration to the US irrespective of where the foreign capital 
originally came from.  
In the case of the Philippines, the US holds special significance for many 
Filipinos because of the Philippines’ status as a former colony of the US and the many 
military and industrial ties between the two countries. As will be discussed later, the US 
government also instituted labor importation and scholarship programs in the early 
twentieth century that facilitated the entry of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos into the 
United States and their eventual naturalization (Rodriguez 2010; Tyner 2009, 2004; Choy 
2003). These programs helped created a legacy of migration from the Philippines to the 
United States.  
But it should be noted that the Philippines also has historical and religious ties 
with Spain stemming from the 300 years it was ruled as a Spanish colony, and with Italy 
given that Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion in the Philippines (with 83% 
of Filipinos identifying themselves as Catholic4). These factors could contribute to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. Retrieved December 13, 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html  
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making these two countries attractive destinations for Filipino migrants as well. More 
generally, Western countries and high-income countries in other parts of the world may 
hold the allure of modernity that could serve to attract aspiring migrants from the 
Philippines (Lan 2006). 
 
Network Theory of Migration 
Building on social capital theory, the network theory of cumulative migration 
posits that the presence of family, friends, and sometimes even co-ethnic strangers 
overseas can reduce the costs and risks of migration, thus easing the migration decision 
for potential migrants and encouraging them to move to the same destination as their 
overseas contacts (Garip 2008; Curran et al. 2005; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; 
Palloni et al. 2001; Singer and Massey 1998; Massey and Espinosa 1997). These network 
contacts can provide both tangible and intangible aid to prospective migrants: Extending 
financial assistance, matching the migrant with an overseas employer, assisting with the 
securing of a visa or work permit, recommending a reliable recruitment agency to use, 
giving advice about effective migration strategies or, upon the migrant’s arrival overseas, 
offering a place to stay or a job or simply companionship. Even the mere knowledge that 
a community of co-ethnics exists in a particular destination can sometimes serve to ease 
the worries of prospective migrants, resulting in a “herd effect” among future potential 
migrants (Bauer, Epstein and Gang 2002). 
 The network theory of migration can be seen as building on the neoclassical 
model of migration given that the presence of overseas contacts can significantly reduce 
the cost of migration and make it a more viable option to connected individuals who 
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otherwise would have found it too expensive or too risky to leave their home country 
(Borjas 1999). Prospective migrants can also possibly increase their potential overseas 
income or increase the probability of employment if they have contacts in the destination 
willing to directly hire the newly-arrived migrant or connect them with prospective 
employers (Massey et al. 1998). Potential migrants with access to “ethnic enclaves” 
overseas may find ready employment within this community of co-ethnics upon their 
arrival in the destination, thus sparing them from having to resort to low-wage jobs in the 
secondary sector in the host economy (Portes and Bach 1985). In this manner, overseas 
migrant networks can significantly alter the cost-benefit equation for potential migrants, 
increasing the odds of their deciding to leave their home country. Migrant networks have 
been found to be particularly critical in fostering women’s independent migration from 
patriarchal societies where they might encounter greater resistance to their migration 
decision (Curran et al. 2005; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). 
 Set against this overwhelmingly positive picture of how networks can encourage 
cumulative migration are several recent ethnographies that highlight repeated instances of 
resistance on the part of overseas migrants to assist their contacts in the home country 
emigrate (Bashi 2007; Kanaiaupuni 2000; Böcker 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). The 
critical social capital literature also points to the role played by macro-structural factors—
such as the state of the economy and the existence of a supportive/restrictive regulatory 
environment—in influencing helping decisions (Smith 2007, 2005; Menjívar 2000). It is 
not enough to assume that the large stock of overseas Filipinos—roughly 10% of the total 
population of the country (Asis 2006)—only plays a positive role in encouraging 
additional migrations from the Philippines. What must also be taken into consideration is 
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the socio-legal environment in which those overseas migrants live in their host country in 
order to determine if it is conducive to the mobilization of migrant social capital.   
 
To summarize: Where one set of theories largely ignore social structure and focus 
only on the agency of individual migrants (or their families), the other set of theories 
ignore agency and only highlight the role of structural forces in initiating migration 
flows. Network theory, meanwhile, exists almost exclusively at the meso-level and, in its 
current formulation, ignores both the micro- and macro-level factors that can influence 
the helping decisions of overseas migrants. Throughout this section, I have also alluded 
briefly to these theories’ (in)ability to explain migration out of the Philippines. What 
follows now is a discussion of Philippine history to explain the historical context from 
which Philippine out-migration originates and the current socio-economic conditions in 
the Philippines that facilitate continuing large-scale out-migration from the country.  
 
A History of Philippine Migration 
An archipelago of more than 7,000 islands in Southeast Asia (see Map 1.1), the 
Philippines has a long history of migration. As early as the twelfth century, traders from 
China, Siam, Angkor, India and the Arab world had established regular trading links with 
coastal settlements on the larger Philippine islands. (See Appendix F for a detailed 
timeline of the Philippines’ migration history.) But it was the conquest of these territories 
by Spain in 1565 that created the entity we now know as the Philippines and began its 
eventual absorption into the world economy (Tyner 2009). The Spaniards used the 
Philippine port city of Manila as an exclusive entrepôt where Mexican silver was 
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exchanged for Chinese silks and other products from Asia. Known as the “galleon 
trade”—because of the large sailing ships that were used to transport these goods and 
precious metals between the Spanish Americas, the Philippines and China—it completely 
restructured the local Philippine economy.  
Harsh tax obligations were imposed on native households to support Spain’s 
colonial ambitions, pushing many families into long-term debt and landlessness. Tens of 
thousands of Filipino men were conscripted to build and repair galleons for Spain and 
many of these laborers ended up also serving on these ships as crew members, later 
deserting and settling down in other Spanish territories in what is now the United States 
(Okihiro 1994:38 citing Espina 1988:1). They formed the oldest Asian American 
immigrant community in the United States.   
The galleon trade began to dwindle towards the nineteenth century as British 
traders encroached further and further into Spanish trade routes. This compelled Spain to 
reorient the Philippines’ colonial economy towards export agriculture. The large-scale 
production of export-driven cash crops such as sugar, cacao, coconut, hemp, tobacco, 
fruits and spices was initiated (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). A plantation-based 
economy was introduced into the Philippines, which only served to exacerbate existing 
inequalities between an increasingly landless, peasant population and the small but 
wealthy, landowning class that had been created by the Spanish overlords. This 
dismantling of traditional Philippine society and its concomitant integration into the 
global economy are two of the most important legacies of 300 years of Spanish colonial 




























In 1898, when the United States secured control over the Philippines as part of the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War, this process of 
integration into the world economy only hastened. The nascent Philippine nationalist 
movement fiercely opposed this transfer of power to the United States. What ensued was 
the Philippine-American War which lasted from 1899 to 1902, and ended with the 
complete annexation of the Philippines as an American colony. It was at this point that 
migration out of the Philippines began in earnest, fueled by the close patron-client 
relationship that developed between the United States and the Philippines in the early 
twentieth century. 
 
Migration to the United States 
Tyner (2009) writes that three separate migration systems developed between the 
US and the Philippines:  
1. The first was built on educational links between the two countries. The United States 
implemented a nation-wide, free, mandatory, English-language-based public school 
system that encouraged a “cultural orientation toward the West in general, and the 
United States more specifically” (Tyner 2004:25). It also introduced a scholarship 
system which brought thousands of children from elite Filipino families to the US to 
study in prestigious universities across the country and then return to the Philippines 
to join the government or enter the business world. This pensionado program helped 
cement the United States’ cultural status as the “dream destination” for aspiring, 
upwardly mobile Filipinos.  
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2. The militarization of the Philippines enabled the second migratory route to the United 
States. With the establishment of US military bases in the Philippines as part of the 
broader US effort to expand its sphere of influence within the Asia-Pacific, male 
Filipinos were allowed to enlist in the US Navy and eventually settle in the US after 
completing a certain number of years of military service.   
3. The third and final route for prospective migrants to the United States was through 
labor recruitment. After the US annexation of Hawaii in 1898 and the decimation of 
much of the indigenous population of the Hawaiian islands due to various introduced 
diseases, American businesses needed to find an alternative cheap labor force to work 
the many sugar plantations that had been established on the Hawaiian islands. 
Originally, China and Japan had been the primary sources of labor for these 
plantations but the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Gentleman’s Agreement 
with Japan in 1906 had severely restricted the entry of migrant workers from these 
two countries. The Philippines, which was now considered a colony of the United 
States, was not affected by the increasingly restrictive immigration policies of the US 
government, and so, large-scale labor recruiting efforts in the Philippines began. 
Starting in 1906, tens of thousands of male laborers left the Philippines each year to 
work on plantations in Hawaii (Rodriguez 2010; Asis 2006; Takaki 1989). In the 
1920s, Filipinos also began migrating directly to the US mainland to work on farms 
in California and other West Coast states, and to work in fish canneries in the Pacific 
Northwest and Alaska. Several thousand Filipino men also joined the US merchant 
marine on an annual basis. All in all, an estimated 150,000 Filipinos arrived in the 
United States during the first three decades of the 20th century and many of these 
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migrants eventually settled in the United States. Tyner (2004) reports that, by 1930, 
there were 45,000 Filipino immigrants living on the US mainland and more than 
63,000 in Hawaii.  
However, with the increasing number of Filipino immigrants in the US, American 
anti-Asian xenophobia began to rise once again. Pressure began to build within the US to 
restrict the entry of Filipinos. But this could only be effected if the Philippines was no 
longer part of the United States, setting the stage for the 1934 passage of the Tydings-
McDuffie Act. This piece of legislation allowed for a ten-year period of transition after 
which the Philippines would be granted independence from the United States. In the 
immediate term, the Philippines’ status was changed from US colony to commonwealth, 
allowing for the immediate reclassification of Filipinos as non-US citizens and therefore 
subject to US immigration restrictions. The annual quota for Filipino immigrants to the 
United States was set at 50, effectively ending most permanent migration to the United 
States. 
A year after World War II had ended, and therefore a year later than originally 
scheduled, the Philippines gained its independence from the US. However, its economy 
remained inextricably dependent on that of the US. The independent-in-name Philippine 
government signed generous treaties with the United States government giving US 
businesses the right to export goods to the Philippines duty-free for eight years, after 
which tariffs would only be incrementally increased over a 25-year period. In contrast, 
strict quotas were imposed on all of the Philippines’ major exports to the US. The 
Philippine peso was pegged to the dollar and could not be devalued. And US businesses 
were given “parity rights” to invest in Philippine natural resources and public utilities.  
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Meanwhile, the US military was given 99-year leases to set up military bases on 
Philippine soil. Other military links between the two countries continued unabated as 
well. Filipinos were still allowed to enlist in the US Navy, apply for US citizenship after 
serving for a number of years, and subsequently settle in the US (Rodriguez 2010). And 
in 1948, the US established the Exchange Visitor Program (EVP), a Cold War initiative 
that allowed Filipino nurses to receive specialized training and work in the US (Choy 
2003). Rodriguez (2010) writes that, while the EVP was not created exclusively for the 
Philippines, by the 1960s the program was dominated by Filipino nurses. Additional 
exceptions were made to the Tydings-McDuffie Act for the entry of agricultural workers 
into Hawaii and for war brides. And so, migration to the US continued even after 1934, 
but in considerably smaller numbers.    
This state of affairs continued until 1965 when the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (and its subsequent amendments) removed nationality-based quotas from the United 
States’ immigration policy framework. This opened the door for increased permanent 
immigration from South and Central America, Africa and Asia, including the Philippines, 
for both foreign family members of existing Americans but also for foreign professionals 
such as doctors, engineers and nurses who did not have any close relatives in the US. 
Around the same time, other Western countries (primarily Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) also struck down their pro-European immigration policies, opening up these 
destinations for permanent immigration from the Philippines as well. But the US remains 
the primary (and preferred) destination for permanent emigrants from the Philippines.  
In 2010, the US granted permanent residence status to 58,173 immigrants who 
had been born in the Philippines (US Department of Homeland Security 2011). Of those, 
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33,746 (or 58%) were the immediate relatives of US citizens and another 17,849 (30%) 
were more distant relatives of US citizens or permanent residents. In other words, 88% of 
Filipino immigrants who received permanent resident status in the US in 2010 had done 
so by leveraging their migrant social capital resources, relying on their connections with 
existing US citizens or permanent residents.5   
 
Contract Migration from the Philippines 
A second revolution in migration flows from the Philippines was kickstarted in 
1974 with the “manpower export policy,” decreed by then-President Ferdinand Marcos, 
which both diversified and greatly expanded the volume of out-migration from the 
Philippines (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). There were several factors behind the 
adoption of this policy. Overseas temporary emigration was seen as a means to find 
employment for the country’s “excess” labor force and also quell any potential political 
unrest (Rodriguez 2010; Tyner 2004). In the early 1970s, the Philippine economy was 
suffering from the structural adjustments demanded of it by the International Monetary 
Fund to facilitate its shift from an agricultural economy to an export-oriented and 
industrialized one. This had resulted in a massive displacement of the rural poor from 
their traditional subsistence-based lifestyles. At the same time, there were insufficient 
jobs in the formal economy to absorb these displaced workers. The manpower export 
policy was initially designed to be a temporary stopgap measure until the country had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Another 323,216 Filipinos were granted non-immigrant temporary visas in 2010 to visit the US for 
business, pleasure or study. Of these, 1.5% were students or exchange visitors, 66% were either tourists or 
businesspersons, 22% were commercial seafarers and 6% were temporary workers. (Accessed from the US 
Department of Homeland Security website. Table 28: Nonimmigrant Admissions (I-94 Only) by Selected 




weathered this economic crisis. A central part of this policy was the requirement that all 
overseas workers remit between 50-80% of their foreign earnings back to their families in 
the Philippines through Philippine banks. The resulting influx of foreign currency 
remittances from these overseas Filipinos provided a much-needed crutch for the weak 
Philippine economy to the point that successive national administrations have continued 
to rely heavily on labor migration.   
At the same time (as previously mentioned), outside the Philippines, there were 
changes occurring at the global level that created an opportunity structure for potential 
Filipino labor migration. The 1973 oil embargo and subsequent hike in oil prices resulted 
in a massive influx of funds into the oil-rich economies of the Middle East who chose to 
use this money to initiate ambitious development and infrastructure programs in their 
countries. Most of these Middle Eastern countries (such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain) lacked a large enough internal labor supply to meet 
all their new labor needs and so they began a large-scale importation of foreign 
temporary workers. Newly-rich Arab households began hiring foreign domestic workers 
to help in the home and to signal their improved class position (Esim and Smith 2004; 
Sabban 2004; Silvey 2004; Ismail 1999). Filipino domestic workers in particular came to 
be highly prized because of their English language skills and relatively high educational 
qualifications (de Regt 2009).   
By the 1980s, the newly industrializing economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore were also importing migrant workers on a large scale to make up for 
national labor shortages in construction and sanitation (Skeldon 1992). As their female 
labor force participation rates continued to climb, these countries also looked to foreign 
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workers to make up for the national care deficit that was emerging (Lan 2006; Tam 1999; 
Yeoh, Huang, and Gonzalez III 1999; Constable 1997). The Philippines continues to be 
an important source country for migrant workers for all these Asian countries, especially 
in the areas of domestic service (Stalker 2000). By the 1990s, a second tier of Asian 
countries (particularly Malaysia and Brunei) had begun to industrialize and they too 
became popular markets for Filipino domestic workers. 
While importing low-skilled temporary migrants in large numbers, all of the 
above countries in the Middle East and Asia also introduced strict immigration provisions 
to ensure that these workers could not settle within their borders and become permanent 
residents at some later point in the future (Castles 2006; Skeldon 2000). As a result, 
temporary migration out of the Philippines grew exponentially from the 1970s onwards. 
There continues to be a steady rise in the number of Filipinos emigrating each 
year on temporary contracts as the Philippine economy remains plagued by high under-
employment and low wages (Rodriguez 2010; Asian Institute of Management Policy 
Center 2005). A government-supported culture of migration has also developed in the 
Philippines, facilitated by a for-profit migration industry that actively recruits temporary 
workers and places them overseas (for a price) (Asis 2006). Temporary labor migration 
out of the Philippines has now completely dwarfed permanent out-migration which still 
continues unabated, just on a much smaller scale. In 2009, only 79,718 Filipinos left the 
country on a more permanent basis (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2011). In 
contrast, in 2010, over 1.1 million Filipinos migrated to over 200 countries and territories 
to work on temporary labor contracts (Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 2011). 
Another 438,705 Filipinos were hired to work onboard merchant marine vessels as 
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commercial seafarers. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 display the number of Filipino labor migrants 
leaving the country each year between 2006 and 2010, organized by the top ten 
destination countries and occupational categories respectively. Table 3.2 also reveals that 
the single largest occupational category for outgoing Filipino labor migrants in 2010 was 
for “household service workers.”  
As a result of this voluminous and broad-based out-migration of Filipinos each 
year since the 1970s, a culture of migration has become entrenched in Philippine society. 
A 2005 survey in the Philippines found that 33% of adult respondents agreed with the 
statement: “If it were only possible, I would migrate to another country and live there” 
(Asis 2006). This number jumps to 60% when asking the children of migrant workers. 
This migratory culture has also been fostered by the government through its celebration 
of migrants as “national heroes” for remitting their savings back to the Philippines 
(Rodriguez 2010).  
Finally, the large stock of overseas Filipinos—a little more than 10% of the total 
population of the country—who send regular remittances and balikbayan gift boxes to 
their family members in the Philippines paint a picture of overseas life as financially 
rewarding, even if difficult at times. All these contribute to the current state of affairs 
where migration is a very real option that many Filipinos consider at least once at some 





Number of Land-based Migrant Workers Leaving the Philippines, by Top Ten Destinations, 2006-2010 
 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 All Destinations – Total 788,070 811,070 974,399 1,092,162 1,123,676 
 Saudi Arabia 223,459 238,419 275,933 291,419 293,049 
 United Arab Emirates 99,212 120,657 193,810 196,815 201,214 
 Hong Kong 96,929 59,169 78,345 100,142 101,340 
 Qatar 45,795 56,277 84,342 89,290 87,813 
88 Singapore 28,369 49,431 41,678 54,421 70,251 
 Kuwait 47,917 37,080 38,903 45,900 53,010 
 Taiwan 39,025 37,136 38,546 33,751 36,866 
 Italy 25,413 17,855 22,623 23,159 25,595 
 Bahrain 11,736 9,898 13,079 15,001 15,434 
 Canada 6,468 12,380 17,399 17,344 13,885 
 Top 10 Destinations  















Number of Newly-Hired Land-based Filipino Migrant Workers,  
by Top Ten Occupations & Gender, 2010 
Occupation Women Men Total 
All Occupations – Total 185,602 154,677 340,279 
Household Service Workersa 94,880 1,703 96,583 
Production Workers 11,865 15,286 27,152 
Laborersb 5,915 9,764 15,679 
Charworkers/Cleaners 9,521 2,612 12,133 
Nurses 10,254 1,828 12,082 
Caregivers/Caretakersa 8,750 543 9,293 
Waiters, Bartenders 4,396 4,393 8,789 
Wiremen/Electrical Workers 30 8,576 8,606 
Plumbers/Pipe Fitters 16 8,391 8,407 
Welders/Flame-cutters 22 5,037 5,059 
Top 10 Occupations 







Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
Notes: 
a. The categories “household service workers” and “caregivers/caretakers” are artificial 
distinctions created by the Philippine government based on the titles given to these workers in 
different destination countries. They are called caregivers if going to Canada and Taiwan, and 
household service workers if going to Singapore and Hong Kong. 
b. The category “Laborers” was created by combining the categories: “Laborers/Helpers 
General”, “Laborers” and “Laborer Industry (NEC)” as published in the POEA’s 2011 
migrant worker deployment report. 
c. The Top 10 occupational categories only account for 38% of all male migrant workers leaving 
the Philippines in 2010. This is because most of the male-dominated occupations fall within 
the construction industry which consists of smaller, very specific, occupational categories, 
e.g. Operators - Earthmoving Machinery, Machine Fitters, Construction Laborers, Drivers, 





The Philippines Today 
Having established that there are broad structural forces at the global level 
encouraging out-migration from the Philippines, I now discuss the factors within the 
present-day Philippines that foster the continued outflow of so many Filipinas. One of the 
most critical of these is the “migration bureaucracy” established by the Philippine 
government to facilitate the export of Philippine migrant labor to markets around the 
world. 
 
The Philippines as Labor Exporter 
Among labor-exporting countries, the Philippines is regarded as an innovator and 
role model in its marketing and management of its migrant citizens. Over the last 40 
years, it has built a vast government apparatus focused on all aspects of migration 
management, including the authorization, regulation, marketing, training, recruitment and 
placement of Filipino migrant workers overseas (Rodriguez 2010; Agunias 2008; Tyner 
2004). Within this migration bureaucracy, the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration6 (POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration7 (OWWA) 
are the two most important governmental entities. The POEA is charged with the 
regulation and promotion of the country’s labor migration program. All outgoing labor 
migrants are required to seek clearance from this government agency before leaving the 
country. At the same time, the POEA issues licenses to private recruiting agencies and 
sets minimum labor standards that these agencies are expected to comply with. The 
POEA is also active overseas, promoting Filipinos as ideal workers for the world 




economy: Docile yet hardworking, educated but undemanding (Rodriguez 2010; Tyner 
2004).  
The OWWA, meanwhile, is an agency within the Department of Labor and 
Employment and its central mandate is to protect the welfare of overseas Filipino 
workers and their families who remain in the Philippines. In order to do this, it 
administers destination- and occupation-specific “pre-departure orientation seminars” for 
all outgoing labor migrants to advise them about the overseas work environment and 
suggest ways to deal with potential problems that may arise with their employers. 
Philippine embassies and consulates in major destination countries frequently have a 
labor attaché (through OWWA) on staff to deal with any migrant labor-related issues that 
may arise, such as arranging for the repatriation of workers who ran away from their 
employers or negotiating with local law enforcement officials in situations where 
overseas Filipino workers are arrested or accused of a crime. 
However, despite the Philippines’ sprawling migration bureaucracy, it is 
important to not overstate the government’s importance in fostering the out-migration of 
its citizens. Certainly when the national policy on labor exportation was first 
implemented in the 1970s, the actions of the Philippine state were integral to the policy’s 
success. At that time, the Philippine government directly handled all the recruitment and 
placement of Filipino migrant workers overseas. But now, 40 years later, out-migration 
from the Philippines is very much a public-private partnership, sustained not only by the 
government but also by the private sector that profits tremendously from the export of 
migrant Filipino labor (Agunias 2008).  
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There are now well over 1,000 private recruitment agencies licensed by the 
government to match prospective migrants with overseas employers.8 These for-profit 
agencies handle the vast majority of all recruitment and placement of Filipino workers 
overseas. In contrast, the Government Placement Branch placed just 6,519 (or 2%) of all 
newly-hired land-based workers in 2010 (Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 
2011:11).  
 
The Philippine Economy 
Just as important as the Philippine government’s migration infrastructure in 
fostering out-migration from the Philippines, are the continuing dire economic straits that 
many Filipino families find themselves in. In 2009, the individual poverty rate in the 
Philippines was 26.5%. The female unemployment rate was 7.4%, and among employed 
women, 46.1% were characterized as holding “vulnerable employment” as unpaid family 
workers or own-account workers.9 Employed women are also heavily concentrated in 
low-paying sectors—24% in agriculture and another 66% in services (such as domestic 
work)—with limited opportunities for career development. These negative wage 
pressures make it hard for locally-employed Filipino women to sufficiently support their 
families.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As of January 21, 2011, there were 1,372 active, accredited recruitment agencies in “good standing” listed 
on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration website. (http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-
bin/agList.asp?mode=all)  
9 All labor and security statistics for the Philippines were sourced from the World Bank’s website at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/philippines and the Annual Labor and Employment Estimates of the 
Philippine Government’s National Statistics Office at 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/lf101103_ar.pdf. Retrieved on March 28, 2012 
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Added pressure comes from the high rate of underemployment, measured at 
18.8% of the employed in 2010.10 For workers earning an hourly wage, the limited 
number of hours they work each week contributes to the smaller income they bring home 
and increases the pressure on them to find alternative ways of supporting their families. 
This is especially true for women who are usually employed in lower-paid and lower-
status positions. In general, women’s careers are also considered less important than 
men’s (Medina 2001). Paradoxically, this can make it easier for women to jettison their 
careers in the Philippines and seek work overseas.  
While the average family income has increased only marginally in recent decades, 
the cost of living has been rising at a fast clip, especially in urban areas. Between 2006 
and 2009 alone, the Consumer Price Index in the Philippines went up from 137.9 to 160, 
a 16% increase (using 2000 prices). At the same time, the average family income only 
rose 3%. This is part of a pattern of declining real incomes that has become standard in 
the Philippines (Alonzo, Horton and Nayar 1996).11 Lan writes that this steady decline in 
real wages (especially in urban areas) has made overseas employment more and more 
tempting even for middle class families (2006:127).  
There are additional cost pressures for families with college-age children. A 2003 
report from the International Institute for Educational Planning (under UNESCO) found 
that “scholarships and other types of student support cover at present only a small 
fraction of eligible students enrolled” in Philippine colleges and universities (Kitaev, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Sourced from Table 4.1B “Underemployed and Visibly Underemployed Persons As Percent to Total 
Employed, Philippines:  1987 – 2010” in the 2011 Yearbook of Labor Statistics published by the Bureau of 
Labor and Employment Statistics. Retrieved on April 4, 2012. 
http://www.bles.dole.gov.ph/PUBLICATIONS/2011%20YLS/STATISTICAL%20TABLES/PDF/CHAPT
ER%204/Tab4-1B.pdf.  
11 Family income statistics available online from the National Statistical Coordination Board. Retrieved on 
April 4, 2012. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_income.asp. 	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Nadurata, Resurrection, and Bernal 2003:16). Though the government of the Philippines 
does offer student loans and scholarships, these programs have been plagued with 
difficulties and reach “only a few thousand new borrowers a year” (Kitaev et al. 
2003:20). Of the 2.4 million students enrolled in a tertiary institution in the Philippines in 
2001, 75% went to private institutions and these institutions charge tuition fees that are 
significantly higher than what government student loan programs cover. The University 
of the Philippines—considered the nation’s top public university—charged the equivalent 
of US$250 per year for tuition in 2003; the University de la Salle—by some accounts, the 
top private university in the country—charged US$2,000 a year in contrast. The failure of 
credit markets in the Philippines to make tertiary education more affordable to Filipinos 
is another push factor propelling Filipino parents to consider working overseas so as to 
earn sufficient income to put their children through college.  
 
Family Hierarchies and Gender Norms 
But why would the high cost burden of tertiary education in the Philippines 
encourage so many women to want to work overseas? One possibility has to do with how 
Filipino women are often seen as “keepers of the family purse” or “household treasurers” 
within their households (Chant and McIlwaine 1995:9). While it might appear that this 
should result in Filipino women holding positions of power within their households, 
several scholars have found that in fact what happens is that women’s responsibility over 
the family finances simply increases their feelings of stress and worry as they struggle to 
make ends meet. Women typically pour almost all their earnings into their household 
coffers, while men siphon off a greater portion of their income for their personal needs, 
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gambling or drinking (Eder 2006; Chant and McIlwaine 1995). I hypothesize that this 
cultural practice can compel Philippine women (more than men) to seek overseas 
employment to supplement the family income and provide for their dependent children.  
 There are other social forces that can explain women’s out-migration from the 
Philippines. The Philippines (like most Asian societies) is still a very patriarchal society 
with men seen as the natural heads of households, family breadwinners and decision-
makers (Eder 2006; Roces 2000; Chant and McIlwaine 1995; Eviota 1992). Even as more 
and more Filipino women take on employment outside the home, their status in the 
family is still second to that of their menfolk. This is codified in laws that make divorce 
illegal in the Philippines and separation only permissible in cases of incest and adultery. 
When married couples are allowed to legally separate, their assets are not evenly divided 
but, rather, they revert to the original title-holder, disadvantaging women who may have 
been financially dependent on their husbands. The low rates of legal separation are also 
connected to the widespread adherence to the Roman Catholic faith and the very strong 
kinship networks that exist in the Philippines that may pressure couples to remain 
together. For women who find themselves unable to separate from their husbands, 
international migration might provide a convenient escape route. In her interviews with 
Filipino migrant domestic workers in Italy, Parreñas found that 14 out of the 20 legally 
married respondents she interviewed were women who had left the Philippines to escape 
abusive, unfaithful or wastrel husbands (2001:66-67).   
 A final factor that might motivate some women to seek work abroad is the 
Philippine norm of never-married women taking on the financial responsibility of caring 
for their parents and supporting their younger siblings’ education (Lan 2006; Chant and 
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McIlwaine 1995; Medina 2001; Lauby and Stark 1988). As they become the 
breadwinners for these relatives—even if they do not live within the same household—
these women might feel added pressure to work overseas in order to earn a higher income 
to support their family members. Lauby and Stark (1988) hypothesize that rural 
households in the Philippines might be more inclined to dispatch their unmarried 
daughters rather than sons to urban centers because of this tradition and the expectation 
that daughters will send a greater portion of their earnings back home, compared to sons.  
 
The Filipino Migrant Domestic Worker 
Migrant domestic work is clearly a popular exit strategy for female prospective 
migrants desirous of leaving the Philippines. Migrant domestic workers constitute the 
single largest occupational bloc of labor migrants leaving the Philippines (see Table 3.2) 
and almost all of these migrant domestic workers are women (Philippine Overseas 
Employment Administration 2011).  
 For unemployed and even many employed women in the Philippines, migrant 
domestic work represents a significant increase in their earnings, no matter how lowly or 
vulnerable the occupation. Even for Filipinas who had full-time jobs in the Philippines, 
migrant domestic work oftentimes provides a higher wage than a white-collar job. The 
average nominal daily wage rate for women in non-farm-related work in 2011 was 
PHP331 (or US$7.9212). The average nominal daily wage rate for women in the 
manufacturing sector was even lower at PHP287 (or US$6.87).13 This was before any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Using the historical exchange rate on 07/06/2012, of US$1 = PHP41.7899.  
13 Data published through LABORSTA Internet, the International Labour Organization’s Department of 
Statistics’ online database on labor statistics (http://laborsta.ilo.org/) and originally sourced from the 
Philippine government’s labor force survey.  
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compulsory deductions for taxes, social security, or insurance, and this wage rate was 
expected to cover all living expenses (rent/mortgage payments, food, transportation and 
utilities for both the individual worker and any dependents). In comparison, a domestic 
servant job in Hong Kong pays roughly PHP671 (or US$16) a day14 with no deductions 
and with room and board provided. The above kind of simple accounting could push 
many women, employed and unemployed to consider life overseas as a migrant domestic 
worker.  
 Migrant domestic work is an attractive option for women migrants also because 
(in most cases) it does not require any particular training or educational qualifications. 
For female migrants especially, domestic work is a convenient exit strategy to consider 
because such work has traditionally been framed as “women’s work” (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild 2003; Parreñas 2008). As a result, prospective female migrants do not 
necessarily have to prove their suitability for such overseas jobs; being female is seen as 
qualification enough. In addition, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, this particular 
choice of overseas occupation gives these migrants entrée into a wide range of 
destination countries that import foreigners as temporary domestic workers. In 2010, 
newly-hired Filipino migrant domestic workers travelled to over 200 countries and 
territories to start work (POEA 2011). Given that the Philippines that does not share a 
border with a high-income country, these temporary labor importation programs 
represent the most effective strategy available to capital-constrained prospective migrants 
seeking to enter these countries.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Based on the current minimum wage rate required by Hong Kong law (3,740 Hong Kong dollars a 
month, divided by 30 and using the exchange rate on 07/06/2012 of US$1 = HK$7.7540 and HK$1 = 
PHP5.3890). 
15 For low-capital migrants from low-income countries that do share a land/sea border with a high-income 
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Finally, another reason behind the adoption of migrant domestic work could be 
because it represents an easier job fit to many women who were already performing 
various domestic duties—childcare, eldercare, cooking and cleaning—in their own 
homes. Lan writes that one of the allures of migrant domestic work is that it allowed 
women to be paid for work that they currently performed in their own homes for free 
(2006:133).  
While previously there were few regulations governing the migrant domestic 
worker industry, the POEA now has instituted some restrictions on the deployment of 
Filipinos overseas as domestic workers. There is now a minimum age of 23 years before 
a Filipino is allowed to work overseas as a domestic worker.16 The POEA also regularly 
issues bans on the deployment of Filipinos as domestic workers to countries that are 
deemed to provide inadequate protections to ensure their safety and prevent exploitation 
by employers. In 2010, for instance, the POEA lifted a ban that had been in effect for 
over ten years, preventing Filipinos from working as au pairs in Switzerland, Norway 
and Denmark.17 Similar bans have been applied at various times to other receiving 
countries in the Middle East and Asia.  
The POEA also has a standard employment contract, specifying a minimum wage 
rate of US$400 a month and a weekly day of rest, that it requires all out-going Filipino 
domestic workers to sign. However, this contract has no legal standing outside the 
Philippines and few receiving countries honor its terms (Battistella and Asis 2011). In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
country, irregular migration is always a very real option. Much of Mexican migration to the United States 
falls within this category. 
16 POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 4, Series of 2011. Accessed at 
http://poea.gov.ph/gbr/2011/gb_4_2011.pdf on May 6, 2012. 
17 POEA Governing Board Resolution Nos. 4 and 7, Series of 2010. Accessed at 
http://poea.gov.ph/gbr/2010/POEA%20GBR4-20100001.PDF and 
http://poea.gov.ph/gbr/2010/GB%20Resolution%20No.07,%20S2010.PDF on May 6, 2012. 
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addition, the POEA has to maintain a delicate balance between protecting its overseas 
citizens and marketing them to overseas employers (Rodriguez 2010). The recent see-saw 
decisions over the minimum age for migrant domestic workers are a reflection of the 
pressure the POEA faces from hiring countries, Philippine recruitment agencies and 
prospective Filipino migrants themselves: The minimum age used to be 25 years in 1994, 
then it became 21 years in 1998, 18 years in 2001, 25 years in 2006, and most recently, 
23 years in 2010 (Battistella and Asis 2011).  
 
Participants’ Accounts of their Migration Decision 
When asked why they first decided to leave the Philippines, almost all 
participants mentioned financial reasons as being the primary driver behind their 
decisions, supporting the basic premise of neoclassical economic theory. All in all, 89% 
of participants spoke of wanting to earn more money. Every one of the study participants 
seemed perfectly aware of the fact that they could earn significantly higher wages 
overseas compared to in the Philippines, even from a low-status job like migrant 
domestic work. As one participant in Singapore, Agatha, who possessed a vocational 
diploma as a “computer secretarial”, put it:  
I work as a cashier last time and then in a factory for almost two years. But the salary is 
not enough. Because the salary here in Singapore [as a domestic worker] is double. So 
that’s why we come to Singapore and work. 
	  
Another participant, Padmé, a college graduate who had worked for an NGO in the 
Philippines before finding employment in Canada, explained that she first began to think 
of working overseas when she observed how her father and her brother were both able to 
afford expensive gifts for their family after starting to work abroad: 
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[My father] was working in Saudi Arabia before for seven years. But he’s actually 
working for an American company. He’s a chef. […] My father—he didn’t finish any 
degree or whatever. He’s just trained by people he worked with back home. But then, 
when he went to that country, he was earning more than the Filipino engineers who are 
working for the Saudi government actually. He was being paid three times more. So, 
that’s how I told myself that I can even help more of our relatives if I’m going to go out 
and explore the possibility of earning more than what I’m already earning back home. 
  
Like Padmé, 61% of participants were already employed in the Philippines prior 
to their departure. In other words, most migrants were not leaving because they couldn’t 
find jobs in the Philippines; they were not the poorest Filipinos without access to any 
capital. Just under a third of study participants indicated that they left the Philippines in 
order to find a job. Rather, most participants left because the jobs they possessed did not 
provide them with sufficient income to meet their immediate and/or long-term financial 
needs. This finding echoes what other migration scholars have uncovered about women 
migrants’ motivations in Asia (Parreñas 2001; Thadani and Todaro 1986). 	  
  And for those participants who were unemployed, the chance at finally earning 
some money (even if it was from a low-status occupation like domestic work) was too 
attractive to pass up. This was the case with Malia, who had decided to pursue an 
overseas domestic worker job after having been unsuccessful at finding a job in the 
Philippines that utilized her engineering training: 
I was a fresh graduate. I graduated in October of 1984. And then, after that, I went home, 
hoping that I could earn somehow an employment back in the province. But 
unfortunately at the time, it was also the same [jobless] scenario in the province as in 
Manila. So when I went home hoping for an employment, it is still the same. The status 
of employment is still very, very difficult. And because of the burden of no [savings] to 
finance me for a review class that I was supposed to take before going for the board 
exam, I decided to grab the opportunity [to work abroad].  
Because when I was riding a jeep, I found an ad in front of a building that they 
were hiring domestic workers for Malaysia. That was primarily focused on KL [Kuala 
Lumpur] in Malaysia. So […] because of the difficulty that I am having—because even 
though you are a graduate, you have to find some work experience before you can land a 
job. But how can I get the work experience if they are not giving me the chance for the 
experience to start?—So the time is passing and days are going. So I decided that, at the 
very least, I should grab the chance of working as a domestic worker.  
	  
101 
In this regard, these participants seem to fit the mold described in neoclassical 
economic theories, rationally weighing the costs and benefits of working overseas and 
disregarding the low prestige associated with paid domestic work. Michael Piore makes a 
similar finding, writing in Birds of Passage that the “migrant is initially a true economic 
man, probably the closest thing in real life to the Homo Economicus of economic theory” 
because they are “working totally and exclusively for money” (1979:55). However, even 
though almost all participants were motivated in part by a desire for a higher income, 
many participants did not fit this ideal of the pure economic migrant. 
Several participants who were employed in the Philippines also left for more 
intangible reasons, partly out of a sense that their current job did not fulfill them in any 
way, partly because they imagined that the life they would lead overseas would be so 
much better than their current one. One interviewee recalled how she had studied medical 
technology in college but had only found an entry-level position in a hotel in the 
Philippines upon graduation. Working in poorly paid jobs that did not utilize their 
training and expertise, or working in part-time jobs that lacked either security or a chance 
at a promotion, encouraged study participants to look favorably at migration. For these 
interviewees, giving up an unfulfilling job in the Philippines for a low-status occupation 
overseas, but one that offered significantly more money, was a worthwhile exchange.  
Young, carefree women who were not yet burdened with familial responsibilities 
meanwhile saw migration as a bit of a lark and were attracted by the opportunity to see 
the world through their overseas employment. Christy, a single Filipina who had worked 
in a factory in the Philippines before finding employment as a domestic worker in 
Singapore, explained her migration decision in this manner: 
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I didn’t have really any reasons for coming here [to Singapore]. It’s just like I came here 
because a friend asked me to come here. I don’t have the plan to come overseas. […] [My 
friend,] she’s here before. And I was working in the Philippines in a factory. And then 
after that, when she came back from Singapore, she said to me to go to an agency to 
come here. [But] I said I’m not interested. Then, after that, she is asking me, “Okay. Just 
do this for fun!” I didn’t have the plan. [Christy laughs.] So, because she insisted, so I 
just go and I signed the papers and, after two weeks, I have employer [in Singapore]. 
[Christy laughs again.] So I said, “What shall I do?” And she just said, ‘Yes, just go on.” 
I thought it’s fun. 
	  
In Christy’s estimation, working overseas would be “fun” and that was reason enough to 
give it a try. Her work in a factory in Manila that made thread was mundane and she was 
open to trying something new. “I didn’t ask anything!” she recalled during her interview, 
laughing at how impulsive she had been.   
 Other young, unmarried participants remembered how they had been envious of 
other Filipinas who were working abroad and who had an air of not just newly acquired 
wealth but also cosmopolitanism about them. A telephone operator in the Philippines, 
Emmeline, was pulled into applying for an overseas job by a friend of hers who was more 
serious about leaving the Philippines. When she received the call from the recruitment 
agency telling her that an overseas employer had selected her, she had to decide whether 
or not to take up the offer. “I said, ‘I will try,’” she recalled. “Because some of the 
Filipina going back to Philippines, they look very good, you know? So I thought, maybe I 
will become like that also!” Overall, 37% of participants fell into what I call the 
“aspirant” category of migrant, propelled by what they imagined their future life overseas 
could hold for them personally. 
 
Household/Family Considerations 
A different set of considerations influenced participants who had family 
obligations. Participants who were parents almost always spoke of leaving because they 
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wanted to provide a better life for their children. (Overall, 44% of all participants raised 
their children’s livelihood as the reason why they decided to seek work overseas.) In 
explaining their motivation, these participants referred not only to the immediate needs of 
their children but also their long-term aspirations for their children, which usually 
involved their children earning a college degree and having a fruitful career. Time and 
again, participants shared how a good college education in the Philippines costs a great 
deal of money and would have been hard to afford on a Philippine salary alone. In the 
case of Lacey, a part-time domestic worker in the United States who now also works as a 
migrant rights activist, the only reason why she left a fulfilling and reasonably well-paid 
job in the Philippines was because she knew that her salary would not support her two 
children’s college fees: 
[I had] a job that I like. Yeah. But the thing is, with the rising cost of everything in the 
Philippines, we cannot send our children to good universities or colleges. So that was the 
challenge for me at the time. Because I have been petitioned by my family, my brother 
specifically, to come to the US. But for the longest time, I did not want to come here 
because I find my job and my life there [in the Philippines] more meaningful. But when 
the time came for me to send my children to college, you know, reality hits. Yeah. My 
sense is that I cannot do it there [in the Philippines]. I cannot do it there, so I was forced 
to come here. 
	  
Eberta, a former domestic worker in Singapore who now worked as a migration 
counselor for the Philippine embassy in Singapore, explained how her children had also 
been the primary reason she had given up her job in the Philippines to seek work 
overseas: 
It was 22 years ago. Because I have four children and my salary that time was very small. 
It was only 1,500 [Philippine] pesos [a month]. And we are renting a room, not a house, 
and it’s about 800 pesos [a month]. And my salary is too small. How to feed my children 
and give them a good education? So I decided to go overseas. At least, if I work and then 
I earn a little higher, then I can send my children to university.   
	  
Meanwhile, several participants who were unmarried and without children talked 
about the need to support their younger siblings’ education (if their siblings were still 
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school-age) or their siblings’ children’s education. (A third of participants saw 
themselves in this light, calling themselves their families’ “breadwinner.”) This was how 
Andrea, an unmarried, former domestic worker, explained her decision to leave the 
Philippines: 
Last December in the year 1990, I leave the Philippines for Hong Kong for the sake of 
my [sister]. I have one sister, a half sister, a maternal sister. She has five children and 
when I leave the Philippines, the eldest is about 19 years old so starting to go college. 
Then, after that, I send the boy to college. […] Because I do not have family. I have only 
one sister so all my best I give them. Send to college their children. […] I want them to 
study so that they can work.    
 
Other unmarried participants tried to explain the cultural norms behind this 
practice during their interviews. Laura, a 53-year-old, unmarried Filipina who had 
worked in Hong Kong for over 30 years, recalled how she had used most of her earnings 
to support her parents and the college education of several of her nieces in the 
Philippines. Laura had three brothers who also worked overseas as merchant seafarers, 
but she explained that, because her brothers were all married, “they have their own 
family, so they [have to] support themselves.” In other words, Laura’s brothers were 
largely excused from any responsibility to support their parents because it was 
understood that they would need to provide for their own wives and children. Laura, on 
the other hand, as a single woman, was expected to take the lead in looking after her 
parents and serving as a benefactress to her various nieces and nephews.  
A select few participants spoke of leaving the Philippines because they wanted to 
leave an abusive relationship. (Only 6% of participants fell into this category.) In such 
situations, their husbands were also often not financially supporting the rest of the family. 
These women sought work overseas partly to earn enough money for their children but 
also simply to get away from their husbands. Rena, who was on her second contract in 
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Singapore, explained that she had decided to leave the Philippines because she could not 
take any more physical abuse from her husband who was also unemployed: 
I had business in Philippines selling veggie. Then my husband don’t have work and so, 
me, I am the breadwinner of my family. So, for that reason, that is also one reason. Then, 
he is always beating me, punching me. […] What you call it in English? “Battered wife?” 
You call it “battered wife.”   
 
Other scholars who have studied Filipino migrant domestic workers have written 
that women migrants were pursuing a “covert strategy” (Parreñas 2001:64) to “avoid 
unpaid household burdens at home” (Lan 2006:134). However, in my interviews with 
study participants, such a motivation for leaving the Philippines was not apparent, either 
overtly or from reading between the lines. Participants certainly enjoyed the sense of 
financial independence that they achieved by working overseas, and their new status as 
family breadwinners. But my conclusion after analyzing the interview transcripts is that 
this realization only came after they were already working overseas; it was not the 
primary motivation behind their initial migration decision. When participants did use the 
language of “running away,” they were very explicit in explaining that they were running 
away from specific relationships and not the institution of domestic life or the gendered 
norms concerning household responsibilities. (But certainly, the desire to escape such 
household burdens may have been a reason for their continuing to work overseas rather 
than return home at the end of their first contract.)  
 
Neighborhood/Network-level Considerations 
Several participants, like Emmeline, also spoke of only starting to consider 
migration after comparing their circumstances with those of their “neighbors” or relatives 
who had gone overseas. It should be noted here that the term “neighbors” refers not only 
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to those individuals who enjoyed spatial proximity with study participants but also those 
who were socioeconomically proximate. Participants would look at the comfortable 
lifestyle these individuals’ families in the Philippines were enjoying, thanks to the 
income boost provided by their overseas job, and ask themselves: Why not work overseas 
as well?  
One of the reasons why Carrie, a university graduate and a secondary school 
teacher in the Philippines, started considering overseas work was because her neighbors 
in her village were clearly leading more comfortable lives after their children found work 
overseas: 
I was challenged. Our neighbors have only finished the secondary level in the high 
school. They don’t finish the university, their college level. But they are abroad and they 
were able to build a house! A nice house because of the money they earned. But our 
house is too small and old. So I said, “Oh, I better go.” Yeah, because I want to make also 
the house for my family. So I decided that my first ambition is to build another house for 
us also. So I was challenged: How can the other people who did not finish the university 
make such a nice house? Or a better house? Not so beautiful but at least a better place to 
stay. How about me? What am I doing? My salary is only good for groceries. I can only 
buy groceries for my parents and myself. That’s all. I cannot even save a single cent 
because you know the prices are so high and the salary is too low. So how can you save 
money? So, I better go.  
	  
This is also what happened with Cissie who saw how her aunt’s life improved 
considerably after her aunt worked in Hong Kong as a migrant domestic worker for 
several years: 
Because [my aunt] is working here [in Hong Kong] a long time ago. And then I can see 
how their life is improving.  What I mean is, she can—she has her own house and lot. 
She has all the things that they need. They can buy it […] because, of course, her salary.   
	  
Carrie and Cissie’s stories speak to the notion proposed by NELM theorists of relative 
rather than absolute poverty being a migration motivator (Stark, Micevska, and Mycielski 
2009; Stark and Taylor 1989). It was this sense of relative deprivation compared to 
neighbors and relatives who were now better off that encouraged individuals to attempt to 
better themselves by going overseas as well.  
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But what NELM theorists fail to consider is that there is a simultaneous herd 
effect occurring. These individuals considered migration as a means to improve their 
lifestyle because that was the approach taken by their neighbors as well. Several 
participants spoke of having been caught up almost in a wave of neighbors and 
acquaintances all looking for jobs overseas. Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2002) have talked 
about the herd effect influencing the location choice of Mexican immigrants within the 
United States. But, in this present study, this herd effect seems to have regularly 
influenced the migration decision and also the occupational choice of many interviewees. 
Carla chose to emigrate from the Philippines and also chose her destination (Saudi 
Arabia) by following in the footsteps of others from her village: 
All the people in our village go to Saudi Arabia. […] Yes! [Carla laughs.] Our neighbors 
are going to Saudi Arabia to seek a job because they said they can earn more than if they 
stay here in the Philippines. So that encouraged me also to go and work.  
Only the women? Or the men as well? 
Men! Men and women! Everybody! 
 
An important reason why the herd effect occurs is because the people being 
emulated belonged to participants’ “aspirations window” (Ray 2006). Ray defines this 
window as being “formed from an individual’s cognitive world, her zone of ‘similar,’ 
‘attainable’ individuals. Our individual draws her aspirations from the lives, 
achievements, or ideals of those who exist in her aspirations window” (2006:410). In the 
case of study participants, the people who populated their aspirations window were 
friends, relatives, colleagues at work, classmates and village/town neighbors. These role 
models’ migration decisions directly affected study participants’ musings about migration 
as well. There was a sense that if their role models could emigrate, then study participants 
could too. This had been a strong motivator for Gail who had been an elementary school 
teacher in the Philippines and had been struggling to make ends meet for her family. She 
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was inspired to travel stepwise to Canada by the actions of the principal of her school 
who had decided to emigrate to Canada. “Our principal is going there [to Canada] also,” 
Gail recalled during her interview. “So I told myself that if my principal who is planning 
to go, why can’t I go to Canada to go out [of the Philippines]. If somebody will help me, 
so why can’t I?” 
 
Participants’ Accounts of their Occupational Choice 
 The previous section already alluded briefly to how herd effects (a category of 
network effects) influenced study participants’ choice of migrant domestic work as their 
exit strategy from the Philippines. Just as the presence of relatives, friends or neighbors 
overseas encouraged participants to consider labor migration, these contacts’ decision to 
work as migrant domestic servants was critical in encouraging participants to do the 
same. For Malia, the unemployed engineering graduate mentioned earlier, any resistance 
she might have felt about taking on paid domestic work was negated when she received a 
letter from a friend of hers whom she greatly respected, who had become a domestic 
worker in Bahrain: 
That is the push for grabbing the work as a domestic worker. I received a letter from a 
friend who graduated ahead of me by one semester. She is very brainy and she took a lot 
of government examinations to apply for [engineering] jobs. But still, unfortunately, she 
was not able to land a job, even though she has a lot of recommendations from the 
government. And I was just shocked and surprised when I received a letter from her 
[writing] that she is already in Bahrain working as a domestic worker. And she is a 
talented and intelligent woman. So, as I was saying, that was the booster that pushed me 
to work as a domestic worker. Because I was saying, she is more intelligent than me and 
she is a smart girl, she passed a lot of government examinations for our course, but she 
ended up as a domestic worker. So, I said, why shouldn’t I make that stepping stone too?   
	  
For study participants without a college degree, migrant domestic work was 
alluring because it did not require as many qualifications as other overseas jobs. In 
contrast, securing an overseas factory job often called for more qualifications. Abbie, a 
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38-year-old former housewife and college dropout, explained that she had not looked for 
factory jobs because there were “too many requirements. I [do not] have requirements 
like special skills, employment certificate. I only have employment certificate of my 
family!”  
Abbie’s comment about her “employment certificate [from] her family” 
highlights many participants’ recognition that their experience with domestic work in 
their own homes made it easier for them to take up waged domestic service overseas. 
Most participants, almost all of whom were women, expressed more comfort performing 
household duties than other low-skilled jobs such as factory work. Working in a factory, 
on an assembly line, seemed dangerous to many participants. “It’s so hard, like that. 
Because all the plastic and then the chemical thing, you smell it and then like—I cannot 
do that!” one participant, 36-year-old Rani, explained to me.  Domestic work in contrast 
seemed less daunting to such participants like 38-year-old Delia, who had chosen to 
become a domestic worker in Hong Kong after being unsuccessful finding a job in the 
Philippines after graduating from college:  
I guess I think domestic work is okay. Because we are not rich, I used to work in our 
house at home. But, for factory, I do not have any experience. What will I do there?  
Domestic work is better, so that is why I decide [to do that].   
	  
There were also supply side factors that steered participants towards domestic 
work. Several participants recalled how, when they first started to consider working 
abroad, the recruitment agencies that were placing labor migrants overseas seemed to be 
looking only for domestic workers. “Because too many agencies, all wanted DH. No 
other work. All household work,” explained 65-year-old Betty, using the popular 
acronym for a domestic helper: “DH.” Betty ended up applying for overseas jobs at six 
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different recruitment agencies, all of whom were placing only domestic workers 
overseas.  
Even those participants who had training in other vocations had eventually settled 
for domestic work after unsuccessful attempts to secure overseas work that more closely 
matched their skills. One interviewee, 39-year-old Karen had thought her training in 
physical therapy would help land her a job in a spa in an overseas hotel job but to no 
avail:  
Yeah, before, because I finished physical therapy, massage, I want to work in hotels, 
something like that. But the domestic helper job is there only! [Karen laughs.] So I said I 
just want to try.  
	  
Several participants suggested that domestic work offered the speediest route out 
of the Philippines while more skilled occupations involved longer wait-times. There 
seemed to be a general sense that migrant domestic work was the most efficient exit 
strategy out of the Philippines, at least for prospective migrants without college degrees. 
Other participants saw migrant domestic work as the most expedient means to gain 
access to a particular desired destination country after which participants could look for a 
higher-skilled job that more closely matched their training and credentials. In this way, 
domestic work was not just an exit strategy to leave the Philippines, but also an 
opportunity to secure a better job at some future point in time. This was the case with 29-
year-old Ariel, a former elementary school teacher who had worked as a maid in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. She explained that she had chosen to be a domestic worker 
“because I was thinking it’s my stepping stone to go to other countries. So I said, ‘Okay, I 
will try first as a DH.’ Maybe [if it’s] God’s will, I can then go to other country to work 
as my profession.” 
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On the demand side, some participants had relatives or friends overseas who were 
already working as domestic servants and these network contacts convinced participants 
to follow in their footsteps and become migrant domestic workers too. Knowing a 
relative or friend who had also become a domestic worker, greatly reduced the stigma 
attached to this particular occupation. This pattern also highlights the importance of 
overseas network contacts in facilitating the adoption of migrant domestic work among 
study participants by reducing the “psychic costs” (Borjas 1999:178) of working 
overseas. In some cases, these contacts even matched participants with an overseas 
employer willing to hire them, thus reducing the actual costs of migration and making the 
decision to become a migrant domestic laborer almost impossible to avoid.  
 
An Assessment of Migration Theories 
The above firsthand accounts from study participants, combined with the history 
of Philippine migration provided earlier, can help us assess the applicability of the 
various theories of migration to the case of Filipino migrant domestic workers. From 
participants’ stories, it is clear that there is some evidence to support the broad argument 
laid out within neoclassical economic theory: that individuals are partly drawn to migrate 
because of differentials in the wages they currently receive at home and the wages they 
expect to receive overseas. And if this wage differential is large enough, these individuals 
are also willing to consider taking up low-status occupations like paid domestic work that 
they might have shunned in their home country.  
But the stories shared by interviewees also highlight how the understanding of the 
migration decision eschewed by neoclassical economics is overly simplistic. The decision 
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to emigrate is not simply a case of wanting to earn more money. The true motivator is the 
reason why migrants need the extra money in the first place. In probing participants’ 
answers to this question, their stories about being unable to afford their children’s 
education, of not finding a job in the Philippines after months of looking, or of only 
finding part-time work with minimal wages and no clear career trajectory, highlight the 
structural factors that drive so many Filipinos to consider migration in the first place. 
Filipino migrants would not have left the Philippines in such large numbers if it 
were not for the structural displacements they were experiencing at home. This is where 
world systems theory becomes relevant. It was the extreme poverty, indebtedness and 
landlessness that rural Filipinos experienced under colonial Spain and later neo-
imperialist United States that resulted in their internal migration to urban parts of the 
country, especially Manila. Later, it also encouraged their international migrations to 
other countries. This is a theme that has continued to the present day as the Philippine 
economy continues to suffer from widespread underemployment, rising costs and 
stagnant wages.   
The history of migration flows from the Philippines to select countries with 
specific structural labor demands, and in select types of occupations, also provides strong 
support for segmented labor market theory. Table 3.1 shows how, in 2010, 80% of all 
temporary labor migrants leaving the Philippines went to 10 high-income countries. 
These destinations span a wide geographical area including Asia, the Middle East, 
Europe and North America, and they have differing cultural and political backgrounds. 
But what they all have in common are very specific labor shortages that have resulted in 
all of them instituting labor importation programs over the last 40 years. Thus, even 
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though structural displacement can create the willingness and desire to leave one’s home 
country, specific immigration and labor policies need to be in place in receiving countries 
to create a ready market for these migrant workers. In other words, both segmented labor 
market theory and world systems theory need to be applied in tandem to explain 
migration flows from the Philippines to specific countries in the global economy. 
Participants’ accounts also provide qualified support for some of the proposals of 
the new economics of labor migration (NELM) theory. The first is that relative poverty is 
almost as important as absolute poverty as a motivator for migration. The second is that 
migration decisions are often made because of a failure of credit and capital markets in 
the home country. This was made clear by the fact that parents of college-going students 
found it easier to work overseas to pay their children’s tuition fees, rather than take out a 
loan.  
 However, there was one pattern observable in participants’ accounts of their 
migration decision-making process that runs counter to the model of household decision-
making proposed by NELM theorists. Rather than an autocratic head who made all the 
decisions on behalf of the household, or a family where all household members decide in 
a democratic and unified fashion—the vast majority of interviews presented a picture of 
the initial migration decision being made autonomously by the individual migrant herself. 
This departure from NELM will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter. 
 
An Assessment of Women’s Migration from the Philippines 
 Accounts of women’s migration from the Philippines in the 1980s found that 
primarily young, single women were undertaking migration (see Eviota and Smith 1984). 
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More recent accounts have found a preponderance of older, married women among 
Filipina migrants overseas (Parreñas 2001). I found significant numbers of both young, 
single women and older, married women among my study sample.18 Table 3.3 reveals 
that among interviewees, there was a sizeable number (41%) of migrants who first left 
the Philippines between the ages of 16 and 25, but an equally large number (39%)who 
left between the ages of 26 and 35. Likewise, though most interviewees (37%) possessed 
a college degree, 35% had been unable to complete their degree and 27% possessed only 
a high school diploma or less.   
Table 3.3 
Characteristics of Interviewee Population 
Characteristics Percentage  of Study Sample 
Age at First Departure (in years): 
16 – 25 
26 – 35 
36 – 45 





Education at First Departure:  
Less than High School 
High School 
Some College  







In other words, demographically speaking, female migrant domestic workers 
leaving the Philippines are bifurcated according to both age and education. But rather 
than focusing on such demographic divisions, I classify study participants according to 
their motivations for migrating. I find that my sample population of women migrants can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Oishi (2005) finds significant cross-national differences among women migrants from the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in her multi-country study of migration among women from the developing 
world. However, in this dissertation, I focus more on intra-country variations within the population of 
women migrants. 
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be broken down into four broad ideal types, each with their own distinct (though 
sometimes overlapping) reasons for migration. They are:  
(1) The “parent” migrant who leaves the Philippines in order to cover her children’s 
day-to-day living expenses and their long-term educational expenses, in particular 
their college education,  
(2) The “breadwinner” migrant who feels personally responsible for the upkeep of 
her parents, younger siblings, and sometimes, even the children of her siblings, 
(3) The “self-driven” migrant who seeks a better life for herself overseas, whether in 
terms of better career opportunities, a chance at permanent residence in a higher-
income country, or simply more fun, and finally, 
(4) The “escapee” migrant who is running away from an abusive or difficult 
relationship with her spouse, or, more broadly, from a life that seems lacking in 
any sense of personal fulfillment.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has served several purposes. It has first provided a brief history of 
the Philippines, focusing on the history of migration from the Philippines. This history 
has helped to evaluate the relevance of macro-level theories of migration to the 
Philippine case and, more particularly, the case of migrant domestic workers from the 
Philippines. This leads to the second contribution of this chapter: An introduction to the 
major theories of migration and a qualitative assessment of how well these various 
macro- and micro-level theories of migration can explain the migration decision of the 
participants in this study.  
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 What this evaluation reveals is that no single theory can adequately explain the 
out-migration of women from the Philippines in such large numbers. Instead, these 
theories—all of which have varying degrees of validity—need to be considered in concert 
to understand the myriad, multi-level factors that push so many Filipinas to leave their 
home country and seek greener pastures overseas, whether permanently or on a 
temporary basis. In doing so, I take heed of the point raised by Massey et al that the 
“causal processes relevant to international migration might operate on multiple levels 
simultaneously” (Massey et al. 1998:50).  
More importantly, the analysis of participants’ accounts of their migration 
decision highlights the diversity within the female migrant domestic worker population 
from the Philippines. This migrant population contains young women and old, married 
housewives and single mothers, college graduates and high school drop-outs, women 
running away from abusive relationships and women who see migrant domestic work as 
a ticket to a personally fulfilling life in their dream destination. The scholarship on 
gendered migration has grown substantially in recent years with the recognition that 
women make up an almost equal number of migrants moving around the world today. 
But the continuing focus seems to be on uncovering differences between men and 
women, without acknowledging that even with the population of women migrants from 
any given country, there can exist variation between women in terms of their 
demographic characteristics and their motivations for migration. The taxonomy of 
Filipina migrant domestic workers I have constructed in this chapter demonstrates how 
differing motivations can drive very different Filipino women to make similar migration 
decisions. It also indicates how the institutionalized culture of migration has become so 
117 
entrenched within the Philippines that it has made migration a very real option for varied 
kinds of Filipinas. This is one of the factors that have led to such a diverse population of 
Filipina migrant domestic workers employed in countries around the world, and also 
directly feeds into the diverse population of “multinational maids” I observed in my 








My mother don’t let me go. She was always crying [before I left the Philippines]. She 
even told me, “I let you go to college and you finished your schooling in order to become 
a teacher. I did not ambition you to go abroad to become only a [domestic] helper.” So 
she was crying. She didn’t give me even a single cent [to pay the agency fees]. She didn’t 
like it.  
 
The account provided here comes from Carly, a 53-year-old former elementary school 
teacher, who left the Philippines in 1982 at the age of 27 to work in Saudi Arabia as a 
domestic worker. She worked in Saudi for several years before finding a similar job as a 
domestic worker in Hong Kong. When I interviewed her in Hong Kong in 2008, she had 
been living outside the Philippines for 27 years. During that time, she had put most of her 
nieces and nephews in the Philippines through college, helped several of them find 
overseas jobs as migrant domestic workers or nurses, bought land and built a house in the 
Philippines for her parents, and helped start a charitable foundation in her hometown to 
provide college scholarships to impoverished high school students. Simply put, her 
decision to work overseas had been a boon for her family and neighbors in the 
Philippines. But when she first voiced the possibility of leaving her job as a teacher in the 
Philippines to work as a migrant domestic worker in Saudi Arabia, her mother had been 
                                                
1 An early draft of this chapter was a joint winner of the 2012 Dorothy McGuigan Prize for the Best Essay 
on Women awarded by the Women’s Studies Department at the University of Michigan. 
2 Throughout this chapter, I use household and family interchangeably, recognizing that within the 
collectivist Philippine society, there exist very strong ties even between immediate family members who do 
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appalled and had done all she could to change Carly’s mind, going as far as to refuse to 
help her cover the monetary costs of migration.  
This type of familial resistance to their migration decision (and their decision to 
take up waged domestic work) was a common thread connecting over half of study 
participants. These women recalled their parents and/or husbands expressing boisterous 
disapproval of their idea to work overseas as waged domestic servants. Familial 
resistance was often framed in a gendered manner, with relatives arguing that it was not 
“right” for women to live apart from their families and work overseas by themselves, or 
that the responsibility to be the family breadwinner belonged to their husbands.  
Even in situations where participants’ families did not express outright resistance, 
participants still spoke of seeking “permission” from their parents (and especially their 
fathers) and husbands, highlighting the patriarchal power dynamics that exist within 
almost all Filipino households and the negative pressures placed on potential women 
migrants. It was rarely the case that study participants decided that they wanted to leave 
the Philippines and then just left. The process—described in the previous chapter—of 
making the migration decision and deciding to become a migrant domestic worker was 
only the first part of the story. The second part—dealt with in this chapter—involved 
participants sharing their migration decision with their immediate family members and 
seeking their approval and, in some cases, material support. Most participants spoke of 
having undergone such a process: Presenting the case for labor migration to their 
relatives and negotiating with them in order to secure their blessings about leaving the 
Philippines.   
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In exploring this process of migration negotiation further, this chapter asks the 
following questions: Is familial resistance to women’s independent migration decisions a 
given? If no, under what conditions does resistance manifest itself? And, when there is 
resistance, how do women migrants overcome it? In other words, how does such a 
decision get translated into actual action? Contrary to the original proposition by new 
economics of migration (NELM) scholars, I find that the migration decision for Filipino 
migrant domestic workers is an independent, individual decision that they then have to 
negotiate with powerbrokers in their family, who may or may not resist the migration 
decision but who almost always have a say in the final outcome. These negotiations are 
embedded within power hierarchies along gendered and generational lines that exist 
within Philippine families and Philippine society as a whole. I term my approach to 
household-level migration decision-making the “negotiated migration” model and I argue 
that it presents a more realistic picture of how prospective women migrants around the 
world navigate the power dynamics within their families.  
In the case of the present study, these negotiations between prospective migrants 
and their families were aided by various macro-structural factors including the rising cost 
of living and the high cost of a tertiary education in the Philippines, the gendered 
overseas labor market that favored women migrants from the Philippines, and the lack of 
well-paid employment opportunities for women in the Philippines, all of which were 
outlined in Chapter Three. But, in order to win their families’ support, many women also 
agentically and exclusively framed their migration decision as a personal sacrifice they 
were making in order to fulfill their gendered family roles as dutiful daughters, 
supportive spouses and caring mothers within patriarchal Philippine society. The more 
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individualistic and/or self-oriented objectives behind their migration decision were 
carefully filtered out so that prospective women migrants could win over their relatives. 
Instead, participants focused on how much money they could remit to the Philippines and 
how this money could transform the lives of their relatives.   
 In the remainder of this chapter, I re-introduce NELM theory but explore it in 
much more depth than I did in Chapter Three. I particularly focus on how NELM 
theorists have approached the migration decision-making process within a household. 
From there, I provide a concise history and geography of women’s independent 
migration, highlighting how outright familial resistance is contingent rather than a given. 
I then shift focus to the present study and participants’ accounts of their families’ 
reactions to the announcement of their migration decision. I look at the individual- and 
household-level factors that are associated with familial resistance and the different 
gendered and non-gendered strategies that participants used to win over their relatives. I 
end by discussing how such strategies highlight the agency of these women to 
successfully navigate family politics and power hierarchies to secure the support of their 
relatives. But I also highlight some of the negative implications of these strategies for 
participants’ future lives both overseas and if they return to the Philippines. Thus, even 
though this chapter highlights how women migrants have greater agency than they are 
sometimes given credit for, it also emphasizes how their agency has limits. Though they 
managed to overcome some of the structural constraints restricting their spatial and social 
mobility, they did not eradicate all of them. This is the case when it comes to their degree 





The Migration Decision at the Household Level 
The neoclassical economic theory of migration assumes that potential migrants 
are utility-maximizing, rational and, most critically, independent actors, weighing the 
costs and benefits of migration before making their decision whether or not to leave their 
home country (Borjas 1999, 1990; Todaro 1980, 1969; Lewis 1954; Hicks 1932). There 
is no consideration of how other actors’ opinions, beliefs, ideologies and power might 
impinge on an individual’s migration decision (Portes and Walton 1981). In contrast, 
NELM theorists view the household2 unit as the primary migration decision-maker, 
determining whether or not an individual member of the family should migrate and also 
which family member to send forth (Lauby and Stark 1988; Taylor 1987; Findley 1987; 
Katz and Stark 1986; Stark and Bloom 1985). According to NELM, households dispatch 
a member of the family overseas or to a nearby town/city to seek work so as to expand 
and diversify their household’s joint income stream and reduce their relative poverty vis-
à-vis other households in their reference group. NELM scholars have proposed various 
household decision-making models to explain the internal family dynamics that underlie 
the out-migration of the selected household member: The “unified household” approach, 
the “dictatorship” model and lastly, the “super trader family” model. 
 
                                                
2 Throughout this chapter, I use household and family interchangeably, recognizing that within the 
collectivist Philippine society, there exist very strong ties even between immediate family members who do 
not live under the same roof (Medina 2001; Hofstede 2001; Chant and McIlwaine1995; Aguilar and Evasco 
1991). For instance, a woman may still be greatly influenced by her parents even after she has married and 
has moved out to live in a separate residence with her husband. In addition, there is a tradition for 
unmarried adult daughters (rather than say the eldest son) to take on the responsibility of caring for their 
younger siblings and elderly parents even if they live apart. 
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The “Unified Household” Approach 
The model of household decision-making that is most commonly associated with 
NELM is that of a “unified household” equitably sharing a joint utility function and 
reaching a common consensus as to which family member to send overseas. This model 
rests on the assumption of a “moral economy” existing within the family, where 
individual members selflessly subsume their personal interests for the greater good of the 
family both before and after migration (Lacroix 2010; Carling 2008). All members of the 
household are presumed to have jointly decided to send an agreed-upon member of the 
family to work overseas in order to benefit from their wages.  
This “unified household” perspective has been routinely criticized by feminist 
migration scholars for ignoring the unequal distribution of power between men and 
women in patriarchal households and the ideological constraints on women’s 
independence and authority that can severely limit potential women migrants’ ability to 
garner support from their family members for their migration decision (Boyd and Grieco 
2003; Chant and Radcliffe 1992; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Folbre 1986; Radcliffe 
1986). As a case in point, ethnographic accounts of migration patterns out of Mexico 
have highlighted regular cases of reluctance on the part of male migrants to assist their 
female relatives leave Mexico partly because of their belief that helping these women 
involved more work and more responsibilities (Kanaiaupuni 2000). The independent 
Mexican women migrants that Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo interviewed in her seminal 
work Gendered Transitions were all unmarried and almost always came from broken 
families or ones without a patriarchal head of household, enabling them to avoid the 
patriarchal resistance encountered by women from more traditional and intact families 
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(1994:83-97). In the Philippines, meanwhile, men are seen as traditional breadwinners for 
their families and this results in husbands being generally resistant to a role reversal 
where wives work overseas and men stay behind in the Philippines to look after the 
children (Lan 2006; Chant and McIlwaine 1995). These criticisms of the “unified 
household” model tap into the next model of household decision-making: The 
“dictatorship” approach.  
 
The “Dictatorship” Approach 
The “dictatorship” model takes as given that power hierarchies along gendered 
and generational lines exist within most families, and especially in more traditional 
conservative societies in developing countries. The “dictatorship” model assumes an all-
powerful head of household who commands complete obedience from other family 
members and makes migration decisions on behalf of the entire family. Such a despot 
might decide to send a family member overseas because he—and the head of household 
is usually a “he”—can command that individual to send remittances back to the family. 
Or he sends away a family member whom he sees as a potential competitor for intra-
family power, resources and status (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991).  
A variant of this approach is the “altruistic dictator” model which views the head 
of household as a loving despot with a utility function equivalent to the joint utility 
function of all other household members. The altruistic dictator’s decisions are always 
made whilst keeping the best interests of his relatives at heart and, as such, he chooses the 
same family member who would have been selected under the “unified household” 
model.  
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 This “dictatorship” view of household decision-making, taken together with 
entrenched patriarchal ideologies about a woman’s place in the home, has been used to 
explain the resistance many potential women migrants run into when they attempt to 
leave their homes for greener pastures. It has been used to explain the out-migration of 
younger sons from their ancestral homes (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991). But how does it 
explain the large volumes of independent women migrants we can observe around the 
world today? Independent female labor migration (both internal and international) has 
become increasingly prevalent throughout Asia and other parts of the world since the 
1980s. For instance, in Italy, Filipino women (and not men) were the pioneering migrants 
and it was they who sponsored their husbands and other relatives to join them in Italy 
(Strozza, Gallo and Grillo 2003; Parreñas 2001). In Bangladesh, the majority of factory 
workers in the “ready-made garment” industry are rural women who migrate 
independently to urban areas to work in these factories (Afsar 2003). In China, there has 
been a tremendous increase in independent women’s internal migration from rural parts 
of the country to rapidly industrializing city centers. Liang and Chen (2003) find that the 
vast majority of Chinese women migrants working in the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone are now independent migrants (over 96%), having travelled to Shenzhen by 
themselves rather than with their husbands or other family members. Theorists who 
support the “dictatorship” model would, of course, argue that these women were all sent 
forth by their household heads.  
 This is exactly what Lauby and Stark (1988) argue after finding that, among rural 
Philippine households, daughters (rather than sons) are more likely to migrate internally 
to urban centers to seek work. These authors postulate that this was because daughters 
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(rather than sons) are more likely to remit a greater proportion of their earnings to their 
parents out of a greater sense of familialism. This likelihood of a greater remittance 
stream from their daughters led parents to dispatch their daughters to the city, according 
to these authors.3 However, Lauby and Stark draw their conclusions using only survey 
data about rural-urban migration flows and remittance levels, without directly 
investigating the internal family dynamics that they hypothesize about. The intra-
household causal mechanisms that support Filipino women’s independent migration are 
thus still not clear. 
 
The “Super Trader Family” Model 
The third approach to household decision-making is what Amartya Sen (1983) 
cleverly calls the “super-trader family.” In this model, there are at least two autonomous 
decision-making entities within the household—the potential migrant and other 
relatives—each with their own set of preferences and long-term goals. The potential 
migrant and their family then enter into an agreement involving “intrafamilial trade in 
risks, coinsurance arrangements, devices to handle principal agent problems, moral 
hazard problems […] and contract enforcement problems […] and, overall, striking a 
mutually beneficial, intertemporal, self-enforcing contractual arrangement” (Katz and 
Stark 1986:136).  
                                                
3 A recent study by Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005) contradicts Lauby and Stark’s (1988) claim. These 
authors find that male migrants from the Philippines (primarily by virtue of earning larger salaries overseas 
compared to female migrants) remit a large portion of their earnings to their families back home. Surveying 
over 1,000 Filipino men and women working in various overseas destinations, Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 
find that male migrants remit on average 60% of their overseas earnings to the Philippines while female 
migrants remit 45% of their earnings. But it is still possible that there might be a prevailing misperception 
within Filipino families that it is women migrants who remit more money, and this could encourage parents 
to unilaterally dispatch their daughters overseas to work. 
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At one level, this approach to household-level migration decision-making appears 
to make sense because it recognizes both an agentic individual migrant and the existence 
of multiple decision-makers within a household. But this approach has been criticized too 
for exclusively focusing on the economic interests of individual family members and 
ignoring the role played by culture, ideology and other structural forces in shaping 
individuals’ views about the normative distribution of intra- and extra-household 
responsibilities and decision-making power within a family (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; 
Sen 1990, 1983). Critics have pointed out that family members’ perceptions about the 
proper role of women in the intra- and extra-household division of labor, their 
perceptions about what women contribute to the household (particularly in economic 
terms) and their perceptions about the amount of benefits (and rights) women are entitled 
to claim, all influence how such negotiations proceed (Sen 1990; Kandiyoti 1988).  
Even if it is in a family’s economic best interests to send one of their womenfolk 
overseas to work, family members may not support such a decision if it runs counter to 
their views about a woman’s role in the household. This brings us back to the question 
that started this chapter: How do women, often bargaining from a position of weakness 
within patriarchal households, overcome familial resistance and gain their relatives’ 
support for their decision to work overseas. What are the successful negotiating tactics 
that independent women migrants deploy?   
 
Independent Female Migration 
For the purposes of this paper, I define “independent labor migration” as the 
setting forth of an individual from their hometown/village by themselves in order to seek 
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work elsewhere, but without the benefit of a family member in the destination sponsoring 
them or a family member from their home accompanying them on their journey. In 
scanning the history of women’s independent labor migration, it becomes clear that 
claims about familial resistance to women’s independent migration have not always been 
true. At different points in time and in different countries, patriarchal households have 
supported their womenfolk’s departure from their ancestral home to seek work in the 
nearest urban area or in another country, with the understanding that these women would 
remit some of their earnings back to their families. At other times, households have 
refused to support such migrations.  
 In 19th century Europe, poor, rural households regularly dispatched their 
daughters to work in nearby towns as live-in domestic servants or factory workers (Scott 
and Tilly 1980). Across England, France and Italy, this practice was both widespread and 
unquestioned. Scott and Tilly argue that daughters (rather than sons) were sent forth 
because they were less needed back on the farm and they were more likely to remit more 
of their earnings back to their families. More recently, before the neoliberalization of the 
Indian economy in the 1980s, women from poor families within certain tribal 
communities in India would frequently move to more prosperous villages during the busy 
planting season to take up agricultural work (Bardhan 1977). Likewise, in the early 
1970s, in parts of rural Java, there were times in the growing cycle when women’s labor 
was most in demand (for instance, when it was time to plant rice) and, during those times, 
women would take up waged employment outside their village and work for long hours 
planting rice, while their husbands stayed at home to cook and look after the children 
(White 1976). These examples from different countries and different eras would seem to 
 129 
indicate that households in patriarchal societies can be responsive to macro-structural 
forces that favor the labor migration of women over men. However, none of the above 
studies provide an inside view of how these households came to the decision to dispatch 
their women, rather than their men, whether or not this migration decision was initiated 
by the women themselves, and what model of decision-making was used. 
More recently, Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (1994) ethnographic account of 
gendered migrations from Mexico to the United States is one of the better known 
rebuttals of the “unified household” NELM model. None of the eight unmarried women 
migrants interviewed by Hondagneu-Sotelo talked about traveling to the US as the result 
of a household-level migration decision (1994:83-97). For these unmarried women 
migrants, and even for the women who followed husbands already in the US, 
Hondagneu-Sotelo reports that almost all encountered resistance from their relatives (and 
especially their male relatives) when they first announced their decision to migrate.4 The 
women who migrated independently were able to do so partly because they were all 
unmarried and not beholden to a reluctant husband, and partly because they were already 
wage earners in Mexico and therefore able to fund their own journeys, without having to 
rely on resistant family members for economic support. As mentioned earlier, many of 
these unmarried women migrants also came from broken families or ones without a 
patriarchal head of household and, as a result, encountered less organized resistance to 
their migration decision. Only two interviewees actively negotiated with their parents, 
making the case that it was in their parents’ best interests to support their migration 
                                                
4 Other scholars of Mexican migration to the US report similar findings when it comes to Mexican 
women’s migration attempts (Arizpe and Aranda 1981). In contrast, Mexican men who migrated to the US 
by themselves brooked no arguments from their wives who remained in Mexico (Hondagneu-Sotelo 
1994:58-62).  
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decision because they would send remittances from the US (1994:90). However, the 
small sample size makes it difficult to assess if such negotiations are the norm and also if 
all women migrants are likely to encounter familial resistance or only certain sub-
categories of women.  
Other relatively recent studies from around the world have uncovered regular 
incidences of familial resistance to women’s independent labor migration from sending 
countries marked by high degrees of patriarchy. Women migrants from rural Brazil, rural 
Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, rural Bangladesh and the Philippines all encounter varying 
degrees of pushback from parents, husbands and fiancés when they first announce their 
decision to migrate (whether overseas or to urban areas within their own country) to seek 
employment (Lan 2006; Afsar 2003; Stichter 1990; Wong and Ko 1984; Arizpe and 
Aranda 1981; Aguiar 1975). Many young women had to delay their migrations until their 
parents relented and permitted them to leave home (Aguiar 1975). In other cases, parents 
vetoed certain destinations as being too dangerous, too licentious or simply too faraway 
(Arizpe and Aranda 1981).  
 Structural forces at the societal level may play a part in these divergent family 
responses to women’s independent migration decision. Stark, Micevska and Mycielski 
(2009) find that the eventual household member to go abroad is usually the one who 
stands to earn the most from working overseas, and is therefore potentially able to remit 
the most back to the remaining members of the household. Following this line of 
thinking, if a gendered labor market exists overseas that provides more lucrative job 
opportunities for women migrants, a household might decide to send one of its women 
members (rather than one of its men). But without investigating the internal family 
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dynamics that surround the migration decision, we will remain unable to explain this 
variation in familial resistance to women’s independent migration and what successful 
women migrants do when they come face-to-face with resistance to their migration 
decision.  
 
Interviewees’ Accounts of Familial Resistance 
Study participants were almost evenly split on whether or not they had 
encountered familial resistance when they first broached the idea of working overseas. 
Altogether, 55% recalled encountering resistance from one or more of their immediate 
relatives: Their parents, husbands, older siblings and children. Many participants also 
recalled encountering some degree of resistance from extended relatives and friends, and 
this typically went along the lines of “Don’t go; we’ll miss you!” from friends and “Are 
you sure you want to leave your family?” from an extended relative. Participants’ 
recollections of this type of generalized negativity towards their migration decision were 
vague enough that I concluded it was unlikely to have been a meaningful obstacle to their 
planned departure from the Philippines. In contrast, participants could clearly recall what 
their close relatives had said and done when they first raised the notion of working 
overseas. I inferred that it was this category of relative that was the true source of 
substantive resistance.  
Within the category of close relatives, most participants encountered resistance to 
their migration dreams from their parents, either both or just one parent. Among 
participants who encountered resistance, 56% experienced pushback from their parents 
and 29% from their husbands. But even in cases where participants did not face overt 
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resistance, many of these women still spoke of “asking permission” from their parents 
and/or husbands before going abroad and their choice of words demonstrates the unequal 
power structure (along generational and gendered lines) that prevails in Philippine 
households. In other words, even though most participants made the decision to migrate 
on their own, they still needed to receive the blessings of their parents (and/or their 
husbands if they were married) before leaving. Thus the migration decision for study 
participants lay somewhere between the autonomous decision-making of neoclassical 
economic theory and the unified household model of decision-making.    
 
Husbands’ Resistance 
Several husbands who were resistant to the idea of their wives going overseas 
argued that their families’ existing standard of living in the Philippines was already 
comfortable enough and did not require raising. Christine, who had worked first in Hong 
Kong and then Canada, recalled how her husband had said that there was no need for her 
to work overseas: 
But, for my husband, at first, he really don’t want me to leave. He said, “We have our 
daughter and I can still, I can still provide you our needs.” But I said, “Yeah, you can 
provide me the needs right now. But how about if we have more children? If I give birth 
again?’ I said that I guess for the future of our family and the future of our children, in 
case we are going to add more, then I really need to go. I really need to go abroad. 
 
This conversation between Christine and her husband reflects the differing opinions that 
occasionally existed between spouses about their ideal standard of living and their long-
term financial needs. In situations where the wife believed that their family needed a 
significantly higher inflow of income, while her husband did not, disagreements (similar 
to what Christine had had with her husband) cropped up about the appropriateness of and 
purpose behind overseas migrant work. Amarilla, an interviewee in Singapore, spoke of 
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how her husband too had initially been resistant to her working overseas because he did 
not think he needed her to contribute to the family income:  
When I first come here, I talk to my husband that I want to help him. First time, he do not 
want. But, maybe he realized that he needs my help. That’s why he allowed me to work 
here in Singapore.    
 
Without interviewing participants’ husbands, it is impossible to know if these men 
truly felt that their income was enough to support the family or if they were rather 
rebelling against the possibility of their wives out-earning them while overseas. But other 
case studies of Filipino migrant domestic workers have reported on husbands’ resistance 
to their wives’ newly-acquired status as family breadwinners and their own new status as 
“househusbands” (Lan 2006; Parreñas 2001; Pignol 2001). A similar pattern of husbands 
rebelling against the loss of their breadwinner status has been observed amongst the 
families of Sri Lankan migrant domestic workers (Gamburd 2000). In addition, as will be 
seen later, this notion of normative gendered roles within the household was also raised 
by the fathers of several participants, lending further credence to the idea that there was 
deep-seated reluctance on the part of men to subvert traditional gendered norms about the 
ideal distribution of responsibilities within the household.  
 
Parental Resistance 
In justifying their resistance, parents most often raised concerns about their 
daughters’ safety, regardless of how old their daughters were at the time. The separation 
and isolation their daughters would experience overseas was another concern that parents 
frequently brought up. Desiree, who had left the Philippines when she was 25 to work in 
Singapore, recalled how her father had told her that “it is too far away and then you are 
alone” when she announced her decision to him. Another domestic worker in Singapore, 
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Ariel, explained how her mother had told her, “No, you just work here [in the 
Philippines] because, when you go to other country, you don’t know what might happen 
to you.”  
Other participants recalled their parents overruling their migration decision and 
citing their youth and inexperience as reasons why they should not work overseas. 
Parents were also more likely to directly raise their daughters’ gender and their expected 
role in the household as a reason for their not leaving. Matilda’s father had spoken of 
these concerns when he initially vetoed her plan to work overseas: 
My father doesn’t want me to go abroad. “Because,” he said, “It’s not you to go 
anywhere. It should be your husband. He is the man. Then he should be the one to give 
you everything you need.”  
 
Likewise, Aisha’s father had had no issues with her brother working in Saudi Arabia but 
balked when she first raised the notion of working in Brunei as a domestic worker.  
Actually, my father is against it. Because, of course, who wants your daughter to be a 
maid, right? […] He’s a father. […] Of course, I’m not the first one in the family to go 
out [overseas]. My another brother is in, at that time, is in Saudi. But he’s a guy, so [my 
father] won’t mind. But I am a girl, so it’s a big issue.   
 
Several other participants echoed Aisha’s matter-of-fact statement about the double 
standards her father applied towards her and her brother’s migration decisions. These 
women spoke of having had male siblings already working overseas when they first 
raised the notion of migrating themselves. They took for granted that parents would be 
more worried about the safety of their daughters than their sons, and that parents would 
also have more say in their daughters’ migration decisions.  
 
Why Familial Resistance Mattered 
 Some readers might argue that familial resistance should not make any material 
difference to participants’ decision to migrate, and that participants would have left the 
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Philippines anyway. This would be a misreading of family dynamics within the 
Philippines. Filipino sons and daughters are very filial, demonstrating a deep-seated 
respect for and obedience of their parents (Medina 2001; Chant and McIlwaine 1995; 
King and Domingo 1986; Trager 1988). After surveying the literature on power relations 
within Philippine households, Medina (2001:164) also reports that husbands have more 
authority to override and countermand joint household decisions made with their wives. 
She writes that wives generally give into their husbands’ wishes for the sake of family 
harmony.  
This assessment of the power structure within Philippine families is supported by 
accounts from several participants about how they had tried to leave the Philippines 
earlier but had been unable to do so because they had encountered stiff resistance from 
various family members. This resistance was typically aimed at participants’ initial 
migration decision but, in some cases, it was directed towards particular destination 
decisions they wanted to make.  
 For instance, Jeannie, a live-in caregiver in Toronto, talked about how when she 
wanted to re-migrate from Hong Kong to Canada, her husband had refused to give her 
permission, dramatically altering her onward migration plans: 
In 2008, I decided to come to Canada because I don’t have any future in Hong Kong. But 
I was planning [to come here] in 2004. Actually, before I got married, when I got 
married, I talked about this with my husband, that I want to come to Canada. But then he 
said, “No Canada.”  
Why? 
He doesn’t want to come to Canada. So I decided, okay. Okay, it’s out of my mind 
already. So I will not plan for Canada. So I put it out of my head at that time. Because I 
want a family. I want kids. But then, in 2008, I decided I wanted to come to Canada. 
Because you know, I was alone. I wanted to leave my husband.  
 
In Jeannie’s case, she had initially given up on her plan to re-migrate to Canada because 
her husband wanted her closer to the Philippines and did not relish the idea of relocating 
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to Canada. But four years later, with her marriage failing, she no longer cared whether or 
not her husband approved of her desire to move to Canada. 
 
Factors Influencing Familial Resistance 
Slightly less than half of participants (45%) indicated that they had not 
encountered any significant resistance from immediate family members when they first 
suggested working overseas as a migrant domestic worker. A joint qualitative and (very 
simple) quantitative comparative analysis of participants who did experience resistance 
against those who did not was conducted to determine variables associated with the 
occurrence of familial resistance. Some potential causal variables and some interaction 
effects between these variables were uncovered though a larger sample is required to 
assess the statistical significance of these variables and their interaction effects in 
influencing familial resistance. 
Surprisingly, I did not observe any discernable pattern in how participants’ age at 
first departure was associated with the occurrence of familial resistance (see Table 4.1). 
But participants’ marital status did seem to play a role. Women who had never married, 
or were separated or widowed were less likely to have encountered resistance from their 
close relatives compared to married women migrants. (I should stress here that it was not 
that these unmarried women did not face resistance; just that fewer of them encountered 
resistance compared to married participants.) For those unmarried participants who also 
had children to support, their overwhelming need to earn more money cleared away most 
lingering resistance their families might have had. Rebecca, a 32-year-old single mother 
 137 
in Hong Kong with a young daughter in the Philippines, laughed out loud when I asked 
her if anyone had told her not to leave the Philippines: 
Nobody said that! [Rebecca laughs.] Nobody says that because they know the reality, that 
I cannot survive there [in the Philippines] because of my salary. [Rebecca laughs again.]  
And your parents? They were okay with you leaving?  
Yes, they were okay with me leaving them. Because we don’t have enough income, 
enough monthly income for us. Because, as what I said earlier, my parents were already 
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permanent immigrants (to the US or Canada) are also not included as the family dynamics surrounding 
their migration decision were qualitatively different.  
b. Includes women who were either widowed, separated from their husbands or never married. 
  
In contrast, married participants with children were much more likely to face 
resistance. Normative ideas about the role of mothers as the primary care-providers for 
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their children drove much of this resistance. Marnie, a domestic worker in Singapore who 
had left the Philippines when she was 24, had encountered resistance to her migration 
from her mother. Marnie’s four children were between seven years and ten months in age 
when she left the Philippines. Her husband was a farmer in the Philippines whose 
earnings were minimal and she herself was a housewife. While her husband had had no 
issues with her working overseas—perhaps because he understood the precariousness of 
their financial situation—Marnie’s mother had disapproved. “My mother says that ‘You 
can’t do anything’ because I have my own family already,” Marnie recalled.  
Another participant, Lena, who had also been a housewife in the Philippines 
before she left for Hong Kong at the age of 25, spoke of her parents trying to change her 
mind. Her parents told her that “it is very hard to leave a child with another,” implying 
that her husband or her own parents would not be an adequate substitute for Marnie’s 
own physical presence. Linda, a domestic worker in Singapore, meanwhile recalled how 
her relatives had criticized her for abandoning her children who were all girls. “They say 
that it is hard to leave them. ‘Who can teach them? Who can guide them? That is what a 
mother should do’,” Linda remembered during her interview.  
Participants who were more educated, possessing a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
were less likely to experience resistance (see Table 4.1). It is possible that in these 
households, a more egalitarian power structure existed and parents/spouses were more 
willing to respect participants’ decisions as being well-thought and for the good of the 
family. Janelle, a college graduate and former social worker in the Philippines, recalled 
how she and her husband had jointly agreed that she should work overseas after she 
brought up her plan.  
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Oh yeah! Me and my husband talk about it. You know, I said my plan. […] So that's what 
I said. That’s what I thought and said, ‘I need to, you know, I need to go.’ Well, my 
husband says he wants to go, but I said, “Well, that depends.” Because we were looking 
at it. For a man, there's not really a lot of opportunity that time. It was always the woman 
who was faster to, you know, to leave the country. 
 
The original idea to emigrate had been Janelle’s but she then talked it over with her 
husband, debating which of them would find it easier to secure work overseas. 
Subsequently, Janelle told her parents, not so much to get their permission and but to ask 
for their help looking after her young children while she was overseas. What followed 
was a reasoned discussion with her parents about her decision:  
I told my parents about how much I earned in the, you know, in the company that I’m 
working with. And I said, “You know I need to go. And if I leave, you know, I need your 
support to look after my kids too.” That’s why I need to talk to them. My kids were too 
little that time. [At] the time I left, my eldest is four. My youngest was two years old, 
yeah. 
 
In Janelle’s case, her decision to emigrate came closest to a cooperative household-level 
decision that involved herself, her husband and her parents, all of them agreeing together 
on a plan of action that entailed Janelle working overseas while her remaining relatives 
looked after her children. This is very different from Hondagneu-Sotelo’s accounts of 
married Mexican men who decided to immigrate by themselves to the US and simply 
announced their decision to their wives as a done deal, expecting their wives to take over 
all their household responsibilities while they were gone (1994:58-62).  
Magda was another college graduate who did not face resistance from her family 
when she first broached the idea of working overseas and sought their endorsement. Her 
parents were concerned about the long separation and the possibility of workplace abuse, 
but they still supported her decision. 
Yes, of course, I talked with my family first. Yeah, [I asked them] what they will think of 
my leaving. So, they said, “If you want to, we cannot stop you, if you think it is for your 
own good. If you believe that it’s for your own good, we will support you all the way.”  
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Like Magda’s parents, most mothers and fathers harbored concerns about participants 
becoming domestic workers overseas because of the loss of status and the safety issues 
involved. However, as is clear from Magda’s account, not all parents chose to prevent 
participants from leaving the Philippines; many only expressed their reservations but did 
not withhold permission.  
Critically, in Magda’s case, her announcement about her migration decision was 
eased by the fact that her older sister already worked in Singapore as a domestic worker 
and had been the one to suggest that Magda look for work in Singapore as well. The 
presence of a close female relative in the same overseas destination participants were 
considering (and that relative enjoying a positive experience while employed as a migrant 
domestic worker), significantly lessened the chances of participants encountering 
resistance from other family members. If, as in Magda’s case, that overseas relative also 
offered substantive migration assistance—in effect, lessening the costs and potentially 
even the risks of migration—family members were even less likely to have issues with 
participants’ migration decision. This was the case with Valentina, a high school 
graduate, whose sister had earlier found employment in Singapore as a domestic worker 
and then told her stories about the wonderful life to be had abroad: 
When you were thinking about going overseas, did you talk to anyone about it?  
Only my mother. And then my mother say, “Okay, try your best so that you can support 
your children.” Like that. 
Did anyone tell you, “Do not go?” 
No. [Valentina laughs] Because my sister, she came here first.  
 
 Participants who were already out-earning their husbands or whose husbands 
were unemployed (due to disability, infirmity, or simple choice) also tended to encounter 
diminished resistance as well, both from their husbands but also from their parents. 
Nannette, a former secondary school teacher who had first worked in Hong Kong and 
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was now in Canada, had opted to follow in the footsteps of her three sisters who had 
chosen to work in Hong Kong as domestic workers. According to Nannette, her husband, 
though sad to see her go, had little say in the matter because he was unemployed and 
completely dependent on her income. Another participant, Vanessa, a former architecture 
teacher, had overcome her mother’s earlier resistance when her mother realized that 
Vanessa was not receiving enough financial support from her wastrel husband (from 
whom Vanessa later separated):  
Because, at that time, I asked the consent of my mom because she is going to help me 
financially [to pay the recruitment agency fees]. Before, she always opposed my going 
abroad. But later on, when she see my life with my husband is not good, that my husband 
is not good, then she is ready to help me and allow me to come here, to Taiwan, and then 
from Taiwan to Canada. 
What was she afraid of? Why did your mother not give you permission before? 
Because my mom—she is a Chinese—so it seems she likes the kids, the family [to be] 
together. And she is very family-oriented. But actually, I have two brothers. They are 
seamen. Of course, they are men. Unlike women: If you go abroad, it’s something like, 
something, that’s not safe. 
  
As Vanessa unpacked the reasons behind her mother’s initial resistance to the idea 
of her working overseas, she exposed her mother’s gendered ideas about migration being 
a male endeavor while women’s role was to stay at home to look after the children. 
However, Vanessa’s mother’s biases were trumped by her realization that Vanessa’s life 
in the Philippines was quite miserable and that her husband was not providing for her. At 
that point, Vanessa’s mother’s resistance evaporated. But Vanessa’s story also reveals the 
continuing power Filipino parents wield over their daughters even after their daughters 
marry and become parents too. Part of this power is grounded in the fact that prospective 
women migrants often had to rely on their parents to step in and look after their children 
while they were abroad. But the strong kinship ties and sense of filial piety that exists 
within collectivist Philippine society also strengthened parental influence over these 
decisions. 
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 Finally, there appears to be a decline in the rate at which prospective migrants in 
the Philippines encounter familial resistance over the years (see Table 4.1). This is most 
likely in response to the growing culture of migration that has become entrenched within 
Philippine society (Asis 2006). Working overseas as a migrant domestic worker is no 
longer a step into the unknown for many Filipinas. The steadily increasing number of 
Filipinas with overseas experience sets a precedent that future potential migrants can 
utilize when they raise the idea of labor migration with their families. In addition, the 
growing stock of overseas Filipinos means that newer prospective migrants are more 
likely to already have overseas contacts working as migrant domestic workers to help 
allay any concerns that parents or spouses may have. 
  
Gendered Strategies to Overcome Resistance 
Those participants who did encounter pushback from relatives had to work to 
overcome this gendered resistance to the idea of their working overseas by themselves 
and as a domestic worker to boot. Several successful strategies were utilized but most 
involved participants emphasizing their gendered identities as dutiful daughters, caring 
mothers and supportive spouses, framing their migration decision as an exclusive act of 
intra-familial loyalty and self-sacrifice. Study participants would highlight how the 
benefits of migrating—particularly, the greater income that would be available—would 
allow them to fulfill their gendered roles as mothers, daughters and sisters. They would 
also talk about the negative consequences of inaction, in terms that made it clear that not 
migrating would make them less than adequate parents, siblings or wives. What they did 
not mention were the more self-directed motives behind their migration decision: The 
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desire to see the world, be independent, live in the West, escape a failing relationship or 
jumpstart their careers.  
 
The Migrant as Dutiful Daughter 
In trying to convince their parents to support their migration decision, participants 
regularly framed their reason for migrating as a family-based need, rather than an 
individual pursuit for selfish purposes. This was a common approach taken by almost all 
study participants who faced resistance from their parents: Emphasizing the shared 
benefits that would stem from their individual migration decisions. Desiree pointed out to 
her reluctant father that working overseas would allow her to fund her siblings’ university 
educations, something that he was unable to do on his own income: 
He doesn’t like me to go here. He said it is too far away and then you are alone. And so I 
said, “If you want to help finish all my brothers’ and sisters’ education, [let me go].” 
Because my two brothers, the two younger brothers, they are so clever. They say they 
want to learn, to study. 
 
In justifying her migration decision to her father, Desiree spoke of how she would be 
helping him fulfill his own responsibilities as the head of the household by providing a 
university education for his sons, her brothers. Other participants spoke of the 
understanding they had reached with their parents whereby they would work overseas 
and send remittances to their parents in order to support their siblings’ continued 
education, purchase land and build a house for their parents, or buy medications for 
parents who were sickly. Like Desiree, 44-year-old Aisha who had left the Philippines for 
Brunei at the age of 28, explained that her father had eventually agreed to support her 
migration decision after she convinced him that she could help raise her entire family’s 
living standards: 
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I say […] at least, I can help out the family. And I say, we can raise up the living 
condition. And I tell him, “Didn’t you want to have our own house? Buy a small land?” 
And he smiled bitterly. But I know. He’s a father. Then, after that, he said okay.    
 
Another participant, Rory, who was about to commence her second contract in 
Saudi Arabia when I interviewed her, recalled how she had won over her parents:  
My father […] does not like I go to other country because he has heard about, through the 
television, about accidents. […] But, for me, I am decided. Before, I told my father, I 
want to go. I want to help all my family. 
Your mother? Was she okay with you leaving? 
No, at first, it’s not okay. She is not okay. But after that, I ask my mother, “I want to go, I 
want to go. Not only for myself. It is just only for you.” [And] after two years [overseas], 
I have no money now. […] My money, all my salary in two years, I give it to my family. 
I give all to my family. 
 
In this manner, Rory cast herself (both to me, her interviewer, and her parents) as a filial 
daughter who continuously put her family’s needs before her own. Josie, a domestic 
worker in Singapore, had argued her case with her parents in a similar vein, telling them 
that she was not migrating to secure only her own future but theirs as well: 
When I came here in 1990, my father was very worried because one of the Filipina before 
that had come here—Flor Contemplacion, that one—got hanged. So my father is very 
worried that if I go abroad something happens like that [to me]. But I explained to them 
bit by bit. […] Sometimes, he is, of course, he wants us to stay very close. But I 
explained to him, “If we stay here together with us, we have nothing to reach our dreams. 
Our life is still the same.”    
 
In speaking in such terms, participants were turning the NELM “unified household” 
model of NELM on its head. Rather than participating in a collective decision-making 
process, these women were making their migration decision independently and 
individually over their families’ objections, but doing so to boost their families’ joint 
income stream and collective standard of living. 
 
The Migrant as Caring Mother 
When describing the initial resistance they had encountered from family 
members, many participants who were mothers spoke of how their relatives had 
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expressed disapproval over these women leaving their children behind in the Philippines. 
The underlying criticism being leveled at participants was that they were being 
irresponsible and heartless mothers, abandoning their children and leaving them in the 
care of another. Participants tended to counter these criticisms by arguing that working 
overseas (on a temporary basis) was in fact the exact opposite of abandonment, but 
rather, the best way for them to fulfill their role as mothers.  
Linda, the domestic worker in Singapore who had been criticized for abandoning 
her three daughters, tried to convince her relatives by clarifying that she was deeply 
concerned about her daughters’ education and day-to-day living, and that it was this (very 
maternal) concern that had compelled her to seek work overseas. Diane, a married mother 
of two, recalled how her husband had not wanted to let her leave the Philippines and she 
had had to convince him that her overseas domestic work was the only way for them to 
provide for their children: 
My husband is very reluctant for me to leave. But I said, “If I stay here [in the 
Philippines], what will happen?” It’s not that we will go hungry. We won’t become like 
that. But we have got two kids and the kids are growing. So I said, “If we stay with this 
income, more likely the future of the kids will be a question mark. So maybe if I go there, 
maybe I can give our children a brighter future.” But he is really, really reluctant.  
 
Diane was careful not to paint a doomsday scenario for her husband because she did not 
want him to think that she saw him as an inadequate provider. At the same time, she 
emphasized how the tertiary educational system in the Philippines was too financially 
burdensome for a Philippine income—even two such incomes—to cover. She made it 
clear to her husband that if they wanted to secure their children’s future, they would need 
to seriously consider overseas work. 
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 A similar situation occurred with Millie, a trained midwife who had first worked 
in Singapore for two years, then returned to the Philippines and sought to go overseas 
again to Hong Kong but was initially not allowed to do so by her husband: 
After I went back home, my husband doesn’t allow me to work [overseas] anymore. 
Yeah. So I look after my children for two years. But, because of the economy, I really 
need to come abroad and to look for work again. 
How did you convince him to let you go again? 
I just talked to him nicely. “You know, life here is so difficult and we want that the 
children, after growing up, go to college or universities. But if I’m just here to look at 
you, look at each other’s face, nothing will happen for us. And then our children won’t go 
to—we cannot send them to school, you know.” So he think it over and let me come 
again.  
 
In addition to revealing how participants cited their concerns about the cost of their 
children’s education to win over resistant husbands, Millie’s choice of words—about 
talking to her husband “nicely”—highlights how many participants had to tread lightly 
when dealing with their husbands, as the next section shows. 
 
The Migrant as Supportive Wife 
Participants frequently had to battle the belief that it should be their husbands, 
rather than themselves, holding the role of family breadwinner, whether in the Philippines 
or overseas. In such cases, interviewees framed their decision to migrate as a common 
sense response to the gendered overseas labor market that was available to Filipina 
migrant workers, which made it easier for low-skilled women rather than men to secure 
jobs overseas.  
In some cases, participants had to use this line of argument with their parents 
rather than their husbands. Matilda was able to overcome her father’s resistance to the 
idea of her working overseas only by pointing out how skewed the overseas labor market 
was: 
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I told my father that I think I need to work because [my husband] is not required for any 
job going abroad. He is not skilled. That’s why I preferred to just go abroad and then he 
[my husband] will be the one to look after my children.  
 
In Matilda’s case, it was only her father and not her husband who expressed reservations 
about her working overseas. But Matilda still had to work to overcome her father’s 
traditional views on the normative division of labor in the household. She tried to sway 
him by arguing that her migration decision was not an attempt to upend the gendered 
hierarchy in her household but rather a reaction to macro-structural forces outside her 
control.  
Other married participants had made similar arguments with their husbands. This 
was why Janelle, and not her husband, was the one to leave the Philippines to support 
their children’s education: 
That time it is easier for a woman to get employed overseas. Me and my husband, we talk 
about it. […] I said, “I need to, you know, I need to go.” Well, my husband says that he 
wants to go, but I said, “Well, that depends.” Because we were looking at it. For a man, 
there’s not really a lot of opportunity that time. It was always the woman who was faster 
to, you know, to leave the country. […] I was only the one [to apply]. I said we cannot do 
both, because of the financial, you know? The financial cost of applying [for an overseas 
job]. If I will go faster, then just I will try. Because, you know, if I go faster then I could 
start to earn [faster].  
 
Janelle was able to convince her husband to not even bother to apply for an overseas 
position. Other participants spoke of having made a pact with their husbands that both 
would apply for an overseas job and whichever one of them received an offer first, would 
be the one to go. Inevitably, it was the women. In such cases, participants were able to 
win their husbands’ support for their decision by allowing the market to dictate which 
one of them should go overseas. Thus both husbands and wives were freed from others’ 
negative commentary about normative gender roles within a household. They could argue 
that the decision to send the wife overseas was simply a reaction to the social forces that 
favored a woman’s departure from the Philippines over a man’s. Speaking of it in these 
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terms made clear that husbands were not being deficient in their care for their children, 
and neither were wives trying to usurp the head-of-household role. Rather, the decision to 
let the wife work overseas was simply the most practical option available to their family.  
  
Non-Gendered Strategies to Overcome Resistance 
A smaller number of participants also described adopting secondary negotiating 
strategies that were not gendered. These strategies were often more tactical in nature, 
such as waiting until very close to their departure date before notifying their family 
members so as to cut short the window available to relatives to express their disapproval 
or mobilize against participants’ migration decision. These strategies also did not focus 
on the benefits that migration would bring to the migrant’s family or the gendered roles 
that women migrants felt they needed to take on to gain their family’s support. Instead, 
one tactic attempted to highlight the migrant as an independent individual, capable of 
making important life decisions for herself, out of the shadow of her parents and older 
siblings. Another attempted to give family members a sense of involvement in the 
decision-making process by allowing them to veto certain destinations or the timing of 
the migration journey. 
 
The Late-Notifying Migrant 
A particularly common tactic (especially among younger, never-married 
participants) was to avoid any mention of  their migration plans to their family members 
until all the arrangements had been made for their overseas employment. This worked 
only for participants who had direct access to sufficient financial capital to cover the 
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costs of migration themselves without having to rely on their relatives for funding. 
Typically, these women were already employed and had their own personal source of 
income upon which to draw to cover their migration costs. For those participants who 
needed their relatives’ financial support, their announcement about their migration 
decision typically occurred much earlier in the migration process.  
But for several participants who were already employed in the Philippines, the 
strategy they adopted was to secure an overseas employer, fix their departure date, and 
only then, a week or two before leaving, announce their decision to their family. In 
Women in Motion, Nana Oishi (2010) recounts a rather extreme story of a married 
woman who only told her husband of her plans to work abroad on the morning of her 
departure. “I woke him up early in the morning and said I was going to work in Malaysia 
for two years on that day. He was shocked and trying to stop me, but it was too late!” the 
woman told Oishi (2010:105). 
Desiree (mentioned earlier) had adopted a similar (though less drastic) strategy 
with her father. “I finished all my papers to come here in Singapore and then I told my 
father that I’m going here to Singapore,” she recalled during her interview. Her delayed 
notification of her migration decision left little room for resistance on her father’s part. 
But this tactic had a two-fold purpose in Desiree’s case. Not only was it meant to curtail 
some of the resistance her father might have expressed, but it also allowed Desiree to 
demonstrate that her migration decision was not just fanciful thinking and that she had 
been organized and proactive enough to make good on her dream. She was able to 
showcase her ability to save money, impress a potential employer, handle the necessary 
paperwork, and overall, be fully responsible for her life—all skills that helped convince 
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her father that his daughter was mature and self-sufficient enough to undertake an 
independent migration. 
 
The Mature Migrant 
In fact, young and unmarried migrants consistently tried to demonstrate to their 
parents that they were mature enough to work overseas. Heather, a 34-year-old woman 
who had been working in Hong Kong for only a few months when I interviewed her, had 
only told her mother a week before her departure about her plans, using the delayed 
notification tactic described earlier. But she also tried to mollify her worried mother by 
saying “that no need to worry about me because, in the first place, I am old enough to 
handle it.” This argument that participants were “old enough” to make an independent 
migration decision was a common refrain in younger participants’ accounts of their 
bargaining sessions with their parents.  
In Aisha’s case, her parents had initially been against the idea of her working 
overseas as a domestic worker because of the negative stories they had heard about life as 
a maid. But Aisha managed to convince them to let her go to Brunei, partly by reminding 
them that her cousin was already working there as a domestic worker, and partly by 
telling her parents that she was capable and resourceful enough to protect herself from 
abusive employers:  
That’s why my parents—[at first,] they don’t let me come here but [then] I get approved. 
I say, “I got her [my cousin] here. Why she stay there [in Brunei] if it’s not okay?” I say, 
“This is life, man! If you’re lucky, if you’re unlucky, you have to take the risk. For me, if 
you want to be successful, you have to take a risk. Because everyday life is a risk. Even 
in the Philippines also, there are bad people and good people.” I tell my father, “People in 
the whole world is the same. In Philippines, there’s bad, there’s good. And overseas, 
there’s bad and good. And, for me, if there is bad, maybe I will use my mind. I will bust 
my brain how to get out of that bad position, right?”  
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Another migrant, Sherrie, in Hong Kong, who had enjoyed a carefree, hedonistic 
lifestyle in the Philippines when she was younger, had had a lot more convincing to do 
before her parents accepted that she was levelheaded enough to work overseas. Among 
the many strategies she used with her parents, she also tried to explain that migrating was 
in her long-term best interests because it would help her stay on the straight and narrow: 
Since before, I always dream to be going abroad. Yeah. But before they [my parents] 
don’t allow me because I am still young and I am the youngest. They used to treat me 
like the baby, like their princess. But later on, I said, “If I just stay here, in the 
Philippines, I think I can’t save money for my future, [or] for you, for your medication. 
Because before—as I have said—I am not very, very nice. I used to—I used to go out all 
night, drinking, smoking, drinking. I got a lot of friends. So me, myself also decided that 
I am too tired for this. And I am not getting any younger.  
And so I told them, “I am not going to do this [anymore].” And I told them, 
“And who will suffer later on [if I keep behaving like this]? It’s me.” So that’s why I 
said, “I think this is the right time and I hope you understand me.” And my mother and 
my father, they cry because they don’t want me to go but they respect my decision 
because they know that if I stay there [in the Philippines], maybe I am just like what I 
used to be.   
  
The Flexible Migrant 
Giving their relatives some say over the parameters of their migration decision 
was another tactic successfully employed by several participants during their 
negotiations. These women spoke of changing their planned destinations because family 
members vetoed particular countries as being too risky. Their relatives would permit the 
prospective migrant to emigrate only if she went to work in countries the family deemed 
safe. Jinnifer, a young woman who was about to leave the Philippines for the first time 
when I interviewed her, explained that her family had allowed her to work overseas on 
the condition that she not seek out employment in Saudi Arabia which had a reputation 
for being a dangerous place to work. Other participants had family members who vetoed 
entire regions—for example, all of the Middle East—as a precondition before throwing 
their support behind participants’ migration decision. This was the case with Millie, 
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whose husband had vetoed the Middle East as a destination when she first brought up the 
notion of working overseas: 
I didn’t plan to go to the Middle East because they said that the men are, you know, they 
are very aggressive. And they might, they will do something to the maids. […] But 
anyway my husband also doesn’t like that idea to go to the Middle East. Yeah, maybe if 
I’m a man, okay. But if you’re a woman, he said, you cannot. 
 
Interestingly, Millie’s remarks reveal that she had never planned on looking for work in 
the Middle East. But, by letting her husband exercise his veto power over that part of the 
world as a destination, she allowed him to feel more in control of her migration decision. 
By meeting their relatives halfway on such issues, participants demonstrated that they 
were willing to listen to their relatives’ concerns about their intended life as a migrant 
domestic worker.  
 
Discussion 
These firsthand accounts from study participants help shed new light on NELM 
and assess its applicability to the case of Filipino migrant domestic workers. From 
participants’ stories, it is clear that there is little evidence to support the traditional 
models of unified or autocratic household-level migration decision-making proposed by 
NELM. Among study participants, the migration decision was almost always made by the 
individual migrant herself and then negotiated over with participants’ significant others, 
most often parents and husbands.  
At the same time, not all powerholders in participants’ families expressed their 
resistance to participants’ migration decision, which speaks to the diverse pool of women 
who consider overseas migrant domestic work and the differentiated household/family 
power dynamics that can be found in the Philippines. Women who were 
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unmarried/widowed/ separated, did not have any children, and those who possessed a 
college degree, were less likely to encounter resistance from their families. Women with 
female relatives already working as migrant domestic workers in their intended 
destination were also less likely to face resistance. And in households where women were 
out-earning their husbands, the balance of power in the household had swung sufficiently 
in the woman’s direction that there was little to no resistance to her independent 
migration decision. Thus, the picture painted by feminist critics of NELM theory is also 
incomplete. Not all independent women migrants in patriarchal societies encounter 
familial resistance prior to their migration.  
When participants did encounter resistance, it was clearly gendered. This was 
most apparent in those cases where parents spoke out against their daughters’ migration 
decision even though they had had no issues with their sons leaving the Philippines to 
work overseas. Their resistance was framed using normative beliefs that still enjoy wide 
circulation within the Philippines about a woman being primarily responsible for all 
social reproductive functions within her household and her subordinate status vis-à-vis 
the male head of household—either her husband or her father. Married women were told 
that it was their husband’s responsibility to be the family breadwinner; women with 
children were accused of abandoning their children. 
Participants adopted various strategies in order to win over their resistant 
relatives. They highlighted structural factors such as the lack of well-paid employment 
opportunities available for women in the Philippines, the exorbitant cost of higher 
education in the Philippines and the difficulty low-skilled men would have securing 
overseas jobs. They also touted the benefits that their migration would bring to their 
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family: Better finances to support family members’ living needs and sometimes the 
possibility of permanent resident status for their parents, children and spouse if the 
migrant was planning to move to a country where family reunification was allowed. They 
framed these benefits in a gendered manner and constructed their independent migration 
decision as an exclusive act of love, filial loyalty and self-sacrifice, rather than an 
individualistic decision. They cast themselves as dutiful daughters, caring mothers and 
supportive wives, promising to remit most of their overseas earnings in order to ensure 
the future livelihood of the family members they left behind. They thus subverted 
Philippine norms about a woman’s role as care-provider to her husband, children, parents 
and younger siblings, and agentically reframed their migration decision as a way to fulfill 
this role rather violate it. Study participants’ negotiations are thus simultaneously 
reflective of Filipino women’s relatively weak status within patriarchal Philippine 
households and their agency in successfully negotiating with more powerful stakeholders 
within their family. It is not at all the straightforward transaction that is the third model of 
intra-household migration decision-making proposed by NELM scholars. The 
“negotiated migration” model I propose instead argues that individual migrants make 
their initial migration decision independently, though sometimes for collective purposes, 
and must then negotiate not only with individual family members but also with the 
system of patriarchy that exists within their households in order to have their migration 
decision ratified.  
However, given that this study was not originally designed to test NELM theory, 
there are limitations in the study design that need to be acknowledged. One shortcoming 
is the dearth of interviews with male migrants and the absence of interviews with 
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involuntary female non-migrants to assess how well NELM theory holds up in those 
situations. In the case of the former, it is possible that even in patriarchal societies, 
prospective male migrants (especially younger sons who still live with their parents) may 
also have to negotiate with their kinfolk before being given permission to leave their 
ancestral home and work overseas. However, prospective male migrants are traditionally 
granted much greater autonomy by their families. In many cultures, the out-migration of 
young males from their homes and villages is seen as a rite of passage and male non-
migrants are sometimes publicly shamed for not undertaking this journey (Jónsson 2008; 
Lan 2006). In any case, I would argue that the “negotiated migration” model can apply 
equally well to both men and women migrants, and can easily explain the reduced 
resistance male migrants experience. Using my approach, men coming from societies and 
households that hold certain expectations about a man’s breadwinner role and his “right” 
to migration can be expected to meet significantly less familial resistance and, as a result, 
have to engage in less bargaining with other family members.  
The absence of interviews with involuntary female non-migrants presents a more 
critical problem. It is possible that these non-migrants presented the same arguments as 
study participants did when attempting to leave the country, but that for some reason they 
were unable to persuade their relatives to support their migration decision. Future studies 
should consider interviewing both involuntary non-migrants and voluntary migrants to 
contrast their negotiation experiences with their families.   
Finally, there are the ongoing concerns with retrospective interviewing and the 
fact that I did not interview any members of participants’ households to verify 
participants’ accounts of their migration negotiations. Some participants might have 
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falsely recalled having had to overcome familial resistance, perhaps unconsciously 
making their initial struggles and subsequent victory over these struggles appear larger 
than they were. Or participants might have said that they did not face any resistance at all 
because they wanted to retain a fiction of unified familial support for their migration 
decision. However, I am inclined not to mistrust participants’ accounts in this regard. The 
fact that the study sample was split almost evenly between those who experienced 
resistance and those who did not, leads me to conclude that there does exist significant 
variation in the degree of familial resistance potential women migrants encounter. Given 
the diversity of women who consider migrant domestic work as an exit strategy from the 
Philippines, it stands to reason that they would experience a diversity of reactions from 
their family members. My findings also help explain the seemingly contradictory results 
of other analyses, with some studies finding strong familial resistance to and other studies 
reporting household-level support for women’s independent migration.  
 
Conclusion 
Over the last few decades, an increasing amount of scholarly attention has been 
paid to the international migration patterns of women who face very different drivers and 
opportunity structures at the household and societal level than male migrants (Morrison, 
Schiff and Sjöblom 2008; Curran, Shafer, Donato, and Garip 2006; Boyd and Grieco 
2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). Several efforts have also been made to theorize the 
migration of women.  
Saskia Sassen has written extensively about the macro-level forces in both 
sending and receiving countries that encourage the out-migration of female labor 
 157 
migrants from the developing world towards the West (Sassen 2006, 1988). Increased 
border security has been found to have a greater negative effect on women’s migration 
from Mexico to the United States, possibly because of women’s greater aversion to risk 
(Richter and Taylor 2008). Other scholars have highlighted how differing socio-cultural 
expectations for men and women can make migration a non-option for women who are 
expected to stay at home and take care of their families (Boyd and Grieco 2003; Radcliffe 
1986). At the meso-level, several researchers have argued that migrant networks may 
operate in gendered ways, with male migrants encouraging the out-migration of other 
men and female migrants encouraging other women to migrate (Curran, Garip, Chung, 
and Tangchonlatip 2005; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; Kanaiaupuni 2000). At the 
micro-level, rural Mexican women’s migration has been found to be positively associated 
with their years of schooling, possibly because of more-educated women’s sense of 
frustration with the social constraints and lack of employment opportunities they 
experience in Mexico (Richter and Taylor 2008; Kaniauipuni 2000). 
At the household level, feminist migration scholars have repeatedly critiqued the 
NELM assumption that women in traditional families are treated as equal partners when 
it comes to migration decision-making (Curran, Shafer, Donato, and Garip 2006; 
Radcliffe 1986; Wolf 1992; Folbre 1986). Meanwhile, other migration scholars have 
found potential women migrants regularly make their migration decisions individually, 
often over the objections of their relatives (Oishi 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). 
However, no alternative gendered theory has been offered to explain how and why 
women’s independent migration still occurs in the face of familial resistance. To fill this 
gap in the literature, I have proposed a new qualitative model of household-level 
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migration decision-making that is based on the concept of a negotiated migration 
decision and is meant to take the place of the “super-trader family” model of household 
decision-making within NELM.  
Rather than trading on economic interests, these family negotiations trade on 
different beliefs about the gendered division of responsibilities and power within a 
family. I argue that the migration decision is still more often than not an individual 
decision, but one that is often made for collective purposes to benefit not just the 
potential migrant but also the migrant’s family/household. This decision is then 
negotiated with the migrant’s household members in order to secure their support and, in 
some cases, permission. The bargaining that takes place between the potential migrant 
and his/her family is embedded within a set of social and cultural norms and perceptions 
about each family member’s roles and responsibilities in the household, and a gendered 
and generational power hierarchy. These variations in power, ideology and perceptions 
can mean that prospective migrants encounter varying degrees of familial resistance, 
from none at all (for example, in situations where they are treated as equal members of 
the household and/or are already expected to provide financially for their children, 
younger siblings or aged parents) to a great deal of resistance (as in situations where they 
are viewed as primarily responsible for social reproductive functions within their home).  
The process of negotiating the migration decision with resistant family members 
is one that has not been discussed in any depth within the migration literature, even 
though it is of great importance to independent women migrants, many of whom labor 
under a set of socially constructed constraints on their freedom of choice and movement. 
In the case of the Philippines, the gendered social norms that cast women as providers of 
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emotional care within the home and men as the primary providers of financial support, 
make it more difficult for women to work overseas by themselves while outsourcing their 
caregiving responsibilities.  
While the above social structures set the stage for the reluctance these women 
encountered when they first broached the idea of working abroad, other structural forces 
create the conditions that enabled study participants to overcome this resistance. These 
latter factors include the lack of well-paid job opportunities within the Philippines for 
these women, the rising cost of a university education in the Philippines for these 
women’s children, the worldwide demand for female Filipino migrant domestic workers, 
the speed with which one of these domestic worker jobs can be secured, and the relative 
dearth of overseas job opportunities for unskilled male laborers. The ability of individual 
migrants to navigate these opposing structural forces speaks to the individual agency of 
these women migrants à la Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. Even as these women 
were often discouraged from migrating overseas on the basis of appeals to their 
children’s welfare, they were able to cite their husbands’ and parents’ desires and 
aspirations for their family to secure eventual approval and support for their migration 
efforts. Others raised the Philippine tradition of unmarried daughters providing for their 
younger siblings and elderly parents as justification for their migration. Thus these 
women manipulated Filipino society’s gender norms to reframe their migration decision 
as a logical extension of their roles as daughter, wife and mother. In this, they were also 
aided by the Philippine government’s casting of Filipino migrants as national heroes and 
martyrs (Rodriguez 2010; Tyner 2009). The “migrant as martyr” trope propagated by the 
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Philippine government made for easy parallels with the “mother as martyr” trope that is 
already well-established in Philippine society.   
In the future, it would be worthwhile to explore how well these findings about 
Filipino women migrants’ decision-making processes transfer to other countries and 
cultures. As it stands, the very different structural conditions that potential female 
migrants from Mexico face can explain why they have a significantly lower propensity to 
migrate (Morrison, Schiff and Sjöblom 2008). For these Mexican women, the absence of 
a female-biased labor market in the United States, and the greater risks associated with 
undocumented travel, most likely made it difficult for them to overcome the resistance 
their relatives had to their journeying northward by themselves. It would be useful to 
contrast the migration decision-making process for female migrants from countries such 
as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Vietnam which have a substantial volume of 
documented female domestic workers leaving the country each year, to assess if they too 
had to negotiate with their families before being able to go abroad.  
Set against this chapter’s findings of participants’ agentic negotiations with their 
resistant families, there is a single down note. By emphasizing how working overseas 
would fulfill their roles as caring mothers, dutiful daughters and supportive spouses, 
participants inadvertently bolstered traditional, conservative views of women’s place in a 
household. Thus, while they carved out a figurative space for themselves as independent 
wage-earners and migrants, they cemented the traditional gendered view of Filipino 
women as the primary care-provider in the household: Self-sacrificial and self-effacing, 
always putting their family first before their own personal needs. This bind is apparent in 
Rory’s lament (mentioned earlier) that “my money, all my salary in two years, I give it to 
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my family. I give all to my family.” Other participants spoke of the constant, never-
ending demands for remittances from family members who took for granted that 
participants would send them money to meet all their needs. This practice of remitting 
practically all their earnings back to the Philippines and setting aside hardly anything for 
themselves has been observed by other scholars of Philippine migration as well (Lan 
2006:148; Parreñas 2001). Within this study, participants spoke of how they were 
constantly inundated with demands from family members in the Philippines for more 
money. Lan calls these remittances “filial tributes” (2006:148) to Filipino parents. I 
would argue that the expectation of regular remittances is compounded by the 
“patriarchal bargaining” (Kandiyoti 1988) that aspiring Filipina migrants have to 
undertake in order to win their family’s support for their migration decision.  
In this way, participants’ actions inadvertently fostered the model of “Asian 
feminism” (Roces and Edwards 2010; Sen 2004; Roces 2000) being promoted by the 
patriarchal governments of modern Asian countries. These governments encourage 
women’s labor force participation to boost the national GDP of their countries but, at the 
same time, they continue to expect women to hold a subservient position in their 
households vis-à-vis their husbands and fathers (Brooks 2006; Sen 2004; Roces and 
Edwards 2000; Chant and McIlwaine 1995; Afshar 1987). Thus, even though these 
pioneering women migrants break gender barriers when it comes to their labor migration, 












The Transnational Labor Market for Migrant Domestic Workers 
 
For Filipinas seeking to leave the Philippines for the first time as temporary 
migrant domestic workers, there is still the “where” of their migration journey to 
consider. A number of recent demographic and socioeconomic trends in both developed 
and high-income developing countries—most critically a rapidly aging population and 
declining birthrates that are shrinking the size of the productive population (UNDP 
2000)—have resulted in an explosion of demand for domestic workers in these countries. 
The rising female labor force participation rate, alongside reductions in state investment 
in public welfare programs, has also created a “care crisis” in these countries, with 
families (especially women) feeling unable to devote sufficient time to their childcare, 
eldercare, and/or housework duties (Parreñas 2008; Hochschild 1989, 2000). These social 
reproductive responsibilities are still viewed as predominantly a private rather than a 
public responsibility and, more particularly, the responsibility of the woman of a 
household. Many working women are forced to hire household help if they want to 
maintain some kind of balance between work and home life (Enloe 2000; Carnoy 2000). 
In other countries (especially in the Middle East) with a long history of waged 
domestic service, a rapidly growing middle class population has resulted in a booming 
demand for more domestic workers. But native-born citizens in all of these countries 
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increasingly shun such 3-D jobs. In order to make up for this shortfall in their internal 
labor supply, many of these countries have introduced new foreign guest worker 
programs or expanded existing policies to allow foreign domestic workers to be 
employed within their national borders. 
In Canada, the government has instituted a “Live-In Caregiver Program” that 
imports foreign workers on four-year work permits to serve as live-in nannies and 
domestic workers (Bakan and Stasiulis 1997). Italy, Cyprus, Norway, Greece, Israel (and, 
until recently, Spain) have similar programs that allow foreign caregivers into the country 
on short-term visas (Parreñas 2001; Anthias and Lazaridis 2000). High-income 
developing countries in Asia (such as the “tiger” economies of Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan) and the Middle East are also important destinations for foreign domestic 
workers who enter into renewable two-year contracts with local and expatriate employers 
in these countries (Lan 2006; Parreñas 2001; Yeoh and Huang 1998; Constable 1997a). 
In short, Filipina migrants who decide to seek employment overseas as domestic workers 
can choose from the many overseas markets open to migrant workers. 
Some critics might argue that for low-capital migrants like waged domestic 
workers, the notion of a destination decision is moot and that they are simply steered 
towards specific countries by factors outside their control. While this might be somewhat 
true for first-time migrants who are severely capital-constrained, repeat migrants must 
make a destination decision each time they end one overseas contract and decide to start 
another. Do they stay in their current country of employment? Or do they move to 
another country? For repeat migrants who have, in some ways, committed to a life 
overseas as a temporary migrant and who have managed to set aside some money from 
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their overseas earnings, the destination decision is an especially critical one. And so, 
having looked at study participants’ migration decision in the previous two chapters of 
this dissertation, this present chapter and the next deal with participants’ destination 
decisions(s). 
This chapter outlines the key differences between the domestic worker programs 
of seven of the most important markets for Filipino domestic workers—Canada, Italy, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and the United States—
that together absorbed over half of newly-hired domestic workers leaving the Philippines 
between 2005 and 2009. This analysis serves three purposes. First, it highlights how labor 
migration—even for a low-status occupation like waged domestic service—offers 
prospective migrants entry into a wide range of countries around the world, including 
some that are otherwise highly restrictive in their immigration policies. Second, the 
comparison of these countries’ programs reveals that even though the work being 
performed by migrant domestic laborers in each of these countries is very similar, these 
countries’ programs are not. In fact, it is possible to objectively rate and rank each of 
these domestic worker programs on two broad criteria: the degree of employment rights 
and the degree of migrant rights granted these migrant domestic workers. Third and most 
important, this analysis reveals how different countries’ policy regimes play a critical role 
in establishing a transnational labor market for migrant domestic workers, a necessary 
pre-condition for multistate migration. In fact, differences in state policy are some of the 




Migrant Domestic Worker Policy Regimes 
In 2010, newly-hired Filipino migrant domestic workers began work in over 200 
countries and territories around the world (POEA 2011). These migrant domestic workers 
labor under different labels in different host countries: In some countries (such as Canada 
and Taiwan) they are designated as “caregivers,” while in others, they are known as 
“domestic helpers” or “maids.” But across these countries, there are few significant 
differences in terms of the actual duties domestic workers are asked to undertake. 
Whatever their title, migrant domestic workers are expected to perform one or more types 
of carework—looking after the elderly and/or the young, cooking, cleaning and washing. 
However, there are significant differences across markets in terms of the regulations 
governing these workers’ labor protections, living conditions and wage rates.  
The International Labor Organization (ILO), which adopted the Convention on 
Domestic Workers1 recognizes domestic workers as being entitled to the same types of 
protections as other workers. It highlights the following areas that any national legislation 
on domestic workers should guarantee: 
1. A formal, written contract between employer and employee outlining the expected 
wages, working hours, duties, rest periods and other benefits, 
2. A minimum wage level, 
3. A regular payment schedule for wages, 
4. A limit on the amount of in-kind payments given to workers, 
5. A guarantee of privacy and comfort as part of a domestic worker’s living quarters, 
e.g. a private room, a separate bathroom, a private bed, etc., 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/100thSession/media-centre/press-releases/WCMS_157891/lang--
en/index.htm. Accessed on January 20, 2012. 
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6. A limit on the number of hours a domestic worker is expected to work or be on call 
per day, 
7. A guarantee of autonomy with respect to a domestic worker’s personal life, e.g. 
employers do not have the right to confiscate a worker’s passport or read a worker’s 
personal correspondence, 
8. Weekly rest periods of at least 24 hours, 
9. Protection against unjustified termination of employment without notice or severance 
pay, 
10. Access to health insurance, social security insurance and unemployment insurance, 
11. The right to be treated equally without being discriminated against on the basis of 
nationality, race or health condition, 
12. The right to collective bargaining and the right to freely associate with other domestic 
workers, 
13. The opportunity to invest in personal development through classes, as long as these 
classes do not interfere with work responsibilities, 
14. Access to courts or labor tribunals in the event of a dispute with an employer, and 
15. A recognition of a worker’s own family responsibilities (e.g. maternity leave). 
No country currently guarantees the full set of these protections to paid domestic 
workers. However, some countries do significantly more for these workers than others. 
Almost all European countries already include domestic workers in their general 
protections for workers. Most Middle Eastern and Asian countries, in contrast, 
specifically preclude domestic workers from their national labor laws (International 
Labor Organization 2010). Asian countries do provide separate but very limited 
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protections to domestic workers, but countries in the Middle East provide almost no 
employment rights at all. These latter countries fail to guarantee minimum wages, limited 
work hours, weekly rest days, maternity leave and other protections to domestic workers. 
In other words, there are sharp regional contrasts between different countries’ domestic 
worker policy regimes. 
For the remainder of this section, I focus on the domestic worker programs and 
policies of seven countries—Canada, Italy, Hong Kong, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States (US) (see Table 5.1 for a summary 
of differences between these country markets). These destinations were chosen to reflect 
the diversity of countries and world regions that Filipino domestic workers (and Filipino 
migrants in general) migrate to each year. Together, these countries represent 51.2% of 
the average annual outflow of all newly-hired migrant domestic workers from the 
Philippines (see Table 5.2). Hong Kong draws just over a quarter of these newly-hired 
Filipino migrant domestic workers while the UAE and Saudi Arabia each absorb an 
additional 10 percent of this migration stream. Finally, Canada, Singapore and Italy each 
take in just 2.5 percent of the newly-hired migrant domestic worker flow out of the 
Philippines, though it should be noted that these numbers are most likely heavily 
underestimated (see Table 5.2, footnotes c & d). And finally, the US accepts only 0.1% of 
all migrant domestic workers leaving the Philippines each year (see Table 5.2, footnote e) 
but it is included in this discussion because—as will be discussed in more depth in 
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Living Conditions Working Conditions 




or relevant work 
experience 
• Fluency in 
French/English 
 





>$1200 • Unlimited freedom 
of movement 
• Permanent residence 
after 24 months of 
employment 
• Guaranteed weekly 
rest day 
• Limited work hours 
• Protection under 
Employment Act 
Italy • 6-month 
caregiver training 




• Unlimited freedom 
of movement 
• Permanent residence 
after 6 years of 
employment 
• Guaranteed weekly 
rest day 
• Limited work hours 
• Protection under 
Employment Act 
 
Hong Kong • High school 
diploma 
$1,500-$2,000 ~$450  • Unlimited freedom 
of movement 





• Guaranteed weekly 
rest day 
• Protection under 




Singapore • High school 
diploma 
• Females only 








>$300 • Unlimited freedom 
of movement 
• No option for 
permanent residence 
• No guaranteed 
weekly rest day 
• Some labor 
protections  
 











 $380 • Some freedom of 
movement outside 
employer’s home 
• Many incidents of 
abuse 
• No option for 
permanent residence 
• Freedom of religion 
 
• No guaranteed 
weekly rest day 
• No labor protections  
Saudi 
Arabia 






 $200 • No freedom of 
movement outside 
employer’s home 
• Many incidents of 
abuse 
• No option for 
permanent residence 
• No freedom of 
religion 
• No guaranteed 
weekly rest day 
• No labor protections  
Notes:  
1. All currency amounts are in US dollars. 
2. The costs of entry are the total fees charged by recruitment agencies based in the Philippines unless otherwise stated. 
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Table 5.2 
Average Annual Migration Flows for Newly-Hired Filipino Migrant Workers, 2005-2009 









Worldwide Total 881,212  81,538  
Hong Kong 86,656 9.8% 20,491 25.1% 
United Arab Emirates 138,507 15.7% 8,213 10.1% 
Saudi Arabia 244,716 27.8% 6,994 8.6% 
Italy 21,863 2.5% 2,063c 2.5% 
Canada 11,444 1.3% 2,035c 2.5% 
Singapore 40,410 4.6% 1,962d 2.4% 
United States of 
America 2,888 0.3% 59
e 0.1% 
Sub-Total 546,484 62.0% 41,817 51.3% 
Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 
a. Countries are listed in descending order of the average volume of migrant domestic workers they 
receive annually from the Philippines.  
b. Includes POEA statistics for both “household service workers” and “caregivers.” 
c. Data for Canada and Italy are most likely heavily underestimated due to undercounting of Filipino 
caregivers who traveled first to intermediate countries before finding jobs in Canada and Italy. 
d. Data for Singapore is likely underestimated as many Filipino domestic workers in Singapore arrive on 
tourist visas to avoid pre-departure processing (and tallying) by Philippine government agencies.  
e. Data for the United States is likely underestimated given the significantly higher number of A-3, G-5 
and NATO-7 United States’ visas issued to Filipino citizens during this period. See Table 5.6. 
 
Canada 
 Prior to the 1940s, most migrant domestic workers entering Canada were white and 
British and granted full citizenship rights immediately upon their arrival (Daenzer 1997). 
However, starting in the 1960s, the rapid increase in Canadian women’s labor force 
participation rates, together with their inflexible work arrangements, precipitated a 
national care crisis that the dwindling immigration flow from the UK was unable to 
solve. By the 1970s, in order to address this problem, Canada was issuing 10,000 to 
16,000 temporary work permits a year, 96% of which were being issued to live-in foreign 
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domestic workers (Arat-Koc 1989).2 These women were drawn from Southern and 
Eastern Europe, the Caribbean and the Philippines (Daenzer 1997). Eventually, in 1981, 
the Canadian government formalized these migration flows under the Foreign Domestic 
Movement (FDM) program (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2007). In contrast with 
earlier migrant domestic workers, participants in the FDM program were no longer 
immediately granted permanent residency upon arrival but instead had to complete two 
years of employment before they could apply for permanent resident status.   
 The FDM program was replaced by the Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP) in 
1992. To qualify for the LCP, applicants need to have completed the equivalent of a 
Canadian high school diploma (which, for Filipinos, translates to at least two years or 72 
credit hours of college courses), have six months of full-time training in caregiving (or 
one year of relevant full-time work experience) and have sufficient knowledge of English 
or French.3 Once in Canada, workers are protected by relatively strict regulations 
concerning their work hours, wages and benefits that all local employers are expected to 
abide by. These working conditions vary slightly according to provincial or territorial 
law. To take Ontario as an example, migrant domestic workers in that province there are 
only allowed to work eight hours a day, at a minimum rate of CA$10.25 an hour (or just 
under US$10.50), with a mandatory weekly day of rest, nine public holidays each year, 
and two weeks of paid vacation time for each year of service.4 Employers are required to 
provide a private room and board to caregivers at a stipulated cost and also make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Only the province of Quebec offers heavily subsidized, full-day kindergarten for all children under five 
years of age, charging parents only CA$5 a day. The province of Ontario is considering offering full-day 
kindergarten to all four- and five-year-olds. For younger children, most Canadian working parents are still 
forced to rely on private arrangements that include daycare centers and live-in caregivers (Turgeon 2010:8). 
3 For the full eligibility requirements, see http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/caregiver/apply-who.asp. 
Retrieved on January 10, 2011. 
4 http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/is_fn_esa.php. Retrieved on January 10, 2011. 
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employment insurance and pension payments on behalf of their employees. Overtime pay 
of at least 1½ times the basic wage is required for any hours worked over 44 hours a 
week. Live-in caregivers are also protected under Canada’s Employment Standards Act 
that guarantees a host of employment rights including maternity leave, parental leave and 
protection from termination without notice. And, in the latest changes to the LCP that 
were introduced in April 2010, caregivers now have a window of four years in which to 
complete the 24 months or 3,900 hours of full-time employment required to qualify for 
permanent residence in Canada.  
 When compared to the generous citizenship rights granted to earlier generations 
of migrant domestic workers by the Canadian government, the current LCP regime seems 
unfairly strict (Hodge 2006). However, when compared with the programs instituted by 
other countries, Canada comes across as a bulwark of liberalism. Canada is one of only a 
handful of countries that offers even the possibility of permanent residence and eventual 
citizenship to migrant domestic workers. Given the allure of gaining permanent resident 
status and the relatively high wage rates offered, Canada remains extremely attractive to 
prospective migrant domestic workers. Filipinos have practically monopolized 
applications for the LCP since its inception. In 2008, the latest year for which full 
immigration statistics are available, 11,231 live-in caregiver applications were approved 
by the Canadian government. Of these, 10,120 applications (90%) were from individuals 
holding Filipino citizenship.5 Table 5.3 provides more details on the number of live-in 
caregiver visas issued by Canada between 2000 and 2009.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Data purchased from Citizenship and Immigration Canada in 2010 by the author. 
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Table 5.3 
Number of Live-in Caregiver Applications Approved by Canada, 2000-2009 
Year Total Applications  (All citizenships) 
Applications from 
Philippine Citizens 
% of Total Applications 
from Philippine Citizens 
2000 2,236 1,910 85% 
2001 3,753 3,122 83% 
2002 3,458 1,860 54% 
2003 4,575 3,883 85% 
2004 6,134 5,273 86% 
2005 6,538 5,953 91% 
2006 8,185 7,483 91% 
2007 11,878 11,025 93% 
2008 11,231 10,120 90% 
2009*  6,455 5,779 90% 
Source: Immigration Canada 
* 2009 data was only available for the January-September period. 
 
 The popularity of Canada’s LCP among Filipinos is also reflected in the 
exorbitant fees that overseas recruitment agencies in the Philippines and other countries 
charge prospective migrants who seek an LCP work permit to Canada. By Canadian law, 
migrant workers are not required to pay these agencies any placement fee at all; instead, 
employers are expected to bear all recruitment-related expenses.6 This stipulation is 
largely ignored by recruitment agencies. Prospective Filipino migrants are routinely 
called upon to pay agencies anywhere from US$3,000-US$16,000 for a work permit to 
Canada.7 The average Filipino had an average annual family income in 2009 of only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/faq/work/caregiver-faq24.asp 
7 Based on field interviews conducted with migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong, Singapore, the 
Philippines, and Canada between 2008 and 2010. Recruitment agency costs varied depending on the 
country where the agency was located. If a migrant was applying through an agency in the Philippines, 
charges sometimes went up to US$16,000. If the migrant was applying from Hong Kong or Singapore, 
however, the agency charges were more likely to be within the US$3,000-US$6,500 range. A handful of 
Canada-based participants reported having used agencies that allowed them to pay a portion of their 
placement fees through salary deductions after having started their contracts in Canada. But the vast 
majority of participants had been required to pay these fees in their entirety upfront before departing for 
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PHP206,0008 (or US$4,640). Based on 2009 Philippine income data, the cost of entry to 
Canada would be between 65-340% of the average annual family income in the 
Philippines and, as such, an almost unsurpassable obstacle for most Filipino prospective 
migrants.  For this reason alone, gaining direct entry from the Philippines to Canada 
through the LCP is limited to migrants (like Sherrie in Chapter One) with high levels of 
capital. These migrants need to have access to sufficient financial capital to pay the 
exorbitant agency fees, possess enough human capital in terms of the necessary 
educational qualifications and work experience to meet the requirements for the LCP, 
and/or have sufficient social capital in the form of friends or relatives in Canada who 
could directly match the migrant with a Canadian employer and thereby save the migrant 
from having to pay a placement fee to a recruitment agency. Working in an intermediate 
country for a few years is one way for less-endowed migrants to accumulate this much-
needed capital in order to secure an LCP visa to Canada.  
  
Italy 
Before the 1960s, Italy (and other southern European countries like Spain) was a 
net sender of migrants, but as its economy began to offer more employment opportunities 
for its own citizens and for foreigners, this pattern began to reverse itself. Italy is now 
considered a new country of immigration in Europe and various categories of migrant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Canada.  
8 http://www.census.gov.ph/. Data was collected using the Family Income and Expenditures Survey 
conducted by the Philippine government’s National Statistics Office. However it is generally recognized 
that there is widespread underestimation, ranging from 30% to 70%, of income across both high- and low-
income families in the Philippines. In the case of low-income families, this underestimation of household 
income is due to a significant portion of their income streams being non-cash-based (Rodriguez 1998) but 
also due to the non-reporting of income from the informal sector of the economy and from remittances 
(Rodriguez 1996). But even with a higher income estimate for these low-income families, they would still 
most likely be cash-strapped when it came time to cobble together sufficient funds to pay the necessary 
recruitment agency fees. 
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worker are in high demand, especially in the industrialized north (Calavita 2005). The 
need for live-in domestic workers is particularly strong and stems from the same 
demographic trends facing other Western European countries: A rapidly aging population 
and declining fertility rates (Izzo 2010). But the Italian welfare state is less developed 
than in northern Europe. Affordable, state-sponsored childcare and eldercare is not 
widespread, forcing Italian families to make their own private arrangements (Anthias and 
Lazaridis 2000; Calavita 2005). In addition, the notion of nursing homes for the elderly is 
not popular in Italy for cultural and religious reasons. As a result, many Italian families 
employ caregivers to look after their aged relatives and their very young. Overall, there 
are an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 individuals in Italy’s paid domestic service sector, 
most of whom are foreigners (Chaloff 2008). Filipinos form the largest bloc of registered 
non-EU foreign domestic workers in the country (Rubio 2003). As of 2008, there were 
56,445 registered Filipino domestic workers in Italy, comprising 8.5% of the total 
664,785 registered domestic workers in the country (see Table 5.4), though it is widely 
accepted that there are many more unregistered Filipino domestic workers. Another way 
to gauge the size of this population is to first estimate the number of registered Filipinos 
in Italy: 124,000.9 Roughly 66 percent of them (over 80,000 migrants) are women and 
most of these 80,000-plus women work as domestic servants and caregivers (Calavita 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Statistics accessed from the National Institute of Statistics online database at 
http://demo.istat.it/str2009/index_e.html on February 6, 2011, from the table “Foreigner Citizens. Resident 
Population by sex and citizenship on 31 December 2009, Italy  - East Asia” 
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Table 5.4 
Number of Registered Domestic Workers in Italy, 1999-2008 
Year All Domestic Workers % Filipinos
a % Eastern Europeansb % Italians
b 
1999 250,291 15.3% 8.0% 50.9% 
2000 262,229 15.7% 9.9% 48.6% 
2001 269,906 15.4% 11.0% 48.2% 
2002 552,086 8.9% 41.0% 24.1% 
2003 536,861 9.1% 41.2% 24.7% 
2004 499,321 9.8% 39.8% 26.5% 
2005 478,280 10.3% 38.6% 27.8% 
2006 478,275 10.5% 38.7% 27.9% 
2007 620,299 8.7% 47.4% 22.2% 
2008 664,785 8.5% 47.9% 21.6% 
Source: Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale (INPS), Italy. Data accessed online on March 1, 
2011 from http://www.inps.it/webidentity/banchedatistatistiche/domestici/index01.jsp?  
a. Data does not include undocumented Filipino domestic workers. 
b. As the percentage of Filipinos in the domestic work sector steadily declined from 1999 to 
2008, Eastern Europeans took up the slack, going from 8% market share in 1999 to 47.9% 
market share in 2008. Many of these Eastern Europeans are Poles and Ukrainians. Likewise, 
the percentage of native Italians in this particular sector of the labor market precipitously 
declined, going from 50.9% in 1999 to only 21.6% in 2008. However, it should be noted that 
even though they control a smaller share of the market, in terms of actual numbers, there were 
still more registered Filipino domestic workers in 2008 (56,506 workers) than in 1999 (38,294 
workers).  
 
The Italian government recognizes the strong internal demand for domestic 
workers. Since 1998, it has regularly set aside roughly half of its annual import quotas to 
foreign caregivers (Calavita 2006; Rubio 2003). Using these quotas, employers and maid 
placement agencies can apply for two-year renewable work permits to hire foreign 
domestic servants who have undergone a six-month training program in caregiving or 
possess relevant work experience. These “residence permits”—or permesso di 
soggiorno—are tied to a particular employer but, other than that, they provide foreign 
workers with many of the same labor protections as Italian workers: The freedom to 
unionize, mandatory rest days, annual leave, social security benefits, unemployment and 
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accident insurance and protection from unlawful dismissal during pregnancy (Campbell 
2007; D’Alconzo, Rocca, and Marioni 2002). After one year of employment with a 
residence permit, foreign domestic workers are allowed to petition their spouses and 
dependent children to join them in Italy as long as they can show that they can support 
their family members financially. After six years of legal employment under one of these 
temporary residence permits, migrants are eligible to apply for a 10-year automatically 
renewable “EC Long-Term Residence Permit” (permesso di soggiorno per soggiornanti 
di lungo periodo) that can set the migrant on the path to citizenship (Chaloff 2008). And 
after ten years of legally living in Italy, a non-EU national can apply for Italian 
citizenship. However, Parreñas notes that “ethnically distinct migrant groups are unlikely 
to be given access to the status of citizen” (2008:59). The vaguely defined prerequisites 
for naturalization, such as having “sufficient financial resources” make it easier to 
discriminate against migrant domestic workers. In other words, Filipino migrant domestic 
workers may theoretically have access to the full spectrum of migrant rights but, in 
reality, few do. 
In addition, satisfying the six-year work requirement to qualify for a residence 
card is difficult as many migrants often find themselves between jobs or working illegally 
for employers who are reluctant to register them as this would require the employer to 
contribute social security and insurance payments to their worker’s account. As a result, 
undocumented status is a regular occurrence for many Filipino domestic workers in Italy.  
Given the high volume of undocumented migrants in the domestic service 
industry, the Italian government has initiated several amnesty programs since 1986, 
several of which specifically targeted domestic workers. In fact, most foreign residents in 
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Italy acquired their legal resident status through these regularization programs (Sciortino 
2009). But it is hard for these legalized immigrants to enjoy any vertical mobility out of 
waged domestic service because other sectors of the Italian economy enjoy much smaller 
immigration quotas and are not as easy to enter (Calavita 2005). Instead, most domestic 
workers achieve only horizontal mobility, going from a live-in to a live-out arrangement 
with their employer, and from full-time to part-time status which gives them additional 
flexibility in organizing their workday (Banfi 2008).  
The relatively lax enforcement of immigration policies by Italian authorities 
(Calavita 2005), the chance at regularization in the future, and the high wages (between 
US$800-US$1,200 a month) that workers are able to earn even in the underground 
economy, keep Italy an attractive destination for Filipino migrants (Banfi 2008).10 It also 
helps that Filipinos sit at the top of the racialized foreign domestic worker hierarchy in 
Italy, commanding the highest wages compared to other nationalities such as Sri Lankans 
who sit at the bottom (Calavita 2005:62-63). However, similar to Canada, the cost of 
securing a work permit for Italy is prohibitive for most prospective Filipino migrants. 
Agencies in the Philippines charge up to US$10,000 in fees for a visa to Italy (Banfi 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 It is difficult to estimate the actual volume of Filipino migrants entering Italy each year. The POEA 
reports that only 1,831 Filipinos left for Italy in 2009 to work as newly hired domestic workers or 
caregivers (Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 2010). However, this statistic does not take into 
account irregular migration to Italy, which appears to be rather substantial as indicated by anecdotal 
accounts from study participants with friends or relatives in Italy. It also ignores multistage migrants who 
travelled to Italy after having worked in an intermediate country such as Israel or Cyprus. 
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Hong Kong 
During its days as a colonial outpost of the British empire, Hong Kong was a 
thriving market for household workers, primarily sourced from the local Chinese 
population or mainland China (Constable 1997a). However, in 1949, the Communist 
takeover of China effectively closed the border with Hong Kong and dried up the inflow 
of Chinese domestic workers (or amahs as they were called) into Hong Kong (Oishi 
2005). During the 1960s and 1970s, as Hong Kong (still a British protectorate) started 
shifting from a trading hub to, first a manufacturing center, and then a global service 
center, Hong Kong women began to join the formal workforce in droves, making 
affordable childcare an increasingly urgent issue. Foreign expatriates who constituted a 
large portion of the Hong Kong workforce also demanded more English-speaking 
domestic workers (Oishi 2005). Finally, in 1973, the government of Hong Kong 
approved the importing of foreigners to serve as household workers. Filipino maids 
became an increasingly popular choice for Hong Kong employers (both Caucasian 
expatriates and local Chinese) primarily because of their English language skills 
(Constable 2003). In fact, Hong Kong remains the top destination in the world for newly-
hired Filipino domestic workers (Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 2010). In 
2010, 28,602 Filipinos were newly hired as domestic workers to work in Hong Kong as 
live-in domestic helpers. This figure does not include all the Filipinos already working in 
Hong Kong who renewed their contracts for an additional two years. Estimates from the 
Philippine consulate in Hong Kong put the total number of Filipino domestic workers in 
Hong Kong at 185,000 (Robles 2002) and, once you include other nationalities, there are 
over 300,000 migrant domestic workers employed in Hong Kong. 
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Hong Kong offers a relatively strong set of workplace protections (by Asian 
standards) for migrant domestic workers. These benefits and protections include a 
minimum wage of HK$3,740 (or US$480) a month11, up to two weeks of paid vacation a 
year, paid maternity leave, paid sick leave, a one-time long-service payment for five 
years of continued employment with the same employer and employer coverage of 
medical expenses.12 Workers who wish to complain about abuses (of any kind) at their 
employers’ hands or about the non-payment of their wages can seek restitution through 
the Labor Tribunal. Foreign domestic workers enjoy the same protections as local 
workers under Hong Kong’s Employment Ordinance and they even have the freedom to 
form unions.13 Foreign domestic workers are also guaranteed a mandated rest day 
(constituting a full continuous 24 hours) every seven days.14  
On the downside, Hong Kong law requires workers to reside in their employer’s 
domicile but does not mandate that they be provided with a private room. Instead, due to 
the cramped living conditions of many Hong Kong residents, workers are often made to 
share a room with their employers’ children or aged parents. Some employers do allow 
their workers to (illegally) rent apartments or rooms in boarding houses, and these spaces 
become popular gathering places for workers’ friends during the weekends.15 These 
spaces allow workers to enjoy some complete privacy, a rare commodity given that most 
workers have to spend their rest days in public parks, shopping centers, or on sidewalks 
and under overpasses (Constable 1997a).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




15 This phenomenon has not been discussed in much depth in the literature on the Hong Kong market, but 
Pei-Chia Lan (2007) analyzes the advantages of the illegal live-out arrangement for migrant domestic 
workers in the Taiwanese market which shares some similarities with its East Asian neighbor. 
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Unlike Canada and Italy, Hong Kong (and all other Asian and Middle Eastern 
countries) does not offer the possibility of permanent residence to migrant domestic 
workers.16 Instead, workers are hired on two-year renewable contracts. During my field 
research in Hong Kong (and Singapore), I encountered Filipino workers who had spent 
the better part of their lives—two decades and more—as migrant domestic workers on 
continuously renewed two-year contracts. Hong Kong also does not provide an option for 
family reunification so workers must remain separated from their families in the 
Philippines, only seeing them during their annual vacations or when they finally return to 
the Philippines for good.  
Some workers are fortunate enough to be able to secure Hong Kong-based jobs 
for their spouses or adult children. I interviewed several workers (male and female) who 
had managed to use their contacts to find local domestic worker jobs for their spouses. I 
also interviewed several mother-daughter pairs: Women who had worked in Hong Kong 
for many years and had found jobs for their daughters when these young women reached 
the age of majority. Sometimes, these mothers were lucky enough to find a job for their 
daughters with the same employer, allowing them to build a semblance of family life 
overseas.17 There is also a small lesbian population among Filipino domestic workers in 
Hong Kong and these women can find living overseas away from the strictures of a 
socially conservative family liberating (Constable 1997b). In all three of these cases, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In 2011, a Hong Kong high court ruled that domestic workers and other contract laborers should be 
eligible for permanent residence after completing seven years of employment in Hong Kong, concluding 
that any law that barred only these workers from permanent residence was discriminatory. However, the 
Hong Kong government appealed this decision and it was overturned by an appeals court. It is scheduled to 
be heard again in front of Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal. 
17 It was more likely that female migrants were able to find overseas jobs for their adult daughters (and 
sisters and nieces) than for their husbands (or brothers or sons). This reflects the gendered nature of 
domestic work in general. Another contributing factor is the fact that overseas domestic workers 
accumulate industry-specific expertise and contacts, with limited exposure to information about job 
openings in other sectors of the host economy that may be less skewed towards women. 
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workers were able to spend time with their spouses, partners, or children, during their rest 
days which greatly helped to alleviate their sense of isolation. However, such cases were 
the exception rather than the rule. Most workers in Hong Kong were not so lucky and 
could only look at domestic workers in Canada and Italy with envy.   
However, securing a job as a migrant domestic worker in Hong Kong is 
significantly easier compared to getting a job in Canada, Italy or any other country in the 
West. First, a Hong Kong job does not require any substantial human capital 
requirements except a high school diploma. As a result, both college dropouts and high 
school graduates are able to secure jobs here. In addition, both male and female 
prospective migrants are allowed to apply for jobs as domestic workers in Hong Kong. A 
prospective migrant’s only real hurdle to entering Hong Kong is the still-large financial 
outlay required to pay the recruitment agency fees, which in 2008, ranged from 
PHP80,000-100,000 (or US$1,800-2,250) and included the cost of airfare from the 
Philippines to Hong Kong, medical examination fees, visa fees and POEA fees. This is 
despite Hong Kong’s standard contract stating that employers are responsible for 
covering the cost of all of these expenses for their domestic worker.18 Prospective 
migrants are usually expected to pay these fees to recruitment agencies upfront which 
constitutes a significant financial burden, roughly 40-50% of the average annual income 
of a family in the Philippines based on 2009 figures. Prospective migrants often take out 
high-interest loans from private lending companies or acquaintances in the Philippines to 
help make these payments and, depending on their repayment plan, may take up to a year 
to pay off their loan (Varia 2007).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hong Kong’s standard employment contract for domestic workers is available at 




Similar to Hong Kong, the Singapore government instituted a program in 1978 to 
allow foreign nationals to work within its borders as temporary live-in household 
workers. Statistics about the numbers of domestic worker permits issued by the 
Singapore government each year are not regularly published, but one estimate holds that 
by 2007, there were 160,000 foreign domestic workers living in this island of four million 
people, one for every seven households (Yeoh 2007). Most of these workers come from 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The majority of Filipino domestic workers 
arrive on tourist visas and then use a Singapore-based maid placement agency to find an 
employer and process the necessary paperwork (Yeoh, Huang and Gonzalez III 1999). As 
a result, while they have legal work permits from the Singapore government, they are 
“invisible” to the Philippine government which makes it difficult to trust the Philippine 
government’s data on the volume of the Filipino migration flow to Singapore.19 
Philippine government statistics significantly undercount the flow of Filipino domestic 
workers to Singapore, putting the number at only 1,962. 
Unlike in Hong Kong, only women can work as migrant domestic workers in 
Singapore, and they must be between 23 and 50 years of age when they first apply for a 
work permit. Applicants need only possess a high school diploma but they must pass a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The Philippine government mandates that all out-going labor migrants first secure authorization from the 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, attempting to ensure that the government collects 
accurate statistics on the volume of labor migration flows out of the country. The government argues that 
going through official channels ensures that migrant workers can be adequately protected by the Philippine 
state in the event of abuse or contractual violations while overseas (Rodriguez 2010). However, this 
requirement also imposes an additional financial burden (in the form of various fees charged by 
government agencies) on prospective migrants, encouraging some migrants to attempt to sidestep it. With 
certain countries such as Singapore, this is easier to do so than with others, such as Taiwan which requires a 
signed authorization from the Philippine government before a work permit can be issued (Rodriguez 2010).    
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series of tests soon after their arrival in Singapore to prove that they have the basic skills 
needed to work as a domestic servant.20  
In terms of labor protections, Singapore is not as progressive as Hong Kong. For 
instance, there is no minimum wage rate mandated by the government and also no 
mandated weekly day of rest. It is left to employers’ discretion to provide workers with a 
weekly rest day and a decent living wage.21 As a result, the living and working conditions 
that domestic workers endure in Singapore can vary widely. Filipinos, by virtue of their 
reputation as being better educated and more “modern” than workers from Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka and other Asian countries, command the highest wages in the local market, 
amounting to SG$400 or more a month (roughly US$300 a month) (Human Rights 
Watch 2005). Filipino domestic workers also often enjoy a weekly or at least a bi-weekly 
rest day, compared to other nationalities. However, all domestic workers (even Filipino 
ones) have access to fewer workplace protections in Singapore compared to Hong Kong. 
Most critically, they are not covered under Singapore’s Employment Act which regulates 
the working hours, rest periods and annual leave for most other occupations.22  
Singapore is particularly wary of low-skilled temporary migrant workers settling 
within its borders and therefore imposes strict regulations to ensure that migrant workers 
leave the country once their contracts have ended. Employers are required to pay a hefty 
SG$5,000 (or US$4,000) “security deposit” to the government which will be forfeited if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/work-permit-fdw/before-you-apply/Pages/basic-
requirements-of-a-foreign-domestic-worker.aspx. Retrieved on February 7, 2011. 
21 Starting in 2013, all new contracts will require employers to give their workers a weekly rest day or come 
to an arrangement with them to pay them extra for working seven days a week. 
22 http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/work-permit-fdw/before-you-
apply/Pages/default.aspx. Part of the reason for this security deposit is to artificially raise the cost of 
employing a maid, constraining the market for foreign domestic workers. 
185 
their domestic worker goes missing.23 (The possibility of this occurrence is sometimes 
raised as the reason why employers restrict their workers’ movements outside their house 
and do not provide them rest days.) There are also guidelines aimed at restricting 
marriages between locals and foreign low-skilled workers. Foreign domestic workers are 
required to undergo a medical examination every six months and, if they are found to be 
pregnant, are liable to be deported back to the Philippines if they choose to carry the 
pregnancy to term.24 Hinting at the sexual stereotypes that circulate about promiscuous 
domestic workers who seek to steal their female employers’ husbands, one of the 
conditions of migrants’ work permits is that “the foreign worker shall not indulge or be 
involved in any illegal, immoral or undesirable activities, including breaking up families 
in Singapore” (Singapore Ministry of Manpower 2010:8). Doing so can result in the 
revocation of the migrant’s work permit.  
Offsetting the above restrictions is the cost of securing a job in Singapore which is 
significantly less than what a job in Hong Kong costs. Migrant domestic workers from 
the Philippines pay on average PHP50,000-60,000 (or US$1,100-1,300, which is between 
25-30% of their average annual family income) for a job in Singapore. Recruitment 
agencies also regularly accept part-payment of these required agency fees through a 
series of monthly salary deductions over the course of six to ten months after the worker 
has already started their tenure overseas, which can sometimes save these workers from 
having to take out a costly loan.25  





25 The payment of agency fees through monthly salary deductions is a controversial topic. Scholars argue 
that it results in slave-like conditions for migrant domestic workers during their first few months of 
employment where they effectively work for no pay at all. They are completely dependent on their 
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Abuse does also occur on a regular basis in Singapore (and Hong Kong). The 
Philippine Embassy and the Sri Lankan High Commission in Singapore receive between 
40-80 complaints of workplace abuse a month from their nationals (Human Rights Watch 
2005:3). And between 1999 and 2005, at least 147 migrant domestic workers died from 
workplace accidents or suicide, most of them by jumping or falling from residential 
buildings (Human Rights Watch 2005:38). However, when comparing the situation 
facing migrant domestic workers in Singapore with that facing workers in the Middle 
East, it appears that abuse occurs at a much lower frequency in Singapore and is usually 
of a less egregious nature. 
The government of Singapore is also extremely sensitive to any external criticism 
of its policies, particularly its human rights record, and this sensitivity has paradoxically 
(but constructively) helped push the government to recently introduce additional 
protections for domestic workers. A December 2005 report by the US-based non-profit 
Human Rights Watch criticizing the poor working conditions of foreign domestic 
workers in the country was strongly denounced by the Singapore government (Singapore 
Ministry of Manpower 2005a, b) with the Minister of Manpower issuing a public 
statement claiming that the report “grossly exaggerates the abuse and lack of rights of 
foreign domestic workers in Singapore” and that domestic workers “receive full 
protection under Singapore’s laws” (Singapore Ministry of Manpower 2006). But soon 
afterwards, and much more quietly, the government introduced a series of changes to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
employer’s goodwill to be provided with a basic allowance for small purchases such as a phonecard to call 
home (ILO 2010). But, during my interviews with study participants, the vast majority of migrants 
described this payment option as an advantage that made Singapore more attractive as a destination. This 
payment plan lowered the cost barriers to migration, making it more accessible to low-capital migrants. 
When making their destination decision, migrants assumed that since they were being provided room and 
board by their employers, they could survive without any earnings for a few months. This issue will be 
discussed in further detail in Chapter Four. 
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regulations governing foreign domestic workers. In July 2006, a standard contract was 
issued that all Singapore-based employment agencies were required to use if they wanted 
to stay accredited (Human Rights Watch 2006a). This contract requires that employers 
provide their domestic servants with three adequate meals a day over and above their 
salary. Also, employers who request a replacement maid must now give their former 
domestic servant the chance to seek alternative employment in Singapore before 
repatriating them. In October 2006, the Ministry of Manpower promised to conduct 
random interviews of first-time domestic servants to ask them about their working 
conditions. In December of that same year, guidebooks were also sent to all employers, 
outlining their rights and responsibilities towards their domestic servants. In tandem, the 
penalties against employers found guilty of abusing their workers were considerably 
tightened, most likely in an attempt to scare employers into treating their domestic 
workers properly. The rape of a worker now results in imprisonment for eight to 20 years 
and caning with at least 12 strokes, while wrongful confinement of a worker within her  
employer’s home results in up to one year of imprisonment and/or a SG$1,000 (or 
US$780) fine.26 It is not clear what effect these measures have had on workers’ living and 
working conditions but they do represent a good faith effort on the part of the Singapore 
government to protect these workers from abuse.   
 
United Arab Emirates 
The oil-fueled economic growth of countries in the Middle East from the 1970s 
onwards led to a surge in demand in the Persian Gulf for foreign workers of all stripes 




(Castles and Miller 2003). This demand was particularly acute in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), a federation of seven monarchies in possession of the world’s sixth-
largest oil reserves. This continues to be the case today. In 2000, the UAE’s foreign 
worker population made up 90.4% of its total national labor force (Esim and Smith 
2004). Of these foreign workers, migrant domestic workers form a significant proportion, 
and among female migrants to the UAE, domestic workers make up the single largest 
occupational bloc. Over 100,000 temporary visas were issued to domestic workers in 
1999 alone (Sabban 2004) and there are an estimated 600,000 domestic workers in the 
UAE in total (Jureidini 2010). Rima Sabban (2004) writes that a local culture that 
denigrates any kind of manual work, and the high per capita income of UAE citizens, are 
the primary reasons why the average Emirati household employs, not one, but two 
domestic workers. In fact, current government ceilings on the employment of domestic 
servants allows an Emirati couple with two children to employ “two [live-in] domestic 
helpers, a nanny, a driver, a cook and a gardener” (Sabban 2004, p. 99).  
 In 2010, the UAE was the third most important destination for Filipino migrant 
domestic workers, with 13,184 newly-hired Filipinas flying to the UAE that year, behind 
only Hong Kong (with 8,602 Filipino domestic workers) and Kuwait (with 21,554) 
(Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 2011). Traditionally, Filipino domestic 
workers were considered “trophy maids,” prized because of their English language skills 
and relatively high education (Sabban 2004). In recent years, however, the share of the 
domestic worker market controlled by Filipinos has substantially decreased as many of 
them have successfully moved out of domestic work and secured better paid and higher 
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status jobs in the local hospitality and retail industries.27 (These jobs still require short-
term work permits with no option for family reunification or permanent residence.) In 
addition, Indonesians and Sri Lankans are increasing their share of the UAE market, 
helped by the lower wages they are willing to accept. While Filipino workers generally 
receive the highest wages in the Emirati market (AED1,470 or approximately US$400 a 
month),28 Bangladeshi workers receive the lowest (AED750 or US$200 a month).29  
 Despite their “trophy maid” status, working conditions for Filipino domestic 
workers are still poor in the UAE. A survey of 51 domestic workers in the UAE 
conducted by the International Labour Organization in 2002 found that workers clocked 
an average of 105 working hours per week, had no overtime pay, did not receive any rest 
days each month and had no social security coverage. In addition, 50% reported being 
abused (physically, sexually, and/or verbally) by their employers. Their freedom of 
movement was also somewhat restricted and all of them had their passports withheld by 
their employers (Esim and Smith 2004:18). By Emirati law, workers are guaranteed one 
month of paid leave for each year of work, but it is left to employers to decide if their 
employee should also receive a weekly (or even monthly) rest day and, as mentioned 
above, few employers grant this respite to their workers. 
 The UAE government has begun to recognize the vulnerable position in which 
foreign domestic workers are placed when they work within the confines of private 
homes. In recent years, it has made some effort to regulate this sector. Domestic workers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Thus, surprisingly, this Middle Eastern country offers migrant domestic workers more opportunities for 
vertical mobility than Asian labor-importers like Hong Kong and Singapore. This partly explains it out-size 





are still not covered under the country’s national labor laws (Sabban 2004) but, in 2007, 
the government issued a standard employment contract30 covering the minimum wages, 
holidays and medical coverage to which all employers of foreign domestic workers must 
adhere (Wall Street Journal 2007). A government agency has also been established to 
mediate between employers and employees in the case of any disputes. The UAE 
government is currently considering a bill that would more closely align domestic 
workers’ rights with the ILO’s Convention on Domestic Workers, including a weekly day 
off, a written contract and an end-of-service gratuity among other protections. The UAE 
cabinet passed a draft of the bill in January 2012 and it must now be approved by the 
Federal National Council before the UAE President can sign it into law.31  
 While living conditions in the UAE can be harsh, they are reportedly still not as 
restrictive as in Saudi Arabia. Female workers in the UAE are not required to cover 
themselves with an abaya—the loose black robe and head covering that are commonly 
worn by women in more conservative Muslim countries when they go outdoors—and 
they do not always need a male chaperone to accompany them. Sabban reports that “one 
can easily find domestic workers, males and females, going from house to house, 
working part time and on an hourly rate” (2004:100). Though Sabban is writing about the 
pervasive underground market for waged domestic work that exists in the UAE, her 
observation points to the relative freedom of movement available to some migrant 
domestic workers in that country. Non-Muslim foreigners also have the freedom to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 A copy of the new standard contract can be viewed here: 
http://www.poea.gov.ph/advisory/advisory12_07.pdf (Retrieved January 25, 2011). 
31 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/employment/domestic-workers-get-more-protection-from-
exploitation-1.1016692. Accessed on May 6, 2012. 
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practice their religion (though not the right to proselytize)32 and so Christian domestic 
workers, for instance, are able to attend church services on Sundays if their employers 
permit. The ability to leave their employer’s residence to attend services once a week and 
mingle with their fellow domestic workers, even if only for a couple of hours, helps 
mitigate the many restrictions these workers have to endure during the rest of their work 
week. And Filipino workers are often in a position to negotiate for such terms with their 
employers because of their higher status within the migrant domestic worker market. 
 The cost of securing a job as a foreign domestic worker in the UAE ranges 
between PHP13,500 and PHP20,000 (or US$300-445), roughly between 6-8.5% of the 
average Filipino family income in 2009 (Agunias 2010:11) but most recruitment agencies 
allow migrants to pay at least a portion of their fees through salary deductions over the 
course of three to six months after they have started working. Thus, even though wage 
rates in Singapore and the UAE for Filipino domestic workers are roughly on par, the net 
cost of securing a job in the UAE is significantly lower.  
 
Saudi Arabia 
There are over 1.2 million migrant domestic workers in Saudi Arabia (Human 
Rights Watch 2008) and, among Filipinos, Saudi Arabia is the fourth most common 
destination for newly hired domestic workers. In 2010, a total of 11,582 newly-hired 
Filipino domestic workers left for this desert kingdom (Philippine Overseas Employment 
Agency 2011).33 This is despite the fact that domestic workers in Saudi Arabia are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90223.htm (Retrieved February 17, 2011). 
33 Six out of the top ten destination countries for newly-hired domestic workers leaving the Philippines in 
2010 were Middle Eastern countries, amounting to 62 percent of the volume of migrants going to the top 
ten destinations (Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 2011). 
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frequently exposed to high levels of abuse, contract violations, extreme isolation and very 
limited protection from local law enforcement (Human Rights Watch 2006b). In 2000 
alone, there were 19,000 cases of domestic workers fleeing their Saudi employers 
because of mistreatment, non-payment of wages and other issues (Chammartin 2004).  
Workers in Saudi Arabia are hired on temporary, renewable contracts that can last 
anywhere between six months to three years (Silvey 2004). Saudi Arabia (like all Middle 
Eastern countries) uses the kefala system of sponsorship, which requires foreign workers 
to have a local guarantor/employer or “kafeel” (Jureidini 2010). A worker’s permit to 
reside in Saudi Arabia is dependent on their continued employment with their sponsor. 
Termination of this contract, or running away from one’s employer, results in an 
immediate reclassification of the worker as an illegal alien, which carries with it the 
likelihood of arrest, imprisonment and deportation. On paper, this system of sponsorship 
is similar to the migrant domestic worker programs of most countries which also tie each 
worker to a single employer. However, the kefala system of the Middle East is much 
more restrictive for workers and open to abuse. Local employers in Saudi Arabia are able 
to illegally buy and sell their sponsorship permits (and effectively their domestic 
workers) at immense profit and without the consent of the worker (Calandruccio 2005). 
In 2004, the Saudi Arabian government reported that 70 percent of all work visas issued 
were subsequently traded on the black market (Shah 2006). It is also common practice for 
employers to withhold their workers’ passports to deter any attempts to escape in the face 
of abuse.  
Saudi Arabia provides foreign workers with no option for securing permanent 
residence and, much worse, very little in the way of any official policy dealing with the 
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treatment and protection of foreign domestic workers. Female workers are confined to 
their employers’ residences and not allowed to move freely outside even when they are 
off-duty. On the rare occasions when they are allowed outside, they must be accompanied 
by a male member of the household at all times and must wear an abaya. There is also no 
mandatory rest day for workers and many domestic workers report having to work seven 
days a week for their Saudi employers.  
 Most likely to counteract these wide-ranging restrictions, and also to meet the 
strong demand for foreign maids among Saudis, recruitment agencies charge the lowest 
placement fees for jobs in Saudi Arabia. In 2008, the average cost of securing a work 
permit to Saudi Arabia was US$200 (roughly 5% of the average annual Filipino family 
income) and could be paid in full through monthly salary deductions over the course of 
three to six months after the domestic worker had started their tenure overseas. 
Interviewees called this payment approach “fly first, pay later” and it was consistently the 
payment method offered by recruitment agencies that sent migrants to Saudi Arabia.34  
 The Saudi government has recently introduced some regulations to protect foreign 
domestic workers from abuse (Calandruccio 2005; Human Rights Watch 2009b) but 
these changes are still relatively weak. A “reception center” was established for runaway 
domestic workers and there are now also government-run shelters in the country’s three 
largest cities where abused female workers can live while their cases are being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 When comparing the different payment methods adopted by recruitment agencies in the Philippines, the 
general pattern appears to be that agencies placing migrant workers in highly sought-after countries (such 
as Western nations and Hong Kong) are able to set their own terms and demand payment of all fees 
upfront. Agencies placing workers in less-preferred countries (such as the UAE and Singapore) are willing 
to accept part-payment after the commencement of employment. Finally, for jobs in Saudi Arabia, agencies 
accepted full payment of their fees through salary deductions. There does not appear to be any government 
regulations that specify which payment approach to use given that most of the exorbitant fees agencies 
charge migrant workers are illegal. It simply appears to be a matter of agencies responding to the varying 
levels of demand for different destinations. 
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investigated (Calandruccio 2005). In 2005, the government drafted a standard 
employment contract for foreign domestic workers, outlining the responsibilities of not 
only workers but also recruitment agencies. Four years later, it was approved by the 
country’s Shura Council, an appointed committee that is the highest legal authority in the 
land, second in power only to the King and his Council of Ministers. However, as of 
2010, the Council of Ministers had yet to pass this bill and make it into law, leaving 
workers vulnerable to continued abuse and exploitation (Human Rights Watch 2010). As 
further indication of the government’s resistance to the introduction of any meaningful 
improvements in domestic workers’ living conditions, the bill passed by the Shura 
Council in 2009 excluded the right of workers to leave their employer’s residence or keep 
their own passports, and obliges workers to “obey” their employers at all times (Human 
Rights Watch 2009a, b).     
 In 2011, the Saudi government issued a ban on new work permits for domestic 
workers from the Philippines and Indonesia due to the vociferous complaints of these two 
countries’ governments about labor conditions in Saudi Arabia.35 The Philippine and 
Saudi governments are currently in bilateral negotiations to lift this ban. In April 2012, 
the Saudi government also issued minimum wage requirements of SAR600-800 
(US$160-213) for all foreign domestic workers employed within the kingdom. The 
Philippine government insists however that its citizens receive a minimum wage of 
US$400 a month.  
 
 





Finally, I include a discussion of the United States’ provisions for the entry of 
foreign domestic workers into the country, despite it not having an active program to 
import migrant domestic workers. The United States has not needed to resort to such a 
policy instrument to satisfy local demand for live-in care workers partly because of its 
large immigrant population.36 Many immigrants (documented and undocumented) who 
are unable to find employment in the formal, primary labor market turn to waged 
domestic service as a means to earn an income (Romero 1992; Salzinger 1991). For these 
immigrants, waged domestic service is a failsafe job option because of its unstructured, 
private, unregulated and flexible nature (Romero 1992). 
 While it does not have a dedicated program like Canada’s to import foreign 
domestic workers, the United States does allow some foreign domestic workers to enter 
the country under special non-immigrant visa categories. Foreign diplomats are allowed 
to bring their domestic workers with them when they are posted to the United States. The 
State Department issues a dependent visa (under the categories A-3, G-5, or NATO-7) to 
these workers and their visas are tied to their employer’s visa.37 Once their employer’s 
visa expires or is revoked, the domestic worker also loses their visa status and must leave 
the US.  
As Table 5.5 shows, only a few such visas are issued each year, and even fewer 
go to Filipinos. It should be noted however that the percentage of such “personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In the antebellum period, many American-born African slaves worked as house servants in the homes of 
well-to-do Americans. Even after Emancipation, Black domestic workers continued to make up a dominant 
share of the domestic service market especially in the South (Katzman 1981). However, in the cities of the 
North, native-born Blacks were slowly crowded out of this market by newly arrived, poor immigrants from 
Ireland and other countries in Europe (Diner 1983; Lynch-Brennan 2009). More recently, waves of 
immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, and Central and South America have filled this need (Parreñas 2001; 
Romero 1992; Salzinger 1991). 
37 More details available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_2638.html#8. 
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attendant” visas that are issued to Filipinos is disproportionately high—averaging 17% of 
all such visas between 2000 and 2009—despite the large number of countries that send 
diplomats to the United States. These statistics seem to indicate that, within diplomatic 
circles, Filipino domestic workers command something of a niche.	  	  	  
	   Foreigners visiting the US for business or pleasure are on rare occasions also 
allowed to bring their domestic workers with them under a B-1 visa. Unfortunately, the 
State Department does not keep separate records for this particular sub-category of B-1 
visas.38 But it is unlikely that the number of migrant domestic workers entering the US on 
such visas is very high. As the website of the Consulate General of the United States in 
Hong Kong and Macau warns: “The majority of domestic helper applicants are unable to 
qualify for a visa to enter the United States” because it is difficult for these helpers to 
prove that they do not intend to stay permanently in the US since “they have already 
demonstrated a willingness to depart their original residence to seek contract employment 
in another country”.39	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Author interview with State Department official, December 2010. 
39 http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/niv_domestic_helpers.html. Accessed on February 23, 2011. 





Number of US Non-Immigrant Visas issued (in Total and to Philippine Citizens) by Visa Category, 2000-2009 
  Visa 
Category 
 
 Number of Visas Issued 
   YEAR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  
A-3a 
Total visas 2,486 2,228 1,971 1,259 1,258 1,227 1,017 1,000 1,000 1,186 
  Visas to 
Filipinos 





















              
  
G-5b 
Total visas 1,737 1,645 1,482 1,117 945 998 940 1,058 973 911 
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 Visas to 
Filipinos 





















              
  
NATO-7c 
Total visas 3 1 8 3 1 5 2 2 3 3 
  Visas to 
Filipinos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Retrieved from Department of State website on January 12, 2011. http://www.travel.state.gov/xls/FYs97-09_NIVDetailTable.xls 
a. A-3 visas are issued to the attendant, servant, or personal employee of an ambassador to the United States, a public minister, career diplomat, 
consul, foreign government official, or their immediate family. 
b. G-5 visas are issued to the attendant, servant, or personal employee of G-1 through G-4, and immediate family. G-1 diplomatic visas are issued 
to representatives of foreign governments who are required to enter the United States to work at an international organization such as the 
United Nations. 
c. NATO-7 visas are issued to the attendant, servant, or personal employee of a NATO representative 
 
Notes:  
1. 2009 data should be considered preliminary but not subject to significant change.  
2. It should be noted that all three visa categories are issued to personal employees, and not just domestic workers. As such, the actual number of 
migrant domestic workers entering the country under these visa categories is most likely less than the numbers provided here. 
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Whatever their numbers, there are limited labor protections for foreign domestic 
workers once they are inside the United States because of their lack of coverage under 
federal and state labor laws either formally or in practice. State Department officials 
attempt to educate migrant domestic workers about their employment rights before the 
issuance of their visas40, but there are scattered reports of foreign workers being coerced 
into working long hours for minimal or no pay after their arrival in the US, having their 
passports confiscated by their employers, and not being allowed to leave their employers’ 
residence.41 Such cases are categorized as labor trafficking by the Department of Justice, 
and between 2007 and 2008, there were 313 such alleged incidents reported to various 
government task forces (Beck, Cohen, and Kyckelhahn 2009).42   
A final category under which temporary care workers can enter the country is 
through the US au pair program which allows young foreign nationals between the ages 
of 18 and 26 to work as live-in caregivers for host families requiring childcare services, 
while simultaneously attending a post-secondary educational institution in the US.43 The 
au pair program was designed as a way to help young foreign nationals be exposed to US 
life and culture through a work-study program, and they are not considered domestic 
workers by the government. Unlike the other categories of migrant domestic labor, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 During the visa application interviews at US consulates, workers are seen separately by consulate staff 
without their employers being present. They are provided with pamphlets explaining their rights under US 
law and given the toll-free number of the National Human Trafficking Resource Center, a non-profit, non-
governmental organization. 
41 My interviews with migrant domestic workers in New York City who had worked for diplomat 
employers reveal that few workers are willing to report workplace abuse to the authorities. Instead, they 
would much rather run away from these employers and work in the underground economy where jobs as 
domestic workers are plentiful.  
42 Not all of these incidents involved migrant domestic workers but it is widely accepted that the small 
number of reported cases represents just a tiny fraction of the actual number of incidents of labor 
trafficking that occur in the US but go unreported. 
43 Many European countries have similar au pair programs that allow foreign nationals to work within their 
borders as part-time nannies and simultaneously study. The list of European countries includes the UK, 
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway.   
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are relatively strict regulations governing this program and a great deal more oversight.44 
Only 13 private agencies are licensed by the State Department to match foreign au pairs 
with local host families, and these au pairs are issued only 12-month visas with short 
extensions granted only in certain cases.  
Few au pair visas are issued to Filipinos. Conversations with executives at several 
of the 13 sponsor agencies revealed that it is difficult for Philippine candidates to secure 
au pair visas. Despite often being highly qualified—many Filipino applicants are 
nurses—and despite being preferred by many US parents because of their reputation of 
being very nurturing towards children, Filipino au pair candidates often have their visa 
applications denied. There is an apparent concern among US consular officials in the 
Philippines that many of these applicants will not return to the Philippines and that they 
will instead attempt to find ways (both legal and illegal) to remain in the US. In response 
to the higher visa denial rates and longer visa processing times for Filipinos, several 
agencies have stopped accepting applications from au pair candidates in the Philippines. 
Those agencies that still accept Filipino applications only process about four to five 
candidates a year, of which only one or two are approved annually. As such, given the 
various hurdles that are tied to this visa category, it is unlikely that many Filipinos utilize 
the au pair path to enter the US. Among US-based study participants, most entered on 
permanent immigrant visas and then took up caregiving as a way to make ends meet 
when they could not find jobs in other, more formal sectors of the US economy. Others 
came on tourist visas, then overstayed and worked illegally as both live-in and live-out 
nannies, housekeepers and babysitters in order to support themselves and their families in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 More information is available at the State Department website at 
http://exchanges.state.gov/jexchanges/faq.html#4. 
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the Philippines. Only two study participants had entered the US on temporary work visas 
as domestic workers for foreign diplomats, but both had eventually run away in the face 
of harsh working conditions.  
 
A Cross-Country Comparison of Migrant Domestic Worker Programs 
In the preceding section, I looked at the migrant domestic worker policies of a 
diverse set of countries: two post-industrial Western countries (namely Canada and 
Italy)45, the newly industrialized Asian economies of Hong Kong and Singapore, and two 
high-income countries from the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates). Not only do these countries cover three very different geographical regions in 
the world, but the economic, historical, political, cultural and demographic contexts of 
these countries also vary greatly. All these factors have combined in different ways to 
drive these countries to set up programs to import migrant domestic workers. At the same 
time, these diverse factors have helped push each of these programs in different 
directions.  
In contrast to Cornelius et al. (2004) who put forward a “convergence hypothesis” 
that advanced industrial countries have begun adopting broadly similar immigration 
policies in recent years, my analysis did not unearth any evidence of a broad policy 
convergence occurring at a global level across different countries’ migrant domestic 
worker programs. Instead, my investigation elicited the insight that these programs run 
the full gamut in terms of how a receiving country can deal with guest workers. At one 
end of the spectrum, these workers are promised a reasonably strong set of employment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 I am leaving the US out of this comparative analysis given that it lacks an established migrant domestic 
worker program. 
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rights and some measure of migrant rights. At the other end of the spectrum, these 
migrant workers are viewed as little more than paid chattel to be used for a time and then 
returned to their home country when their usefulness has run its course. 
At the same time, however, in the last ten years, all six of the countries I analyzed 
have inched towards providing additional workplace protections and employment rights 
to these guest workers. While there is no broad-based convergence emerging between 
programs, all six countries’ programs have shifted slightly towards increased regulation 
of the working conditions of migrant domestic workers. In Singapore’s case, this has 
meant the threat of harsh fines and prison sentences for employers caught mistreating 
their domestic workers or requiring a weekly rest day. In the case of the UAE, it has 
meant requiring all employers of domestic workers to follow a standard contract that 
spells out, among other things, the right of workers to have regular rest periods. Credit for 
these changes lies with the concerted efforts of local migrant worker organizations in 
each receiving country, but also the constant attention given to this vulnerable population 
by human rights organizations and the United Nations (through the work of the UNHCR, 
UNIFEM and the ILO). These organizations have made steady progress in this area 
through publicity campaigns that aim to raise local citizens’ awareness of the problems 
facing migrant domestic workers in their respective countries and shame recalcitrant 
governments into doing more for these workers. The ILO’s 2011 adoption of the 
Convention on Domestic Workers recognizing domestic workers as being entitled to the 
same types of protections as other workers is emblematic of continuing international 
efforts to demand greater workplace protections for domestic workers. 
202 
Finally, this analysis reveals that there is a clear hierarchy among these programs 
if we grade them according to two criteria: The degree to which a program recognizes the 
rights of foreign domestic workers as migrants, and the degree to which their rights as 
workers are recognized. The ILO only focuses on employment rights in its Convention on 
Domestic Workers, but the degree of migrant rights bestowed on foreign domestic 
workers also has a direct bearing on their long-term well-being in their host country. 
Using these two criteria, it is possible to rate any country’s migrant domestic worker 
program (see Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1 
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Cornelius et al. (1994) write that the rights-based legacy of Western nations has 
ensured an emphasis on the rights of migrants living in these countries even if these 
individuals are not permanent residents or even documented migrants. Such a statement 
may not ring true to migrant rights’ activists in Western countries, but, in comparison to 
countries in Asia and the Middle East, there is a clear fault line between these latter 
programs and the ones in Italy and Canada: The degree of migrant rights (to citizenship, 
residency and family reunification) offered these workers (see Figure 5.1).  
Despite some core differences between their migrant domestic worker programs, 
both Italy and Canada have adopted policies that offer (at least on paper) the possibility 
of migrant domestic workers securing eventual citizenship in either of these host 
countries. Canada recently eased the requirements for live-in foreign caregivers to qualify 
for permanent residence. Now caregivers have four (instead of three) years to complete 
their employment requirement of either 24 months or 3,900 hours to qualify for 
permanent residence.46 And, since 1986, Italy has launched four legalization programs to 
assist undocumented foreign workers—particularly domestic workers—gain legal status. 
Italy also allows migrant domestic workers to sponsor their family members to join them 
overseas. 
These provisions by no means imply that all foreign domestic workers in these 
two countries are granted their full set of migrant rights. Far from it. Partly in response to 
the growing anti-immigrant sentiment in Italy, the Italian government recently increased 
the minimum number of years of legal employment required for a long-term residence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 http://www.rhdcc-hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/foreign_workers/lcpdir/lcpone.shtml. Accessed on 
February 10, 2011. 
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card from five years to six. And, as Parreñas (2008) notes, few Filipino migrant domestic 
workers are successful in securing Italian citizenship despite the number of years they 
have lived in Italy.  
Meanwhile, activists in Canada point out that earlier generations of migrant 
domestic workers (from Europe) used to be granted citizenship rights immediately upon 
arrival in Canada rather than at the end of several years of employment. It is hard not to 
interpret this change in policy as an indication of a racial bias against more recent 
migrants from the Global South.  
However, when compared with the situation facing domestic workers in other 
parts of the world, Canada and Italy are still markedly more generous. Asian countries, 
for instance, do not currently grant migrant domestic workers the option of family 
reunification or permanent residence no matter how long these workers have been 
employed overseas. Nor do these countries have any kind of legalization program for 
undocumented workers. Arrest and deportation are the only options available. These 
countries carefully manage their population make-up, having seen the issues encountered 
in the 1970s by Western countries with their nominally temporary, low-skilled guest 
worker programs that quickly turned permanent (Castles 2006; Martin, Abella, and 
Kuptsch 2005). While they are willing to grant permanent residency to high-skilled 
migrants, and in fact actively recruit such migrant labor to their shores, Asian countries 
are very wary about allowing so-called “low-skilled” migrants from settling down within 
their borders.  
The Singaporean government has gone so far as to discourage romantic 
relationships between foreign domestic workers and local Singaporean men, out of a 
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concern about low-skilled foreign women diluting the country’s stock of human capital. 
Middle Eastern countries meanwhile are especially fearful of how changes to their 
population make-up might affect the political environment within their borders. For this 
reason, they too do not extend the promise of citizenship or residency rights to migrant 
domestic workers and most other foreign workers. 
 
Employment Rights 
The second fault line that divides the various migrant domestic worker programs 
around the world is the degree of workplace protections granted these workers. In the 
case of Middle Eastern countries (with the exception of Israel), the domestic service 
sector remains largely unregulated and unprotected (International Labor Organization 
2010). In both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, there are few laws on the books governing 
how migrant domestic workers should be treated. Migrant domestic workers are not 
protected under these countries’ national labor laws (Calandruccio 2005; Sabban 2004) 
and what few laws exist are not enforced with any regularity. Workers in both countries 
report an inability to rely on the local police or immigration officials to protect them from 
exploitative or abusive employers (Human Rights Watch 2008; 2009a; 2009b). In 
addition, the kefala system of sponsorship that makes domestic workers completely 
dependent on their employer, establishes a structural vulnerability that compounds the 
pre-existing vulnerability workers face because of their confinement within their 
employer’s residence. Human Rights Watch has documented repeated incidences of 
employers in Saudi Arabia brutalizing their domestic workers with impunity (Human 
Rights Watch 2010). It is true that the United Arab Emirates is a more permissive society 
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than Saudi Arabia and, as a result, domestic workers in the UAE are able to venture out 
of their employers’ houses on errands such as grocery shopping and taking their 
employer’s children to the park or for a doctor’s appointment (Sabban 2004), something 
that workers in Saudi Arabia would never be allowed to do by themselves. The ability to 
perform these simple tasks independently allows workers in the UAE to interact, however 
briefly, with other migrant domestic workers and build friendships that can help alleviate 
their sense of isolation. However, even in the UAE, workers complain about frequent 
incidences of abuse (verbal, physical and sexual) at the hands of their employers that go 
unpunished and, in this regard, the country is still very similar to Saudi Arabia in its 
treatment of low-skilled foreign workers.  
In contrast, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada and Italy all regulate their migrant 
domestic worker industry (to varying degrees, of course) and this government oversight 
extends to monitoring how employers treat their foreign workers. The legal and judicial 
systems in all four countries are available to protect foreign workers from exploitation or 
abuse. Abuse continues to occur (especially in Hong Kong and Singapore) but having a 
police and court system that is independent and impartial enough to protect workers’ 
rights (however limited they may be) does help to improve the overall work environment 
in these countries. Of these four countries, Singapore’s regulations are the weakest given 
that migrant domestic workers are not covered under its national labor laws. However, 
this island-nation has made significant strides in recent years in its efforts to protect 
migrant domestic workers from employer and agency abuse. In the other three countries, 
migrant domestic workers enjoy substantively more protections.  
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However, none of these six countries decouple migrant domestic workers’ work 
permits from their sponsoring employer and, as a result, workers in these countries still 
often feel beholden to their employers and are wary of complaining about ill treatment in 
case they lose their work permit status as a result. In addition, none of these countries 
allow workers to “live out” in a separate residence from their employer, which would 
again reduce workers’ exposure to the possibility of abuse or overwork. Canada and Italy 
do require employers to provide a private room to their domestic workers, ensuring that 
workers in these countries enjoy a measure of privacy even while living in their 
employer’s residence. This is a better arrangement than in space-constrained Hong Kong 
and Singapore where employers are only asked to provide their employees with some 
amount of privacy, but are not required to give them their own room. But overall, there is 
still “room” for improvement on this front even in Canada and Italy. 
  
Transnational Labor Markets and Multistate Migration 
The state of affairs described in this chapter constitutes a transnational labor 
market for migrant domestic workers. I characterize this labor market as “transnational,” 
even though there does not exist complete free movement of migrant domestic workers 
across national borders as exists within the European Union (EU) for EU citizens and 
permanent residents. In the case of migrant domestic workers (from the Philippines and 
other countries in the Global South), their movement from one receiving country to the 
next is still constrained by both sending and receiving country immigration policies. 
However, migrant domestic workers in one country are still able to use the capital 
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(human, financial, social and cultural) that they have acquired working in one country to 
seek similar employment in another country.  
Taking the case of Canada as an example, the Canadian government requires live-
in caregiver (LIC) applicants to have undergone a six-month caregiving course or possess 
at least one year’s worth of caregiving experience. This caregiving experience can easily 
be acquired while working overseas in another destination. Over 80% of study 
participants in Canada fell into this category, having worked in at least one intermediate 
destination country before arriving in Canada. And, as Table 5.6 shows, this pattern most 
likely holds true for all Filipino migrant domestic workers entering Canada, reflected in 
the discrepancy in the national-level statistics published by the Canadian and Philippine 
governments regarding the number of live-in caregiver visas issued to Filipinos each 
year. In 2008, a total of 10,120 caregiver applications from Filipino citizens were 
approved by the Canadian government. However, the Philippine government’s official 
statistics indicate that only 1,853 Filipino caregivers were deployed to Canada from the 
Philippines in 2008 (POEA 2010). This mismatch between the data published by the 
Philippine and Canadian governments has existed since 2003. In fact, Table 5.6 shows a 
steady increase in this data mismatch from 2003 (when the shortfall was roughly 2,000 
migrants) until 2008—the latest year for which full statistics are available—when there 
was a mismatch of over 8,000 individuals.  
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Table 5.6 
Comparison of Live-in Caregiver Statistics  
Published by Canada & the Philippines, 2003-2009 
Year 
Canadian Entry Statistics: 
Approved Applications  
from Filipinos 
Philippine Departure Statistics: 
Deployed Caregivers  
to Canada  
Data 
Mismatch 
2003 3,883 1,811 2,072 
2004 5,273 2,527 2,746 
2005 5,953 753 5,200 
2006 7,483 1,992 5,491 
2007 11,025 4,170 6,855 
2008 10,120 1,853 8,267 
2009  5,7791 1,4061 4,373 
Sources: Immigration Canada & Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
Notes:  
1. 2009 statistics purchased from the Canadian government only represent data collected from January to 
September 2009. In contrast, 2009 statistics published by the Philippine government represent data for all 
of 2009. Despite this discrepancy in the reporting periods, the Canadian entry figures are significantly 
higher than the Philippine departure figures. 
 
I interpret this data mismatch as representing Filipinos who applied to enter 
Canada as live-in caregivers while working in other destination countries such as Hong 
Kong. These latter destinations serve as “stepping stones” to accumulate sorely-needed 
migrant capital and allow migrants to bypass being counted (and taxed) by the Philippine 
migration bureaucracy. The steady increase in the numbers of such multistate migrant 
domestic workers indicates the increasing popularity of such a strategy. 
 A similar mismatch in immigration statistics can be observed between the United 
States and the Philippines. The Philippine government reports that less than 60 Filipinos 
entered the US as newly hired migrant domestic workers each year between 2005 and 
2009 (see Table 5.2). But the US government’s statistics on entering Filipino domestic 
workers are significantly higher—averaging 440 domestic workers each year (see Table 
5.5). Given that most of these 400-plus Filipino migrant domestic workers are not 
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registered with the Philippine government, it is plausible that they entered the United 
States after having first worked in an intermediate destination country.  
Maid placement agencies in destination countries also play an important role in 
the creation of this transnational labor market for migrant domestic workers. These 
agencies usually partner with a recruitment agency in the Philippines to screen and 
process willing Filipinos who are eager to find work as domestic workers overseas. But 
increasingly, these agencies also partner with agencies in other destination countries, or 
directly recruit from the existing stock of overseas domestic workers. During my 
fieldwork in both Singapore and Hong Kong, I frequently observed flyers in the windows 
of local maid placement agencies that were aimed at foreign maids, rather than their 
Singaporean or Hong Kong employers. These posters had headings such as “Canada 
Need (sic) Caregivers” and “From Singapore to Canada”, and were advertising how these 
agencies could help place Filipino domestic workers in Asia in caregiver positions in 
Canada. Other Singapore- and Hong Kong-based agencies advertised domestic worker 
positions in Italy and Spain. In this manner, these maid placement agencies are what I 
call “agents of globalization,” actively promoting the multistate migration journeys of 
Filipino migrant domestic workers. 
These agencies also set the stage for multistate migration through the imposition 
of a sliding scale fee structure that makes it more cost-effective for aspiring migrants to 
apply for positions in the West from intermediate destinations like Hong Kong and 
Singapore, rather than directly from the Philippines. As Table 5.1 reveals, a Philippines-
based applicant for a LIC position in Canada would be expected to pay up to US$16,000 
in agency fees. In contrast, an applicant based in Hong Kong is typically charged only 
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between US$3,500 and US$6,600, which represents a significant cost saving for the 
applicant. In addition, once in Hong Kong, the applicant would be earning much more 
than she could make if she were still in the Philippines when she applied to Canada. For 
all these reasons, study participants often counseled their network contacts in the 
Philippines to first seek work in what they called “stepping stone” countries like 
Singapore and Hong Kong, before attempting to apply for positions in the West. These 
country reputations will be addressed in further detail in the following chapter.  
  
Conclusion 
Prospective migrants who choose waged domestic service as their exit strategy 
from the Philippines, have a wide selection of destination options available to them. 
These countries range from Western nations like Canada, Italy, Greece and Cyprus, to 
Asian countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea, to most Middle 
Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain. This chapter 
focused on six of these countries (and the US), selected to represent the four major world 
regions where Filipino migrant domestic workers can be found. The policy realities 
concerning each of these countries’ migrant domestic worker programs were examined: 
Both the policies on the books (such as their entry requirements for migrant workers, 
labor laws and regulations) and the policy praxis on the ground (such as the non-
enforcement of labor laws).  
This analysis revealed that these six countries’ programs vary significantly. 
Advanced Western nations like Italy and Canada confer the highest degree of both 
employment and migrant rights, while countries of the Middle East provide the least. 
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Asian countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong provide no migrant rights to these 
low-status workers but they do provide more labor protections than do Middle Eastern 
countries, primarily as a function of their being freer societies in general. All of these 
differences are reflected in the cost of securing entry into each of these markets. The 
more comfortable the living and working conditions (and the higher the net wages) 
available in a country, the more expensive the fees charged by recruitment agencies to 
secure a work visa to that destination. A Filipino earning the average national income in 
2009 would be hard-pressed to scrounge together sufficient funds to cover the fees 
required for a work permit to Canada. A job in the Middle East, on the other hand, costs 
as little as 5% of the average annual household income in the Philippines.  
There are also concrete policy differences between these countries in terms of the 
particular personal characteristics (or migrant human capital) they expect newly arrived 
domestic workers to possess. These entry requirements relate to workers’ gender, age, 
educational qualifications, language abilities, health and work experience. In order to 
work as a live-in caregiver in Canada, a prospective migrant must possess the equivalent 
of a Canadian high school diploma, which amounts to at least two years of tertiary 
education for a Filipino migrant. An applicant must also prove their English/French 
fluency and possess a caregiver training certificate or relevant work experience lasting at 
least one year. In contrast, there are no educational qualifications required to secure a 
position as a domestic worker in the Middle East. 
The amount of migrant capital resources a prospective migrant domestic worker 
possesses thus interacts with different host countries’ migrant domestic worker policies 
and praxis to determine which destinations the migrant can realistically expect to enter on 
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their first attempt to leave the Philippines. Few prospective Filipino migrant domestic 
workers are able to enter Canada’s live-in caregiver program directly from the 
Philippines. In contrast, a job in the Middle East is within the reach of most prospective 
migrants (whether they desire it or not as a destination). Thus, varying program 
requirements interact with potential migrants’ access to capital to directly shape their 
migration trajectories.  
At the same time, the transnational labor market for migrant domestic workers 
encourages these migrants to adopt multistate migration trajectories in order to reach 
those country markets that provide better living and working conditions, but are harder to 
enter. A job as a domestic worker in Hong Kong allows a migrant to save some money to 
pay the agency fees for a Canadian LCP work permit. In Hong Kong, the migrant would 
also be accumulating useful work experience that would make her more attractive to 
prospective employers in Canada and allow her to avoid enrolling in an expensive six-
month caregiver course. The migrant might even be able to make new acquaintances in 
Hong Kong who could directly match her with a Canadian employer. Finally, maid 
agencies in Canada actively recruit migrant domestic workers from intermediate 
destinations such as Hong Kong and Singapore that are deemed to serve as suitable 
training grounds and de facto credentialing centers. Workers from these countries pay 
significantly lower fees for a job in Canada. For all these reasons, applying to Canada 
from outside the Philippines can be a more efficient strategy. Along these lines, Chapter 
Six will provide firsthand accounts from study participants to show how Hong Kong and 
Singapore have developed reputations as ideal “stepping stones” for more preferred 







The World According to Migrant Domestic Workers 
 
The migration literature has long recognized that prospective migrants often 
choose from several destination options. Destination characteristics that have been found 
to play a significant role in shaping a migrant’s destination decisions include, but are not 
limited to, each potential destination’s distance from the migrant’s origin country/city, 
the concentration of co-ethnic residents in each overseas location, the relative cultural 
familiarity of the locations, the overall quality of life offered, and the economic 
opportunities available (Bauer, Epstein, and Gang 2005; Jones 1978; Le 2008; 
McConnell 2008; McHugh and Morgan 1984; Ratha and Shaw 2007; Roseman 1983).  
However, these studies typically take a positivistic approach to understanding the 
destination decision-making process. They assume, first, that prospective migrants are 
fully aware of these factual differences across destinations, and second, that migrants 
rationally and objectively weigh the costs and benefits of different countries when 
making their destination decision. These studies fail to recognize that migrants arrive at 
their destination decisions using so-called “data” about different host countries that may 
or may not be entirely based on fact. First-time international labor migrants typically 
choose between countries they have never visited, making their destination decision in an 
environment of uncertainty, based on the perceived attributes of various destination 
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options.1 To a large extent, the same situation applies to repeat migrants considering new 
destinations to travel to. Therefore, if we want to understand how migrant domestic 
workers’ initial and subsequent destination decisions are made, it is not enough to 
analyze the very real policy differences between different countries’ migrant domestic 
worker programs (as we did in Chapter Five). It is also important to look into how such 
policies are understood and interpreted by the migrant domestic workers that these 
programs directly target. Simply put, we need to view the world of destination options 
through the eyes of migrant domestic workers. 
This chapter, therefore, is an attempt to insert some intersubjectivity into the 
scholarly discussion over the destination decision-making process. Such an effort has its 
ontological roots in Weber’s call for Verstehen or “understanding” of the meanings 
individuals attach to the world around them. Together with Chapter Five, it is also a 
direct application of Bourdieu’s “structural constructivism.” With that aim in mind, this 
chapter charts participants’ cognitive maps of the world, investigates the process by 
which these mental maps were constructed and discusses the impact these maps have on 
participants’ destination preferences.  
This analysis reveals that there is a clear destination hierarchy in the minds of 
prospective migrant domestic workers from the Philippines, one that is consistent across 
study participants, grouped as they are by nationality, occupation, religion and, to some 
extent, socioeconomic class. This shared destination hierarchy is a personally and 
socially constructed, tiered ranking of migrants’ destination preferences, with Western 
                                                
1 Um and Crompton (1990) make a similar point with respect to tourists’ destination decisions. 
2 http://www.gallup.com/poll/124028/700-million-worldwide-desire-migrate-permanently.aspx 
3 The average age of Canadian-based participants when they first arrived in Canada was 33 years. This is 
significantly higher than the average age of all study participants when they first left the Philippines to 
work abroad (28 years) given that the vast majority of Canadian participants had worked for several years 
in intermediate destinations before finding employment in Canada.  
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countries at the very top, followed by Asian countries, and finally, the Middle East. Up to 
this point, participants’ destination hierarchy closely matches the more objective country 
and region ranking presented in Chapter Three. However, upon closer examination, it 
becomes clear that migrants’ destination hierarchy is imbued with cognitive biases and 
affect-laden thinking. Together, these findings give us an insight into how migrants make 
their short- and long-term destination decisions, and also why they might pursue 
multicountry migration trajectories characterized by more optimism than rationality.   
 
The Literature on Destination Perceptions 
Both the migration and tourism research literatures teach us that all prospective 
travelers—migrants and tourists—carry around in their heads an “awareness set” of 
potential destinations. Simply put, this awareness set is the collection of all possible 
destination countries that the prospective traveler is passively aware of through 
information about the world that they have accumulated over time (Um and Crompton 
1990; Brown, Malecki and Philliber 1977). However, these cognitive maps are not 
always accurate (Malmberg 1997; Lee 1966:50). A century ago, Charles Trowbridge 
wrote that migrants carried in their heads misperceptions about the world around them 
that were “entirely imaginary, and erroneous” (1913:890). Trowbridge was referring 
primarily to individuals’ assumptions about the distance and orientation of faraway 
destinations from their current location, but he noted that there exist other dimensions of 
misinformation in peoples’ understandings of the world around them. In other words, 
when migrants make destination decisions that appear unintuitive to an impartial 
observer, it is not necessarily the case that these migrants are being irrational in their 
217 
destination choice, but rather that the information they use to make their decision may be 
inaccurate. Jones (1978) finds that migration flows are shaped more by migrants’ 
perceptions about living and working conditions than objective measures of these factors. 
In addition, when prospective migrants receive information about different destinations, 
they process this information through a “perceptual filter” (Gould and White 1986:26) 
that may bias them in one way or another towards particular destination data.  
Where do these perceptions of and biases toward/against different potential 
destinations originate? Arjun Appadurai (1996) uses the term “mediascapes” to highlight 
the role of mass media in creating an image of the world of destination options that may 
not necessarily be grounded in fact. Likewise, there is evidence that governments—
through their internally-focused propaganda machines and externally-focused tourism 
divisions—can play a critical role in influencing prospective migrants’ destination 
perceptions (Buchanan 2007; Jones 1978).  
Migrants’ social networks can also play a decisive role shaping their views of a 
country either positively or negatively, with individuals more likely to believe the 
opinions of prior migrants with whom they share strong ties. Most of the literature on the 
role of migrant networks on the destination decision has focused on how the existence of 
network contacts in a particular destination increases the odds of migration to the same 
location by reducing the costs of migration (Garip 2008; Massey and Espinosa 1997; 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). Other social scientists have found a herd effect whereby 
prospective migrants simply follow earlier migrants to the same location, even if they 
cannot rely on them to ease their transition upon arrival (Bauer, Epstein, and Gang 2002). 
But the social mechanisms underlying these causal effects are interpersonal information 
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flows from destination to origin. Earlier migrants may send back glowing reports of their 
host country to potential migrants in the homeland. Communication may also occur 
unconsciously and without words, through the gifts migrants purchase for their relatives 
in the home country and the generous remittances they send home. Such actions signal 
that the country in which the migrant works is most likely a good destination for future 
migrants as well. 
The converse of this situation occurs when prior migrants who endured negative 
experiences—in the form of hardship or abuse—in a particular destination dampen future 
migration flows to that country. When they return home prematurely, as a result of the 
voluntary or involuntary early termination of their contracts, prior migrants signal that 
life in that particular destination is difficult. And while prospective migrants might 
understand in the abstract that a single negative incident is insufficient to condemn an 
entire country, if this incident (involving someone they know personally) occurs on top of 
existing negative stories they have heard through their local grapevine or through the 
mass media, it may be sufficient to downgrade a country’s worthiness as a potential 
destination in their minds. 
A prospective migrant’s social context, coupled with their particular life-stage, 
can also influence how they process any destination information they receive, biasing 
them towards (or against) particular countries (Woodside and MacDonald 1994; 
Moutinho 1987; van Raaij and Francken 1984; Lee 1966). Older migrants may be more 
risk-averse when it comes to selecting a destination. Potential migrants who are single 
and still living under their parents’ roof may give greater deference to their parents’ 
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destination preferences. Likewise, potential migrants who are female and married may be 
influenced by their husbands’ worldviews.   
There may also be cultural or historical reasons behind the filters prospective 
migrants use to process the destination information they receive (Sassen 1998, 1989). 
Saarinen (1973) finds that Canadian students are more likely to know of and consider 
other Commonwealth countries important, compared to non-Commonwealth countries. 
Likewise, Filipinos appear to have an inherent preference for the United States because of 
their status as former colonial subjects of the US (Asis 2006; Rimonte 1997). From 
surveys with over 250,000 adults in 135 countries between 2007 and 2009, Gallup found 
that the United States was the most popular destination mentioned by respondents, with 
nearly 24% of all respondents listing it as their desired future residence.2 The United 
States’ popularity is tied to the mythology of the American Dream of safety, security and 
freedom from want, which has lured millions of immigrants to its shores since the 
country’s founding and continues to do so today, whether or not it is still accurate or 
achievable (Sassen 1988; Handlin 1973). In a similar manner, other destinations may 
hold a pre-existing allure (or repulsion) for migrants that colors all subsequent 
information they are given about these countries and their migrant domestic worker 
programs. 
Having discussed, at a theoretical level, some of the factors that may influence 
prospective migrants’ perceptions about different destination options, the next section 
provides excerpts from study participants’ interviews to give a sense of how these 
migrants saw and understood the world of destinations available to them.  
                                                
2 http://www.gallup.com/poll/124028/700-million-worldwide-desire-migrate-permanently.aspx 
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Participants’ Destination Perceptions 
Participants’ pre-arrival perceptions of the seven countries introduced in Chapter 
Five fell into four categories, regardless of whether they were positive or negative. Their 
descriptions dealt with their perceptions of: 
(1) The working conditions for migrant domestic workers in each country,  
(2) Each country’s immigration policy framework including whether or not there 
were pathways to permanent residence and citizenship,  
(3) The ease of entry into the country, and finally,  
(4) More general evaluative comments about the country as a whole.  
By and large, participants’ perceptions of the world were very similar. Their 
“mental maps” consisted of the same destination countries that almost all study 
participants were aware of, the same blank parts of the world about which participants 
knew very little at all, and the same destination hierarchy with Western nations at the 
very top, Asian countries in the middle, and Middle Eastern countries at the very bottom. 
The only exception to this rule existed among US-based study participants who had only 
taken up domestic work after their arrival in the US.  
For these Filipinos, domestic work had not played a part in their exit strategy 
from the Philippines; instead, it had simply been a by-product of their lives in America as 
undocumented migrants or after finding themselves shut out from white-collar 
professions. Their lack of socialization in their adopted occupation and its global reach 
meant that they were significantly less familiar with the various overseas labor markets 
available to migrant domestic workers. For all other study participants, their interactions 
with recruitment agencies in the Philippines and elsewhere, the formal pre-departure 
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orientation and training workshops they had been required to attend in the Philippines, 
their domestic work experience in other countries, and their embeddedness within 
migrant domestic worker networks that spanned the globe, all contributed to a strong 
degree of isomorphism in their worldviews and destination hierarchies. As a result, these 
non-US-based study participants—particularly the ones with several years of overseas 
work experience under their belt—were much more cosmopolitan in their ability and 
eagerness to talk about the relative merits of different countries’ labor markets and policy 
regimes. In contrast, US-based participants were remarkably ignorant of and uninterested 
in other countries’ working conditions. As a result, most of the country descriptions 
provided below come from non-US based interviewees.  
 
Canada 
Canada is a free country. And if we go there, we just work for eight hours a day. And 
then another [thing], extra pay for the overtime. And the employers, they will allow the 
helpers to have two days holiday [a week], sometimes three days. Saturday, Sunday, and 
go back on Monday. [My friends], they said it’s nice here. And they already have—they 
already are [permanent] residents there. Immigrants. They already have landed immigrant 
[status] because they were already there for three years. And they are working in another 
job now. 
Did they start as domestic helpers as well? 
Yeah, caregivers. Caregivers. They said, “If you work as a caregiver here, you will just 
have that work. No other.” They said. And then the employer provides everything! 
“Computer, everything,” they said. The employers will provide them.  
 
 
The above quote comes from Renasha, a 46-year-old Filipina in Hong Kong who 
was considering applying for a caregiver job in Canada at the time of her interview. Like 
Renasha, most study participants who were not already in the West uniformly described 
Canada as one of their “dream destinations.” The primary reasons given for Canada’s top 
ranking were the presumed high wages available there and the possibility of gaining 
permanent resident status. These two factors were mentioned by 33% and 21% of 
222 
participants respectively. (Table 6.1 lists the ten most common descriptors applied to 
Canada by participants.) Participants from the Asian interviews spoke in glowing terms 
about what their lives would be like after their arrival in Canada. “I only dream of 
Canada,” Abbie, a 38-year-old woman in the Philippines told me. “To get my whole 
family [there] also. To become a Canadian!” she told me, laughing in glee at the very 
thought of acquiring Canadian citizenship. “Canada, my dream country!”  
When compared with most other Western countries that provided visas to foreign 
domestic workers, Canada was still participants’ preferred destination because of the 
pathway to permanent residence that it offered. Jo-Ann, a former NGO worker who had 
worked in Hong Kong for seven years before moving to Canada, explained that she knew 
of many Filipino caregivers in Canada who had previously worked in Germany (most 
likely as au pairs). Jo-Ann claimed that because Germany did not offer permanent 
residence to foreign domestic workers, these Filipinos had chosen to re-migrate to 
Canada. 
Another reason for Canada’s popularity as an end destination was the possibility 
(after gaining permanent residence) of upgrading one’s occupation from low-status 
domestic work to a higher status, and perhaps even white-collar, job. One out of five 
participants mentioned how they looked forward to returning to their original career 
whether in social work, accounting or education, or attempting an entirely new career, 
after they had secured permanent resident status in Canada. Diane, a 38-year-old Filipina 
in Singapore, shared her plans to transform herself from a domestic worker to a florist 
once she reached Canada:  
Actually, my friend in Canada, Nancy, offered me a job. Also in domestic work. But, 
after two years, she said, if I have that certificate in flower [arrangement], I can apply to 
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florists after two years. She said it’s a good business in Canada as well. With this kind of 
skill, I can earn, she said, 10 times, 20 times, 30 times, what I am earning in Singapore. 
 
Most participants were certain that two short years after their arrival in Canada, 
they could start the new lives they had planned for themselves. Jeannie, a 49-year-old 
live-in caregiver in Toronto, recalled her pre-arrival image of Canada from when she had 
still been working in Hong Kong: “Canada is the best because you have to stay for [only] 
two years as a low working-class, as a caregiver. But then, you can look forward to 
something else. They allow you to travel [and have] permanent residency after two 
years.” To study participants, this was a more-than-worthwhile bargain. They were, for 
the most part, blind to the intricacies of securing permanent resident status in Canada, the 
time it would take to process their paperwork, the additional tests and checks they and 
their families would need to go through, and the costs involved with sponsoring 
dependent family members for permanent residence.  
They also did not factor in the possibility that they might not be able to complete 
their two years’ employment requirement so quickly, that they might have to switch 
employers or that there might be periods of unemployment in between that could drag out 
the time needed to qualify for permanent residence. All they understood was that, in 
exchange for two years of low-status domestic work, they would acquire a future of 
upward mobility in a Western country. This unrelenting optimism that so many study 
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 While participants were very aware of the better working and living conditions in 
Canada, they were also familiar with the high cost and the more stringent entry 
conditions for securing a caregiver visa to Canada. Altogether, 26% of participants raised 
the issue of the high placement fees charged by recruitment agencies as a significant 
barrier to gaining access to Canada. Accounts varied with regards to how much agencies 
charged, with participants in Singapore citing amounts ranging from US$2,500-
US$4,000, Hong Kong participants claiming between US$2,500-US$10,000, and 
participants in the Philippines citing figures going from US$6,800-US$17,000. The lower 
agency fees charged in Singapore and Hong Kong were a critical factor behind several 
participants’ adoption of a stepwise migration strategy in order to reach Canada. But this 
wide variation in fees even within a single country market also speaks to the lack of 
transparency and widespread corruption in the migration industry. These exorbitant fees 
had resulted in many participants deciding to defer their dreams of going to Canada until 
they had saved sufficient money. Mindy, a 27-year-old Filipina who was working in 
Singapore when I interviewed her, explained her plans for the future as follows:  
Now, I stay [in Singapore] more than three years already. But I am not willing to stay 
here forever also. I am going to save money first for myself, and then I am going to find 
another job. For example, I would try to go to Canada. But right now, I do not have 
money to do processing in Canada like that. 
How much would it cost to go to Canada? 
I think the last time I inquire in the agency, they said, SG$5000 [or US$3,900]. It costs a 
lot of money. [...] Yeah, I need to save a lot of money. 
 
While it was difficult but not impossible to accumulate the needed financial 
capital to cover these exorbitant agency fees, it was almost impossible (while overseas) 
for non-college graduates from the Philippines to accrue the additional human capital (in 
the form of the necessary college course credits) required to secure employment as a live-
in caregiver in Canada. Eighteen percent of participants raised this issue. Participants 
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who lacked the prerequisite educational qualifications expected of live-in caregiver 
applicants to Canada—the equivalent of 72 college credit hours or roughly two years of a 
college education—had resigned themselves to never working in Canada (and had moved 
on to consider other destination options with less stringent entry conditions). Annie, a 26-
year-old Filipina working in Singapore, explained why she had turned her attention away 
from Canada as a final destination:  
Of course, I cannot go there [to Canada]. I know that already. Because I know I do not 
have 72 units. That’s why. But, in Spain, even if you are [only a] secondary graduate, we 
can go already. But, in US and Canada, must be 72 units or college graduate to come 
there. So [it is] hard to go. 
 
Several participants also raised the issue of an upper age limit for applicants to 
Canada, stating that they were too old to qualify for a live-in caregiver job. In reality, the 
Canadian government does not stipulate any age limits for applicants, but it is possible 
that recruitment agencies dissuade older Filipinos from applying, assuming that 
employers prefer younger candidates.3 
 While awareness of how difficult it was to gain entry into Canada was widespread 
and largely accurate, few participants mentioned any disadvantages to working in 
Canada. The most frequently cited worry was the high cost of living. But only four 
participants raised this issue and only for two of them was this sufficient reason to decide 
not to seek a job in Canada. Rebecca, a 32-year-old domestic worker in Hong Kong, was 
one of those migrants. Her initial plan had been to travel stepwise from Hong Kong to 
Canada but she explained how stories about the high cost of living in Canada were 
making her rethink her destination dreams: 
                                                
3 The average age of Canadian-based participants when they first arrived in Canada was 33 years. This is 
significantly higher than the average age of all study participants when they first left the Philippines to 
work abroad (28 years) given that the vast majority of Canadian participants had worked for several years 
in intermediate destinations before finding employment in Canada.  
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I heard from my friends in Canada that life is difficult there too. Because although salary 
there is higher compared to Hong Kong, they are paying taxes there. And they are paying 
for their personal needs also. And then the price for their personal needs are also high 
there. So my friends told me, “Why do you need to go to Canada? Maybe, if you want to 
go to Canada and get a green card, then you can go there. But if you just want money, 
then better to stay in Hong Kong.” That’s what they say. I don’t know. 
 
Other concerns participants expressed included the bitter winters—three 
participants raised this issue—and the long distance from the Philippines—another three 
raised this point. But while these factors gave a handful of participants pause, they did 
not deter most. In general, participants shared overwhelmingly positive stories about 
Canada with little discussion of any potential difficulties. Figure 6.1 shows how there 
were four times as many positive statements about Canada as there were negative. In 
many respects, what participants described was the Canadian version of the American 
Dream: A chance at a comfortable life, a social safety net, family reunification and 
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When it came to ways to achieving this “Canadian Dream,” a quarter of 
participants also raised the point that it was easier to travel to Canada through a stepwise 
migration trajectory, rather than directly from the Philippines. Several reasons were given 
for this approach: First, that recruitment agencies in Hong Kong or Singapore charged 
less than agencies in the Philippines for applicants seeking jobs in Canada, and second, 
that the visa processing time in those intermediate countries was considerably shorter 
than in the Philippines, taking only weeks or months instead of years. Marcie, a 39-year-
old caregiver in Toronto, was one participant who had heard that traveling stepwise to 
Canada was easier and who had then acted on this advice. As a young woman in the 
Philippines, she had heard an advertisement on the radio singing the praises of Canada 
and telling listeners that the easiest way to Canada was via an interim job as a domestic 
worker in Singapore.  
Actually, my father, my parents are against my going abroad. But I was young and I 
wanted to expand my horizons. I got the idea of going abroad because of the radio 
station. [Marcie laughs.] One time I was cleaning the house and then suddenly the 
announcer said, “Oh, it’s nice to work abroad. You go first in this country [Singapore] 
and then, after two years, you can cross country to Canada.” So I started thinking. Before 
that, I really don’t have plans because I really want to work in the Philippines. But when I 
was young, I was very impulsive and very ambitious to work abroad.  
 
Marcie convinced her parents to let her work in Singapore as a domestic helper by 
sharing with them her dream of settling in Canada. She was eventually able to realize this 
dream. However, instead of taking two years to get to Canada, it took 14 years—four 
years in Singapore and then another ten years in Hong Kong—before she was finally able 
to secure a live-in caregiver job in Canada. She had been working in Canada for 17 
months when I interviewed her in 2010 and she was starting to think about the paperwork 
required to apply for permanent residency. She estimated that there would be a 12-month 
waiting period, after she finished her 24 months’ employment requirement, before she 
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would eventually receive permanent resident status and even longer if she decided to 
sponsor her parents in the Philippines. All in all, Marcie’s dream of getting to Canada 
was considerably more arduous and drawn-out than she had ever imagined it would be 
back when she was still in the Philippines but she had still not changed the top ranking 
she had given Canada in her destination hierarchy.  
  
Italy 
Now, in Italy, I will be a tutor. And, at the same time, a nanny. At the same time, 
a domestic helper. All in one. But, anyways, it’s Italy! […] You know the 
difference really is the place. [...] In the Philippines, even if you are a domestic 
helper [in Italy], it’s no problem because it’s there! It’s Europe! 
 
The above quote comes from Winola, a 49-year-old Filipina who had worked as a 
private, live-in tutor for four years for a local Saudi family in Saudi Arabia, before 
returning to the Philippines. Back home, Winola had enrolled in a six-month caregiving 
course with the plan of finding a position as a live-in caregiver in Canada but she had 
been cheated out of her deposit of PHP250,000 (almost US$6,000) by her recruitment 
agency. Then, out of the blue, another agency had offered her a job as a live-in caregiver 
for a Saudi family in Rome, Italy and she had jumped at this opportunity. In justifying her 
decision to accept the Italian job offer, Winola spoke in broad generalities about Italy, 
conflating the country with the rest of Europe. A similar approach was adopted by most 
participants who saw that part of the Western world as an undifferentiated, but alluring, 
whole. “Europe? It’s a big country,” was how one interviewee vaguely described the 
region when asked what she thought of working there. Participants glossed over 
differences in immigration policies, working and living conditions, prospects for 
citizenship and anti-immigrant fervor among the 27 countries within the European Union. 
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In fact, alongside Italy, participants only mentioned a handful of European countries (the 
UK, Spain, Italy and Cyprus), a function of where most of the migrant domestic worker 
traffic to Europe was directed.4  Other large European economies, such as France and 
Germany, were almost never mentioned. 
But even in the case of the four European countries that were regularly brought up 
during the interviews, participants displayed a distinct lack of specific knowledge about 
them—and Europe in general. This was reflected in the level of detail participants used to 
describe these destinations. While participants used 38 unique descriptors for Canada, 
only 23 were used for Italy. Likewise, while 58% of participants named Canada their 
“dream country,” no one talked about Italy in those terms. Forty percent of participants 
called it a “nice” or “very nice” country but it was clear that Canada still trumped Italy 
when it came to participants’ destination preferences. 
The most common statement made by participants about Italy dealt with the high 
salaries available there. Altogether, 53% of participants made such a statement, eagerly 
pointing out that the opportunity to earn in euros made Italy (and other countries in the 
Euro zone) very attractive. Several participants also mentioned that Italy offered 
comfortable working conditions in the form of limited work hours and nice employers. A 
28-year-old Filipina named Ariel, interviewed in Singapore, was one of the interviewees 
who had heard good reports about working in Italy:  
                                                
4 Of the 3,317 Filipinos who traveled to Europe in 2010 as newly hired domestic workers, Cyprus (47%), 
Italy (37%), Romania (4%), Spain (3%) and Norway (3%) accounted for 95% of the flow, according to 
official statistics from the Philippine government. Another 15 European destination countries each had less 
than 50 Filipino migrant domestic workers enter their borders in 2010. (Data collated from Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration website at 
http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2010%20Deployment%20by%20Occupation,%20Destination%20and%20Se
x%202010%20-%20New%20hires.pdf on February 9, 2012). But, as has been pointed out earlier, these 
figures disregard the undocumented migration of migrant domestic workers to Europe and those migrant 
domestic workers who travelled to Europe through an intermediate destination such as Israel.   
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My friend in Hong Kong, she have an auntie, a relative in Italy. And she told me that 
Italy is very nice, like that. […] She told me that the people there are very nice also. And 
then you can rest. […] You can work and then stay out in the weekend, like that. And 
then you have rest there. That’s what they told me. And then also, you can earn how 
much money there, like that. 
 
There was some talk of occupational mobility for migrants in Italy. One 
participant had in-laws in Italy who were long-time residents who now held minimum-
wage jobs in garment factories. Another participant, Marnie, had a sister who had lived in 
Italy for over 20 years and now worked in a restaurant. “The last time, it was as a 
domestic helper,” Marnie explained. “But, after five years, they got their green card. 
They find the [new] work there. Now, they work in a restaurant. Like waiter, like that.” 
But no participant made any mention of their Italian contacts moving up the occupational 
ladder into white-collar professions. Instead, the occupational mobility that long-term 
residents in Italy secured had more to do with gaining the freedom to set their own work 
schedule as a part-time rather than full-time domestic worker, or to work in a less 
isolating but still low-status and low-wage job. In other words, it was understood that 
horizontal rather than vertical occupational mobility was available to long-term migrants 
in Italy, while Canada appeared to offer more opportunities for vertical mobility. 
 Like Canada, Italy was recognized by participants as having high entry barriers 
for prospective migrants seeking to enter its borders. Altogether, 47% of participants 
talked about the exorbitant placement fees required to secure a job in Italy. At the same 
time, however, there was a general impression that Italy imposed less stringent job 
qualification requirements compared to Canada. While the cost of securing a job in Italy 
was on par with the cost of a job in Canada, participants repeatedly said that prospective 
migrants to Italy (and other European countries like Spain and Cyprus) required less 
human capital in the form of educational qualifications and relevant work experience. 
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According to these interviewees, applicants did not need to be college graduates to get a 
job as a domestic worker in European countries like Italy; a high school diploma would 
suffice. Several participants also talked about how their advanced age had precluded 
them from applying to Canada for a live-in caregiver job, but that their age was not an 
obstacle when applying to Italy or Spain. This distinction between the difficulty of 
entering the country (which was related to financial capital barriers) versus the relative 
ease of securing a domestic worker job once in Italy (which was more related to human 
capital barriers) was not present in participants’ images of Canada. This reflects the 
difference between the thriving underground market for migrant domestic workers in 
Italy and the more regulated market in Canada.5  
As a consequence of this underground market and the rather byzantine 
immigration rules and quotas imposed by the Italian government, participants were less 
familiar with the process of applying for a work visa to Italy. Instead, several 
participants, like 47-year-old Winnie in Toronto, had heard that “mostly in Italy, it’s a 
TNT6. […] They go there as a tourist or with no proper processing of [visa] papers.” 
Winnie was referring to the large volume of undocumented Filipinos living and working 
in Italy, with many of them working in the waged domestic service industry. Winnie had 
Filipina friends who had first worked as domestic workers in Israel and then paid over 
US$7,000 to be clandestinely transported to Italy and then matched with a willing 
employer. Another participant, 35-year-old Ginifer, had used her entire life savings 
(PHP200,000, or roughly US$5,000) from nine years of factory work in Taiwan to pay an 
                                                
5 It is also a function of Canada’s unique geographical location: Separated from most other Western nations 
and only sharing a land border with the United States which was just as strict when it came to entry 
restrictions. As a result, entry into Canada was largely through legal means and, particularly, the LCP. 
6 TNT refers to “tago nang tago”, a Tagalog phrase which loosely translates into “hiding and hiding”. TNT 
is a colloquial expression popular among Filipino migrants to refer to an undocumented migrant.   
 
235 
illegal “travel agency” to get her a tourist visa to Sweden and then take her overland into 
Italy where her friends had promised to help her find a job as a domestic worker. Other 
participants, like 29-year-old Jasmine who had worked in Hong Kong and now Canada, 
had heard from friends in Italy that “it’s, like, really hard to go there if you don’t have 
any family to sponsor you.” These stories reflect most prospective Filipino migrants’ 
understanding that they would need large amounts of social and/or financial capital to 
gain access to Italy, effectively limiting the number of Filipinos who could aspire to 




Of course, US is a big country and a nice country and I think American people are good 
also. They are kind, friendly. And then, of course, about the earnings! 
- Rayann, 35 years old, Hong Kong 
 
You know, it’s more harder to go to the US than Canada. Yeah. I think some people can 
just go there in the US because they have somebody there. They have relatives there to 
sponsor them. But you cannot just apply. Because here [in Canada], we apply as live-in 
caregivers. But I think you cannot apply there [to the US] as live-in caregivers.  
- Jasmine, 29 years old, Canada 
 
The United States held a unique position in study participants’ destination 
hierarchies. Like Canada, it was a “dream destination” for many interviewees (43%) but 
an almost similar number of participants (37%) talked about the extremely high barriers 
to entry imposed by the US government, particularly the need for high educational 
qualifications or family sponsorship, that were almost impossible to overcome. While 
participants highlighted the difficulties involved in securing entry into Canada, most still 
recognized that the live-in caregiver program gave prospective low-capital migrants a 
chance at the Canadian Dream. In the case of the American Dream, however, there was 
no such opening. In talking about the United States, 15% of participants specifically 
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mentioned that they had not heard of a parallel live-in caregiver program in the US, 
ruling it out as a viable destination option.  
Prospective migrants without specific educational or employment-based 
qualifications, or access to sufficient financial capital, could only rely on relatives to 
sponsor them for a family reunification visa or a tourist visa. But even with relatives 
willing to do so, the wait for a family reunification visa could take decades while many 
applications for US tourist visas from the Philippines are routinely denied. There was a 
general sense that the US embassy in the Philippines was very strict when it came to 
issuing visas of any kind to Filipinos for travel to the US. Participants like Rani talked 
about some of these difficulties:  
US is so hard [to enter]. Because my grandma is there and then they want to get me but 
it’s so hard to go. […] Like, the American embassy, they have a lot of things they want 
you to find [like] all the papers. It’s not like other countries that you can [visit], anytime 
you can go. But, in Philippines, it’s so hard to get in US. 
 
One participant, Beatrice who had previously worked both as a live-in domestic worker 
and a teacher in a daycare center in the US, had been a university professor and 
government employee in the Philippines. But even she had been apprehensive when 
applying for a tourist visa to the US and had worried that her application would not be 
approved.  
Several interviewees had devised multistate migration plans to gain access to the 
United States. Rachel, a 28-year-old domestic worker who had already worked in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore by the time I interviewed her, had set her sights on finding 
a job in Canada because she planned on using Canada as a stepping stone to the US:  
In the US is my auntie. My mother’s sister is in USA.  
Has she told you anything about the US? 
“US is nice but hard to bring the maid there.” She wanted to bring me there but it’s hard. 




 Other participants seemed to have settled on Canada as their final destination 
because they had decided that securing entry into the US was too difficult. For these 
participants, Canada was something of a “consolation destination” rather than a dream 
destination. Renasha, for instance, had initially claimed that Canada was her dream 
destination but then qualified her answer: 
If I have the chance to go to US, I will go to US. 
So the US would be your final destination? 
Yeah, US is my dream country. 
Why? 
Because they said US is a heaven. 
Who said the US is a heaven? 
People used to say that a long time ago. But now, whenever you talk about the US, they 
say the [immigration] law is very strict, so I don't like to go anymore. 
 
In general, those participants with extensive and close family connections in the US 
appeared more likely to retain the US as their top destination preference, while those 
interviewees with limited family ties to the US were willing to reorder their destination 
preferences. This speaks to the role of overseas networks in weighting prospective 
migrants’ destination perceptions and preferences.  
Why did the US hold such a prominent position in so many participants’ 
destination hierarchies? In trying to explain why the US was their dream destination, 
most Asia-based interviewees spouted the same, slightly vague dreams of upward 
mobility, comfortable living and high wages that they spoke of when describing life in 
Canada. “It’s very nice there and a lot of money earned and then you just only have five 
days to work if you want to. And then, the other days, then you do your own business or 
whatever because it’s the weekend there,” was how 36-year-old Rani talked about life in 
the US.  
But many Canada-based participants’ perceptions of the US (and their destination 
hierarchies more broadly) changed considerably after they arrived in Canada. Having 
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experienced life in a Western country—and one that shared a land border with the US—
Canada-based participants had acquired much more information about the merits and 
demerits of life in the US vis-à-vis Canada. According to Vanessa, a 47-year-old 
domestic worker in Toronto, the US and particularly California—the state with the 
highest concentration of Filipino immigrants—offered milder weather and lower taxes, 
when compared to Canada:  
I think, my first choice is US. Because the taxes there is low. And the second [choice] is 
Canada because the taxes here are so steep. You need to pay two taxes: the federal and 
provincial. That’s why most of the nurses here move to New York.  
Because of the taxes? So they can earn more money in the US? 
Yes. So that’s why until now they, [the US, is] still—out of all the countries in the 
world—they are the only country still open for immigrants. […] Canada will be great as 
the United States if they only welcome more immigrants, professionals.  
 
 
But Vanessa was in the minority in this regard. There were also newly-discovered 
disadvantages to life in the US that discouraged several Canada-based participants from 
attempting to re-migrate there. In addition, many of them had developed a positive affect 
towards Canada that influenced their opinions about the US and tended to make them 
defend Canada more vigorously than they might have before their arrival in Canada. 
Several of these participants talked about their preference for Canada’s welfare programs, 
its national healthcare service and its public transportation system, favorably comparing 
these government services over America’s more free market system. The healthcare 
debate that had raged in the US between 2009 and 2010 had also clearly affected 
Canadian-based participants’ views about both countries’ merits. During their interviews, 
these women regularly touted the “free” healthcare and other welfare benefits they 
received in Canada as advantages over the United States’ more capitalistic approach. 
Overall, participants in Canada appeared to be much more educated about the 
pros and cons of life in Canada vis-à-vis the United States, compared to their counterparts 
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in Asia and even those in the US. Few US-based participants knew much about working 
conditions in Canada. Nor did they express much interest in moving to Canada, not even 
those participants who were currently working illegally in the US.   
 
Hong Kong 
They said that, if you come from Riyadh, Riyadh is hell and Hong Kong is heaven! 
That’s what they told me. So I just wanted to try that. 
Who said that? 
A lot of people said that. Because Hong Kong is Asia. And you have the day off. And it’s 
a small country but all the stuff is good.  
Did you know people who were already working in Hong Kong at that time? 
Oh yeah, people from my hometown. There were a lot of them.  
– Jeannie, 49 years old, Canada 
 
Hong Kong was a popular destination among participants both as a terminal 
destination and a stepping stone to greener pastures in the West. When compared with 
other Asian markets, Hong Kong had a reputation as a place where a migrant domestic 
worker could earn relatively high wages and enjoy some workplace protections. In fact, 
Hong Kong’s high wage rate was its most commonly mentioned characteristic with 48% 
of participants raising this trait and 34% saying that Hong Kong was a nice destination to 
work in. Rebecca, a 32-year-old single mother, explained how her friends had touted both 
those aspects of Hong Kong when she first started thinking of going abroad:  
Before I decided to go here [in Hong Kong], I think [it over] a million times. [Rebecca 
laughs.] I think a million times before I leave. And then I consult my friends, my family. 
“Oh, what should I do now? My salary is too low. I cannot answer the needs of my 
family, especially those of my daughter. So, where should I go?” My friends advised me, 
“You can go to Hong Kong, because Hong Kong is a nice place, and then Hong Kong has 
a higher salary than the rest of the Asian countries.”  
 
The legal protections afforded migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong made it 
particularly attractive, especially in comparison with other countries in Asia and the 
Middle East that did not regulate their waged domestic service industry. This was the 
other reason Rebecca had chosen to work in Hong Kong: “I choose Hong Kong because I 
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believed that the laws here are fair. And then I am safe here. And then the salary is quite 
bigger than the rest of the countries, like Asian countries, like Singapore, Malaysia or 
Saudi Arabia. So that is why I choose here.” Likewise, Andrew, a 28-year-old domestic 
worker who had been working in Hong Kong for less than two years when I interviewed 
him, had heard from his friends that Hong Kong provided better protections for migrant 
workers compared to other Asian countries: 
What I have heard, when you are in Singapore, you are not free to join any association or 
organization. You cannot express yourself as a migrant. If you are maltreated, you need 
to go to the agency. You can’t go to the immigration to report the employer. Or in 
Taiwan, they are only accepting women [domestic workers]. […] So, that is why I chose 
Hong Kong. Because you are free to express yourself [here]. You can do whatever you 
want on your rest day. They are respecting your day off. So, you have 24 hours day-off 
and then, the most important is, you are allowed to join the [workers’] association. 
 
Another advantage that Hong Kong enjoyed over other destinations was its 
proximity to the Philippines. Sixteen percent of participants spoke of how a flight from 
Manila to Hong Kong takes only two hours and how this had raised Hong Kong’s appeal 
to them. As 42-year-old Vivian explained: “I like Hong Kong. Because, you know, it’s 
very near to the Philippines. Only one hour. Whatever happens here, I can go home 
quickly. But, if I am in other countries, it is very hard.” In fact, Hong Kong’s proximity 
to the Philippines was so important to a few Hong Kong-based participants that they had 
turned down opportunities to work in the West so they could remain close to the 
Philippines. This was the case with 53-year-old Laura in Hong Kong, who had turned 
down a job offer from her cousin in Canada:  
You know what? When my cousin went to Canada, she told me the following year I am 
coming there. But I am considering my mom because she is getting older. I am very close 
to my mom because I am still single. So I said, “What’s going to happen to my mom? I 
cannot go home anytime from Canada. Whereas from here [in Hong Kong], which is an 
hour and thirty minutes to fly, I can go to my home and see my mom and see my family 
[anytime].”7 
                                                
7 There was no discernible pattern, at least on the basis of marital status, distinguishing those study 





 But against these advantages, several widely known disadvantages were also 
associated with Hong Kong. The first and most critical of these was the high risk of the 
early termination of workers’ contracts by their employers. Thirty-five percent of 
participants raised this “termination” issue—wherein employers prematurely end their 
domestic worker’s contract after only a short stint on the job—and talked about its 
prevalence in Hong Kong. Under Hong Kong law, once their contract is terminated, 
workers have only two weeks to find a new employer before they are required to leave 
the country.8 For workers who had used up all their savings and taken out loans to secure 
a job in Hong Kong, being forced to leave without recouping their investment and while 
still saddled with massive debts, was a terrifying possibility. When they were first trying 
to leave the Philippines for Hong Kong, some interviewees (like 33-year-old Ginny 
below) had encountered difficulties when trying to borrow money from friends and 
family simply because of Hong Kong’s reputation for early termination:  
[My cousin] doesn’t want me to borrow their money because he said Hong Kong is a—
because they also heard that Hong Kong is not good because there is so many 
termination. There is a termination policy there. Because there are other workers who are 
there only a few days in Hong Kong and then [they are] coming back to the Philippines 
already. And then, it is very, it’s worse because they have to pay all their loans. And then 
their family farm, they have to sell to others to pay back their loans, things like that. And 
so my cousin doesn’t want me to borrow their money because of what they heard.  
 
Coupled with the risk of early termination was the large amount of financial capital 
required to secure a job in Hong Kong. Altogether, 29% of participants cited high agency 
                                                                                                                                            
or participants with children were frequently just as eager as single/younger participants to go to Canada, 
because of the possibility of eventually sponsoring their families to join them in Canada. The distinguishing 
characteristics of multistate migrants will be discussed in further depth in Chapter Seven. 
8 By law, Hong Kong employers are required to provide one month’s notice or one month’s wages in lieu 
of notice upon termination of the employment contract. Workers have two weeks to find another employer 
before they are required to leave the country. And even if they find a replacement employer, workers are 
still required to leave Hong Kong and return to their country of origin before entering Hong Kong again 
with their new contract (See http://www.immd.gov.hk/ehtml/ID%28E%29969.htm#8). This requirement 
places an additional financial burden on migrant workers in Hong Kong who are usually expected to pay 
their recruitment agency another set of fees for finding them a new employer. 
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fees as one of the reasons why they were unable to go to Hong Kong directly from the 
Philippines, or had initially opted for cheaper destinations. Marnie, a 43-year-old 
domestic worker in Singapore, told me that she had chosen not to seek jobs in Hong 
Kong because she would have had to pay over PHP100,000 (or US$2,300) in placement 
fees. Another worker, 29-year-old Lena, explained why she had initially worked in the 
UAE for two years before moving to Hong Kong in 2006:  
Before I go to the UAE, I thought of applying to Hong Kong before. But because of too 
much agency fee to pay and then so many expenses to shoulder before coming to Hong 
Kong, I was very—Because I am afraid to borrow money if, later, I will be shouldering 
so many debts. Like that. So, I stopped applying [to Hong Kong] before.  
 
Prospective migrants had to weigh the risk of termination and the high cost of agency 
fees against the probability of earning relatively high wages and enjoying important 
workplace freedoms (a weekly rest day and the ability to attend church and be part of a 
vibrant community of Filipino migrant domestic workers) when deciding if Hong Kong 
was a worthwhile destination. Participants who opted to not work in Hong Kong because 
of the risk of termination were simply trying to reduce the likelihood of their regretting 
their decision in the future. The avoidance of “decision regret” (Bell 1982) because of 
future uncertainty was an understandable move on the part of these prospective migrants 
given the high stakes involved.  
Added to this mix of concerns was the likelihood of working for local Chinese 
employers who were stereotyped as being fussy, not trusting, strict and tightfisted. One in 
five participants had heard that Chinese employers in Hong Kong were overly 
demanding, adding to their fears of early termination. Ramona, a 28-year-old first-time 
migrant who was about to leave for the UAE, explained why she had been fearful of 
working for a Chinese employer in Hong Kong:  
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You know, in Hong Kong, some of the Chinese people is very—what is this—they don’t 
give food, like that. They underpay and [give] physical abuse, like that. And always shout 
and shout like this if ever you [make] a mistake. In Hong Kong, the money that [domestic 
workers] earn there is big; the only problem there is the employer. Sometimes, they don’t 
want black color in the [domestic workers’] t-shirts; they only like red. And they don’t 
want to see their employees crying or sad. They want their employees to be happy 
persons, not homesick.  
 
Participants going to Hong Kong often hoped to find work with white expatriates 
employed by Western multinational corporations because these employers had a 
reputation for being lax, generous and more understanding (Paul 2011). However, even if 
workers were able to find employers who treated them well, they understood that they 
were still only temporary workers and that they would never gain permanent resident 
status in Hong Kong no matter how long they were employed. “Because, in Hong Kong, 
you will be there forever as a domestic helper,” was how one study participant put it. 
Workers understood that their likely future involved either returning to the Philippines 
when they retired or moving on to a Western country (particularly Canada) that did offer 
a path to permanent residence and family reunification. There was a general recognition 
that, outside of the West, Hong Kong was one of the best countries to work in, as long as 
one could secure steady employment. 
Stories about Hong Kong being an especially good stepping stone to Canada also 
enjoyed wide circulation and influenced participants’ decisions to look for work there. “It 
is because I have heard Hong Kong is a very easy [place] to apply in Canada. That’s why 
[I came here],” Catherine, a 30-year-old Filipina, said to justify her decision to seek work 
in Hong Kong. “If I am going to apply [to Canada] in the Philippines, it takes so many 
years. When here [in Hong Kong], I heard that after two-to-six months, you can go.” In 
this manner, Hong Kong represented not only an attractive destination in its own right (if 
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one could find a good employer who would not terminate one’s contract) but also a 
convenient stepping stone to countries even higher up migrants’ destination hierarchies.9   
 
Singapore 
I have a cousin here in Singapore. When she hears that I was going to Hong Kong, she 
called me up and said, “Why don’t you come here in Singapore?”  
I say, “What is Singapore?  Where is it?”  I don’t know about Singapore at that 
time. So I said, “Where is it?”  
“It’s a neighboring country. You don’t know Singapore?” [she asked.] 
I said, “No, I don’t know. I don’t read about Singapore.”Actually, my history is 
not good. I don’t know anything about Singapore.  
So she say, “Oh, this is a very quite good place to work. But here, you have to 
work hard and you have to be honest.” And she says, “[…] Here people also have 
freedom, as long as you don’t break the law here. There’s not much difficulty to work 
and you don’t get in trouble.”   
So I then come here. […] I don’t really know about Singapore. I just read in this 
booklet in the Philippines. I hear a big thing about Singapore: Number one, the law. They 
are following the law, like that. I hear the law here is very important. And that’s why it’s 
great to come here. And my cousin assured me that, “Oh, here, the employer can’t touch 
you. Because you just call the police. [...] It’s not like the Philippine police that just say, 
‘Oh, forget it.’” So I was brave enough to come here.  
– Aisha, 44 years old, Singapore 
 
I heard that in Singapore the employer is very fierce. 
Who told you that? 
Some other people who come from Singapore already. And then they say the salary is 
very low. And then, if you work, you work so hard! It’s not only eight hours [that you 
work each day]. It is not like with Canada where it is only eight hours [a day]. Here [in 
Singapore], it is 24 hours [a day]. More than that! Like that. So, yes, I am scared.  
- Eartha, 47 years old, Singapore  
 
Participants were divided into two distinct camps when it came to their pre-arrival 
perceptions of Singapore. On the one hand, many participants had heard stories of 
Singapore being a “nice” (41%), “clean” (17%) and “safe” (15%) country with low 
placement fees and the option of paying one’s agency fees through salary deductions 
(26%). On the other hand, there were a significant number of participants who said they 
                                                
9 It should be noted that different countries served as stepping stones to different terminal destinations. 
While migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong primarily focused on moving to Canada, I heard several 




had heard that it was a “scary” country (31%) that they were discouraged from working 
in. These latter participants typically cited the famous case of Flor Contemplacion—the 
Filipina domestic worker who was found guilty of the murder of another Filipina worker 
and her young charge, and later hanged by the Singapore government in 1995.  
Many Filipinos still believe that Contemplacion had been framed by the 
Singaporean employer of the murdered worker and that the Singapore government had 
railroaded a confession out of Contemplacion while ignoring evidence that would have 
exonerated her. The case is widely regarded as the moment that galvanized Filipino 
migrant workers around the world to demand greater protections from the Philippine 
government (Rodriguez 2010; Solomon 2009; Tyner 2004). Despite the fact that almost 
20 years had passed since the case was front-page news in both Singapore and the 
Philippines, it was still one of the first things that participants spoke about when they 
were asked for their impression of Singapore as a place to work.  
Most participants who brought up the Contemplacion case saw it as an indictment 
of Singapore’s cavalier treatment of foreign domestic workers. “Since I heard the case of 
Flor Contemplacion, I never dreamed of [going to] Singapore. I never dared to go there,” 
declared 46-year-old Mandy in the Philippines. But there were a handful of participants 
who raised the Contemplacion case in order to explain that it had not deterred them from 
choosing to work in Singapore. In some instances, such as with 38-year-old Diane in 
Singapore, interviewees explained that they did not believe that Contemplacion’s fate 
was representative of most migrants’ experiences in Singapore: 
During that time, when I decided to come to Singapore—I don’t know if you heard the 
news about that Filipino, Flor Contemplacion, who was hanged? I come here 1996. And 
that time, it was only two years since that happened. It’s really very hard news. And very 




Because I say, “Different persons, different future.” I analyzed the situation and I think 
that those are self-inflicted situations. It is up to us to behave. […] If you don’t behave, 
then you can anticipate those bad things going to happen to you. So, for me, as long as I 
behave, that’s it. So I am very blessed, I am very appreciative. So, seems like, I came to 
love Singapore. 
 
In general, participants who spoke about Singapore in negative terms only knew 
of the country through news media reports, while those who spoke about it in positive 
terms had personal connections with earlier migrants who had worked in Singapore. The 
personal stories these participants heard had convinced them to discount the negative 
reputation that continued to plague Singapore. Thus, the heterogeneity in opinions about 
Singapore largely stemmed from a clash between the stickiness of the Singapore 
mythology as a harsh country with draconian laws, and the personal (and largely positive) 
stories about Singapore that some study participants had access to. This is reflected in the 
quote from Aisha at the beginning of this section. Aisha talked about Singapore’s laws 
not as harsh or punitive, but as safeguards: Protecting workers, rather than constraining 
them.  
The other reputation that Singapore had among migrant domestic workers was 
that of offering low wages, particularly when compared with Hong Kong. A third of 
participants had heard complaints about Singapore’s low wages but most of them 
weighed this disadvantage against the fact that recruitment agencies charged significantly 
lower placement fees for jobs in Singapore compared to Hong Kong. In addition, 
Singapore-based agencies’ willingness to accept payment of their fees through monthly 
salary deductions, rather than a one-time upfront cash payment, was considered a 
significant selling point. These two factors were important considerations for participants 
as they weighed the pros and cons of working in Singapore versus Hong Kong. Juno, a 
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30-year-old Filipina in Singapore, shared with me how these cost comparisons had 
pushed her into choosing Singapore: 
In Hong Kong, sister, there is a placement fee. We have no money to pay the 30,000 
[Philippine pesos] like that. Since Singapore is salary deduction, I have money to pay. 
Just salary deduction.  I pay only my medical [examination fees]. Just only 1,700 
[Philippine pesos]. So it is easy for me to go in Singapore.  Because in Hong Kong, 
placement fee is 30,000 [pesos] and we have no money to pay that placement [fee]. So, I 
choose Singapore, lah!  
 
Likewise, 54-year-old Lilith recalled that, prior to choosing to work in Singapore, her 
overseas friends had shared with her only two things about the island nation and both had 
involved comparisons with Hong Kong: “Only they tell me that pay there [in Hong 
Kong] is higher than in Singapore. But the placement [fee] is higher also, much higher 
than in Singapore.” 
  Singapore-based employers, the majority of whom were Chinese by race, also had 
a reputation for being demanding (similar to Hong Kong employers). But while 35% of 
participants voiced fears about early termination in Hong Kong, 13% specifically stated 
that there was no such widespread practice of contract termination in Singapore. Agatha, 
a 33-year-old domestic worker in Singapore, described the comparative merits of 
Singapore and Hong Kong in terms of this issue:  
In Hong Kong, they say that the pay is more higher. But the termination is very high. […] 
They say that if the employer don’t like you, or even if first day, they don’t like you, they 
send you back home. They don’t give you a chance to find another employer. [But in 
Singapore,] if you don’t want your employer, or you see that the employer is no good, 
then you can just call the agent to settle for you. 
 
In this manner, the stories circulating about Singapore reflected both its 
attractions and drawbacks as a destination, with an almost equal measure of positive and 
negative accounts (49% positive versus 51% negative).10 In addition, many of the 
                                                
10 The large number of study participants, based in Singapore, who tended to have primarily positive views 
of the island nation, biases this ratio. Among non-Singapore-based participants, impressions of Singapore 
tended to skew more negative. 
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descriptions applied to Singapore were relative, comparing it either positively or 
negatively with Hong Kong, in the same way that Canada was constantly compared with 
the United States. With Singapore and Hong Kong, these contrasting accounts of working 
life in these two countries highlight the mid-level ranking of these and other Asian 
countries in most participants’ destination hierarchies. These countries represented 
worthwhile destinations for labor migrants who were willing to accept holding only 
temporary resident status in their host countries. They also offered significantly better 
living and working conditions than the Middle East. But for migrants who wanted 
more—better jobs, higher wages, permanent resident status and all that came with it—
these Asian countries still fell far short of what the West had to offer.  
  
United Arab Emirates 
Participants’ perceptions about the United Arab Emirates (and the emirate of 
Dubai in particular) were symptomatic of the heavy marketing of Dubai as a shopper’s 
paradise and liberal oasis in the culturally conservative Middle East (Henderson 2006; 
Elsheshtawy 2004). While 98% of the descriptions applied to the Middle East were 
negative11, 72% of the descriptions of the UAE were positive (see Figure 6.1). 
Altogether, 54% of participants described the UAE as a “nice” country and 29% also 
used the term “open country” to contrast the UAE with other Middle Eastern countries, 
particularly Saudi Arabia which was universally described as a “closed country.”  
                                                
11 All in all, 29 unique themes were used by participants to describe life in the Middle East, of which only 
one was positive. Three participants said that the Middle East was a “nice” place to work. Almost 60% of 
participants described the Middle East as a “scary” place to work with 29% having heard that employers in 
the Middle East were abusive.   
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The term “open country” implies a place where the local culture is more liberal 
and the social mores regarding dress codes, the treatment of women and religious 
freedoms are more permissive. Because of the UAE’s reputation as an open country, 
participants such as 38-year-old Abbie were willing to set aside their fears of working in 
the Middle East to consider working in the UAE:  
I don’t want to go the Middle East. I hate the Middle East. 
But Dubai is also in the Middle East. 
Yes, but [it is an] open country. According to the stories of my niece, my nephew, and 
also my husband […], it is okay. I think it is like the Philippines. […] Girls can wear 
shorts. Not like in Jeddah [in Saudi Arabia].  
 
Abbie’s husband worked in the construction industry in Saudi Arabia, while her niece 
and nephew both had white-collar jobs in the UAE. Their work experiences and general 
impressions of the UAE informed Abbie’s ideas about the UAE, even though none of 
these relatives knew anything about the life of a migrant domestic worker in the UAE.  
Other positive aspects of UAE life that participants had heard about included the 
additional freedoms that migrant workers in the UAE were granted. The freedom to move 
outside their employers’ houses (14%) and the freedom to attend Sunday church service 
(7%) were raised by study participants. Participants like 44-year-old Melissa made 
specific comparisons with other Middle Eastern countries (and Saudi Arabia in 
particular) to show how much more liberal society was in the UAE:  
All my friends will apply in Dubai. All I hear [is] Dubai is good. Because, in Riyadh, you 
can’t shop, you can’t go outside. Dubai is good. What[ever] you want to buy, you can go 
outside [to buy]. But, in Riyadh, if you want to buy the shampoo, you give the driver the 
money. Madam says, “No go out. You give the money to the driver and the driver will 
buy the shampoo.” 
 
Sarina was another participant who sang the praises of Dubai. Her sister worked 
in Dubai as a domestic worker and 40-year-old Sarina was preparing to join her in the 
UAE shortly. “[My sister], she told me nice, good here in Dubai. She can go outside. But 
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in Riyadh, you cannot go outside. All haram [that is, forbidden]. Not like in UAE. UAE 
is open city. That is nice.” 
A scattering of participants had heard negative reports about the UAE—about 
foreign domestic workers being raped or murdered by their employers—but such 
participants were few and far between. And, similar to Singapore, some of those 
participants who had heard negative stories about the UAE indicated that these stories did 
not affect their overall positive opinion of the country. This was especially the case if 
participants had friends or relatives working in the UAE who had had positive 
experiences. Jinnifer, a 29-year-old first-time prospective migrant, was one such 
participant who thought of the UAE as an attractive destination despite having heard 
news media accounts of rape and abuse occurring there:  
I just hear the news about Filipinas who was raped and punched by [the] employer in 
Dubai. And then the passport was being held by the employer. That’s all. I just heard 
about those things. 
Does that scare you? 
No. 
Why not? 
Because I know that my brother is there and my niece is there. 
 
Jinnifer’s niece was a domestic worker in Dubai and it had been her niece’s employer’s 
mother who had sponsored Jinnifer’s work permit for the UAE. Jinnifer was confident 
that since her niece was enjoying her time in the UAE, she would too.   
The regular glowing media accounts of Dubai as a tourist destination also affected 
how participants viewed the UAE as a whole. 38-year-old Abbie (mentioned earlier) who 
had previously worked in Singapore but was considering a job in the UAE, shared her 
first introduction to Dubai:  
It is beautiful, Dubai. […] I see the movie [about Dubai]. It is a very lovely place. It is 
memorable. So when I am watching, I want to go to that place. I want to—I want to see 




The fact that Abbie was willing to move from Singapore to Dubai, moving down the 
typical destination hierarchy of most Filipino migrant domestic workers, is indicative of 
how popular the UAE was as a destination among migrant workers. 	  
There were other Middle Eastern countries—Kuwait and Bahrain—that a small 
number of participants mentioned as offering a similar “open” culture to migrant 
domestic workers. One participant, 21-year-old Saida, had a cousin working in Kuwait 
who was encouraging her to find work there as well. “They told me that Kuwait is [an] 
open city,” she said. “They can go without hijab. And they can drive!” she told me, 
laughing in wonder at the freedom that would offer. “Because it is an open city, not like 
Saudi.” But other participants still remembered the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
talked about it being a dangerous place to work in light of that conflict. Other participants 
were fearful of working in Lebanon because of the 2006 invasion of that country by 
Israel. The UAE was the only Middle Eastern nation that received consistently positive 
remarks from participants. In fact, the UAE received almost as many positive comments 
(72%) as Canada (81%) despite the radically different living and working conditions in 
these two countries. Some possible reasons behind this exaggerated positive view of the 
UAE are discussed in detail later.  
 
Saudi Arabia 
In contrast to the United Arab Emirates, study participants saw Saudi Arabia in 
almost uniformly negative terms. Ninety-two percent of the statements made about Saudi 
Arabia were negative, compared to only 28% for the UAE. Participants described Saudi 
as a “scary” (36%) and “unsafe” (27%) country, with “abusive” (24%) and “strict” (24%) 
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employers. Time and again, participants recounted how they had heard news stories of 
domestic workers being raped or murdered by their employers in Saudi Arabia. Rebecca 
recalled how she had heard accounts of Saudi Arabia that had convinced her to stay 
away:  
I know that in Saudi Arabia, domestic helpers don’t get a holiday. They were not entitled 
to go out, to go to church during Sunday. […] In Saudi Arabia, most of the Filipinos were 
abused. They are raped by their employers, abused physically, and then, some of them, 
the employers did not provide for them food. They did not give them enough salary. So 
that is why most of the Filipinos, they run away from their employers and go to the 
Philippine embassy for help. 
 
Another participant, Elaine, confessed that she too was scared of working in Saudi 
Arabia. “Because, what I heard in the newscast, there it is like a dangerous country! That 
is what they say. So I am scared. So that’s why I don’t go there. For safety.”  
 Some participants knew of friends or relatives who had personally suffered at the 
hands of their Saudi employers and these contacts’ personal accounts of mistreatment and 
abuse further convinced participants that Saudi Arabia was a dangerous place to work.12 
Marnie had a sister-in-law who had been sexually abused by her second employer in 
Saudi Arabia: “She said she break the contract because the Arabo [sic], if they like you, 
they rape you. So Saudi is not safe for the domestic helpers. […] That’s why she decides 
to go back [to the Philippines].”  
Another participant, Betty, shared her own story of abuse at the hands of her 
Saudi employer. During the first year of her two-year contract, when her female 
employer had not been in the house, her male employer had called her into his bedroom. 
                                                
12 There was a clear difference between how participants talked about employers in Asia as compared to 
employers in the Middle East. Both sets of employers were viewed negatively but, in the case of Asia, 
employers had a reputation for being strict, while Middle Eastern employers were believed to be not only 
strict but also abusive. This was an important distinction for female prospective migrants who were 




She walked in to find him naked and lying on the bed. He had left money and gold on the 
bed in a blatant attempt to buy her sexual favors:  
I run out and then I go to my room and lock my room. And then I didn’t go out. I let him 
know that it’s not good for me, I am very angry and then I lock my door. He said, “I'm 
sorry, sorry! And just testing you.” But I am still not opening the door until his wife 
arrived. When the wife arrived, he is still feeling sorry but he did not tell the wife. And 
me also, I am not telling the wife because I am thinking that I don’t know if the wife will 
believe me. So I just keep on in my room.  
 
Betty never told her female employer about the incident because she was well aware of 
how vulnerable her position in the household was and how easily her male employer 
could deny everything she said. She also recognized that she had been “fortunate” that 
her male employer had not forced himself on her because it would have been hard for her 
to resist in such a scenario. Amazingly enough, Betty continued working for her 
employers for another year after the incident because she could not afford to return to the 
Philippines empty-handed. It was only after she finished her two-year contract that she 
chose to find another employer, but still in Saudi Arabia. 
Participants also talked about Saudi being a “closed” country (21%) where female 
domestic workers were not granted the freedom to leave their employers’ houses without 
a chaperone (18%). And even when domestic workers were able to venture outside, they 
were required to cover themselves in an abayah and cover their heads with a hijab.  
Saida, the only self-identified Muslim in the study sample, was one of only a 
handful of participants who had positive things to say about Saudi Arabia. Saida had 
specifically sought a job in Saudi because, while other participants sometimes spoke of 
Saudi being a “Muslim country” as a drawback, Saida saw it as a plus.13 “I really like 
                                                
13 Other participants emphasized that it was not Saudi being a Muslim country that deterred them, but the 
fact that it was an Arab country. One of these women, Aisha, had previously worked in the Southeast Asian 
kingdom of Brunei which is also a majority Muslim country. She saw a fundamental difference between the 
Asian Muslim culture of Brunei and the Arab Muslim culture of Saudi Arabia. “Middle East for me is very 
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Saudi,” she told me. “Because Saudi is […] a Muslim place. And then I can go in Mecca 
to take haj.”14  
 Among study participants, Saudi Arabia’s biggest draw was the purported ease of 
securing a job there. Participants were well aware of the fact that recruitment agencies 
charged low (or no) placement fees for a job in Saudi Arabia and were willing to accept 
payment of almost all fees through salary deductions. In addition, most domestic workers 
were able to pay off their placement fees within three months of starting their jobs, as 
compared to the six to ten months it typically took a domestic worker in Singapore. In 
speaking about the Middle East in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, several 
participants spoke about how the lack of a placement fee was hard to resist, despite the 
hesitation they felt  about working in that part of the world. Sarina explained how, at the 
end of her first contract in Saudi, she had been forced to accept another job in Saudi 
Arabia because of the financial constraints she was under:  
When I come back [home] again from Saudi, I want another place but I cannot because I 
have no money to pay the placement fee. I want Hong Kong, I want other place, but in 
Saudi, there is no placement fee, just my two months’ salary [deduction]. And I have to 
finance myself. That is the problem. So always Riyadh, Riyadh. 
  
The other draw of Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East in general, were the almost 
nonexistent human capital pre-requisites to land a domestic work job there. Participants 
spoke of prospective migrants they knew who were either too young or too old to seek 
jobs in Asian countries like Singapore and Hong Kong, but who were still able to get jobs 
                                                                                                                                            
dangerous,” she told me. “Number one is the culture. [In Brunei,] they are Asian people, while the Middle 
East, it’s different. They are Arabs and they treat women as really second-class. […] You know, Arabs, the 
guys, they are more […] macho. You don’t have a say inside the house. You just [have to] follow them. So 
much more so if you are a maid. [Then] you can’t say anything! You just follow. So I don’t think I’ll go 
over there.”  
14 Anecdotal evidence from conversations with officials from recruitment agencies and non-governmental 
organizations in the Philippines indicates that there is a growing trend to hire Muslim Filipinas from 
Mindanao, in the southern, Muslim-dominated part of the Philippines, to work as migrant domestic workers 
in the Middle East under the assumption that being Muslim would make these women more inclined to 
work in Saudi Arabia.  
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in Saudi Arabia because it imposed no minimum or maximum age restrictions. One 
participant explained that she had applied for a job in Saudi because Hong Kong agencies 
only accept first-time applicants younger than 38 years of age. Another participant said 
that Saudi Arabian agencies accepted applicants even as old as 50 years. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, one participant shared how her 20-year-old niece, who was unable to 
secure a job in Hong Kong because the minimum age for a job there was 23 years, had 
opted for a job in Saudi Arabia instead. Likewise, there were no minimum educational 
qualifications for a domestic worker job in Saudi Arabia; even high school dropouts 
could find work in Saudi.  
Thus, for low-capital prospective migrants desperate to leave the Philippines, the 
lack of entry barriers and the low cost of entry tended to outweigh Saudi Arabia’s many 
disadvantages. By not requiring significant human or financial capital resources, Saudi 
Arabia and the Middle East continue to attract a significant proportion of first-time 
domestic workers leaving the Philippines each year. In 2010, the Middle East as a whole 
accounted for 58% of all newly-hired domestic workers leaving the Philippines.  
 
Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers’ Destination Hierarchies 
The above discussion of participants’ perceptions about these seven destination 
countries offers several insights. The first is that study participants hold remarkably 
consistent destination preferences that can be organized into a common “destination 
hierarchy” that, I would argue, is applicable to all non-Muslim Filipino migrant domestic 
workers. This discovery is in line with Gould and White’s finding that there is often a 
“shared national perspective” (1986:52) on both popular and unpopular destinations. It 
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stands to reason that this shared perspective would be even more similar among 
individuals who share not only the same citizenship but also the same gender, occupation, 
religion and, to a lesser extent, the same class. Study participants’ shared destination 
hierarchy was a personally and socially constructed, tiered ranking of those regions and 
countries of the world that are popular markets for migrant domestic workers. Figure 6.2 
is a stylized representation of this destination hierarchy, with Western countries 
positioned at the very top, followed by Asian countries in the middle, and Middle Eastern 
countries at the very bottom.  
 
Figure 6.2 




•  North America (Canada, US) 
•  Europe (Italy, UK, Spain, Cyprus) 
THE  
WEST 
•  East Asia (Hong Kong, 
Taiwan) 
•  Southeast Asia (Singapore, 
Malaysia, Brunei) 
ASIA 





THE MIDDLE EAST 
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Within each tier of this destination hierarchy, the interviews revealed that there 
are further sub-divisions. Among Western nations, for instance, North American 
countries (specifically, Canada and the United States) enjoy a higher ranking than 
European countries. Within Asia, East Asian countries like Hong Kong are ranked higher 
than Southeast Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia. Likewise, among Middle 
Eastern countries, the UAE takes top billing compared to Saudi Arabia. It is within these 
tiers and sub-tiers that most interpersonal variation in destination preferences was 
observed. While most participants ranked Hong Kong over Singapore, a vocal minority 
did talk about preferring Singapore over Hong Kong because they enjoyed the tropical 
weather and multi-ethnic cuisine in Singapore, or they had more friends and relatives in 
Singapore. Likewise, some study participants placed the US at the top of their destination 
hierarchies, while others positioned Canada at the top because they found comfort and 
security in Canada’s national health service and better-funded public transportation 
system. But the broader destination hierarchy—starting with the West, followed by Asia, 
and lastly, the Middle East—remained consistent across almost all participants. 
 
The Construction of Destination Hierarchies 
The interviews also highlighted where participants’ destination hierarchies 
originate. After sharing their pre-arrival perceptions of a particular country, participants 
were asked where they had acquired their destination information. Altogether, seven 
different information sources were mentioned by interviewees, ranked here according to 




2. Relatives,  
3. The news media (television, newspapers and radio), 
4. Recruitment agencies, 
5. Employers (both overseas and in the Philippines who shared their opinions about 
different destination countries), 
6. The entertainment media (such as movies and television shows set in destination 
countries), 
7. Government sources (such as information booklets and awareness-raising sessions 
about different destinations produced/organized by either the Philippine government 
or host country governments), and 
8. The Internet. 
Participants were allowed to indicate if they had acquired their destination information 
through multiple sources. Their responses were tallied and are presented in Figure 6.3. 
This chart demonstrates how close network contacts—both friends and family—
were participants’ primary window to the rest of the world, shaping the worldviews of 
75% and 62% of participants respectively. This communication was sometimes 
conducted face-to-face and, at other times, over the phone, Skype, email or through social 
networking services like Facebook and Yahoo Messenger. The power of these informal 
channels of communication is most evident in the cases of Singapore and the UAE, 
where personal, positive stories shared by participants who had friends and relatives in 






























This is not to discount the importance of the news media in shaping prospective 
migrants’ views about different destination options, especially when they had no other 
source of information. Half of participants indicated that they had heard stories about the 
working conditions of migrant domestic workers in various destination options (and 
particularly the Middle East) through the news media in the Philippines. Participants 
recalled watching news stories about sensational cases of maid abuse in the Middle East, 
or following the Flor Contemplacion case in Singapore through regular updates in their 
local newspaper long before they themselves even considered becoming migrant 
domestic workers themselves. In Singapore and Hong Kong, there are several free/low-
cost publications (e.g. Pinoy Star in Singapore and Hong Kong News in Hong Kong) that 
specifically target the Filipino migrant worker population and are widely read. These 
newspapers and magazines regularly publish stories about working conditions and 
newsworthy events in top destination countries for Filipino migrant domestic workers, 
and also include advertisements placed by recruitment agencies touting the advantages of 
working in other destinations. 
These accounts echo studies of tourists’ destination decision-making that show 
that much destination information is acquired “incidentally and passively” (Decrop 
2005:125; Woodside and Lyonski 1989), rather than through an active search. 
Participants were unconsciously building a mental map of the world of destination 
options as they conversed with relatives and friends who were overseas or returned 
migrants, read newspaper stories about the life of migrant domestic workers overseas, 
and watched movies set in countries that were common markets for Filipino migrant 
domestic workers. When they eventually made the decision to leave the Philippines or 
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move to a new destination, there was typically a final, more intentional and more critical 
push to learn about the particular overseas market that they were leaning towards. But 
more general destination information about multiple countries was being gathered and 
stored away in prospective migrants’ minds a long time before their actual migration and 
destination decisions were made. 
 
The Evolution of Destination Hierarchies 
In addition to revealing where and how participants’ destination information 
originated, the interviews also revealed that participants’ cognitive maps of the world can 
evolve over time, sometimes resulting in the reordering of preferences or the addition of 
new tiers and sub-tiers in individuals’ personal destination hierarchies. Few participants 
started their migration journeys with a comprehensive understanding of the world of 
destination options available to them. Initially, their mental maps were sparsely sketched 
out and contained large blanks. It was over time that their cognitive maps gained 
additional detail and definition. Some of these changes in preferences stemmed from 
participants’ direct, personal experiences in various countries. Time and again, 
participants would talk about how they had held one image of what their host country 
would be like, only to have it change after they started working there.  
In other cases, world events—particularly wars—reshaped the relative standing of 
different countries in participants’ minds. Lebanon and Iraq were frequently mentioned as 
unsafe places to work because of the recent wars in those Middle Eastern countries. 
Participants’ mental maps also evolved as a result of interactions with their fellow 
overseas migrants who shared stories with them about new potential destination countries 
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they had not yet considered. As Aisha had mentioned earlier, she first heard of Singapore 
through her cousin who worked there. Until that point, she had had no knowledge of that 
island nation. Migrant domestic workers in the Philippines who had initially thought of 
the West as an amorphous whole, began to learn more about differences between the 
United States and Canada, or Canada and Italy, as they started working overseas and 
interacting with other migrants who had more foreign work experience. Likewise, 
participants’ notions about the Middle East and the relative merits of different Middle 
Eastern countries often became more nuanced the longer they worked abroad and 
especially if they had built friendships with people who had previously worked in that 
region. With each additional year spent overseas, and each additional country they 
worked in, migrants’ awareness of the relative merits and demerits of different 
destination options continued to grow and change, and regions of the world that had once 
been a blank slate to them began to gain definition in their minds, demonstrating the 
significance of both personal experience and active membership in a wide-ranging 
migrant network.  
But these evolving destination hierarchies and the greater awareness of alternative 
destinations also set the stage for the re-migration of migrants after having worked 
overseas for a few years. As Chapter Seven will explore in more detail, when migrants 
learned about alternative (and purportedly better) destinations available to them, they 
began to consider moving to these locations rather than staying put in their current host 
country or returning to the Philippines at the end of their contracts. Their onward 
migration was thus heavily dependent on these migrants’ expanding network of overseas 
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contacts who educated them on new destination options and practical migration strategies 
to gain access to these markets. 
 
Destination Biases 
When comparing participants’ destination hierarchies with Chapter Five’s more 
systematic analysis of different countries’ migrant domestic worker programs (compare 
Figure 6.2 in this chapter with Figure 5.1 in Chapter Five), it becomes clear that even 
without access to detailed policy information, participants’ subjective rankings of 
different world regions share the same order as a more objective assessment of these 
regions’ policies and work environments for migrant domestic workers. However, there 
are several important differences between participants’ destination perceptions and 
Chapter Five’s more objective policy analysis, and these reveal how prospective migrants 
do not always approach their initial and subsequent destination decisions in a completely 
rational and objective manner. Rather, there are cognitive biases inherent in how they 
view the world and construct their destination preferences, independent of the sources of 
their destination information. Three of these biases, and the particular country 
perceptions they affected, are highlighted below:  
 
Anchoring Effects and the United Arab Emirates 
Most interviewees in Asia spoke in glowing terms about the UAE, and Dubai in 
particular, as reflected in the 72% of statements about the UAE that were positive in 
nature. Participants presented a heavily skewed picture of this country that was at odds 
with ILO reports about the frequent abuses that domestic workers in the UAE suffer. I 
 
 264 
argue that this disproportionately positive view of the country stems from what is known 
in social psychology as an “anchoring effect” (Mussweiler and Track 1999; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). This effect is observed when an individual attempts to judge an object 
by comparing it with an “anchor” object that acts as a standard of reference, directly 
influencing the eventual judgment. The classic example of anchoring effects deals with 
individuals who were given an ostensibly random number (the anchor) and then asked if 
they thought the percentage of African nations in the United Nations was higher or lower 
than the random number they had been given. They were then asked to provide their own 
estimate of the percentage of African nations in the UN. Depending on whether they had 
initially been given a high or low supposedly “random” number, participants provided 
answers that were either high or low respectively (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  
Similar anchoring effects have been found in a wide range of contexts, from how 
judges in Germany decide the appropriate sentence length for a convicted criminal, to 
how real estate properties are valued (Mussweiler and Track 1999; Northcraft and Neale 
1987). In the present study, the interview excerpts make clear that migrants also 
evaluated different destinations through a process of anchored comparison. The UAE, as 
a Middle Eastern country, was most frequently set against Saudi Arabia, the prototypical 
Middle Eastern nation in participants’ minds. This is evidenced by the high number of 
participants who, when asked about the UAE, would (of their own volition) provide 
statements comparing it positively with Saudi Arabia.15 Given that working conditions in 
Saudi are universally accepted as being horrific, I posit that this made life in the UAE 
seem idyllic in comparison, leading to the overwhelmingly positive remarks participants 
                                                
15 Even though Kuwait has been the largest Middle Eastern market for newly hired Filipino migrant 
domestic workers in the last few years. 
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made about the UAE. However, if participants had been asked to directly compare the 
UAE with Hong Kong or Canada, I hypothesize that their comments would have been 
much less effusive. But because their natural instinct was to compare countries within the 
same region, and because Saudi Arabia was seen as the prototypical Middle Eastern 
country, the UAE came across as a liberal oasis. 
In a similar manner, participants’ comments about Canada frequently referenced 
the United States, and comments about Hong Kong used Singapore as a reference point 
(and vice versa). Prospective migrants were consciously and unconsciously comparing 
different destinations when making their destination decisions, and depending on the 
country they used as their standard of reference, their eventual perception of the 
destination under consideration could vary drastically.  
 
Cognitive Conservatism and Singapore 
Singapore’s reputation among a sizeable number of study participants—as a scary 
country with draconian laws—is illustrative of how a mythology can develop around 
particular destinations. Such a “destination mythology” weaves together both fact and 
fiction, and enjoys considerable lasting power. The negative mythology surrounding 
Singapore initially came to be after a series of events in the early 1990s, one of which 
was the Flor Contemplacion arrest and subsequent hanging, but all of which cemented 
Singapore’s reputation as a country of strict laws and unbending rigidity.16 
                                                
16 Another event involved the conviction and eventual caning of an American teenager, Michael Fay, in 
Singapore for theft and vandalism. Fay was sentenced to six strokes of the cane. Bill Clinton who was the 
US President at the time personally pleaded (unsuccessfully) with then-Singapore Prime Minister Goh 
Chok for clemency. Other issues that fueled Singapore’s reputation were its system of hefty fines for such 
as acts as public spitting, littering and its import ban on chewing gum (which was partially lifted in 2004). 
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Even though almost 20 years have passed since that time, this reputation 
continues to stick in the minds of many prospective Filipino migrant domestic workers. I 
posit that the stickiness of this place reputation derives from the psychological principle 
of “cognitive conservatism,” the notion that people find it difficult to change their 
opinions once formed and have a hard time incorporating new information that might run 
counter to their existing belief system (Greenwald 1980). Similar behavior has been 
observed among scientists, stock market investors and even psychologists themselves, at 
the individual and at the group level, so it stands to reason that migrants would not be 
immune to this cognitive bias (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens and Moscovici 2000; Kuhn 
1996; Shiller 2000; Greenwald 1980).  
Only participants who had friends or relatives with direct, personal experience of 
Singapore, who could give them a more positive account of life in Singapore, were able 
to shift their point of view. Participants who lacked this personal connection to counter 
the negative mythology surrounding this island nation were more likely to continue 
clinging to their decades-old beliefs about Singapore.  
  A similar effect may have been influencing participants’ views of the United 
States. The mythology of the American Dream played a heavy role in that country’s 
position at the top of many participants’ destination hierarchies. Setting aside participants 
in Canada who were more nuanced in their opinions about the US, most other 
interviewees only spoke in glowing terms about their former colonial master. This is in 
line with the entrenched history of Philippine migration to the US (as outlined in Chapter 
Three) and the continued valorization of the US as a place where the potential for upward 
mobility is very strong. As one participant, Baila, who lived in the US explained:  
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The common concept of those Filipinos who have not come here, who have not gone to 
America—I tell you, even me! When I did not, when I had not had the chance of coming 
here yet, I was thinking that everything in America is good. Everything in America is 
convenient. Everything in America is perfect. There is no beggar, there are no homeless 
people. But when I came here—well, I see, specifically in New York—New York is 
dirty. And there are so many vagrants. There are so many homeless people digging the 
garbage bins to find some food. And when you come here, even though you are 
professional […] until now, they are cleaning houses in Manhattan and they are taking 
care of old people or babysitting.  
 
Participants in the US talked about trying to dissuade their contacts in the Philippines 
from attempting to come to the US, telling them about how difficult life was in the US, 
but they knew that this was to no avail. The positive mythology surrounding the US 
continued to prevail. Why did positive personal stories about Singapore manage to 
overcome negative stereotypes about this island nation, when negative personal stories 
about the US failed to change people’s positive beliefs about life in the US? The answer 
may lie in a third bias prevalent among humans: Our optimism bias. 
 
The Optimism Bias and Canada 
The third and final cognitive bias that was widely observed in participants’ accounts of 
their pre-migration destination perceptions was the tendency to imagine a happy, trouble-
free future for themselves in their chosen destinations and especially in the countries at 
the top of their destination preferences, discounting the many difficulties they might 
encounter there instead. The higher up their destination hierarchy they went with their 
country descriptions, the more optimistic they became about what the future in these 
countries had in store for them. When speaking about Canada, many participants were 
completely confident that within two years of working in Canada, they would be able to 
apply for permanent residency, then sponsor their families to join them, and soon after, 
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shift careers to a more white-collar profession. There was no recognition of the various 
hurdles that they might need to overcome before this imagined future could come true. 
 This “optimism bias” is a fundamentally human trait, something that most 
individuals manifest in our expectations of what the future will bring (Sharot 2011; Irwin 
1953; Marks 1951; Shiller 2000). It is also the reason why so many migrants voluntarily 
choose to leave their homes and relocate elsewhere in the first place: They are working 
on the assumption that their new life will be better than their old one. This is not to 
suggest that prospective migrants do not weigh the costs and benefits of the various 
destination options they are considering. Rather, the concept of an “optimism bias” 
teaches us that when engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, prospective migrants may 
unconsciously overestimate the benefits of life in their preferred destination country and 
the ease of accruing these benefits, while undercounting the costs and risks involved in 
getting to that country and their life thereafter. I posit that this may have also contributed 
to why some participants were willing to change their negative beliefs about Singapore 
but not their positive ones about the US. 
  
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to give a sense of how Filipino migrant domestic 
workers understand the world outside the Philippines, with a special focus on their 
perceptions of seven major destination countries. What this analysis reveals is that 
Filipino migrant domestic workers who already share a national origin, industry, gender 
and religion also share a largely similar view of the world. These migrants view the 
different countries that are major markets for domestic workers hierarchically and 
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comparatively, with Western countries sitting at the very top of their shared destination 
hierarchy, followed by Asian countries and, finally, Middle Eastern countries at the very 
bottom. This ranking of different destinations can evolve over time as migrants’ direct 
and indirect knowledge of the world increases and their own personal situation changes. 
This ranking is also shaped by cognitive biases that result in the overvaluing of some 
destinations and the undervaluing of others.  
This country hierarchy in turn shapes prospective migrants’ initial destination 
preferences and current migrants’ subsequent destination preferences. It also shapes the 
market-driven cost of entry into each respective country. Recruitment agencies are well 
aware of migrants’ country preferences and price their services accordingly. The better 
the expected living and working conditions available within a country’s borders, the 
higher its position in the shared destination hierarchy and, at the same time, the harder it 
is to enter the country. Agency placement fees are inversely proportional to market 
demand and rise exponentially with a destination’s popularity. Overall, the lower a 
country’s ranking, the cheaper and faster it is to gain entry.  
And so, even though low-tiered countries may not be preferred destinations for 
migrant domestic workers, the low barriers to entry into these countries sway more 
capital-constrained migrants into choosing to work there. This is reflected in the relative 
volume of migration traffic to the different regions in migrant domestic workers’ 
destination hierarchy. In 2010, more than half of all newly-hired migrant domestic 
worker traffic was directed towards the Middle East, the least preferred region in Filipino 
migrant domestic workers’ shared destination hierarchy. Another 37% of total migrant 
volume went to Asia which occupies a middle-tier rank in the common destination 
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hierarchy. Only 5% of newly-hired Filipino migrant domestic workers traveled to jobs in 
the West. The progressively smaller number of migrant domestic workers who enter 
countries higher up the destination hierarchy as first-time migrants thus reflects the 
filtering process that restricts entry into higher-tiered countries to those individuals who 
are already in possession of sufficient levels of migrant capital.  
 But the country hierarchy discussed in this chapter has an impact not only on the 
destination decisions of migrants leaving the Philippines for the very first time, but also 
all their subsequent destinations. It does so by embodying these migrant workers’ dreams 
about what their life overseas could be like. All those migrant domestic workers who earn 
little money, toil under difficult circumstances for demanding employers and live apart 
from their loved ones, are fully aware that that there are other countries out there where 
they could enjoy a better life. Multistate migration journeys are intentional acts, 
motivated by the same aspirations that first propelled study participants to leave the 
Philippines and shaped by participants’ expanding knowledge of the world of destination 
options available to them. Some participants moved within the same tier; others moved 
across tiers, such as from Hong Kong to Canada. In both cases, the destination hierarchy 
presented in this chapter helps illustrate how these specific multistate migration 
trajectories emerged, shaped by migrants’ subjective understanding of what the relative 
offerings of different destination countries.  
The concept of a destination hierarchy also helps visualize the importance of 
“stepping stone” countries to multistate migrants attempting to climb to the very top of 
their destination hierarchy. The properties of a good stepping stone country include 
shorter processing times for a visa to destinations higher up the hierarchy, and the 
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opportunity to save money or accumulate additional work experience so as to qualify for 
jobs in a preferred destination. Countries like Hong Kong and Singapore that enjoy a 
reputation for being good stepping stones thus attract migrants not just because of their 
intrinsic benefits as terminal destinations, but also because of their purported ability to 
ease subsequent migrations up these migrants’ destination hierarchy.   
In the next chapter, I present the multistate migration patterns among the study 
sample, paying particular attention to the migration trajectories adopted by migrants in 
Canada. I also show how Hong Kong has developed a reputation within Filipino migrant 
domestic worker circles as the ideal stepping stone to Canada and the West, fulfilling its 







Onward and Upward2: Multistate Migration among the Capital-Constrained 
 
 The first published study of a migration journey involving multiple stages was 
observed, not among international migrants, but among internal migrants within the 
British Isles in the late 19th century (Ravenstein 1885). Ravenstein coined the term 
“stepwise migration” to describe the incremental progression of internal migrants within 
the British Isles, from their native village to a spatially proximate urban center and then 
beyond. Stepwise migration was viewed as “a process of human spatial behavior in which 
individuals or families embark on a migration path of acculturation which gradually takes 
them, by way of intermediate steps, from a traditional-rural environment to the modern-
urban environment” (Conway 1980:10). From this definition, it is clear that the term was 
primarily used to cover internal migrations (see Korinek, Entwisle, and Jampaklay 2005; 
Conway 1980; Riddell and Harvey 1972). When the concept was extended to include 
international migration, the common assumption was that village residents first move 
within their own country to an urban setting where the odds of their emigrating overseas 
increase substantially, with only the final “step” in their migration life-path being to go 
abroad (Konadu-Agyemang 1999; Malmberg 1997). Only much more recently have there 
                                                
1 Parts of this chapter were previously published in 2011 in the American Journal of Sociology (volume 
116, issue 6, pp. 1842-1886) in the article, “Stepwise International Migration: A Multi-Stage Migration 
Pattern for the Aspiring Migrant.” 
2 The title of this chapter is taken from C. S. Lewis’ Chronicles of Narnia series. 
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been studies documenting the process of multiple international migrations undertaken by 
the same migrant. 
But this subfield of international migration studies remains disorganized. This is 
evidenced by the proliferation of terms—secondary migration, tertiary migration, onward 
migration, stepwise migration, serial migration, multiple migration, multistage migration, 
triangular migration and re-migration. (See Paul 2011a; Aydemir and Robinson 2008; 
King and Newbold 2007; Siu 2005; Ossman 2003; DeVoretz and Ma 2002; Lam 1996, 
1994)—that all refer to effectively the same process of migrants undertaking legal stops 
of substantive duration in multiple destination countries.  
The present chapter attempts to bring some clarity to this corner of migration 
studies by putting forward an umbrella term, “multistate migration,” to embrace all types 
of migration that involve migrants spending significant amounts of time in a hierarchical 
progression through multiple destination countries. I particularly focus on how capital-
constrained migrants are able to undertake multistate migration to reach countries at the 
top of their destination hierarchy. Most existing studies of multistate migration focus on 
high-capital migrants, individuals possessing high levels of human, financial and/or 
social capital who move from country to country when their fancy takes them or without 
significant effort (see Aydemir and Robinson 2008; King and Newbold 2007; Siu 2005; 
Ossman 2003). Instead, I attempt to shine a light on the thought process that less well-
endowed migrant domestic workers go through as they attempt to undertake multistate 
migration and the actual mechanics of their migrations across multiple countries. Using 
the Filipino migrant domestic workers I interviewed as my lens, I focus on four key 
questions in this chapter: How did participants come up with the idea of multistate 
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migration? How did they choose each of the intermediate countries they traveled to? 
What kinds of capital did they use to support their journeys across multiple countries? 
And finally, who becomes a multistate migrant domestic worker?  
In answering these questions, it is important to keep in mind the proportion of 
multistate migrants within the sample subset in each study site. Just over 82% of 
Canadian participants were multistate migrants, having worked in one or more 
intermediate destinations for at least a year before entering Canada.3 Among Hong Kong-
based participants, 50% were multistate migrants, after setting aside six participants who 
had only left the Philippines for the first time less than two years earlier. Likewise, if we 
disregard the eight interviewees in Singapore who were still on their first overseas 
contract, 42% of Singapore participants were multistate migrants. In contrast, among US-
based participants, only 22% were multistate migrants, with most participants having 
directly entered the US from the Philippines after having been sponsored by their 
immediate family members under family reunification or tourist visas.4  
The US finding is in keeping with the absence of an accessible market for foreign 
domestic workers in the US and the limited availability of work visas for migrant 
domestic workers seeking to enter the US. In contrast, the high proportion of multistate 
migrants among Filipino live-in caregivers in Canada speaks to the relatively high human 
                                                
3 This statistic parallels the data mismatch presented in Chapter Five between the departure statistics of 
Filipino caregivers leaving the Philippines directly for Canada that was collected by the Philippine 
government and arrival statistics on the number of Filipino caregivers arriving in Canada that was collected 
by the Canadian government. 
4 This statistic is in line with national-level data on the percentage of multistate Filipino migrants in the US. 
Data from the 2000 US Census indicates that roughly 20% of Filipino migrants who arrived in the US at 
least 5 years earlier had lived in a country other than the Philippines in 1995 before entering the US. The 
most popular intermediate countries were Japan, Guam, China (Hong Kong), Canada, and Germany in 
declining order. This statistic is based on a 5% sample of the 2000 US Census and analyzed online at the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) website at http://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml. 
This data is not yet available for the 2010 Census.  
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and financial capital requirements needed to secure entry into Canada through its LCP. In 
subsequent sections, I argue that multistate migration was the only way for these migrants 
to acquire the necessary capital needed to qualify and pay for a job in Canada. I also 
interpret the exponentially increasing proportion of multistate migrants amongst the 
sample of study participants from Singapore, Hong Kong and Canada respectively, to 
indicate that multistate migration is an increasingly necessary strategy for capital-
constrained but aspiring migrants as the entry barriers to different country markets grow 
with the popularity of the destination. Using study participants’ stories as a guide, I 
present a theoretical framework to explain the emergence and growing popularity of this 
migration pattern among capital-constrained migrants such as migrant domestic workers.  
  
The Multistate Migration Decision-Making Process 
Participants’ accounts of their migration journeys made clear that there were two 
models of multistate migration decision-making that existed within the study population. 
Some participants were what I call “stepwise migrants,” proactively adopting multistate 
migration at the outset of their journeys as a strategy of incremental and upward 
progression in order to reach their preferred destination country. Other participants were 
closer to being what I call “onward migrants,” only deciding to re-migrate after spending 
a significant amount of time in one overseas country and after learning about new 






Kirstie, a married college graduate who had worked for an NGO in the 
Philippines, is an example of this latter approach to multistate migration decision-
making. When she first decided to leave the Philippines, she initially planned to work 
overseas for only a few years. She hoped to earn enough money to build a house in the 
Philippines for her family and save for her daughter’s education, before returning home 
for good. Kirstie’s first overseas destination was Hong Kong and, initially, she had had 
no plan to move on from there to a new destination. But after having made friends with 
other Filipino migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong, she learned about the possibility 
of migrating onward to Canada:  
When I was already in Hong Kong, [my friends] informed me about this cross-country 
going to Canada. So, since I can meet the requirements for going to Canada so I tried also 
the luck of the applying. And here I am in Canada right now. […] Because I really don’t 
have—I really don’t have the plan of going to Canada. […] Then, when I was in Hong 
Kong, then because a lot of people were going here in Canada to work, I said I would 
also try my luck in going to Canada. 
 
Kirstie worked in Hong Kong for two years while attempting to accumulate sufficient 
funds to pay for her second migration journey. Around the two-year mark, a friend who 
was working in Canada on a part-time basis contacted Kirstie to say that her Canadian 
employer was looking for a full-time live-in caregiver and the position could be Kirstie’s 
if she was interested. Kirstie jumped at this opportunity to circumvent the use of an 
expensive recruitment agency and, when I interviewed her in 2010, she had already been 
working in Canada for almost two years.  
 The migration story of another participant, Wilma, highlights how critical a role 
macro-structural issues, such as the ongoing economic problems of the Philippines, can 
also play in encouraging Filipinos to become onward migrants. The continuing economic 
blight in the Philippines helps transform Filipino migrants from temporary labor migrants 
277 
into longer-term onward migrants seeking a permanent home for themselves and their 
families outside the Philippines. Wilma had worked for ten years as a community 
organizer in the Philippines before leaving to work in Hong Kong. She and her husband 
had five boys and, after her husband lost his mining job, it became hard to make ends 
meet. Wilma had relatives already working in Hong Kong as migrant domestic workers 
and she asked them if they could help her secure a job in the Chinese territory. Those 
relatives willingly agreed to connect her with a Hong Kong-based agent who matched her 
with a local employer. One of her cousins also loaned her the PHP60,000 (or US$1,400) 
needed to pay the agency’s placement fee:  
That time, the Hong Kong migration is, you know, in demand. That’s what I know. 
Because my cousins in Hong Kong were saying, “You better come here! You better come 
here! There’s a lot of work here!” So I said, “Okay. As long as you pay for all the 
processing and then I’ll pay you later.” That’s the deal. Because I really got no money for 
applying and spending abroad.  
 
Wilma’s original plan had been to work in Hong Kong for ten years before returning to 
the Philippines for good. But after experiencing work-life in Hong Kong, she became 
deeply unhappy with life in the Philippines: 
Every time I went back, it’s getting worse and worse. You can see the difference now, if 
you are in the Philippines and if you are overseas. You are like, Oh my gosh! If you 
spend a few days [back home], you might kill all the people around you! [Wilma laughs.] 
You know what I mean? You go out to a shopping mall, you see all the people, you are 
like, Oh my gosh!  
I don’t know who is to blame. You have already gone out of the country and the 
difference is too much, you know? Yeah, in abroad, you can see people working but you 
get something [from your work]. But here in the Philippines, even if you have work, you 
can work and work and work, there’s nothing. Nothing changed, you know? Nothing 
changed! Oh my gosh, I thought, what will I do here? It’s just, you know, so hard.  
 
On her husband’s urging, Wilma started to consider re-migrating to Canada. “My 
husband said, ‘Why are you not planning to go to Canada? Because there we can 
reunite.’” She checked with various maid agencies in Hong Kong but the fees they were 
demanding were too high, ranging from US$3,500-US$5,000. Wilma could not afford to 
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spend that much money when she was remitting most of her earnings back to the 
Philippines to support her family. But then, unexpectedly, a friend of hers who was 
already in Canada told her that she could find her an employer for only US$2,500. Given 
the prevailing agency rates, Wilma jumped at this lower-cost opportunity and, when I 
interviewed her, she had been working in Canada for three years.  
Each stage of Wilma’s multistate migration journey had materialized because of 
the kindness and generosity of her relatives and friends. None of the individual stages in 
her seven-year journey to Canada had been meticulously planned out beforehand. Instead 
Wilma chose to take advantage of the opportunity for onward migration offered her 
because she came to believe that there was no way she could support herself and her 
family if she returned to the Philippines. The continuing economic malaise suffered by 
working- and middle-class Filipino families was what propelled overseas migrants, like 
Wilma, to make the momentous decision to look for a permanent home outside the 
Philippines. In the case of migrant domestic workers, this decision typically entailed 
attempting to re-migrate to a country that could offer them permanent residence. 
 
Stepwise Migration 
Participants who adopted a more planned approach to multistate migration were, 
in general, well-connected to earlier migrants who had already engaged in multistate 
migration to themselves and had instructed participants on the merits of an incremental 
journey to their preferred destination country. These interviewees spoke of stepwise 
migration as a logical strategy they had adopted to gain additional work experience, save 
extra money and/or apply from an overseas location that allowed for easier (and cheaper) 
279 
visa processing. This was the case with Marnie, a 43-year-old domestic worker in 
Singapore, whose relatives had advised her to use Singapore as a training ground so that 
she could gain the necessary work experience to secure a job in the West: 
They say to come here first […] and, afterwards, some of them have got experience here 
already and they go to Canada, UK, like that. Many Filipinos, they work here four years. 
After that, they go to Canada or US. It is like they only come here to train. 
 
A similar situation occurred with Catherine, a 30-year-old single Filipina in Hong 
Kong, who had a long-held dream to emigrate to Canada where her sister-in-law lived. 
On the advice of her sister-in-law and, in order to foot the bill of migrating to Canada and 
gain the experience required for a Canadian caregiver visa, Catherine had first worked as 
a domestic worker in Saudi Arabia for two years and then returned to the Philippines 
thinking she had saved enough money to fund her re-migration to Canada. But she came 
up short:  
[Saudi Arabia] is only my stepping stone. But I need more money. […] I earned my 
monthly salary of around US$200 in Saudi Arabia. That is nothing. When I came home 
to the Philippines, I have not enough money because I have saved only 120,000 
[Philippine] pesos. That is not enough for Canada [...] I think you need probably 800,000 
pesos for Canada. So I came here [to Hong Kong].   
 
Catherine had to work another two years in Hong Kong before she had saved enough 
money to pay the agency fees for a caregiver job in Canada. When I interviewed her in 
Hong Kong, she was waiting to receive her final visa papers before leaving for Canada. 
All in all, it took Catherine four years and stints in two intermediate countries to 
accumulate enough human and financial capital to make her dream of moving to Canada 
a reality, much longer than her initial planned two-year trajectory of Saudi Arabia-
Canada. Catherine still fit the ideal type of a stepwise migrant; it just took her longer than 
expected to realize her plans, which speaks to the fluidity inherent even in stepwise 
migration trajectories. 
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These unexpected stops in new and additional destinations were all part and 
parcel of even the most organized stepwise migrant’s migration trajectory. Almost all 
stepwise migrants’ stories emphasized the high degree of fluidity in their migration 
trajectories. In particular, participants frequently spoke of how they were caught by 
surprise at the high monetary cost of entry into their preferred destinations and how these 
cost issues had resulted in delays in their re-migration efforts and/or the addition of new 
intermediate destinations to their trajectories. This is also demonstrated by Eva’s story.  
Eva was a college graduate who had worked as an elementary schoolteacher in 
the Philippines for a year before leaving the country to work in Taiwan. Eva had never 
wanted to be a schoolteacher but her parents had coerced her down that particular career 
path. Given that she was not making much money in that line of work, Eva was more 
than happy to switch careers and try migrant domestic work instead. Eva worked in 
Taiwan for one year and then returned to the Philippines, hoping that she could now 
applying for a live-in caregiver position in Canada:  
I’m trying to apply to Canada. But they were asking for money that is more than the 
amount I have. So I said, Maybe I go to the other country. Maybe I save some more in the 
other country. I don’t think it’s time for [Canada.] I tried to save more so I don’t owe 
anybody or anyone, and I didn’t bother my parents. 
So was your idea then that you would just try to save more money and then try again for 
Canada later? 
Yeah, that’s what I really want. If I go in Canada now, I owe some money to somebody. 
And then, if I’m unsuccessful [in Canada], I don’t want. You know, if […] it happen that 
I’m not successful, it’s hard to pay [back] the money. You know, if you borrow some 
money from some companies, there’s a lot of interest. And, if you cannot pay, the more 
the interest, then double the money amount [you owe]. So, yeah, it’s like that. So I 
choose to—I make my mind to take time. Maybe it is not the time, I said. So I take it 
slowly, slowly and not too rushed. So, it’s not my time to go there.  
So I stay in the other country where I can save more and then I don’t need to 
bother anybody until the time is for me. So later, when I applied here in Canada, I don’t 
owe anybody. I used my own money. 
 
Eva’s plan entailed working in Malaysia, one of the few Asian countries where 
recruitment agencies accepted fee payment through salary deductions rather than a one-
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time upfront payment prior to migration. (Singapore had been another option but she 
chose not to work there because the Flor Contemplacion hanging had happened only a 
couple of years earlier. As Eva said: “We hear that news so we’re scared to go in 
Singapore. We hear that Singapore is a very strict country for the workers, like that. So I 
ended up in Malaysia.”)  
 After Malaysia, Eva had planned to go directly to Canada but, once again, her 
plans were derailed because of cost issues. Recruitment agencies in the Philippines were 
asking for PHP600,000 (or roughly US$14,000) excluding airfare, and Eva had only 
managed to save half that amount during her time in Malaysia. As a result, she was 
forced to consider alternative locations again. In addition to Canada, her recruitment 
agency also offered overseas positions in Cyprus, Israel and Kuwait. To Eva, Cyprus 
seemed the best option given that it was in Europe.  
 In Cyprus, Eva was employed by an elderly couple with whom she built a very 
strong working relationship. She worked for them for four years and would have stayed 
longer if not for the fact that the Cypriot government only allows a single nine-month 
extension after a foreign domestic worker’s four-year contract expires. Unable to stay any 
longer in Cyprus, Eva brushed off her dream of working in Canada and applied through a 
maid placement agency in Toronto, paying only US$3,000 this time round. All in all, 
instead of the straightforward Taiwan-Canada trajectory she had expected, Eva had to 
work in two additional intermediate destinations (Malaysia and Cyprus) over the course 
of 11 years on her quest to gain access to Canada. 
Eva’s journey through four countries is an example of the fluidity inherent even in 
the most planned stepwise trajectory. Eva’s case, however, is also an example of how 
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many study participants’ migration trajectories—both in terms of the number of stages 
involved and the actual destinations traveled to—strike a delicate balance between 
agentic action and structural determinism. Eva’s decision to go to Cyprus was a function 
of the high cost of entry into Canada but also the set of destination options her particular 
recruitment agency had to offer. Eva herself mentioned that if she had gone to a different 
agency, she might have ended up in Italy or Switzerland instead. But given the limited 
destination options she was presented with, Cyprus had seemed like the best choice. Eva 
was forced to make choices under difficult constraints but the very choices she made 
gave her the ability to alter (and eventually nullify) these same constraints in the long run. 
 
The Overlap between Stepwise and Onward Migration 
 As the participant accounts above already show, there is broad overlap between 
the two ideal types of stepwise and onward migration, with migrants’ destination 
decision-making oscillating between these two ends of the intentionality spectrum. This 
overlap is important because it highlights the incredible degree of agency and ingenuity 
that both types of multistate migrants manifest as they seek to realize their dreams. At the 
same time, it demonstrates the structural constraints on their agentic action that are not 
always easy to overcome. Marcie, the live-in caregiver in Canada who had previously 
worked in Singapore and Hong Kong, is a perfect example of the duality that exists 
among almost all the multistate migrants in this study: Their at-times strategic and, at 
other times, reactive decision-making under tight constraints.   
Marcie’s story was previously outlined in Chapter Six but, to recap briefly, when 
Marcie was a young woman in the Philippines, she heard a radio advertisement—paid for 
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by a recruitment agency—touting the benefits of Singapore as a stepping stone to 
Canada. Inspired, she convinced her reluctant parents to support her decision to engage in 
stepwise migration through Singapore to Canada. However, when she had almost 
finished her two years in Singapore, Marcie found that she was in fact ineligible for live-
in caregiver positions in Canada: 
Before I finish two years, I tried to write to the Canadian embassy there [in Singapore] 
about how to cross-country to Canada. And they give me all the requirements for the 
Live-in Caregiver program. But that time, […] the only possible people who can work as 
a caregiver must be, should be a graduate of nursing, a teacher or midwife. And I am not 
qualified because I am a commerce graduate. So, after two years in Singapore, I renewed 
my contract. And then after, before I finished four years, the requirement [for Canada] 
was still the same. So that was the time that I decided to work in Hong Kong. Because I 
told you before the salary in Singapore is low.  
How did you choose Hong Kong? 
Because I had friends in Singapore and most of my friends there, they applied to Hong 
Kong. And then, when they arrived there [in Hong Kong], they said it’s better to work 
there [than Singapore]. Because the salary is double.  
 
Marcie’s decision to move from Singapore to Hong Kong was motivated by the scuttling 
of her plan to secure a job in Canada. Four years into her migration journey, she decided 
to shelve that dream of hers and settle for the next-best destination: Hong Kong.  
But after ten years of working in Hong Kong, Marcie had a change of heart: 
After 10 years, I was thinking that although I owned two pieces of land in the Philippines, 
I keep on working as a [migrant] domestic worker. I was thinking of my [past] ambitions 
and I was thinking of upgrading myself. Trying something different. I saw a lot of cases 
in Hong Kong where they start working as domestic workers when they were young and 
still nothing happened. So they get older and their children, they weren’t able to finish 
their studies. And even as they get older in Hong Kong, they didn’t have enough savings. 
It seems that there was no good future or opportunity [in Hong Kong].  
So, I decided to—and that was in 2008—that time, from 2005 to 2008, there 
were lots of people in Hong Kong applying to Canada. So that’s it. So I decided to apply 
[as well].    
 
Marcie applied for a caregiver position in Canada in 2008. By this time, the Canadian 
government had amended its LCP policies such that prior work experience as a paid 
caregiver could qualify an individual for the program. Marcie’s application was accepted 
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and, within a week, she had been matched with an employer in Canada and, within three 
months, she had received her Canadian work permit and had left Hong Kong for good. 
 Marcie’s migration story shows how her migration decision-making went from 
being strategic to reactive, and back again. Her account also reveals the important role 
played by different receiving countries’ immigration and labor policies in shaping 
multistate migrants’ migration trajectories, forcing them to dynamically shift course and 
change plans as they hit unexpected roadblocks.  
Participants also alternated between planned and unplanned destination decisions 
because of the financial burdens involved in adopting a more direct and immediate route 
to their preferred destination. These cost considerations sometimes altered migrants’ 
entire migration strategy—down to their occupational choice—as was the case with 
Cherina, a registered nurse in the Philippines, whose first attempt at migration—applying 
for a nurse position at an eldercare facility in the UK) had been unsuccessful:  
Because that time, I’m working in the hospital [in the Philippines] for less than a year. 
And also, for me, the placement fee was too high. It was really very expensive. I heard 
that it was between 250,000 pesos to 300,000 pesos [i.e. between US$6,000 to 
US$7,000]. So, that time, I am not really sure. Because I don’t know where to get that 
kind of money. So, I am not really sure whether or not to pursue this. I went for an 
interview [for a job in the UK] and actually I passed the interview, but they are also 
looking for more than three years’ experience at that time. And I have less than a year. 
And the other reason is the placement fee is very expensive. And I heard also that we 
have to pay for our own plane ticket. Yeah, plane ticket and also the medical. You have 
to pay for it.  
So you decided just to drop it? 
Yeah. Because we don’t have that kind of money. 
 
Cherina’s initial plan was to continue working in the Philippines and slowly start 
saving money. But many of her friends from college were fellow nurses who were 
already working overseas. One of them, in Saudi Arabia, suggested that Cherina apply for 
a position there as well given that the Saudi government did not require additional work 
experience for registered nurses and there was no placement fee that needed to be paid.  
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Cherina applied for a nursing position in an outpatient clinic in Saudi thinking 
that she could use her time abroad to earn more money and also study for the NCLEX5, 
the licensing examination that all registered and practical nurses must pass before being 
granted a license to practice in the US. But five years into her time in Saudi Arabia, 
Cherina had yet to sit for the NCLEX, mainly because she was working long hours and 
could never find the time to study. At that point, she had pretty much given up on her 
stepwise migration strategy to find work in the West as a registered nurse.  
But then a different opportunity presented itself. Three of Cherina’s nursing 
friends in Saudi Arabia had recently moved to Canada to work as live-in caregivers 
(LICs). A fourth friend, who was in the midst of processing her LIC work permit, talked 
to Cherina about the advantages of this migration strategy: 
She showed me her contract and how she talked to her employers. And she said, “Why 
not try to apply to Canada?” But I have second thoughts because, you know, it’s a live-in 
caregiver program. You have to live in their home. You have to stay with the employer 
and do the housework and stuff. So I told her, “I’m not sure if I can do it.” Because, I 
heard also that caregivers living in Hong Kong, in Saudi Arabia, working in homes, they 
have a very hard life. They have to work so many hours a day. They are getting 
maltreatment from their employers.  
So what I’m thinking before is that, if I work in Canada, that will happen to me 
also? So that was my misconception before. So that’s why I told my friend, “I have to 
think about it. I’m not sure if I could work there as a live-in caregiver.”  
But then, when I talked to one of my friends [in Canada], she said, “Oh no, it’s 
different here in Canada. It’s not the same as Hong Kong at all.” […] She said it’s 
different here. This is not Hong Kong; this is not Saudi.    
 
Persuaded by her friend, Cherina applied for an LIC position in Canada. She 
applied from Saudi Arabia, sending her application materials and résumé to a maid 
placement agency in Canada. Her nurse’s training made her a strong candidate and even 
though the agency fees were US$4,500, her agency allowed her to pay the entire amount 
                                                
5 The National Council of State Boards of Nursing in the US requires any nursing candidate (whether a 
Registered Nurse or a Practical Nurse) to pass the National Council Licensure Examination (NCLEX). 
Further information is available at https://www.ncsbn.org/nclex.htm. 
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in incremental payments over the course of six months after her arrival in Canada. While 
working in Canada as a caregiver, Cherina studied for and passed the Canadian nursing 
licensing examinations and the required English language proficiency test. After two 
years, she applied for permanent residence and, at the time of her interview, she was 
waiting for the official paperwork recognizing her change in immigration status. She 
fully expected to find a job as a registered nurse once she became a permanent resident. 
When asked, she voiced no regrets about the detour into domestic work that she had 
taken, or the years she had spent working in Saudi Arabia, especially now that she was 
back on track towards fulfilling her dream of settling down and working as a nurse in the 
West.  
But the various twists and turns in Cherina’s migration story—her multiple 
transformations from nurse to domestic worker to nurse; her failed attempts at direct 
migration to the UK and stepwise migration through Saudi Arabia to the US; her onward 
migration from Saudi to Canada—highlight how structural factors outside the control of 
individual migrants (from host countries’ immigration and labor policies to recruitment 
agencies’ fee structures) can combine with migrants’ own capital constraints to introduce 
a great deal of dynamic change into their migration journeys.  
 
Multistate Migration Trajectories 
 Having discussed how participants’ multistate migration decisions came about, I 
now turn to analyzing how their specific multistate migration trajectories came to be, 
paying particular attention to Hong Kong’s unique position as a springboard for Canada. 
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How did these migrants learn about the possibility of moving on to Canada from Hong 
Kong? 
 
The Role of Networks in Information Transfer 
As already discussed in Chapter Six, interviewees’ friends and family were 
overwhelmingly the most important source of destination information. The same scenario 
applied when it came to information about multistate migration. Migrant networks were 
crucial in disseminating information about the pros and cons of different countries as 
stepping stones or end-destinations. Sometimes this information was shared with study 
participants when they were already overseas; other times, it was when they were still in 
the process of making their initial migration and destination decisions in the Philippines. 
That was how Jasmine, a college graduate who had worked as a part-time clerical 
assistant in the Philippines and then a domestic worker in Hong Kong, first learned about 
the possibilities of onward migration to Canada:  
When I left the Philippines the first time, I didn’t have any plans of coming here to 
Canada. But like for the first year that I am in Hong Kong, I hear a lot of people saying 
Canada is very good and like this, like that. And then, there’s a friend of Auntie Carrie’s, 
[my aunt in Hong Kong,] and she has a sister in Quebec and they own an agency in 
Quebec. And Auntie Carrie asked me, “Do you want to go to Canada for your future? [If 
yes,] then you can go apply through this person. I know her. She’s my friend. She’s got a 
sister in Quebec and she owns an agency.” So I said, Okay, I’ll try. So I’m so excited that 
time. 
 
These transnational interpersonal connections between Hong Kong and Canada 
were remarkably strong and active, fostered by the large and vibrant community of 
Filipino migrant domestic workers in both countries and the steady outflow of migrants 
from Hong Kong to Canada over the last two decades. A culture of re-migration thrived 
among study participants in Hong Kong, even more so than in Singapore. Almost all 
study participants in Hong Kong talked about friends, relatives and even mere 
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acquaintances who were making concrete efforts to find work in Canada, or they talked 
about contacts who were already in Canada and the stories they had shared about life in 
the West. 
These connections were also facilitated by the heavy use of social networking 
technologies like Facebook, Yahoo Messenger, Skype, and even simply email, by these 
migrants. These communication technologies allowed participants to maintain regular 
contact with friends on either side of the Pacific Ocean. In Canada, many participants 
spoke of having purchased a laptop or personal computer in order to communicate with 
family and friends in the Philippines and elsewhere. Their freedom to use their computers 
in the privacy of their rooms also enabled their heavy usage of such communication 
technology.6 Hong Kong, meanwhile, is one of the most “wired countries” in the world.7 
Even though few migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong had their own room from 
which to talk to their families and friends, Hong Kong-based workers were guaranteed a 
weekly day-off. Many participants used their free time to frequent Internet cafés and 
public libraries where they could go online and chat with friends and family spread across 
the world. Many of Hong Kong’s mass rapid transit stations also have public computer 
booths with free Internet access and these were very popular among migrant domestic 
workers. All Hong Kong and Singapore-based participants who were employed at the 
time of their interview also had at least one, if not two cell phones, that they used to text 
friends and family in the Philippines and other countries.  
                                                
6 In contrast, some participants in Hong Kong and Singapore spoke of hiding their laptops and cellphones 
from their employers in case they were accused of wasting their time talking with friends and family when 
they were supposed to be working. 
7 According to the World Economic Forum’s 2010-2011 Global Information Technology Report, Hong 
Kong ranks 12th among high-income countries when it comes to its “networked readiness.” Report 
available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GITR_Report_2011.pdf. 
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Stepping Stone Countries 
Among Canada-based participants who were multistate migrants, 60% had 
worked in Hong Kong before their arrival in Canada. Why was Hong Kong so popular as 
a stepping stone country? Much of its reputation had to do with the fact that applying to 
Canada from Hong Kong was both cheaper and speedier than doing so from the 
Philippines or anywhere else for that matter. For instance, Arielle, a live-in caregiver in 
Toronto, who had worked first in Taiwan and then in Israel before finding her current job 
in Canada, was now thinking of bringing her sister to join her in Canada. But she 
explained during her interview that “I want her to go to Hong Kong first because the 
processing is easier than in the Philippines.” Even though she herself had worked in 
Taiwan and Israel before moving to Canada, Arielle was of the opinion that Hong Kong 
was a better springboard for Canada. 
Through advice like Arielle’s, Hong Kong has now gained the reputation for 
being the ideal gateway to Canada: Offering speedy processing of visas, costing 
relatively less money for agency fees, and finally, giving Filipino domestic workers based 
there the reputation of being experienced and well-qualified caregivers.  
But Hong Kong was not the only stepping stone to Canada. Altogether, 20% of 
the Canada-based multistate migrants I interviewed had worked in various Western 
nations before moving to Canada. These countries included Cyprus, Israel and Germany. 
None of these three countries have policies allowing migrant domestic workers to apply 
for permanent residence. In the case of Cyprus, as mentioned earlier, the Cypriot 
government has a strict policy of enforcing a four-year maximum stay for migrant 
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domestic workers. Thus, while foreign domestic workers in these high-income countries 
can earn significantly high wages, they are unable to build a legal future for themselves 
and their families in these countries. The limited residency options available to these 
workers was the reason that participants who had worked in these countries decided to 
keep on migrating, even though they were technically already working in a Tier 1 
destination. Thus, while a country can become a stepping stone to greener pastures 
because of intrinsic qualities it possesses that can facilitate subsequent climbs up 
migrants’ personal destination hierarchy, it can also become a stepping stone because of 
internal factors that simply make it inhospitable to long-term migrants. 
This was the case with Israel. Arielle, mentioned earlier, explained that she had 
chosen to leave Israel and re-migrate to Canada because of the political controversy over 
whether or not to grant Israeli citizenship to the Israeli-born children of Filipino migrant 
domestic workers. She and her husband had been working in Israel—Arielle in Tel Aviv 
and her husband in Jerusalem—when their son was born. When their son turned three, 
they decided that Arielle should apply for a caregiving job in Canada: 
I almost don’t want to go to Canada and not to have this job here. But I’m thinking of 
him [my son], of his future. Because though there is a chance that we can migrate to 
Israel, but not a 100% [chance]. Others said you have to wait for the child to become six 
years old and then you can apply for him to become a citizen. But there’s no assurance. 
So I decided to go here [to Canada]. And after 24 months, we can reunite. But it’s really 
hard. 
I didn’t know there was that option in Israel. 
Yes, there is an option [in Israel]. But, you know, the laws always change. Last time 
when I was still there [in Israel], there were some Filipino [children] in Israel, they were 
granted citizenship. I think, more than a thousand that they granted citizenship in Israel. 
Those [Israeli-born children who were] 10 years old and above, when I was still there, 
they offered them citizenship. But, after that, when they changed the prime minster, [they 
decided that children] six years old and below, they should go back to the Philippines 
already.  
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Given the political uncertainties surrounding the issue of Israeli citizenship, Arielle 
decided that a safer bet was applying for Canadian citizenship through Canada’s LCP and 
then sponsoring her husband and son to join her in Canada.8  
  While Hong Kong appears to be the primary feeder country for Canada—partly 
because Hong Kong itself draws the largest proportion of newly-hired migrant domestic 
workers leaving the Philippines each year—it should be noted that other countries may 
act as stepping stones to other end-destinations. Several participants mentioned in passing 
that Filipino migrant domestic workers in Cyprus often sought out work in Italy when 
their Cyprus-based contracts were about to expire. A similar link between Israel and Italy 
was also mentioned by several participants. There is a distinct possibility that multistate 
migration among labor migrants is path-dependent: That each destination choice they 
make directly influences their subsequent destination choice because of how transnational 
migrant networks are structured and the geographical proximity between particular pairs 
of destinations. However, further cross-national data between some of these country-pairs 
needs to be collected to confirm this hypothesis.  
 
 
                                                
8 Arielle was referring to the schizophrenic actions of the Israeli state towards non-Jewish (and non-
Palestinian) foreign workers within its borders. A large undocumented Filipino migrant domestic worker 
population exists in Israel and, in the early 2000s, there were repeated crackdowns against this population 
in the form of police raids of homes and public places with the stated goal of arresting undocumented 
workers and deporting them (Liebelt 2008). However, there was widespread denunciation of these actions 
and, particularly, their effect on the thousands of undocumented Israeli-born children of these workers. This 
was followed by the 2005 decision by the Israeli government to grant permanent residency and later 
citizenship to all Israeli-born children of migrant workers who were ten years and older, could speak 
Hebrew and were attending or had completed school within Israel’s education system. These children could 
later sponsor their parents for permanent residency (Kemp 2007). However, in 2010, the government of 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that it was about to deport up to 2,000 children of 
migrant workers who were less than five years old, did not speak fluent Hebrew and were not yet enrolled 
in school (Esveld and Chen 2010). These fears of deportation and family separation were what pushed 
Arielle to relocate to Canada while her husband took their son back to the Philippines.  
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The Mechanics of Multistate Migration 
Migrants possess a certain amount of capital—financial, human, social and 
cultural capital—prior to leaving their home country but some of this capital is exhausted 
by the very act of migration. Certain forms of capital, such as human, cultural and social 
capital, may remain at their pre-migration levels. But, in order to support a new migration 
to a new destination, aspiring multistate migrants have to accumulate sufficient new 
migrant capital in their current host country to overcome the high entry barriers imposed 
by their new destination’s immigration and labor policies or by the recruitment agencies 
that function as gatekeepers to that country’s domestic labor market.  
 
Migrant Human Capital 
Migrant human capital refers to both information about the process of emigration 
to a desired destination (possible visa categories to apply under, the paperwork required, 
the cost of securing a visa) and the job experience, language skills, educational 
qualifications, family status, and even age, that can facilitate securing a job in the desired 
country. In the case of human capital, the act of migration does not necessarily deplete 
migrants’ existing store of these resources. If a migrant held a bachelor’s degree from the 
Philippines, she remained a college graduate even after finding work overseas.  However, 
if migrants worked overseas in an occupation that was different from their home country 
occupation and college training, their time abroad often cancelled out any of their prior 
work experience and qualifications. In fact, migrant domestic work has been associated 
with significant deskilling of migrants who were white-collar professionals before their 
departure from the Philippines (Parreñas 2001).  
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To counter this atrophying of their human capital, many participants tried to 
upgrade their skills while overseas so as to qualify for more desirable destinations and to 
make themselves more attractive to new prospective employers. Part-time courses in 
caregiving, culinary skills and computer science were popular among many of the 
Filipinos I interviewed in Singapore and Hong Kong precisely for this reason.9 Some of 
these courses had questionable value. For instance, one participant explained that she had 
enrolled in an aromatherapy course “because they say that if you get this certificate […] 
it is easy to go [to Canada].” But the underlying sentiment behind these course 
enrollments was participants’ desire to acquire new skills and make themselves more 
appealing to prospective employers in other countries.  
 However, even without such specialized courses, there was a general 
understanding that prior work experience as a migrant domestic worker was an asset 
when applying for live-in caregiver positions in Canada. This message was reinforced by 
maid agencies in Canada that specifically looked for applicants with prior work 
experience in Hong Kong or Singapore, using this experience as a “signal” of suitability. 
Roxie, a 28-year-old domestic worker in Hong Kong, claimed that agencies in Canada 
would not hire someone unless they had prior overseas work experience: 
You cannot go there in Canada if you have no experience. […] If you have experience, 
it’s easy to go to Canada. Because some of the Filipinos here, they live in Hong Kong 
[and then] they go there to Canada. It’s easy. So I try my best to work here as an 
experience. Because I need to earn my certificate to go to Canada. In four years or like 
that. 
  
A similar statement was made by Fiona, a 40-year former domestic worker, who 
had first worked in Singapore before moving to Hong Kong. She concluded that it had 
taken her very little time to secure a job in Hong Kong because of her prior experience in 
                                                
9 Many participants in Canada meanwhile were enrolled in English language classes as they began to 
prepare themselves for the upcoming change in their residency status and labor market permissions.  
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Singapore. “Since I have experience from Singapore, they [my agent] said it will go 
quicker to Hong Kong,” she recalled. “They said ex-abroad have more advantage to find 
employer than the first-timer.” Fiona’s term “ex-abroad” was a common label applied to 
Filipinas who had previously worked overseas. It was understood that “ex-abroads’” prior 
work experience in the same field—as long as they had not been fired from their previous 
job—made them more attractive to new employers in the same country or elsewhere. The 
Canadian government has even codified this viewpoint by waiving the requirement for 
expensive formal training in a caregiver course for those applicants with at least one 
year’s worth of relevant caregiving experience. In this manner, both overseas recruitment 
agencies and the Canadian government inadvertently encourage an incremental, 
multistate migration to Canada to facilitate the accumulation of occupation-specific 
migrant human capital for migrant domestic workers.  
 
Migrant Financial Capital 
Migrant financial capital refers to the funds needed to pay the necessary agency 
fees, visa application fees, and other ancillary costs that are incurred when attempting 
travel to a desired destination. The ability to access enough funds to cover these costs 
influences how high up their destination hierarchy a migrant can start, and it also has an 
impact on the number and duration of stops multistate migrants have to make on their 
journeys to their preferred destination.  
Participants’ financial capital resources were the hardest hit by their initial act of 
migration. Given the exorbitant cost of agency placement fees, participants typically 
started their overseas stints with severely depleted bank accounts. Many of them had 
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taken on large, high-interest loans that needed to be paid off. And for those participants 
who were paying their agency fees through salary deductions instead, they were 
effectively earning no salary at all during their first year overseas. In order to fund further 
migrations, participants had to work hard to set aside some of their overseas earnings to 
pay the agency fees for their next migration. But they had to do this while also remitting a 
significant portion of their earnings back to their families in the Philippines. This drain on 
their savings could be so significant that some participants had given up on their dreams 
of multistate migration having accepted that they would never be able to save enough 
money.   
This is what happened with Rebecca, a single mother who was the sole 
breadwinner for her daughter, parents and younger siblings. She explained why she had 
given up on her dreams of emigration to the West: 
Why I decided to apply to Hong Kong is because Hong Kong is a stepping stone to go to 
Canada. […] Because many of my friends that were here, they come to Hong Kong first 
and then they gained experience, and then have time, and then apply to Canada. So when 
I come here, I think, Oh, I will just finish my one contract here and then I will go to 
Canada. But then that plan—[Rebecca laughs]—has been vanished! Because I don’t have 
enough money to go to Canada! [Rebecca laughs again.] Because my Canada visa takes 
a lot of money. And we are not talking about pesos, we are talking about dollars! Because 
the application costs another 30,000 Hong Kong dollars [or US$3,850]. So I don’t have 
enough money. I still need to send money to my family every month. And then, my 
money is spent for my holiday, for my personal needs. 
 
Another participant who ran into similar problems was Isabel, a married mother 
of three boys, who worked for a Japanese expatriate in Singapore. She earned SG$500 (or 
just under US$400) a month which was an above-average salary for migrant domestic 
workers in Singapore but she wanted to find better-paying work in Spain. However, she 
was unsure if she could save enough money from her current wages to cover the agency 
fees for a job in Spain: 
I want to go somewhere like Spain because that now is the big salary. But I don’t know 
yet if I can because I need to save money also. Three thousand [Singapore dollars] and 
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then you can apply. […] But then, for me, I say, Oh, maybe I cannot do that. Because I 
need to send my salary every month for the school. My three kids are going to school. I 
need to pay the tuition. And then their everyday pocket money and then for their lunch 
and something like that. 
 
All in all, participants’ success at accumulating sufficient migrant financial capital 
directly determined their success at multistate migration. 
Participants without dependents in the Philippines relying on their earnings were 
better positioned to save enough money to fund further migrations. Participants who had 
overseas relatives or close friends they could turn to for short-term loans to cover the 
costs of their subsequent migrations were also much more successful at multistate 
migration. This was the case with Jasmine, the domestic worker from Hong Kong who 
asked her aunt (who also worked in Hong Kong as a domestic servant) to loan her money 
to pay the agency fees for a job in Canada. In Jasmine’s case, it also helped that she did 
not have any dependent children in the Philippines who required most of her foreign 
earnings. She still sent remittances to her parents in the Philippines but, with fewer 
dependents, she was able to set aside more of her wages for herself and her future 
migration plans. Another participant who had first worked in Hong Kong, asked her US-
based boyfriend for a loan of US$2,700 to cover part of the agency fees for a job in 
Canada. As one onward migrant who had also worked in Hong Kong before re-migrating 
to Canada put it: “It’s easy if they have a money. […] Because if you really don’t have 
money, you cannot go.”  
 
Migrant Social Capital 
The third form of migrant capital needed to support both initial migrations and re-
migrations is social capital and it refers to the information or more tangible forms of 
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assistance that can be provided by network connections to reduce the costs and risks of 
migration (Garip 2008; Portes 1998). Contacts in the preferred destination country are 
particularly important possessors of migrant social capital and were actively cultivated by 
study participants seeking to migrate to those countries.  
Many participants found their access to this type of migrant social capital 
increasing after they had left the Philippines. They made friends with other migrants who 
could provide useful information and tips about how to secure visas to their preferred 
destinations. Some of these contacts did more, recommending a trustworthy recruitment 
agency to use, matching participants with employers in their desired country to hire them 
directly, even introducing participants to new potential destinations and thus reordering 
their country hierarchies. This was of critical importance to migrants who were not 
already embedded within a family network of overseas migrant domestic workers. Diane, 
a 38-year-old domestic worker in Singapore, for example, spoke of a close Filipino friend 
of hers whom she had met in Singapore who managed to emigrate to Canada. That friend 
was now trying to arrange a Canadian work permit for Diane as well. She had already 
found an employer in Canada for Diane and offered to handle all the flight arrangements 
as well, if only Diane would submit the paperwork for a visa application to the Canadian 
High Commission in Singapore.  
Migrant social capital embedded within the Filipino diaspora was also influential 
in encouraging participants to consider multistate migration in the first place. Such 
aspirations were forged through interactions with migrants who had engaged in similar 
multistate trajectories in the past. Almost all the participants who spoke of traveling 
stepwise towards their preferred destination also spoke of friends or relatives who had 
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made a similar multi-stage journey in the past and served as role models whose migration 
strategies and trajectories were to be emulated. Many interviewees in Hong Kong (and, 
to a lesser extent, Singapore) knew of friends or relatives who had earlier used these two 
countries as launch pads for eventual journeys to the West and encouraged them to follow 
a similar trajectory. Consider Juno, a 30-year-old domestic worker, who had first sought 
employment in Singapore on the advice of her aunt and cousin in Canada: 
My auntie says to me that, “If you want to go here [to Canada], you stay first in 
Singapore. Even one year only, like that. It is easy to go first to Singapore and then from 
Singapore, exit to Canada.” […] My cousin who graduated physical therapy, she worked 
as a domestic helper here two years and then cross country to Canada. So I want to be 
like her also. 
 
The role of migrant networks in facilitating multistate migration will be discussed in 
much more depth in Chapter Eight but for now, I will conclude by saying that, when 
successfully mobilized, migrant social capital can be critical in facilitating participants’ 
re-migrations to countries higher up their destination hierarchy. 
 
Migrant Cultural Capital 
Cultural capital refers to the forms of knowledge, skills, education and other 
advantages embodied within an individual that provide them with a higher status in 
society (Bourdieu 1986). This cultural capital can be acquired unconsciously by accident 
of birth (e.g. for people born into a higher socioeconomic class or in a high-status 
country) or through a more concerted cultivation process (Waters 2006; Wacquant 1996; 
Bourdieu 1986). Filipino migrant domestic workers benefit automatically from their 
nationality and the presumed cultural capital they possess by virtue of being Filipinos. 
Starting in the 1970s, the Philippine government framed Filipino women migrants as 
intrinsically more loving, nurturing and better qualified than other nationality groups at 
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traditionally feminine jobs like domestic work and nursing (Tyner 2009). These efforts 
have been very successful. Within the heavily racialized and hierarchical market for 
migrant domestic workers, Filipinos often enjoy top billing vis-à-vis other nationalities 
(Paul 2011b; Lan 2006; Calavita 2005; Constable 1997). In such overseas markets, 
employers can accrue higher status simply by hiring Filipino domestic workers. This 
makes it easier for Filipinos to market themselves to prospective employers in new 
destination countries.   
In addition to the cultural capital that Filipino migrant domestic workers possess 
by simple virtue of their nationality, there is also new cultural capital that they may 
acquire after working overseas for a period of time, especially if they work in countries 
that themselves have higher standing in the world order. Ossman (2004) refers to this 
idea obliquely when she describes the “cosmopolitanism” that the serial migrants she 
interviews had acquired. Ossman cautions that this veneer of sophistication may be 
authentic or simply be a show. Whatever the case, this air of sophistication can help these 
migrants successfully navigate societies that prize well-traveled individuals and cultural 
omnivores. Applying this insight to the case of migrant domestic workers, I find that 
countries like Hong Kong and Singapore were seen as excellent recruiting grounds and 
credentialing sites by maid agencies in Canada. Interviewees reported that migrants with 
prior work experience in these Asian countries were viewed as being more competent 
than migrants from other intermediate destinations such as the Middle East. The 
assumption was that these Asian countries shared more cultural similarities with 
Canadian society and a domestic worker who had been successfully employed in Hong 
Kong or Singapore was equipped with the necessary skill set (especially English 
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language skills) to do well in Canada as well. In this manner, Filipino migrants’ new 
cultural capital (acquired because of their earlier decision to first work in countries like 
Singapore and Hong Kong) can support their multistate migrations up their destination 
hierarchy.  
  
The Profile of a Multinational Maid 
 The previous section has already hinted at some of the factors that distinguish 
multistate migrants from single-state/single-stage migrants. This section delves into this 
topic in more depth. It should first be pointed out that in this study sample, multistate 
migrants sit in the middle ground between “direct migrants” who were able to reach their 
preferred destination with a single migration journey and “single-stage migrants” who 
also only undertook one migration journey but did so to a country lower down their 
destination hierarchy and had gone no further at the time of their interview.10 In other 
words, the multistate migrants in this study were not so capital-rich that they could afford 
to travel directly to their preferred destination but neither were they so capital-poor that 
they could not undertake multiple migrations over the course of their lifetime. I describe 
them instead as being “capital-constrained”: Limited in their initial destination options 
when they first considered leaving the Philippines, but with the capacity to break free of 
these constraints through their accumulation of additional migrant capital. 
 Within the current study sample, multistate migrants were, on average, more 
educated that single-stage migrants, with 82% of them possessing at least some college 
                                                
10 Single-stage migrants are difficult to identify both within this study sample and in general because it is 
very possible that they may undertake further migrations in the future. In fact, many of my study 
participants whom I have classified as single-stage migrants spoke of doing just that. As a result, my 
generalizations about the characteristics of single-stage migrants must be read with caution. 
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education compared to only 56% of single-stage migrants. More than double the number 
of multistate migrants were degree-holders compared to single-stage migrants (see Table 
7.1).   
 
Table 7.1 
Educational Level of Study Participants, by Migrant Type 
Education Direct Multistate Single-Stage 
College and Above 66% 48% 23% 
Some College 25% 35% 33% 
High School 6% 11% 35% 
Some High School 3% 6% 9% 
 
This difference speaks to the greater education requirements for jobs in countries higher 
up participants’ destination hierarchies. Given that multistate migrants are able to move 
up their destination hierarchy to countries that often have higher human capital 
requirements, it stands to reason that they would possess greater educational 
qualifications than single-stage migrants who were unable to qualify for higher-tier 
destinations. Direct migrants meanwhile were even more educated with 91% having 
some college education.  
However, multistate migrants were considerably younger than the direct migrants 
in the study sample when they first left the Philippines (see Table 7.2). Almost 50% of 
multistate migrants were 25 years or under when they first left the Philippines to work 
overseas. In contrast, only 12% of direct migrants were that young. In fact, the average 
age of direct migrants when they first left the Philippines was 37, compared to 27 years 
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for multistate migrants. (There was no difference in the average age of multistate 
migrants and single-stage migrants.) 
 
Table 7.2 
Age at First Departure of Study Participants, by Migrant Type 
Age Direct Multistate Single-Stage 
16-25 12% 49% 44% 
26-35 27% 35% 46% 
36-45 36% 12% 11% 
46+ 24% 3% 0% 
 
The most likely explanation for this large discrepancy in age at first departure 
between direct and multistate migrants has to do with the primary mode of entry into the 
US/Canada employed by my sample of direct migrants. Most of these migrants entered as 
permanent residents, having been sponsored by immediate relatives already residing in 
these countries. Given that the visa sponsorship process is incredibly long (taking 
decades in the case of the US), it stands to reason that these migrants were significantly 
older when they finally secured their official visa papers and were able to leave the 
Philippines. Multistate migrants, on the other hand, typically could not afford to wait for 
overseas relatives (if they had any) to sponsor them for visas to their preferred destination 
and so left the Philippines at a much earlier age (though to a different easier-to-enter 
country) in order to start earning money for their families.  
 This last point is tied to the differences between the network connections of these 
three migrant types. Multistate migrants were significantly less well-connected than 
direct migrants who often had siblings or parents who were US/Canadian citizens and 
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could sponsor them through family reunification visas or help cover the hefty agency fees 
required for direct migration to the West. This is not to stay that multistate migrants were 
not well-connected. Most of them were also deeply embedded within transnational 
migrant networks, however these networks were qualitatively different from those of 
direct migrants. While direct migrants had more relatives overseas who were citizens or 
permanent residents of other countries, multistate migrants’ relatives were instead 
working overseas as temporary migrant laborers—as domestic workers and factory 
workers (among female relatives) and seafarers and construction workers (among male 
family members) with almost no migrant rights. As a result, multistate migrants’ network 
contacts could not sponsor them for family reunification or even tourist visas, but they 
could (if they were willing) still provide advice and other forms of assistance. The 
various ways in which multistate migrants’ network contacts facilitated their multiple 
migrations are covered in Chapter Eight.  
 Finally, there were differences in the financial capital that multistate migrants 
could bring to bear on their migration decisions. Multistate migrants (85%) were more 
likely to have been employed prior to their migration from the Philippines than both 
direct migrants (76%) and single-stage migrants (72%). However, a greater proportion of 
direct migrants (52%) had been employed in so-called middle-income jobs compared to 
multistate migrants (34%). The occupations that the direct migrants in this study 
possessed prior to their departure from the Philippines included that of university 
professor, lawyer, business owner, accountant and bank officer. In contrast, multistate 
migrants were more likely to have been in lower-income jobs in the Philippines such as 
office worker, factory worker, telephone operator and salesperson. This speaks to the 
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greater financial wherewithal direct migrants most likely possessed to assist in their direct 
migration to their preferred destination country.  
 
Table 7.3 
Pre-Migration Income Level of Study Participants, by Migrant Type 
Income Level Direct Multistate Single-Stage 
Middle Income 43% 32% 20% 
Low Income 33% 52% 52% 
Housewife 10% 6% 13% 
Unemployed 14% 10% 16% 
 
 With this rudimentary analysis, we now have a rough sketch of what a multistate 
migrant domestic worker looks like. Such a migrant is endowed with a fair amount of 
human capital (especially in terms of their educational qualifications) and some social 
capital (in the form of overseas network connections who are also migrant workers). But 
they personally possess fewer financial capital resources and this, combined with their 
lack of sufficient social capital resources in their desired destination, is what makes it 
impossible for them to undertake direct migration to their preferred end-destination.  
However, as mentioned earlier, the ability to accumulate capital while overseas is 
one of the most critical aspects of multistate migrants, setting them apart from single-
stage migrants. The ability to accumulate capital (and especially financial capital) is 
directly tied to the number of dependents migrants in the Philippines expecting regular 
remittances from migrants’ overseas wages. The greater the number of dependents and 
the more needy they are, the less likely it is that migrants will be able to set aside enough 
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money to fund another migration. Various other factors—such as whether or not their 
husband (if they were married) was earning an income of his own, and whether or not 
their children (or siblings’ children) were college-age)—all play a part in migrants’ 
ability to acquire and hold onto financial capital, and through this, their ability to engage 
in multistate migration. These differences between multistate migrants, direct and single-
stage migrants are represented below. 
Figure 7.1 
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A Model of Multistate Migration 
This chapter has provided evidence of how individual migrants’ agency and 
various social forces interact to encourage the adoption of multistate migration. I now 
incorporate all these findings into a model of multistate migration. I base my model on 
Everett Lee’s (1966) push-pull model of migration. Lee attempted to build a 
comprehensive migration theory to explain why migration occurs between two countries. 
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Since that time, his push-pull model has been mischaracterized—and, I would argue, 
unfairly—criticized for presenting a view of the world where there are only push factors 
in the origin country that encourage potential migrants to emigrate and only pull factors 
in the destination country that draw these same migrants towards its shores.11 According 
to this version of Lee’s model, all citizens of the origin country would want to emigrate 
as long as there were higher wages to be had elsewhere and the only factors stopping 
them are the financial and personal costs of migration.  
This is far from the argument that Lee made. Figure 7.2 presents the original 
diagram from Lee’s 1966 paper where he first outlined his push-pull model of migration. 
As Lee conceptualized it, the decision to migrate is a function of a set of factors (positive, 
negative and neutral) at both origin and destination countries, a series of intervening 
obstacles and various personal factors. To further elaborate, there are some factors 
(represented by ‘+’s) in the origin country (such as the presence of immediate and 
extended family members or a comfortable, well-paying job) that may encourage 
residents to remain there. There are other factors (represented by ‘-’s) in the origin 
country that repel natives, pushing them to leave. These negative factors could include 
the lack of employment opportunities or an ongoing civil war in the home country. There 
are also other factors that have no bearing on an individual’s migration decision, and Lee 
represented those with ‘0’ signs. Likewise, in the destination country, there are some 
forces of attraction and some of repulsion for aspiring migrants in the origin country.  
But even if a prospective migrant desires to leave (net of these push and pull 
factors in both origin and destination), there are also what Lee called “intervening 
                                                
11 These critics typically lump Lee’s model with neoclassical economic theories of migration that assume 
that wage differentials between origin and sending countries are the only driver of migration. 
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obstacles” that can prevent an individual who wants to emigrate from being able to leave 
their origin country. These obstacles could include the high monetary cost of migration or 
policies that limit the granting of visas according to very restrictive criteria or familial 
resistance to an individual’s migration decision.  
 
Figure 7.2 
Everett Lee’s Pictorial Representation of His Push-Pull Model of Migration 
Source: Lee, Everett. 1966. “A Theory of Migration.” Demography 3(1):47-57.  
 
 
Finally, there are personal factors that can influence the migration decision both 
directly and indirectly. Lee writes about how a potential migrant’s stage in their life cycle 
can determine if they overestimate the benefits of remaining in their home country (if 
they have already lived there for several decades) or underestimate the difficulties of 
starting a new life in a new country (if they are young, unmarried and/or seeking 
adventure) (1966:51).  
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  Lee’s model is both broad enough and simple enough that it can incorporate many 
of the factors highlighted in earlier chapters to explain the out-migration of migrant 
domestic workers from the Philippines. At the same time, the model recognizes that there 
is a migration “decision” that has to be made and that potential migrants do engage in 
some kind of a cost-benefit analysis (however rudimentary or skewed) when deciding 
whether or not to leave their home country. Lee specifically warns that migrants are not 
rational economic actors, solely motivated by financial gain. But, in making the decision 
to leave their home country and work elsewhere, they still attempt to weigh the pros and 
cons of leaving versus staying, which is to say that migrants are not irrational either, even 
if they may sometimes make decisions that appear irrational to others.  
However, there are still limitations to Lee’s model. The first is the fact that Lee 
only talks about the migration decision, and not the destination decision, of potential 
migrants. His model, as it currently stands, assumes a world of only one origin and one 
destination country. Secondly, and this is related to the first limitation, Lee does not 
attempt to explain multistate migration. Given that there is only destination option, the 
notion of migrants moving from one host country to the next does not figure in Lee’s 
model. In fact, Lee specifically writes that “excluded [from this model] are the continual 
movements of nomads and migratory workers” (1966:49).  
In writing that there may be “intervening obstacles” that prevent the migration 
decision, Lee also does not highlight how there may also be intervening opportunities 
that might facilitate the migration decision for potential migrants. These intervening 
opportunities are destination-specific, easing migration to particular countries and not 
others. For instance, as outlined in Chapters Five and Six, a destination country with 
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specific labor importing programs targeting certain types of migrant workers, might be 
easier to enter for aspiring migrants who possess the needed qualifications to enter. 
Despite these limitations, it is relatively easy to amend Lee’s model to correct for these 
shortcomings and fully explain the emergence of multistate migration. This is exactly 
what I attempt to do in the following section. 
 
A Push-Pull Model of Multistate Migration for the Capital-Constrained 
 The first needed modification to Lee’s model is the addition of one more 
destination option, though the model could easily be scaled up to incorporate even more 
countries. In this revised model, represented by Figure 7.3, a prospective migrant in the 
Origin country must choose between two destinations, with one option (Destination 2) 
more attractive to the migrant than the other (Destination 1). This is represented by the 
greater number of ‘+’s and smaller number of ‘-’s in Destination 2 relative to both 
Destination 1 and the Origin. If applied to the case of migrant domestic workers from the 
Philippines, Destination 1 could be Hong Kong while Destination 2 could be Canada.  
 But even though Destination 2 (Canada) is more attractive to potential migrants, 
there are significantly greater migratory hurdles, or intervening obstacles, between the 
Origin and this destination, as represented by the much “bumpier” line connecting the 
two. The bumpier the line and the higher the bumps connecting origin and destination, 
the greater the number of obstacles the potential migrant must overcome in order to reach 
the destination. Given the capital-constrained nature of these potential migrants, these 
bumps could constitute significant impediments to their migration and destination 
preferences. For migrant domestic workers, these obstacles could include the impossibly 
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high placement fees charged by recruitment agencies placing Philippines-based migrant 
domestic workers directly in Canada or the incredibly long wait times for visa 
applications to Canada submitted in the Philippines.  
 
Figure 7.3 
A Push-Pull Model of Multistate Migration for Capital-Constrained Migrants 
 
 
   
At the same time, however, there are intervening opportunities easing the 
migration process between the Origin and Destination 1 (Hong Kong). These 
opportunities are represented by the multiple straight lines in Figure 7.3 that connect 
these two countries. The greater the number of connecting straight lines, the more the 
opportunities for migration to a particular destination. For migrant domestic workers, this 
could refer to the lower human capital requirements for Hong Kong-based jobs. This 
could also refer to the considerably faster processing times for Hong Kong visas when 
applying from the Philippines. All of these factors combine to make it more likely that 
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prospective labor migrants—particularly those who are capital- and time-constrained—
would choose their initial journey to be to Destination 1 (Hong Kong) rather than 
Destination 2 (Canada).  
However, as Figure 7.3 demonstrates, a migrant having arrived in Hong Kong 
could still feel a pull towards Canada as long as their life stage or long-term aspirations 
have not changed. As the earlier excerpts from study participants show, this was very 
much the case. Most Hong Kong-based migrant domestic workers continued to be 
attracted to Canada’s higher wages, better working conditions and its promise of 
permanent residence and family reunification. In addition, the intervening obstacles 
obstructing migration to Destination 2 may now be less formidable, when viewed from 
Destination 1 rather than the Origin Country. For instance, recruitment agencies in Hong 
Kong charge Filipino migrant domestic workers significantly lower fees for a job in 
Canada compared to their counterparts in the Philippines. Also, as mentioned earlier, 
applying for a Canadian work permit out of Hong Kong takes only a matter of weeks 
while it can take more than a year when applying from the Philippines. There might even 
be specific opportunity structures that facilitate such a re-migration decision from 
Destination 1 (Hong Kong) to Destination 2 (Canada) such as the preference Canadian 
agencies have to hire existing migrant domestic workers from Hong Kong. For these and 
other reasons, migrants in Destination 1 who have managed to accumulate additional 
capital to cover the costs of and other requirements for a second migration to the harder-





This chapter has demonstrated how multistate migration is not just the province of 
high-capital individuals who can move around the world at will, settling down wherever 
they choose without any restrictions placed on their mobility. Capital-constrained 
migrants such as foreign domestic workers can also undertake multistate migration. In 
some cases, the decision to re-migrate is motivated by the simple desire for better 
working and living conditions. But, in other cases, multistate labor migrants are 
motivated by the desire for a new home for themselves and their families, and a chance at 
upward mobility in another country. As the participant accounts in this chapter revealed, 
this decision can be made as either part of a long-term strategy or more organically, but 
the multistate migration journeys that these migrants undertake are almost always marked 
by a great deal of fluidity. 
The Filipino migrant domestic workers in this study adopted multistate migration 
in direct response to various emergent social forces. The first of these factors is the global 
labor market that has developed for migrant domestic workers, creating a unique 
opportunity structure that allows these capital-constrained migrants to secure entry to 
countries that might otherwise have been out of reach. At the same time, this global 
market is also transnational, allowing migrants to transfer their prior work experience, 
training and qualifications as domestic workers in one receiving country to another and 
be rewarded for the occupation-specific human capital they have acquired along the way.   
The second and third factors involve the restrictive immigration requirements and 
policies instituted by the countries that rank at the top of most migrants’ destination 
hierarchies and the exorbitant agency fees charged for access to these countries. These 
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immigration/labor restrictions and price controls prevent many migrants from gaining 
direct access to their preferred destination countries, pushing them to consider alternative 
destinations that are easier to enter and can also serve as stepping stones to their preferred 
destinations. Without these entry barriers, multistate migration among the capital-
constrained would be largely unnecessary.  
The fourth factor that encourages the adoption of multistate migration among 
Filipino migrant domestic workers is the presence of a global diaspora of successful 
multistate migrants from the Philippines who serve to inspire others to follow in their 
footsteps. Much has been written about the role of migrant social networks in 
encouraging cumulative migration (Curran et al. 2005; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; 
Kanaiaupuni 2000; Singer and Massey 1998; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Boyd 1989). 
This chapter shows that prior migrants play an equally important role in the adoption of 
particular migration strategies, such as multistate migration, and particular migration 
trajectories, with certain countries such as Hong Kong gaining a reputation among these 
migrants as an ideal stepping stone to the West. Success breeds success, and the greater 
the stock of multistate migrants in a preferred destination, the more likely it is that newer 
generations of migrants will choose a similar migration strategy to gain access to that 
country and choose similar stepping stones in order to do so.  
 At the individual level, multistate migration is made possible by the fact that labor 
migration allows for the acquisition of new capital (human, social and financial) while 
overseas. This capital, if accumulated and mobilized wisely, can support further 
migrations to new (and better) destinations. And the growing popularity of multistate 
migration among Filipino migrant domestic workers in places like Hong Kong and 
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Singapore reflects their ability to undertake agentic and strategic action in the face of 
significant structural constraints.  
However, it should be emphasized that not all migrants who aspire to engage in 
multistate migration are able to do so, largely because of their inability to accumulate 
sufficient capital. The most critical form of migrant capital required for multistate 
migration is financial capital. Given that the majority of the women who become migrant 
domestic workers face significant demands on their foreign earnings from their families 
in the Philippines, it is understandable that many of them are unable to set aside enough 
of the wages to fund another journey up their destination hierarchy.  
When comparing the annual inflow of Filipino migrant domestic workers to 
Canada and Hong Kong respectively, one gets a sense of the difficulty involved in a 
climb to the top of these migrants’ destination hierarchy. In 2008, the last year for which 
a full year’s worth of inflow data is available for both countries, 18,286 newly-hired 
migrant domestic workers left the Philippines for jobs in Hong Kong (Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration 2011).12 In 2008, 4,246 Filipino caregivers were 
granted visas to work in Canada.13 If we assume that Hong Kong was the only source 
country to send Filipino migrant domestic workers to Canada, that would imply that less 
than one out of five migrant domestic workers who find jobs in Hong Kong are able to 
secure jobs in Canada at some later point. In actuality, the odds are even slimmer given 
the other stepping stone countries sending migrants to Canada and the direct migrants 
who travel straight from the Philippines to Canada. In other words, only a fortunate few 
                                                
12 The number of new hires traveling to Hong Kong fluctuates each year but the five-year average between 
2004-2008 was 18,776 new hires. 
13 I am using Canada’s immigration statistics rather than the Philippine government’s published departure 
statistics because of the data mismatch problem highlighted in Chapter Five. 
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are able to fulfill their dreams and gain access to the very top of their destination 
hierarchy.  
But even migrants who do not make it all the way to their dream destination are 
still often able to improve their living conditions by consciously working up their 
destination ladder, to earn more money or enjoy better working conditions. In this 
manner, this chapter reveals the capacity of capital-constrained migrants to surmount the 
barriers that stand in the way of their dreams through a process of multistate migration, 
allowing them to climb their destination hierarchy and gain entry into their preferred 
destinations. If migrant domestic workers—a class of low-capital labor migrant that is 
uniformly seen as being heavily constrained in their migration options—are able to 
engage in multistate migration, other migrants with access to more capital should be even 
better-equipped to do so. There are few studies (outside of those looking at transit 
migration) that focus on migration spanning multiple national borders and even fewer 
databases that track the multinational movements of migrants. Only in the last two 
decades has there been a growing recognition of the growing mobility of migrants in our 
interconnected world. This chapter thus highlights the importance of taking a migration 
life-course approach, following international migrants’ over the course of their lifetimes 
and not just for their initial journey out of their homeland.  






Good Help is Hard to Find: The Differentiated Access to and  
Mobilization of Migrant Social Capital1 
 
In 2008, Diane, a 38-year-old Filipina, had been employed as a domestic worker 
in Singapore for 13 years, working happily for the same Singaporean Chinese employer 
all those years. She was very aware of her relative good fortune. As a way of assisting her 
less fortunate countrymen and women, Diane had established a charitable foundation in 
the Philippines to channel medical care to Filipino children in rural parts of the country. 
She was also one of the leaders of a Singapore-based group of Filipino domestic workers 
that organized regular outreach and fundraising events. When it came to migration 
assistance, Diane had helped her two sisters find jobs as domestic workers in Singapore, 
successfully matching them with willing employers. She had also been approached by 
many other relatives, friends and even neighbors, asking for assistance finding them jobs 
overseas as well. However, she had turned down all these requests: 
I only help bring my two sisters [here to Singapore]. I do not bring anyone else. Because 
one thing: I cannot guarantee whatever will happen to them here. If I recruit people to 
come here and work, the agency gives us 200 [Singapore] dollars as an incentive for 
recruiting these people. But it’s not worth it. It is fast money to earn but the responsibility 
is too great. I don’t want. 
Have you had a lot of people asking you for help? 
Yes! Even my neighbors [in the Philippines]! Even they approach me too. But I always 
say, “There are a lot of accredited agencies. So rather you go there.” Because I cannot 
guarantee. Even though the situation with my employer is very good, I cannot guarantee 
that you will be [lucky] like me when you reach here. So I said, “You go through the 
agency. I can’t be responsible for you. Because if I do help, then to you, I am responsible. 
                                                
1 Portions of this chapter have been accepted for publication in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
in Spring 2013 under the article title “Good Help is Hard to Find: The Differentiated Mobilization of 
Migrant Social Capital among Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers.” 
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To your family, I am responsible. Then how? I cannot! I don’t want. I can help but I 
don’t want to. 
 
Diane’s account highlights the hesitancy with which many migrant domestic workers 
greet requests from their home country contacts for migration assistance. It also 
illustrates the mental arithmetic existing migrants undertake when deciding whether or 
not to expend their social capital resources in the service of prospective migrants from the 
home country. But this notion of a selective and contingent mobilization of migrant social 
capital is not often discussed within the migration literature.  
Instead, only the role of networks in encouraging both international and internal 
migration is well-documented. It is widely accepted that migrant social capital embedded 
within networks of relatives, friends, or even merely co-nationals in the destination can 
reduce the costs and risks of migration, and thereby increase the likelihood of cumulative 
migration (Garip 2008; Curran, Garip, Chung, and Tangchonlatip 2005; Curran and 
Rivero-Fuentes 2003; Kanaiaupuni 2000; Singer and Massey 1998; Massey and Espinosa 
1997). But several recent ethnographic studies of migrant networks have highlighted 
regular instances of current migrants displaying resistance or reluctance to providing 
migration assistance to network contacts in the home country (Bashi 2007; Kanaiaupuni 
2000; Böcker 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994a). These studies demonstrate that the 
mobilization of migrant social capital should not be taken for granted and that it is in fact 
a contingent and selective process. Not all migrants choose to help their network contacts 
and, like Diane, even when they do, they do not assist everyone they know.  
In this chapter, I argue that the mobilization of migrant networks is also a 
differentiated process, with existing migrants sometimes providing significant amounts of 
migration assistance and, at other times, only cursory help. This differentiated provision 
318 
of migration assistance is critical because the volume, type and conditionality of help 
provided has a direct bearing on the migration strategies and destination decisions of 
prospective migrants given the differing barriers to entry for different destination 
countries. In earlier chapters, I have focused on how overseas migrant network contacts 
can encourage aspiring migrants to undertake multistate migration through the migration 
advice and destination information they share. In this chapter, I show how both the 
mobilization and non-/partial mobilization of migrant social capital can encourage the 
adoption of multistate migration trajectories.  
 
Migrant Social Capital 
The concept of social capital has received a great deal of scholarly attention in 
recent decades (Smith 2007, 2005; Royster 2003; Putnam 2000; Menjívar 2000; Portes 
1998; Coleman 1990, 1988; Boyd 1989; Bourdieu 1986). There are two prevailing 
schools of thought about the nature of social capital. (See Adler and Kwon (2002) for a 
detailed discussion of the differences between these two schools.) Some scholars view it 
as an internal characteristic of a social structure and that it “facilitate[s] certain actions of 
individuals who are within the structure” (Coleman 1988:S98). Using this definition, 
some communities can be classified as having a high degree of social capital and others 
not. Communities with high social capital are understood to be more likely to enjoy more 
intra-group transactions based on trust and fewer free-rider problems.  
Bourdieu (1986), on the other hand, sees social capital as a resource or a set of 
obligations that can be converted on demand into other forms of capital, primarily 
economic ones. Together with Loïc Wacquant, he defines it as “the sum of the resources, 
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actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:119). In this chapter, I lean more towards 
this latter understanding of social capital as an external asset that is sourced from 
particular types of network relations between individuals and within social groups. This 
view of social capital is useful because it allows for the recognition that social capital 
resources, even though accessible, may not always be mobilized (Smith 2005; Lin 2001). 
This is critical when it comes to understanding situations where close network contacts 
may choose to withhold help from each other. 
One variant of the social capital concept is “migrant social capital,” which is 
defined as the sum of resources, whether information or assistance, that potential 
migrants can access through their social networks in order to reduce the costs and risks of 
migration (Garip 2008; Palloni et al. 2001; Portes 1998). Existing migrants are a critical 
component of these social networks because they are often in possession of greater 
financial capital and migration-related information than network contacts in the home 
country. In fact, network connections between origin and destination points have been 
found to have positive spillover effects on the migration decisions of migrants’ family 
members and friends in the sending country (Curran et al. 2005; Curran and Rivero-
Fuentes 2003; Kanaiaupuni 2000; Singer and Massey 1998; Massey and Espinosa 1997; 
Boyd 1989).  
 Overseas migrants can facilitate such cumulative migration patterns in various 
ways. Earlier chapters have already highlighted how overseas connections are vital in 
shaping potential migrants’ destination preferences and their eventual destination 
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decisions through the information they share about the world at large. And within the 
migration literature, there are plentiful studies that highlight the way in which overseas 
migrant networks facilitate cumulative migration. Migrants can match their home country 
contacts with a willing overseas employer or provide them with monetary assistance to 
cover the cost of applying for an entry visa (Garip 2008; Ratha and Shaw 2007; Spaan 
1994; Eelens and Speckmann 1990; Boyd 1989). Migrants legally residing overseas may 
sponsor family reunification visas or tourist visas for their relatives and friends (Ezquerra 
2007; Choldin 1973; Keely 1973). Even undocumented entries into a country, or legal 
entries on non-immigrant visas with the intent to overstay, can be facilitated by the 
activation of migrant social capital, with veteran migrants accompanying the novice 
migrant on their first journey across the border or sharing useful border-crossing 
strategies (Muanamoha, Maharaj and Preston-Whyte 2010; Singer and Massey 1998).  
 
Why Do Migrants Help? 
Overall, the network theory of migration has been shown to explain a significant 
amount of the cumulative migration observed around the world (Massey et al. 1998). But 
why do current migrants help their network contacts? In analyzing the role played by 
current migrants in encouraging cumulative migration, it is important to distinguish 
between the altruistic and egoistic motivations behind their helping behavior.  
On the side of altruism, research has shown that cultural values can play a large 
part in framing the act of helping as a responsibility not to be shirked (Perlow and Weeks 
2002; Dovidio 1984). This is of vital importance in the Philippines where there is a strong 
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culture of reciprocal giving (Trager 1988; Tacoli 1999; Medina 2001) and a strong sense 
of collectivism (Hofstede 2001; Asis 1994). 
From an egoistic perspective, providing migration assistance to help family and 
friends relocate to the host country allows a prior migrant to transplant their social 
networks overseas. Much has been written about the sense of alienation and loss 
experienced by immigrants—particularly those experiencing status-discrepancy—upon 
their arrival in their host country (Parreñas 2001; Pratt 1999; Small 1997). Kelly and 
Lusis (2006) write insightfully about how migrants lose some social capital in the process 
of separating themselves from their families, friends and former colleagues in their 
homeland. It is for this reason, these authors argue, that migrants invest so much in 
maintaining their transnational ties: To benefit from the emotional and psychological 
comfort such relationships provide. Granting requests for migration assistance can 
therefore be of instrumental benefit to veteran migrants, giving them a sense of power 
and continued relevance in the lives of family and friends in the home country while 
simultaneously enhancing their networks in the host country (Bashi 2007).  
But even among overseas migrants who are willing to assist their home country 
contacts, the amount and type of assistance provided can vary drastically. The 
differentiated nature of migration assistance is partly a function of the varying capacity of 
different migrants to provide help. Migrants who are naturalized citizens of a top-tier 
destination country, with access to abundant financial resources, have the ability to 
sponsor their immediate relatives for a family reunification or a tourist visa. In contrast, 
migrants who are working as foreign laborers on temporary work visas are typically not 
granted the legal authority to sponsor their relatives for any kind of visas. They also may 
322 
not earn enough to cover the agency fees to secure an overseas job for their relatives. In 
other words, even among overseas migrants who are willing to assist their home country 
contacts emigrate, their own degree of access to capital directly influences how much 
they can help others. In the case of Filipinos seeking to leave the Philippines, those 
aspiring migrants who are closely related to citizens of preferred destination countries 
may be in a better position to leave the Philippines permanently. Filipinos whose close 
ties are to temporary migrant workers instead may only be able to ask for and receive 
more limited forms of migration assistance. 
 
The Non-Mobilization of Migrant Social Capital 
Offsetting the benefits of helping contacts in the home country emigrate are the 
costs and potential risks. Existing migrants may be asked to part with some of their 
savings to cover their contacts’ migration costs, with the possibility of no repayment. 
They may have to invest considerable time and energy handling the paperwork involved 
with applications for visas and work permits. If illegal immigration is involved, there 
could also be the possibility of their own arrest, fines and/or deportation. Finally, existing 
migrants may have to put their own limited social capital in the host country on the line, 
asking potential employers they are acquainted with to trust their recommendation to fill 
a job vacancy, all the while knowing that if their home country contact performs poorly, 
it will be their own reputation that will suffer. Their social capital back home may also be 
put at risk if the contact they assist ends up being abused or mistreated while overseas 
and shifts the ultimate responsibility onto them. For all the above reasons, existing 
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migrants may experience an internal tug-of-war when asked for migration assistance and 
not automatically accede to these requests (Bashi 2007).2   
Even if each request for migration assistance is relatively minor, overseas 
migrants may be bombarded by so many requests that, taken together, they amount to a 
significant burden. Portes and Sensenbrenner write that this outcome is especially likely 
in an environment where “claims [are] buttressed by strong norms enjoining mutual 
assistance within the extended family and among community members in general” 
(1993:1338). In such collectivist cultures—and Philippine society would be a prime 
example of such a society (Asis 1994; Hofstede 2001)—relatives and friends may 
immediately beset anyone who does well for themselves, asking them for handouts. 
Among migrants who have left their home country, a similar scenario can still occur. 
Thanks to the wonders of modern communication technology, relatives and friends back 
home may bombard overseas migrants with requests for help to leave the country as well 
(Bashi 2007). For these migrants, their network connections in the home country can thus 
become a liability.3  Given these varied risks and costs to the migrant, it cannot be taken 
for granted that they will fully mobilize their resources—however much they have—
whenever they are asked to assist a prospective migrant they know.  
Within the last 15 years, there have been several studies highlighting regular and 
repeated instances of the non-activation of migrant social capital within migrant 
networks. Some of these studies highlight the strongly gendered mobilization of migrant 
                                                
2 Similar considerations also apply to network members in the origin country who may be asked to provide 
migration assistance. However, this chapter focuses primarily on the assistance provided by overseas 
migrant contacts. 
3 More generalized social capital can also be a burden for existing migrants who have relatives or friends in 
either the host or home country requesting regular remittance payments or other favors, even without 
asking for migration-related assistance (see Allen 2009). However, for the purposes of this chapter, only 
migrant social capital is considered. 
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social capital. Kanaiaupuni (1995, cited in Kanaiaupuni 2000) notes some reluctance on 
the part of established Mexican migrants in the United States to assist female relatives 
cross the border, out of a sense that bringing female contacts to the US would entail more 
work and more responsibility. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994a) also discusses how gender 
“organizes” migration through exclusively male networks that encourage additional 
migration only by other men. Curran and Rivero (2003) find that the migration of women 
from Mexican households to the US positively affects the migration of other women from 
the same household, but not men. Curran et al. (2005) find similar gendered patterns of 
migration assistance among rural-urban migrants in Thailand. They hypothesize that this 
is due to the different ways in which gender structures the job opportunities for rural 
migrants in Bangkok and how it shapes migrants’ ties to their families and friends in the 
origin village. In other words, it is not so much that men see their female relatives as 
burdensome, but that migrants are often embedded in heavily gendered occupations and 
so are able to provide job-related migration assistance mainly to their own gender 
(Pfeiffer et al. 2008). 
 Other studies have highlighted additional factors that influence the differential 
and selective mobilization of migrant social capital. Vilna Bashi observes veteran West 
Indian migrants in New York and London “hoard[ing] overseas opportunities” (2007:6) 
and only helping those home country contacts whom they believe will either improve 
their lifestyle or enhance their reputation. Anita Böcker finds that Turkish immigrants in 
the Netherlands evolved from being “bridgeheads” to “gatekeepers,” limiting the chain 
migration of their relatives from Turkey to Europe when Dutch authorities began to 
clamp down on irregular migration (1994:103). These researchers’ findings imply that 
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prospective migrant domestic workers from the Philippines might not always be able to 
rely on their overseas contacts to assist them in their attempts to leave the country and 
find work abroad. Immigration policies, the gendered nature of the overseas job market, 
the gender of their overseas contact, their own gender, the reciprocal “gift” they can offer 
their contact in return—all these factors can influence the helping decision.  
Within the urban communities literature on social capital, there are also several 
studies on the promise of job-matching assistance whose findings mirror the 
differentiated mobilization of migrant social capital. These studies add to our 
understanding of the conditions under which migrant social capital can be mobilized. 
Studying job-matching assistance among Salvadoran immigrants in San Francisco, 
Cecilia Menjívar (2000) finds that job information was passed along relatively freely 
among friends, neighbors and relatives, but that job referrals were more circumspectly 
provided. The fear of having the person they recommended perform poorly on the job 
and thus taint their own standing with an employer resulted in jobholders only providing 
referrals to close relatives whom they felt obliged to assist. Menjívar thus highlights how 
different forms of assistance can be provided, and that multiple sub-decisions need to be 
made with each helping decision: Whether or not to help, and just as important, how 
much to help.  
Sandra Smith (2007, 2005) meanwhile finds that many low-income African 
American jobholders are reluctant to provide either job referrals or job information even 
to family members for fear that their help may be wasted and their reputations with 
employers tarnished. From her interviews, Smith finds that individual-level factors (such 
as the work reputations of both the jobseeker and the jobholder) and dyad-level properties 
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(such as the strength of the tie between the jobseeker and jobholder, and the tie between 
the jobholder and the potential employer) influence the helping decision. These 
individual- and dyad-level factors are intuitive enough that they should be universally 
applicable to any helping decision, including the decision to help a prospective migrant 
domestic worker leave the country. 
At the network level, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) highlight how 
“enforceable trust” within a community or neighborhood can engender social capital 
through an internal policing capacity built into tightly-knit groups with a high degree of 
social closure and the resources to ensure the honoring of obligations. Following this line 
of argument, we should expect to see a greater provision of migration assistance in 
transnational networks marked by high social closure and the ability to monitor 
prospective migrants once they are overseas. The corollary of this theory is that less 
migration assistance should be observable in networks marked by low social closure.  
Finally, at the market level, Menjívar finds that the local economy and 
government can directly influence the “viability of immigrant social networks” 
(2000:116). Smith also reports that the degree of economic disadvantage in the 
community where a jobholder lives can influence the amount of job-matching assistance 
the jobholder provides. In situations where there is an abundant supply of job openings or 
where government policies are generally pro-immigrant, social ties are positively affected 
and network members are more likely to help one another. In less favorable situations, 
the potential for assistance-sharing between network members diminishes. I posit that the 
same should apply between prospective and current migrants.  
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All of the above factors operate at different levels to influence the degree to which 
social capital is mobilized. At the national level, the existence of a culture of helping may 
also play a part. The prevalence of such a culture and general patterns of assistance-
giving in the Philippines is discussed next. 
 
Assistance Patterns among Filipino Families 
 The typical household structure within the Philippines is that of the nuclear family 
with parents and children living under the same roof. Within each Filipino family, there 
are strong filial ties between Filipino parents and their unmarried children, and between 
siblings (Medina 2001; King and Domingo 1986; Trager 1988). But Filipino families also 
have an extended kinship structure with strong ties of loyalty conjoining more distant 
relatives such as cousins, aunts, nephews and nieces who may not all live under the same 
roof (Chant and McIlwaine 1995; Medina 2001; Trager 1988). Castillo characterizes the 
Philippine system of family relations as “residentially nuclear but functionally extended” 
(1977:Vol. II, 394). There is also a strong fictive kinship culture within the Philippines, 
with the widespread practices of godparentage and fosterage encouraging strong ties of 
respect and loyalty connecting children with adults who are not their blood relatives but 
still actively involved in their care and upbringing (Trager 1988:76; Yu and Liu 1980; 
Peterson 1993).  
 Within extended Filipino families and Philippine society as a whole, there are also 
deep-seated norms of reciprocal gift-giving (Medina 2001; Trager 1988). The moral 
principle underlying these relationships of mutual obligation is called utang na loob 
which, translated, means “debt of prime obligation” (Trager 1988:77) or “debt of 
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gratitude” (Tacoli 1999:663). These norms are strongest when it comes to the parent-
child relationship. It is accepted that parents, in giving life to their children, have given 
them the greatest gift of all and that their children will be forever in their parents’ debt. It 
is for this reason that Filipinos fully expect to care for and support their parents even in 
old age. The majority of Filipino migrants who send remittances back to the Philippines 
send money to their parents (Asian Development Bank 2006). But a similar sense of 
obligation also often exists between siblings. Unmarried daughters in particular are 
expected to function as benefactresses to not only their parents but also their younger 
siblings and their siblings’ children (Medina 2001; Tacoli 1996; Chant and McIlwaine 
1995).  
For Filipino migrants, there are strong expectations that they will continue to 
support their families in the Philippines (in one way or another) even though they are 
physically separated from them by large distances (Lauby and Stark 1988; Trager 1984, 
1988; Medina 2001; Tacoli 1999). This assistance can take different forms though most 
migrants are expected to send money (Lauby and Stark 1988; Semyonov and 
Gorodzeisky 2005). In 2009, 27.4% of Philippine households reported receiving financial 
assistance from overseas family members.4    
Migrants’ family obligations may also extend to helping their relatives leave the 
Philippines. Many prospective migrants choose the same destination as their overseas 
relatives primarily because of the sense of security they feel knowing that they have a 
family member in the same country they can call upon in times of need and because of 
the destination-specific assistance they can rely on (Medina 2001; Medina and Natividad 
                                                
4 This statistic was calculated using data sourced from the 2009 Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
conducted by the Philippine government’s National Statistics Office. Accessed from 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/2009/ie20092add.pdf on May 31, 2012. 
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1985; Asis 1994). Certainly, most permanent migration from the Philippines to the 
United States and other high-income countries in the West is through family reunification 
visas sponsored by Filipino immigrants who have become citizens and permanent 
residents of those countries. In the case of women migrants, the presence of supportive 
female relatives overseas can also lend greater social acceptability to the idea of women 
leaving the Philippines to live and work abroad (Tacoli 1999; Boyd 1989; Hondagneu-
Sotelo 1992).   
Trager (1988:79) writes that many migrants complain about the generous 
remittances they are expected to send back to their families, but that most still send the 
money anyway. In general, it is hard for Filipinos to turn down requests for help as it 
goes against the normative Philippine culture of reciprocal giving. Refusing to help an 
individual to whom one is already indebted is seen as particularly reprehensible and such 
a person is described as walang hiya, meaning “having no shame” (Trager 1988:77; de 
Leon 1987). Such behavior could also jeopardize an individual’s relations with the person 
requesting help and that person’s family.  
  Having provided an overview of helping patterns among Filipinos in general, I 
turn now to the present study to discuss patterns of migration assistance among 
interviewees.  
 
Giving and Receiving Help among Study Participants 
When talking with interviewees about the process they went through to first leave 
the Philippines (and for each subsequent migration), I also asked them if they had 
requested and/or received migration assistance from anyone they knew. The vast majority 
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of study participants had received some degree of assistance from at least one network 
contact when they were first trying to leave the Philippines, demonstrating the culture of 
giving that is prevalent in the Philippines. As Table 8.1 shows, most participants received 
help from family members, whether an immediate family member (such as a spouse, 
parent, sibling or child) or more extended family members (such as aunts, uncles, 
cousins, nieces or nephews), highlighting the extended kinship structure of Philippine 
society where aunts and cousins can oftentimes feel as close as siblings and parents.  
 
Table 8.1 
Sources of First Migration Assistance Received, by Country of Interview 
Acquaintances 8% 15% 7% 0 0 
Employers 0 2% 4% 0 0 
 
But there are clear differences in the sources of migration assistance received by 
participants across the different interview countries, indicating the contrasting migrant 
networks within which participants were embedded. Interviewees in the US and Canada 
were more likely to have received help from immediate family members, participants in 




Percentage of Participants who Received Help in 
Philippines Singapore Hong Kong Canada US 
Close Family 23% 24% 40% 78% 60% 
Extended Family 27% 37% 50% 43% 32% 
Friends 42% 32% 40% 43% 14% 
Agents 0 0 0 4% 0 
Total 73% 93% 96% 100% 100% 
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extended family members, while participants in the Philippines had relied primarily on 
friends. (The appropriate cells in Table 8.1 have been shaded gray.)  
There was also a great deal of diversity in the types of migration assistance 
participants received, revealing the differentiated nature of migrant social capital 
mobilization. In general, five types of migration assistance were received by study 
participants. These were: 
(1) Financial assistance, either as a loan or gift, 
(2) Direct placement with an overseas employer, 
(3) Submission of their personal information to an overseas maid agency, allowing 
participants to bypass Philippines-based agencies and shave off a significant amount 
of money from their overall cost of migration,  
(4) Recommending a trustworthy recruitment agency to use either in the Philippines or 
overseas, and 
(5) Migration-related advice and information (such as the best strategy to adopt for 
leaving the Philippines or reaching a particular desired country).   
The higher the value of the assistance to the prospective migrant, the greater the 
risk or cost it involved for the existing migrant providing the help. The first two types of 
help (financial and job-placement assistance) carried with them the highest risk because 
of the possibility of existing migrants’ losing some of their personal financial or social 
capital resources if things went awry. There might be no repayment of their loan or, if 
their contact performs poorly on the job, the referrer’s standing with the overseas 
employer might suffer. Their social capital within their home country network might also 
be jeopardized if their contact ends up being abused or mistreated while overseas and 
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shifts responsibility onto them. At the same time, both these forms of assistance are of the 
greatest benefit to prospective migrants, significantly reducing their own financial outlay 
and potentially matching them with an employer who will treat them well.  
The third type of assistance—submitting a contact’s information to an overseas 
agency—poses less risk to existing migrants but is still of considerable value to the 
prospective migrant, even though the latter would still have to pay a substantial 
placement fee to their overseas agency. This form of migration assistance did call for 
some time commitment and effort on the part of the existing migrant, who would have to 
collect and collate their contact’s personal information and secure copies of their 
contact’s passport, educational certificates and work-related documents to submit to the 
overseas agency. This effort was not substantial but it did mean that the overseas migrant 
was inserting themselves personally into their contact’s efforts to leave the Philippines 
and therefore exposing themselves to blame if things did not turn out well. 
The fourth and fifth types of migration help—simply recommending an agency 
and providing migration advice/information—were the lowest-risk forms of assistance, 
not requiring any tangible sacrifice on the part of the overseas migrant (with little danger 
of jeopardizing their social and financial position in their host country) and no deep 
personal involvement. At the same time, such referrals had the potential to reduce the 
possibility of the prospective migrant being cheated out of their savings by an 
unscrupulous agency. And even though there is the saying that “advice is cheap,” 
migration advice can be useful. This is especially the case when the advice provided 
helps the prospective migrant save time, effort and/or money. Thus, these last two 
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categories of migration assistance could still be of value to prospective migrants even 
while they involved little to no risk or cost to existing migrants. 
Table 8.2 reveals how these different forms of migration assistance were 
distributed across the different interview locations. (The most common form of assistance 
for each interview country is shaded gray.) Participants in the US were much more likely 
to have had immediate relatives sponsor them for a visa to leave the Philippines (and 
travel directly to the US). Participants in Canada and Hong Kong were more likely to 
have received financial assistance from their relatives (both close and extended family 
members) when they were attempting to leave the Philippines. In contrast, participants in 
Singapore received less valuable assistance from their network contacts, with most 
interviewees only receiving agency referrals through their contacts. 
 
Table 8.2 
Types of First Migration Assistance Received, by Country of Interview 
Type of Assistance 
Received  
Percentage of Participants Receiving Assistance$ 
Philippines Singapore Hong Kong Canada US 
Visa sponsorship@ 0 3% 7% 13% 65% 
Direct placement 16% 18% 26% 39% 35% 
Financial assistance 21% 37% 56% 74% 25% 
Agency submission 11% 34% 7% 13% 0 
Agency referral 74% 42% 37% 26% 5% 
Migration advice 26% 26% 22% 17% 5% 
Notes: 
$ - Percentages for each country are calculated using the count of participants from that 
country who received help as the denominator. 
@ - Network contacts could assist study participants leave the Philippines by sponsoring 
their visas to foreign countries. These visas fell into three categories: work permits (where 




The Denial of Help among Study Participants 
The above pattern of differentiated provision of migration assistance could be 
traced back to either differentiated access to migrant social capital or the differentiated 
mobilization of such capital. An example of the former would be if US-based participants 
were more likely to receive visa sponsorships to leave the Philippines because they were 
deeply embedded in overseas networks of American citizens, while Canada-based 
participants lacked those kinds of connections. But if the latter explanation were true then 
it is possible that Canada-based participants were also connected to Filipino American 
citizens but that these US citizens had opted not to sponsor them for visas (for whatever 
reason).  
A better way to highlight the differentiated mobilization of migrant social capital 
is by looking at participants’ accounts of being turned down by some of their overseas 
network contacts when they asked them for migration assistance. Many participants, 
especially those in Asia, repeatedly talked about having asked relatives or friends for help 
with their migration efforts and having had their requests denied (see Table 8.3). At the 
same time, participants in all countries shared their own stories of having turned down 
family and friends in the Philippines or various host countries who asked them for 
migration assistance. For instance, half of Canadian participants talked about having had 
to turn down a network contact asking for migration assistance. But a third of them still 
spoke of wanting to sponsor a relative for a visa to Canada or matching a contact with an 
employer overseas. In other words, even though they come from a culture of reciprocal 




Denial of Requests for Migration Assistance, by Country of Interview@ 
  
Percentage of Participants 
Singapore Hong Kong Canada 
Having requests denied 15% 7% 17% 
Denying others’ requests 27% 36% 52% 
@ The US is excluded from this table because the high number of undocumented migrants in its sample 
population which negatively skews their willingness to provide migration assistance. The Philippines is 
excluded because of the wide array of migrant types interviewed there: Returned migrants, prospective 
migrants who had yet to leave the country, migrants between contracts who might or might not decide to 
leave the Philippines again, etc.  
 
But even Table 8.3 does not present the full picture. Rather than denying aid 
entirely, overseas migrants may instead offer conditional aid, promising to help if the 
prospective migrant performs a specific task first. This does not technically count as a 
denial of a request for migration assistance though it might have the same effect. In other 
cases, the volume of aid offered may be severely limited, cramping prospective migrants’ 
capacity for migration or constraining their destination options. 
Looking at the types of migration assistance that study participants provided when 
they did choose to extend help provides a clear pattern of selective and differentiated 
assistance (see Table 8.4). In this table, I focus only on participants in Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Canada because they shared a similar migrant status in each of their host 
countries, allowing for valid comparisons of helping patterns across these three countries 




Types of Migration Assistance Provided, by Country of Interview 
  Percentage of participants providing help in: 
Type of assistance provided Singapore Hong Kong Canada 
Visa sponsorship 0 0 29% 
Direct placement 16%ß 27%ß 29% 
Financial assistance 22% 9% 10% 
Agency submission 30% 9% 14% 
Agency referral 8% 9% 0 
ß Even though a higher proportion of Hong Kong participants provided direct placement assistance to 
their network contacts than Singapore participants, most of this assistance was provided in the early 
1990s or even earlier. In more recent years, Hong Kong participants had not provided as much of this 
type of assistance as their Singapore counterparts. 
 
Setting aside the visa sponsorship plans of Canada-based participants,5 roughly a 
third of these participants had matched one of their network contacts with an overseas 
employer. A similar number of Hong Kong-based participants had done so, but a 
significantly smaller number in Singapore had provided this form of migration assistance 
to their network contacts. In contrast, submitting a network contact’s personal 
information to a Singapore-based maid agency was the most popular form of assistance 
provided by Singapore-based participants. Likewise, participants in Singapore were more 
likely to have provided monetary assistance to relatives and friends seeking to leave the 
Philippines, even though they were paid the lowest wages across the three countries 
under consideration. As I will discuss in the following section, such differences in the 
                                                
5 Participants’ decisions to sponsor visas for the immediate relatives to join them in Canada were to a large 
extent still in the planning phase. However, if participants who expressed their clear intent and willingness 
to sponsor a relative to join them in Canada, they were counted as having already provided this type of 
migration assistance.  
337 
degree of mobilization of migrant social capital are directly tied to variations in these 
countries’ migrant domestic worker markets, among other factors.  
 
The Differentiated Mobilization of Migrant Social Capital 
Having identified a pattern of differentiated migration assistance, this section now 
combines the data presented in the above tables with insights gained from the interviews 
and the earlier literature review section to present a multi-level framework identifying 
various factors at the individual, dyad, network, job and market/country levels that, 
independently and through their interactions with each other, influence the differentiated 
mobilization of migrant social capital among overseas migrants (see Table 8.5).  
 
Individual-Level Factors 
The Provider’s Past Helping Experiences 
Decisions to extend help are often predicated on the outcomes of earlier helping 
decisions (Dovidio 1984; Moss and Page 1972). Prior negative helping experiences have 
been found to stunt an individual’s subsequent desire to offer assistance through negative 
reinforcement (March 1994) and a similar effect was observed among participants. 
Wanda, a 42-year-old domestic worker in Hong Kong, no longer wanted to offer 
migration assistance to most of her Philippine contacts for such a reason. Some years 
earlier, a local doctor—for whom Wanda had worked part-time for seven years—had 
asked her to recommend someone who could work full-time for him.  
 
Table 8.5 
A Conceptual Framework of Factors influencing the Mobilization of Migrant Social Capital 
 
Levels 
Conditions Associated with Migrant Social Capital Mobilization 
 Factors High Mobilization# Low Mobilization# 
 Individual Provider’s past experiences giving assistance Positive past experiences Negative past experiences 
 Perceived competence of the prospective migrant  Committed/Competent Uncommitted/Incompetent 
 
 
Immigration status of current migrant Documented Undocumented 
 Dyad Tie between current and prospective migrants Strong ties Weak ties 
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Tie between current migrants and potential employers Strong ties Weak ties 
Job Gendered nature of the job Weakly gendered@ Strongly gendered@ 
Degree of vulnerability in the job Low vulnerability High vulnerability 
 Network Degree of social closure High social closure Low social closure 
 Market/ 
 Country 
Job availability (real and perceived) High availability Low availability 
 Market turnover High termination rates Low termination rates 
  Domestic worker regulatory environment Pro-worker regulations Anti-worker regulations 
 # In order to aid comprehension, differences in mobilization rates have been clustered into either “high” or “low” categories. High mobilization is characterized by 
the provision of high volume, high value and/or unconditional migration assistance, while low mobilization entails offering low/zero volume, low value and/or 
conditional assistance to network contacts seeking to leave the home country.   
a In a weakly gendered occupational sector, job incumbents are able to pass along job information and referrals to both male and female network contacts who are 
interested. In a strongly gendered occupation, however, job incumbents are restricted to helping only half their network contacts, assuming that their home country 
network is evenly divided between men and women. 
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Wanda had recommended her niece in the Philippines and helped arrange her 
niece’s travel to Hong Kong. But, after three months, the niece grew so homesick that she 
ended her contract without giving notice. Mortified, Wanda said she now refused to help 
any of her other relatives because she was “so ashamed” of having failed her former 
employer.  
 Negative helping experiences also influenced the amount and type of migration 
assistance participants were willing to offer. Rather than refusing to provide any future 
assistance, some participants switched to offering migration help that entailed the least 
amount of risk/cost for themselves. This was the case with Cindy in Canada who had 
previously loaned money to her friends while working in Singapore but had never been 
paid back. As a result, she had switched to a strict policy of having “friends here but no 
money attached.” Now when she was asked for migration assistance, she stalled:  
I just say that if I can find work for you, then I will try to introduce you. But if I don’t 
have, […] maybe they should try somebody else. I suggest them to go and find the 
agency. Then they can choose that way. 
 
In this manner, Cindy was now effectively limiting her exposure to further harm by 
trying to steer her contacts to other sources of help.  
 While negative helping experiences inhibited current migrants’ willingness to 
help others, positive experiences encouraged further helping. Another participant, 
Marnie, had a Filipino friend who had married a Singaporean and opened a maid agency 
in Singapore. Through this trusted connection, Marnie had helped more than eight 
Philippine contacts find employment in Singapore. “They are lucky also. Everybody I 
bringing in Singapore gets very good employer,” she boasted during her interview. These 
positive experiences and the pride she felt after each successful referral encouraged 
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Marnie to continue helping other Philippine contacts who approached her for migration 
assistance. 
  
Perceived Competence of the Prospective Migrant 
Research on the role of networks in the labor market has found that social 
networks help disseminate information about job vacancies (Granovetter 1973; Munshi 
2003) but do not always ensure that better-qualified individuals secure those positions 
(Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004; Mortensen and Vishwanath 1994). For instance, 
jobholders may simply recommend their relatives and friends for a position without 
regard to the ability of these individuals to perform on the job. However, under certain 
conditions, jobholders tend to weigh more heavily the reputation and ability of the person 
asking them for job-matching assistance, using these character traits as a signal of future 
behavior on the job (Smith 2007, 2005; Beaman and Magruder 2010).   
When their own job security or pay is riding on the good performance of the 
jobseeker, jobholders are more careful to refer network contacts whom they are confident 
will be high-performers on the job. In the present study, providers of migration 
assistance—who clearly had a lot at stake when helping a contact emigrate—did not have 
the luxury of relying on their contacts’ work reputations to guide their helping decision, 
as few of their contacts had previously worked in the domestic service sector in the 
Philippines. Their contacts’ lack of experience led participants to worry that their 
contacts would not be able to endure the menial aspects of overseas domestic service. 
Participants looked for clues in how their contacts approached the migration process to 
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assess their commitment level. Rachel, a domestic worker in Singapore, interpreted her 
contacts’ wavering as an early warning that they would not adjust well to overseas life: 
One of my friends in the Philippines, until now is asking me to bring her here. But 
sometimes she feels like she don’t want [to come] and sometimes she feels like she 
wants. So I think better that she stay there [in the Philippines] first. Because, maybe if I 
bring her here, and she changes her mind, it will make trouble.  
 
 Prospective migrants’ indecision often led to wasted efforts on the part of those 
current migrants who had initially been eager to help their contacts. Annie, a domestic 
worker in Singapore, shared how she had previously tried to help friends in the 
Philippines emigrate but no longer did so:  
Yeah, I have so many friends who asked me to help them. But after I do all this, they look 
not so interested. So what can I do for them? I told them I really tried my best to help 
them but they don't cooperate. So, after that, I keep quiet. 
When you say “they don't cooperate,” what do you mean? 
I ask them to send their passport’s Xerox copy because the agency needs it. Or send some 
passport pictures. But until now, they don't send. I spend [money] on calling cards [to 
talk] with them, but they look not interested now. So, okay, if you are not interested, I 
also stop.  
 
Indecision signaled to current migrants that their energies could be put to better 
use helping contacts who were serious about emigrating and willing to accept the 
indignities of paid domestic labor. To avoid any wasted efforts on their part, many 
migrants offered only low-risk assistance (such as simply recommending an agency in the 
Philippines) or conditional assistance—in effect telling their contacts to first prove their 
commitment. This was what happened to Andrea, a former domestic worker who had 
previously worked in Hong Kong and had wanted to emigrate from there to the UK: 
I have my friend in the UK and I asked my friend, “Oh, help me. Find me an employer so 
that I can reach the UK.”  
“Okay,” she said. “First you get the ticket and then I will tell you how to come 
here.” But I do not have money. I do not have money now.  
 
With Andrea unable to save enough money to purchase a plane ticket to the UK, her 
friend never bothered to expend her own social capital to find Andrea a British employer. 
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Lacking the financial capital to self-fund a move up her destination hierarchy to the UK, 
Andrea eventually had to return to the Philippines. 
 
Immigration Status of the Current Migrant 
The legal status of the overseas migrant also had a direct bearing on the degree to 
which they were willing and able to assist their contacts in the Philippines find work 
overseas. In general, migrants who lacked legal immigration status—either because they 
were undocumented or because they had run away from their employer—were somewhat 
constrained in terms of the types of assistance they could provide their contacts. But even 
though sponsoring a contact’s visa was out of the question, providing monetary 
assistance (as long as the current migrant was employed and earning an income, albeit 
illegally) was still an option as were other lower-value types of migration assistance. 
However, their illegal status and marginal existence within their host country’s society 
added various emotional and psychic stresses to their lives (Menjívar 2000), and this 
seemed to stunt many undocumented workers’ desire to help any of their network 
contacts. 
Cala, a babysitter in New York City, who had worked without documentation 
after running away from her diplomat-employer, had only been able to provide financial 
aid to her relatives in the Philippines, before she married an American and was able to 
secure permanent resident status. After gaining legal alien resident status in the US, she 
had helped pay for her niece’s nursing degree with the understanding that her niece 
would eventually seek a job as a nurse overseas. In another case, she had paid the 
placement fees for her sister-in-law who had secured legal employment as a domestic 
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worker in Singapore. But for other relatives and friends in the Philippines seeking to 
come to the US (to work illegally), she had turned them down as gently as possible, 
trying to explain that life overseas was not all it was made out to be: 
Some family members and some friends are asking for some help to come to the US. But 
I’m trying to discourage them. I’m telling them that if they can find a job in the 
Philippines, it’s better if they just stay there. I try to tell them that it’s not as good as they 
think here.  
 
 Another participant in New York City, Lucia, who had been working illegally as a 
babysitter in the US since 1998 after running away from her employer’s house, had been 
asked by her daughters to help bring them over to the US so that they could be reunited as 
a family. Even though Lucia would have liked nothing better than to be with her children 
whom she had not seen in over 10 years, she did not like the idea of her daughters being 
undocumented migrants alongside her, and so she had told them no. The general pattern 
among participants who were undocumented migrant domestic workers seemed to be an 
unwillingness to help other network contacts become undocumented as well.  
 
Dyad-Level Factors 
The Tie between Current and Prospective Migrants 
Jobholders have been found to be more likely to extend high-value job-finding 
assistance to close contacts compared to more distant connections (Smith 2007, 2005; 
Menjívar 2000). Böcker (1994) also finds that the closer the connection between current 
and prospective migrants, the greater the likelihood that the current migrant will offer 
some migration assistance, usually of greater value. In the present study too, participants 
were most likely to have received from their relatives—both close and extended family 
members—financial assistance or direct placement into an overseas job, the two most 
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high-value and high-risk forms of migration assistance (see Table 8.1). They were also 
most likely to have provided such high-value assistance to their relatives. 
While many participants repeatedly expressed the fear that their help was going to 
be wasted, when the need arose to help a close family member—particularly a child, 
spouse or sibling—participants were frequently willing to put aside their concerns and 
offer unconditional assistance. Participants still raised the dangers of working overseas 
with close relatives, but they often provided significant amounts of aid to help those 
desirous of leaving the Philippines. Even migrants who had gone through negative 
helping experiences in the past were still usually willing to extend substantive assistance 
to close family members wishing to migrate. Wanda—the Hong Kong-based worker 
mentioned earlier whose niece had ended her contract early—was nevertheless saving 
money to help her oldest son secure a nursing job in Saudi Arabia and her other son a 
hotel job in Macau.  
It should be noted though that the decision to help a close network contact was 
still influenced by the current migrant’s assessment of the relative’s ability to be self-
sufficient overseas. Participants were very wary of helping those individuals—even 
relatives—if they felt that they were going to be too much of a burden for the participant 
overseas. In this vein, Zulay, a 71-year-old grandmother, who had been petitioned by her 
sister, a US citizen, in 1982 and whose petition for permanent residency was approved 25 
years later in 2007, spoke of her two grandsons who had pleaded with her to bring them 
to the US. Zulay had refused to do so because she knew that she would have to take on 
full responsibility for caring for them once they arrived in the US: 
I know they cannot live here. They don’t even know how to wash dishes. They don’t 
even know how to wash their socks. They depend so much on the maids [in the 
Philippines]. Oh my goodness!  
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In the same way that some Mexican men might express reservations about helping 
Mexican women join them in the US because they saw these women as too much of a 
burden (Kaniaupuni 1995 cited in Kaniaupuni 2000), several of the Filipinas I 
interviewed spoke of their husbands in the same manner. They expressed worries about 
what their husbands would do if they joined their wives in the West: How they would 
handle their inevitable loss of status, possible unemployment and, in some cases, their 
limited ability to communicate in English. An extreme example of this way of thinking 
comes from Nannette, a former secondary school teacher, who had decided not to 
sponsor her husband to join her in Canada once she secured her permanent residence. She 
explained her reasons as such: 
I think it’s not a mistake that I made. Because it’s also for the good of the family.  
Because, if he comes here, I will be the one who suffers because I will be one to go to 
work and he will only stay home. And then it’s not easy supporting a person here in 
Canada, because he spends dollars everyday. But if he stayed in the Philippines, he could 
only spend like $100 in a month, so it’s equivalent to 4,400 [Philippine pesos], or I could 
send like 5,000 pesos and it’s enough for him to survive in one month. 
 
The Tie between Current Migrants and Potential Employers 
The warmth of the relationship between current migrants and potential local 
employers in the host country also had a direct bearing on the provision of one particular 
form of migration assistance: The matching of a prospective migrant with a willing 
overseas employer. In most cases, the stronger this relationship, the more likely it was 
that the current migrant would try to recommend someone to the employer (either of their 
own volition or after being approached by the employer for a recommendation). Due to 
the possibility of the person they recommended not performing well on the job—as was 
the case with Wanda’s niece—current migrants needed to have amassed sufficient social 
capital reserves with individual employers before they could ask these employers to trust 
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their recommendation. Likewise, potential employers usually only ask current migrant 
workers for a recommendation if they feel they can trust these workers’ judgment 
(Mattingly 1999).  
Achieving that degree of trust took time and effort, which is why the strength of 
the tie between employer and current migrant was often tied to the length of time these 
migrants had worked abroad. The longer they had been overseas, the more likely it was 
that these migrants would have had the opportunity to build sufficiently strong 
relationships with prospective employers. This is related to Granovetter’s (1973) finding 
regarding the importance of weak ties to learn about new job opportunities that 
individuals’ core network of interconnected strong ties would not know about. Local 
employers in the host country fall into this category of “weak ties” but these weak ties 
still needed to be strong enough for employers to be willing to accept a foreign domestic 
worker’s recommendation for a potential new hire. In addition, these weak ties belong 
not to the prospective hire, but instead to the referee, highlighting how a combination of 
weak and strong ties are required for prospective migrant domestic workers to find jobs 
overseas. 
This was the situation facing Andrew, a domestic worker who had been working 
in Hong Kong for less than two years, who was being pressured by his younger brother (a 
strong tie) to find an overseas job for him. Andrew said he wanted to help but indicated 
that “right now, it is very difficult to find an employer looking for a male [domestic 
worker].” He had asked for his brother’s patience while Andrew solidified his network of 
local contacts to the point where he was comfortable enough with a potential employer (a 




The Gendered Nature of the Job 
Research on helping behavior has also uncovered different patterns of helping 
between the genders, with women more likely to provide help than men (Eagly and 
Crowley 1986). Male and female migrant networks have also been found to function 
along gendered lines (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; Kanaiaupuni 2000; Hondagneu-
Sotelo 1994). Within the current study, participants (who were overwhelmingly female) 
also overwhelmingly provided migration assistance to other women. Likewise, female 
participants had received migration assistance mainly from female relatives and friends 
working in the domestic service sector overseas.  
Curran et al. propose that the underlying reason for such behavior is the fact that 
men and women “face different barriers to moving, maintain different relationships with 
households and villages of origin, and experience completely different opportunities in 
places of destination” (2005:250). In other words, because men and women’s pre- and 
post-migration experiences are so different, their migration assistance patterns also differ 
significantly. Building on these authors’ point about the gendered nature of most 
migrants’ work, I posit that the female-dominated job sector in which the present study’s 
participants were concentrated and their reliance on labor migration as an exit strategy 
from the Philippines were the primary drivers for the heavily gendered patterns of 
migration assistance I observed. Participants’ migration-related human and social 
capital—either in terms of the information they possessed about job vacancies for 
domestic workers, or the connections they had fostered with particular overseas 
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placement agencies that specialized in providing maids and caregivers to overseas 
employers—was inextricably linked to their work in a female-dominated occupation 
(both in terms of the proportion of women working in this field and how domestic service 
has been socially constructed as being a “natural fit” for women). I propose that it was for 
this reason that they were much more likely to help their female rather than male contacts 
in the Philippines.  
Women participants did help their male contacts emigrate on occasion. A handful 
of women had helped their husbands secure jobs overseas—as private chauffeurs, 
domestic workers and home healthcare aides—so that they could work in the same 
country. All these jobs were still within the domestic sphere and, as a result, participants 
possessed the necessary connections with employers and specific knowledge about these 
vacancies that they were able to refer their husbands for the job.6 And participants who 
possessed sufficient financial capital were more than willing to use it to help immediate 
male relatives (primarily sons) leave the Philippines as well. They used their savings to 
pay the agency placement fees or to cover the cost of specialized training in fields that 
were tailored for overseas work and more open to men, such as hospitality management 
and even nursing. Likewise, several female participants had received destination advice 
and financial loans from brothers who were working overseas as commercial seafarers or 
engineers. But most participants’ migrant capital resources were entrenched in the 
domestic service sector and, as a result, this capital was more often than not deployed to 
help female contacts find employment overseas as domestic workers.   
 
                                                
6 Likewise, Mattingly (1999) notes that many female immigrant household workers in San Diego found 
their jobs through their husbands who were working as gardeners in private homes and who were able to 
recommend their wives as suitable hires to their current employers.  
349 
The Vulnerable Nature of the Job 
All temporary labor migrants are taking on certain risks when accepting work 
overseas. But among migrant domestic workers, there exists a level of risk that few other 
occupational sectors possess: The potential for physical, emotional and sexual abuse. 
Participants were fully aware of the dangers of their job and it frequently made them 
think twice before placing any of their contacts in a similarly vulnerable position. 
Participants who themselves had been abused in the past seemed more willing to help if 
their network contacts were taking up less vulnerable jobs overseas.  
One such participant was Lainey who had been a community organizer in the 
Philippines before being sponsored by her brother to become a permanent resident in the 
US. Lainey now worked part-time as a babysitter in New York but when she first arrived 
in the US, she had worked under horrendous conditions as a housekeeper and babysitter 
for various employers. Her personal experience as a domestic worker in the US made her 
reluctant to help her relatives in the Philippines take up migrant domestic work: 
Every time you go there [to the Philippines], and they know that I’m from here, they 
always ask you for help. […] They ask for jobs [and] if I know somebody that is willing 
to sponsor them. And the close relatives, they ask for financial support. I have two nieces.  
One already left for Saudi Arabia. And another one who’s planning to leave, yeah. 
They’re nurses. So, with those, I am very willing. I am perfectly willing to help out. But 
for those that I know are just going to harm’s way, I don’t help them. I really discourage 
them. 
 
Lainey was clearly willing to help her relatives find work overseas but it was the nature 
of the work that decided whether or not she would extend any assistance. She was 
perfectly happy to help her relatives find more protected forms of overseas employment, 
but she drew the line at domestic work.  
Lilith, a 54-year-old domestic worker in Singapore, refused to help any of her 
contacts leave the Philippines because she too was worried about the possibility of these 
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contacts being abused by a bad employer. She confessed that one of her primary concerns 
was that if such an event did occur, she would be blamed: 
They asked me, but I told them, “I cannot direct you. You have to go through the agent.” 
[…] I don’t want to be blamed in the end if they get a bad employer. That is why I don’t 
encourage them [or] help them to come here. 
 
This fear of being “blamed” for a possible negative work experience was a concern raised 
repeatedly during the interviews. As Rena, a 30-year-old domestic worker in Singapore, 
who had also refused to help her contacts, explained: “If I am the one to introduce them 
and then, after that, they get into trouble, then maybe after that, they blame me.” Many 
participants’ thinking was that it was better to let contacts make their own way overseas 
so that participants would not be seen as culpable if something untoward occurred.7   
What made participants so fearful of helping? I posit that it was because of the 
structural vulnerability that migrant domestic workers experience through the heavily 
marginalized lives they lead in their host country. Part of this stems from the solitary, 
housebound and under-regulated nature of paid domestic service which makes these 
workers more prone to abuse (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Constable 1997). But 
migrant domestic workers also lead marginalized lives outside of work, often categorized 
as racialized and sexualized “others” existing on the outskirts of mainstream society in 
their host country, with local social connections only to their employer’s family and other 
migrant domestic workers (if such mingling among workers was even allowed) (Momsen 
1999; Yeoh and Huang 1998). This compounded vulnerability, combined with the fear of 
being blamed for any future migration-related problems, made participants weigh the 
                                                
7 Blaming others who were only tangentially responsible for one’s current position is a somewhat 
understandable reaction in the Philippines, given its collectivist culture of suppressed autonomy and 
complete family dependency (Hofstede 2001; Schumacher 2002). Migrants who encounter abuse while 
overseas, may convince themselves that the only reason they went abroad in the first place was because 
they were pushed to do so by their network contacts whom they then blame for their abusive situation.  
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risks and costs of providing migration assistance more heavily, often resulting in refusals 
to help or the provision of only limited help.  
Participants who were in more secure jobs, working for employers they trusted, 
appeared more willing to help their Philippine contacts emigrate. Several long-serving 
participants—like Marnie who had worked happily for the same Singaporean family for 
19 years—had assisted multiple contacts find jobs overseas and were perfectly willing to 
help more. In contrast, the ten participants who had been mistreated recently by their 
employers were adamant that they did not want to assist any of their contacts. One such 
worker—Annie, a 26-year-old runaway in Singapore—provided a more nuanced answer, 
however, explaining that she would be willing to help her contacts once her own 
employment situation had improved: “I say [to my friend in the Philippines that] I cannot 
decide to help. Because, you see, until now, I have not got a good job here. But if I have 




Degree of Social Closure connecting Current and Prospective Migrants 
In situations where there is a concentration of immigrants living or working 
together, the immigrant community frequently has the capacity to police the recipients of 
their favors to ensure repayment and the honoring of obligations. As a result of this 
“enforceable trust,” immigrant communities are often characterized by a high degree of 
social capital mobilization (Portes 1998; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).  
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Bashi’s (2007) account of veteran migrants (or “hubs” as she called them) 
insisting that the newly-arrived migrants they helped leave the West Indies reside under 
the same roof with them, is a prime example of social closure in action. These veteran 
migrants did so in order to keep a close eye on their new co-residents and ensure that 
these newly-arrived migrants did not squander the opportunities they had been provided. 
But in migrant communities where such mechanisms supporting social closure do not 
exist, potential donors of social capital resources may be less willing to help their 
network contacts.  
Migrant domestic work, the focus of the present study, is a particularly isolated 
occupation. Due to the housebound nature of this work, contact with other workers is 
often restricted to a weekly or monthly day-off (where that has been granted) or fleeting 
encounters while running errands outside the employer’s home (Constable 2003; 
Zarembka 2003; Parreñas 2001; Milkman, Reese, and Roth 1998; Yeoh and Huang 
1998). In certain countries, employers do not even allow their workers to own mobile 
phones which might have enabled these workers to maintain regular contact with 
relatives and friends. In such situations, high social closure becomes difficult to achieve 
and the provision of high-value migration assistance more of a gamble.  
This can explain why so many participants expressed hesitation about assisting 
contacts find work overseas, or limited themselves to helping only close relatives with 
whom they shared a tightly-knit connection in the Philippines and therefore could follow 
up with more easily through home-country intermediaries. Eva, a 37-year-old Filipina, 
who had worked in a total of four countries (Taiwan, Malaysia, Cyprus and Canada), 
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highlighted exactly these concerns when explaining why she turned down a request for 
monetary assistance from one of her network contacts: 
Before, when I am in Cyprus, someone asked for financial help but I’m not [giving]. 
Because she’s in the Philippines. She was working in Cyprus before and we meet there 
and then it just happens that her employer sends her home. So because she finished her 
contract in Cyprus, she cannot stay in Cyprus anymore. And so she don’t have enough 
financially. She wants to apply to another country but she doesn’t have enough 
financially. So, because we are friends, she called me and asked if I have enough savings. 
But I was thinking to myself, If I lend some money to this person—because I don’t know 
her—we just know each other in Cyprus. I don’t know where she is in the Philippines. 
The Philippines is a little bit big. I don’t know where her family is.  
And so when she asked money, I was thinking I can lend her some money. Just a 
little amount to go to other country. But the problem is: You don’t know the mind of the 
other people, right? We are just lending money without signing any agreement from the 
lawyer. So if anything happens, if it happens that she doesn’t pay [me back], that she just 
keeps hiding herself, so it’s hard for me to look for her and to ask for the payment for the 
money that she borrowed.  
And I don’t like also to ask people. If you borrow money from me, just pay me 
without my having to ask you to pay me back the amount you borrowed. Things like that. 
So if you borrowed money from me, just pay back that amount and pay me whenever you 
have the money. Don’t wait for me to ask you. I don’t like that. So instead of being in 
that situation, I don’t loan that money. Maybe I say I don’t have so I don’t lend her any of 
my money. So that there is no problem afterwards.   
 
In contrast, participants were always willing to provide migration assistance when 
their own employer was looking to hire a second domestic worker. Social closure can be 
especially strong when migrant domestic workers live and work under the same roof. 
And it was, after all, in these participants’ best interests to find a co-worker they could 
get along with and who could be reminded of their debt to the participant on a daily basis. 
Other researchers have found similar helping behavior among Mexican domestic workers 
in the US who “sub-contract” some of their existing work to newly-arrived network 
contacts from Mexico as a way to help these contacts get on their feet while also keeping 







Both Smith (2007) and Menjívar (2000) argue that a flourishing economy leads to 
more job openings, which in turn encourages jobholders to be less risk-averse when 
approached for job-matching assistance. This is most likely the case with migrant social 
capital activation as well, especially when it comes to making personal recommendations 
to potential employers. But job availability is influenced by many factors in addition to 
the state of the local economy. And beliefs about the volume of job openings available for 
network contacts can influence whether or not current migrants even make the effort to 
provide migration assistance. 
Most countries’ domestic labor markets are heavily racialized and hierarchical 
(Paul 2011b; Constable 1997). As a result, an increase in demand for domestic workers of 
a particular nationality can result in a simultaneous decline in demand for workers from 
other countries, all else being constant. This is what has happened to Filipino workers in 
Hong Kong as Indonesian migrants have begun to make inroads in the Filipino share of 
the domestic worker market (Anggraeni 2006; Constable 1997). In 1995, there were an 
estimated 150,000 domestic workers in Hong Kong, of which more than 130,000 were 
from the Philippines and hardly any from Indonesia (Sim 2003; Constable 1997). Now, 
there are reported to be more Indonesians than Filipinos working in Hong Kong’s 
300,000-strong domestic service industry. Several participants expressed the belief that 
employers are now less willing to hire Filipino workers because Indonesians enjoy a 
reputation for being more docile, less demanding and, most importantly, cheaper.8 
                                                
8 Similar sentiments were expressed about Thai workers in Hong Kong during the early 1990s (Constable 
1997:36-7). 
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Constable (1997) also heard similar statements about the relative merits of Indonesian 
domestic workers during her field research in Hong Kong. Carrie, a 53-year-old worker 
in Hong Kong, believed that the popularity of Indonesian workers was due to the fact that 
Indonesians receive language training in Cantonese—the primary dialect used by Hong 
Kong Chinese—prior to their arrival (Wee and Sim 2004): “They know how to speak 
Cantonese. According to them, they study for six months in Indonesia. So they are good 
in Cantonese when they come here. So most Chinese […] they prefer to take these 
Cantonese-speaking people.”  
The increasing popularity of one nationality group meant a reduction in the 
availability of jobs for other nationalities, whether this was Indonesians vis-à-vis 
Filipinos or Thais versus Filipinos. However, no Hong Kong-based participant could 
remember an actual incident where they had been turned down by a prospective employer 
who preferred to hire a different nationality rather than a Filipino. Instead, I posit that 
participants’ assumptions about employers’ changing nationality preferences may have 
prevented them from even attempting to approach prospective local employers with the 
names of potential Filipino hires. In this manner, both real and presumed job availability 
levels can influence the mobilization of migrant social capital. 
 
Market Turnover 
The Hong Kong market has gained a reputation as a place where the early 
termination of workers’ contracts is the norm and where there is a great deal more 
volatility in job tenure (Constable 1997). This has had the effect of making many study 
participants in Hong Kong somewhat wary about helping to bring their contacts to Hong 
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Kong—particularly through an agency—in case their contacts ended up being terminated 
from their contract early and forced to forfeit all their placement fees.   
Such a possibility is frightening for many migrant workers seeking jobs in Hong 
Kong given that they are required to pay exorbitant recruitment agency fees, which in 
2008, ranged from PHP80,000 to PHP100,000 (roughly 40-50% of the average annual 
income of a family in the Philippines. This is despite Hong Kong’s standard contract 
stating that employers are responsible for covering these expenses for their domestic 
worker.9 Prospective migrants are usually expected to pay all these fees prior to their 
departure, constituting a significant financial burden.  
Meanwhile, Singapore-bound migrants pay on average PHP50,000-60,000 (or 
between 25-30% of their average annual family income). In addition, Singapore agencies 
accept part-payment of these fees through a process of salary deductions that can last up 
to the first 10 months but only after the worker has started her job. These divergent 
payment structures are what create differing incentives for Hong Kong- and Singapore-
based agencies when it comes to contract turnover: While Singapore agencies are 
motivated to keep migrants employed so as to be able to collect their placement fees in 
full, Hong Kong agencies feel no such compunction.10  
Constable adds that in Hong Kong, “the more rapid the turnover [of domestic 
workers], the more profitable an agency’s business” (1997:62). She found Hong Kong 
                                                
9 Hong Kong’s standard employment contract for domestic workers is available at 
http://www.immd.gov.hk/ehtml/id407form.htm. 
10 The high turnover in the Hong Kong market and its stricter fee levels and payment structures could also 
explain why fewer Hong Kong-based participants provided financial assistance to their network contacts 
compared to Singapore-based participants. Singapore-based current migrants had to cover a smaller 
proportion of the lower placement fees charged to prospective migrants heading to Singapore, and so were 
in a better position to be generous. In contrast, Hong Kong-based migrants were asked to cover a much 
large sum. When combined with the knowledge that their network contact might be fired prematurely and 
thereby lose any chance of paying them back, Hong Kong migrants were understandably hesitant to loan 
their contacts any money. 
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agencies actively gearing employers to run through several domestic workers before 
settling on a final choice. They did so by offering employers a half refund or unlimited 
replacements of workers within the first forty days of a contract. Likewise, my Hong 
Kong interviewees told me of “Buy One, Get Five” offers made by agencies to 
prospective employers that allowed them to cycle through five domestic workers for the 
price of one. There is limited downside for employers when accepting such offers; 
meanwhile, for agencies, each new domestic worker placed with an employer represents 
significant new revenue, all of it coming from the worker and not the employer. 
These market conditions have led to a situation in Hong Kong where contracts are 
often terminated prematurely (Constable 1997). A domestic worker who is terminated by 
her employer forfeits all the placement fees she paid, even if she was only on the job for a 
few days or a few weeks.11 As a result, several Hong Kong participants explained that 
they had turned down requests for migration-related assistance when they could not find 
an employer to directly hire their contact in the Philippines. These migrants were not 
willing to go through an agency out of concern that the employer the agency found would 
fire their contact, leaving that individual without a job and, most likely, with an 
exorbitant loan that they would be unable to pay back. This was the case with Renasha, a 
46-year-old domestic worker in Hong Kong, who had repeatedly refused to help her niece 
find work in Hong Kong. Renasha insisted she would not bring her niece to Hong Kong, 
“unless I can find an employer who will accept salary deduction and will not terminate.” 
                                                
11 Hong Kong law stipulates that employers who terminate their domestic worker’s contract prematurely 
must pay their employee one month’s wages in lieu of notice or give them at least one month’s notice in 
writing. (See http://www.immd.gov.hk/ehtml/faq_fdh.htm#9, Q43.) However, there is nothing mentioned 
about agency placement fees because technically these workers are not supposed to be paying these fees in 
the first place. 
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Participants in Singapore, on the other hand, were more willing to use local 
agencies to help their contacts. Of the 23 participants in Singapore who had provided 
migration-related assistance, the most common form of help provided was the submission 
of their contacts’ personal information to a local maid agency (see Table 8.4). In contrast, 
only two participants in Hong Kong had helped in this manner.  
 
Regulatory Environment 
Böcker (1994) writes that when the Dutch government began imposing stricter 
requirements on short-term entry visas, creating a more hostile environment for migrant 
networks connecting Turkey and the Netherlands, Turkish immigrants became much 
more particular in terms of whom they helped come to the Netherlands. Böcker was 
referring to permanent immigrants to a country, but a similar situation applies to the case 
of temporary labor migrants and the specific labor and immigration policies that govern 
their stay in a host country. Increasing restrictions on domestic workers’ living and 
working conditions has a dampening effect on their desire to help their network contacts 
find jobs in the same market.  
This is what occurred among the Filipino domestic workers who had started 
working in Hong Kong prior to the 1987 introduction of several “New Conditions of 
Stay” (NCS). The previous rules governing migrant domestic workers had been much 
more equitable, allowing them to remain in Hong Kong to search for a new employer if 
their previous contract had ended prematurely. In contrast, the NCS rules gave an out-of-
work migrant only two weeks to find a new employer before requiring their departure 
from Hong Kong (Constable 1997). In addition, migrants who had successfully found a 
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new employer within the two-week grace period still had to return to their home countries 
to apply for a new work visa to Hong Kong before returning to start their new contracts.12 
This last requirement placed a significant financial burden on migrant workers in Hong 
Kong who were usually expected to pay their Hong Kong agency a hefty fee for finding 
them a new employer. This and other changes in the regulatory environment governing 
migrant domestic workers cumulatively had a strong dampening effect on study 
participants in Hong Kong, lessening their desire to help their contacts find work in Hong 
Kong in recent years.  
In Singapore, meanwhile, local maid placement agencies are much more 
amenable to helping migrant domestic workers switch employers and the Singapore 
government does not require these workers to exit the country while their new work 
permit is being processed. These practices significantly reduce the risks for current 
migrants in Singapore when it comes to helping their Philippine-based contacts find 
employment there. As a result, while Singapore-based participants spoke of having found 
employment for some of their Philippine contacts as recently as the previous year, several 
Hong Kong-based participants spoke of how, in recent years, they had not directly placed 
their contacts with employers. Overall, a significantly higher proportion of participants in 
Hong Kong had turned down requests for migration assistance from their network 
contacts, 36% compared to 27% in Singapore (see Table 8.3). One of the explanations 
Hong Kong-based participants provided for their recent non-helping behaviors was that 
the market for migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong had become more inhospitable in 
recent years. This was how one Hong Kong worker, Cissie, put it: 
                                                
12 http://www.immd.gov.hk/ehtml/ID(E)989.htm. Retrieved on October 6, 2011. 
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Before it’s not like what you can see in here now. Because before, if you are terminated, 
you can find another employer easily. Since it is under the British before, you can find an 
employer in here directly and no need to come back to Philippines to apply for the visa 
again. You can continue your work if you have an employer already. No problem. […] 
But now, since Hong Kong is under the China now, so many things has changed. […] 
Now the salary is become lower. And if you were just terminated and you can find an 
employer, you still have to go back to Philippines and wait for your visa there. And you 
need to have an agency too to work for the processing of the documents. Actually during 
that time Hong Kong is under the British, [it is] really good. Because they have a good 
consideration of the helper. […] But now when it is into China, everything they changed. 
In our salary, our working conditions, so many things happened really.  
 
Even though the NCS were in fact implemented when Hong Kong was still under British 
rule, the overall sentiment of participants—that the regulatory regime in Hong Kong had 
become less hospitable over time—was still valid and was another reason behind their 
growing reluctance to provide migration assistance. 
 
The Filipino Art of Withholding Help 
The above section has delved into the many factors that influence current 
migrants’ decision to extend or withhold help, providing an insight into the self-
justifications used by these migrants. But, when turning down their network contacts’ 
requests for migration assistance, study participants often couched their reasons for 
withholding help in very different ways.  
In Lone Pursuit, Sandra Smith’s (2007) interviewees turned down requests for 
job-finding assistance if they did not deem the jobseeker sufficiently driven or 
hardworking. Smith writes that the low-income jobholders she interviewed upheld the 
ideas espoused in the American Dream that “any jobseeker with motivation and drive 
could find one” (2007:167) and as such saw those without employment as deficient in 
character and drive, and therefore less worthy of receiving any assistance. But during 
their face-to-face interactions with jobseekers, jobholders would often lie and say they 
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had not heard of job vacancies (Smith 2005:23, 25, 28) and, only sometimes, directly 
confront the jobseeker with his/her own incompetence and unreliability (Smith 2005:22).  
Participants in the present study also turned down requests for help if they felt that 
the prospective migrant was not committed enough to working overseas as a domestic 
worker. And, the Philippines’ collectivist culture of reciprocal giving meant that they too 
could rarely couch their refusals in direct terms. The cultural norm of helping in which 
Filipinos are socialized creates strong pressures to provide assistance to friends and 
family from the home country. But clearly, study participants were not “cultural dupes”; 
they were fully aware of the risks and costs associated with helping and often turned 
away network contacts who asked them for migration assistance.  
But culture did play an important part in how participants framed their decisions 
to turn down requests for help. Many participants told their network contacts that by not 
helping them leave the Philippines, they were actually doing these contacts a favor, that 
life overseas was so risky that it would be better in the long run for these individuals to 
remain in the Philippines. Vanessa, a domestic worker in Hong Kong, used this tactic to 
dissuade her contacts in the Philippines from asking her for migration assistance: 
Whenever I go home, there are still those who want to come. I discourage them. I always 
discourage people from coming to Hong Kong. […] I always give them the scenario that 
working abroad is not a guarantee that your life will get better. And I tell them about 
cases after cases that we witness here: those who are abused, those who are with so much 
loans. So instead of improving their life, they would become much worse [by coming 
here].  
 
 Other participants emphasized the difficulties involved with the process of 
international migration to dissuade their network contacts from embarking upon such an 
adventure entirely. They also highlighted how cash-strapped they were, to justify their 
refusal to loan any money to their network contacts. This is what Janelle in Canada said 
to fend off her relatives: 
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My niece, my sister-in-law. Also, my niece and nephews. My cousins, they say, “Could 
you get us there? Could you bring us there?” And I say, “Well, it’s not easy. You need to 
apply for an agency, right? Sponsor [a work permit] is not easy too because, in the 
Philippines, when you get somebody to work here in Canada as the live-in caregiver 
directly from the Philippines, the processing is too long. And you need to, I think, give up 
two years. And, you know, there's no employer who could wait that long. The pressure, 
they need them right away, they need the service. They need somebody to look after their 
kids or who will do housekeeping.”  
And I was sharing with them [my relatives] about the expenses, right? They 
need to think about how costly it is. “Well, you know, I'm not saying, I'm not saying it to 
discourage you because I don't want you to come. But you need to check. And if you 
think that I will help you financially, no, I can't. It isn't [that] I don't want you to come or 
[that] I don’t want to help you, but I'm saying [that] I can't afford it. […] You think that 
[because] I am here in Canada that I have lots of money. [But actually] I'm still in 
difficulty. I'm still buried with loans.” 
  
Such apologia reflect the difficult tightrope study participants had to walk: Trying 
to prevent their social capital from becoming a burden to them (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993) while ensuring that their refusal to help did not jeopardize their social networks in 
the homeland, in which they were still tightly embedded and on which they relied for 
emotional and psychological support (Kelly and Lusis 2006; Parreñas 2001). Because of 
the cultural norms surrounding the values of utang na loob and hiya, participants feared 
that an outright rejection to a network contact might damage their personal relationship 
with them. As Nanette in Canada, put it:  
If I could not find a way [to help], it’s hard to say no to [people]. I don’t know how to 
explain it. Because they get upset. Because, you know, Filipinos, if you don’t help them, 
they will say something about you. I don’t want them to do that, [to say] that I don’t help 
them. 
 
And so, participants repeatedly talked about trying to let their contacts down gently. 
Some migrants went so far as to never say no, instead giving vague promises to help but 
at some unspecified point in the distant future that would never actually come.  
 
The Substitution Effect of Withholding Help 
Previous chapters have emphasized how multistate migration can come about 
because of an aspiring migrant’s initial lack of capital which prevents them from gaining 
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access to their preferred destination country. This lack of capital can result in a 
substitution effect among these aspiring migrants because of their constrained options. 
This substitution effect can be temporal, with these migrants opting for a delayed 
gratification of their desire to enter their preferred destination country. It can also be 
spatial—with migrants opting for less-preferred destinations in the near term. Together, 
these substitution effects (whatever their cause, be it the lack of financial, human or 
social capital) set the stage for their adoption of multistate migration in the long run. 
So far, when speaking of migrant social capital, I have referred primarily to how 
the lack of access to this capital can foster such substitution effects. For instance, aspiring 
migrants without immediate relatives in the US are forced to consider alternative 
destinations and so on. But the partial- or non-mobilization of migrant social capital (as 
described in previous sections) can have a similar substitution effect.  
This is what happened to Winnie, a 47-year-old Filipina mother of five boys, who 
had first worked in Hong Kong before coming to Canada. Winnie had several relatives in 
Canada whom she approached for help finding an employer to hire her so that she could 
avoid paying a hefty agency placement fee. However, Winnie’s Canadian relatives told 
her they were unable to find an employer for her and squashed her dreams of migrating 
directly to Canada:  
I asked my relatives and they said they can help me with my ticket, but directly no. I 
asked them before and they said, “No, we can’t find any [employers].” […] They just 
said, “Oh, we’ll help you buy your ticket but you have to loan it from us. But finding an 
employer, no.”  
 
Winnie eventually found other relatives of hers in Hong Kong who were willing to find 
her a job as a domestic worker in Hong Kong. She worked in Hong Kong for seven years 
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before she was able to secure enough funds to pay the agency fees for a caregiver job in 
Canada and enter the country on her own steam.   
Winnie’s story demonstrates the immediate and long-term effects of the non-
mobilization of migrant social capital. Unable to successfully mobilize her network 
connections in Canada, Winnie had to seek work in Hong Kong instead. She was still 
able to reach Canada in the end but it had taken her many more years and a lengthy 
stopover in Hong Kong to realize that dream.  
Another case is Macy, a certified medical technologist, who was still living in the 
Philippines when she asked her aunts and uncles in the US to help sponsor a visa for her. 
But they told her that they could only help by arranging a “green card marriage” for her. 
Actually, [going to the US] was my desire. You know, being with my relatives in the US. 
But they just told us that it’s really hard to apply. […] They don’t want us to go there. 
That’s my thinking: That they really don’t want us to go there. They said that it’s hard but 
I don’t know how hard that will be. My aunt—the eldest sister of mommy—told me that 
they can arrange marriage [for me]. Something like that. That is the only way they 
presented to me. Aside from that, nothing more. So, you know, I was a bit dismayed, you 
know? I don’t know if they are really willing to help me, you know? 
 
Unwilling to be part of an arranged marriage, Macy had no other means of securing a 
visa to the US and had to consider alternative destinations and alternative migration 
strategies. Macy ended up applying for the live-in caregiver program in Canada and I 
interviewed her when she had been working in Toronto for almost three years. Her initial 
plan had been to use Canada as a stepping stone to the US: Once she secured her 
Canadian citizenship and returned to her former profession as a medical technologist, she 
had expected to move on to the US. This plan had changed somewhat since her arrival in 
Canada but she freely admitted that this form of “triangular migration” through Canada 
had been her backup plan after her hope for a direct migration to the US blocked by her 
relatives. 
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 Altogether, 17% of interviewees in Canada spoke of having had their initial 
requests for migration assistance turned down (see Table 8.3). All of these migrants still 
managed to cobble together enough resources (of their own or from other network 
contacts) to leave the Philippines and travel to a less-preferred country. As a result of 
their initial inability to mobilize all their social capital resources, their eventual migration 




Migrant networks influence migration system dynamics by affecting the 
aspirations, capabilities and opportunity structures of prospective migrants.13 In Chapter 
Six, the role of networks in shaping the destination preferences and aspirations of 
prospective migrants was discussed. In this present chapter, the role of networks in both 
enhancing and restricting the capabilities of migrants was elaborated upon. The examples 
provided here highlight how the process by which this occurs is significantly more 
complex than what the current network theory of cumulative migration describes.  
This chapter showcases how the mobilization of migrant social capital is a 
selective, contingent and dynamic process, with migrants moving from being very helpful 
to not helpful and back over time, depending on their current context, their relationships 
with each network contact, and their past helping experiences. Most study participants 
had received migration assistance when they were first seeking to leave the Philippines. 
Likewise, most of them had offered some amount of migration assistance to at least one 
                                                
13 I am using de Haas’ definition of migration as a “function of [a prospective migrant’s] aspirations and 
capabilities within a given set of opportunity structures” (2011:21).  
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of their contacts in the Philippines. However, only half the time had these participants 
provided substantive assistance—giving money or finding an employer to directly hire 
their contact. These findings point to the need for more data on the actual forms of 
assistance being provided by overseas migrants. It is insufficient to ask whether or not 
overseas migrants assist their network contacts, we need to also ask: “How much help do 
they provide?” 
This chapter’s comparative analysis of migrant domestic worker helping patterns 
across different countries also makes clear that migrant social capital mobilization is not 
simply a function of micro-level factors at the individual and dyad levels, but is heavily 
contingent on more macro-structural factors. For instance, laws that help mitigate some 
of the vulnerabilities of domestic work and migrant labor encourage current migrant 
domestic workers to take on the risk of finding jobs for their home country contacts. 
These findings are in line with Böcker’s (1994) research on Turkish immigrants in the 
Netherlands who became less willing to extend migration assistance as Dutch 
immigration laws became more restrictive. But equally important is the structure of the 
job market in which these migrant labor. Overall, the existence of a pro-migrant and pro-
worker regulatory environment is critical for migrant domestic workers who already 
experience so much structural vulnerability in their working lives. 
In addition to the role played by policies on the books, policy praxis also 
influences the degree of network mobilization. The actual workings of the migrant 
domestic worker market, in particular the role played by market intermediaries such as 
maid agencies, can impact how comfortable current migrants feel extending help to 
network contacts, and also the type of help that they offer. These agencies—which often 
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exist in a regulatory gray area—regularly function as migration gatekeepers, illegally 
charging prospective migrants exorbitant fees that prevent low-capital individuals from 
leaving their home countries. But, as this study shows, these agencies’ recruitment and 
placement practices also have an effect on migrants who are already overseas, 
moderating their willingness to extend certain types of assistance to their network 
contacts, and transforming them into migration gatekeepers as well. 
When the migration assistance that is given is of low value, limited in nature, or 
conditional, not all prospective migrants will be able to accumulate the additional 
resources required to make a journey overseas or reach their preferred destination. Thus, 
it is possible for migrant social capital to be mobilized and yet not result in migration. 
Another likely outcome is that migration trajectories are altered in significant ways, 
shifting away from countries with higher entry barriers and towards countries that offer 
easier access, encouraging multistage/multistate migration as a way to circumvent an 
initial lack of migrant capital. The spatial and temporal substitution effects of the 
low/partial mobilization of migrant social capital are what set the stage for multistate 
migration.  
To end, this chapter reaffirms the outsize role migrant social capital can play in 
the migration decisions of prospective migrants. But it highlights how migration help—
especially “good” help that can make all the difference between migrating to one’s 
preferred destination, migrating somewhere else, or not migrating at all—can often be 
hard to find and is moderated by a range of factors outside the control of individual 
migrants. Most of the empirical research on migrant networks does not provide any direct 
measures of the type and quantity of migration assistance provided, simply assuming that 
368 
assistance was either provided fully or not at all (Garip 2008). What I have tried to 
highlight in this chapter is the need to look more critically at the activation of migrant 
social capital, recognizing its dynamic and differentiated nature and the effect this has in 









 For this dissertation, I investigated the phenomenon of multistate migration, an 
emergent migration strategy and trajectory among aspiring Filipino migrant domestic 
workers. In the preceding chapters, I outlined the multiplicity of factors at the macro-, 
meso- and micro-levels that led to the emergence of this migration pattern. In Chapter 
Three, I described the conditions in the Philippines that have facilitated the adoption of 
multistate migration by aspiring migrants. The continuing economic doldrums of the 
Philippines have set the stage for just over 100,000 Filipinas to leave the country each 
year as newly-hired migrant domestic workers. When their overseas contracts expire, 
however, these women have few reasons for wanting to return to the Philippines for 
good. Their economic worries have not lessened in any permanent way and their choice 
of migrant domestic work does not translate into improved chances for their employment 
in the Philippines. So, many of these women may choose to remain overseas but not 
always in the same overseas destination.  
Migrant domestic workers are able to consider alternative destinations because the 
overseas labor market for these workers is both global and transnational. It is global in 
that there are many high-income countries around the world—countries as disparate as 
Canada, Italy, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Cyprus, the United 
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Arab Emirates and Taiwan—that have instituted labor programs to grant temporary work 
permits to migrant domestic workers. At the same time, this market is transnational in 
that it allows for the skills, experience and reputation accrued by foreign domestic 
workers while working in one of these overseas markets to be transferred to and rewarded 
in another country. These country markets are not isolated silos with no links connecting 
each other. Rather, thanks in large part to the enterprising actions of overseas maid 
agencies and the growing stock of Filipino migrant domestic workers in these 
destinations, there are now well-established flows of migrant domestic workers flowing 
from one overseas market to another, such as from Hong Kong to Canada.  
Migrant domestic workers themselves are aware of the relative merits of these 
different overseas markets. Migrants carry around in their heads a socially constructed 
destination hierarchy that guides each of their destination decisions. Aspiring, optimistic 
migrants—and people who choose to leave their home country for a new one are, almost 
by definition, both aspiring and optimistic—seek better-paying jobs, better working 
conditions and/or the possibility of securing permanent residency in their new country. 
They may not always be able to gain direct access to their preferred destination due to 
high barriers to entry and so may be forced to settle for a less-preferred host country 
instead. But, in their subsequent migrations, they may attempt to climb their destination 
hierarchy and eventually gain access to their preferred host country or, at the very least, a 
country that is higher up their hierarchy. Sometimes, this multistate migration trajectory 
is planned out from the start as an intentional strategy. In other cases, it is more organic, 
with each step in the migration journey occurring independently of any others (even 
though there is an element of path-dependency involved in much multistate migration). 
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But whatever the case, the process of multistate migration is frequently marked by 
dynamic change as new migration opportunities and new destination information can 
alter migrants’ preferences and plans in unexpected ways. 
At the same time, the ability to engage in multistate migration up their destination 
hierarchy is a function, not only of migrants’ initial degree of access to capital, but also, 
their ability to accumulate new capital while overseas. Migrants who are better educated 
and unencumbered by dependents needing most of their foreign earnings are more likely 
to engage in multistate migration. There are also significant differences between 
multistate migrants and those direct migrants who are able to travel directly to their 
preferred destination country in a single step. One of the most critical of these is the type 
of overseas network that the migrant is embedded in. While direct migrants are often 
closely connected to overseas migrants who have already secured citizenship or 
permanent residence in a preferred destination country and can sponsor visas for them, 
multistate migrants have often only other temporary contract laborers to assist them in 
their migration attempts. These differing networks highlight the capital-constrained 
origins of multistate migrants: It is not that they lack any access to capital, but rather that 
they do not have enough of it to support a direct migration to their preferred destination 
country. If and when they are able to accumulate new capital (human, social, financial 
and cultural) while working overseas, these migrants can position themselves to engage 






 Through my findings, this dissertation contributes to various literatures. It adds to 
the migration literature by proposing a conceptual model of multistate migration as 
undertaken by capital-constrained migrants. This is of great use given that this emergent 
pattern of migration is currently both ill-defined and under-studied. My findings also 
shed light on the more subjective side of destination decision-making and how various 
cognitive biases may result in the over- and under-valuing of particular countries as 
destinations.  
Within globalization studies, it expands our understanding of how the processes 
of globalization are transforming certain industries and occupational fields and, in the 
case of this study, creating a transnational labor market for migrant domestic workers. 
Such a global labor market enables these workers, who are often represented as low-
capital migrants, to take their newly-acquired skills and experience acquired while 
working in one overseas market and successfully transfer it to a new country where their 
human capital can be recognized and rewarded.  
This dissertation also speaks to labor studies, highlighting the oft-unrecognized 
agency of individual migrant domestic workers. Between 40-50% of study participants in 
Hong Kong and Singapore and 82% of participants in Canada were multistate migrants. 
Despite working in a low-status, low-paid occupation that heavily marginalized them, 
these migrants were able to accumulate sufficient capital while overseas to support at 
least one additional journey up their destination hierarchy, upending the notion that these 
migrant domestic workers are always the “victims” or “servants” of globalization. 
Instead, the findings point to how migrants’ capacity for agentic action can increase while 
373 
they are overseas, enabling them to take advantage of globalizing market forces and 
climb their destination hierarchies.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to gender studies with its exploration of how 
women’s independent labor migration can still occur within a patriarchal hegemony. It 
does so by presenting a “negotiated migration” model of migration decision-making that 
clarifies how women migrants may successfully navigate the gendered and generational 
hierarchies within which they live in their home country. In this manner, it provides a 
gendered corrective to the new economics of labor migration. 
 However, despite these insights, there are still questions that this study has not 
answered: How does multistate migration impact the migrant domestic workers who 
undertake such journeys? What are other likely occupations where multistate migration 
might emerge? In this concluding chapter, I take a stab at answering some of these 
questions and lay out a research agenda for future studies I hope to initiate.   
 
Multistate Migration among Other Migrant Populations 
Considering that I interviewed a narrow section of the labor migrant population—
only one nationality, one gender and one occupational category—my findings on 
multistate migration may not be generalizable outside this population. However, as 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, there have been several case studies of other 
migrant populations that highlight international migration patterns that could also be 
classified as multistate migration (see Biao 2007; Gold 2007; Konadu-Agyemang 1999; 
DeVoretz and Ma 2002). Biao’s (2007) work focuses on Indian IT workers (most of 
whom are men) and his study highlights the same forces in the global political 
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economy—tightening immigration restrictions in the West, a pent-up demand for cheap 
foreign labor in developed and high-income developing countries and the emergence of a 
migration industry to support and steer the aspirations of prospective migrants in the 
developing world—that set the stage for the emergence of multistate migration among the 
Filipino migrant domestic workers in this study. DeVoretz and his fellow researchers 
focus more on Hong Kong immigrants to Canada who move on to the US. Their work 
highlights the ability of migrants to accumulate new capital while overseas to fund 
further migrations to new, harder-to-enter destinations. These two research examples 
alone suggest that the practice of undertaking multistate migration to climb one’s 
destination hierarchy is not exclusive to Filipinos, domestic workers or women.  
In addition, my preliminary interviews with Filipino nurses in the US1 reveals that 
this migration pattern might be becoming more common amongst this population as well, 
now that the US—the traditional dream destination for Filipino nurses (Choy 2003)—no 
longer offers as many long-term visas to foreign-trained nurses. In earlier decades, there 
was a steady stream of Filipino nursing graduates to the US, first through the Exchange 
Visitor Program (EVP) (established in 1948), then as a result of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 that lifted nationality-based quotas for permanent immigrants 
intending to settle down in the US, and most recently, through specialized employer-
sponsored visa categories (H1-A and H1-C) that were eligible only for foreign-trained 
nursing graduates.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I interviewed only one Filipino nurse in Canada and she had been retired for several years at the time of 
her interview. In contrast, the nursing professionals in the US that I interviewed were all still working as 
nurses and were active in the Filipino nursing community in their respective locations. I should note 
however that my Canadian interviewee had first worked in the US under the auspices of the EVP. But, at 
the end of a two-year stint in Texas, when she was supposed to return to the Philippines, she instead found 
work in a hospital in Toronto. She eventually settled down in Canada, marrying and raising two daughters 
there. So she was a multistate migrant herself. 
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The above specialized visa categories were created in response to severe nursing 
shortages across the country and later in rural parts of the US. But, in recent years, the US 
has become increasingly restrictive when it comes to granting long-term or permanent 
access to foreign-trained nurses. The EVP is still in operation but it no longer lists foreign 
nurses as one of its accepted occupational categories.2 Likewise, the H1-A and H1-C visa 
categories have been discontinued.3 Even employer-sponsored permanent residency is no 
longer an easy option for foreign nurses. Potential employers are able to sponsor foreign 
nurses only if they are seeking to fill highly specialized nursing positions or positions that 
include both nursing and managerial responsibilities, where they can argue that they 
cannot find such skilled individuals among US nurses.  
These recent restrictions on the entry of foreign nurses into the US has not been 
lost on Filipino immigrants in the US. During my conversations with Filipino nurses in 
the US, several interviewees told me about how they were now advising their relatives in 
the Philippines who were newly-graduated nurses, to seek employment in other countries 
that accepted foreign nurses, at least until the US loosened its immigration and labor 
policies. Such advice reflects the ongoing trend for Filipino nurses to seek work in non-
US locations. While the US was the earliest and used to be the largest importer of 
Filipino nurses, several other countries have become more important destinations for 
Filipino nurses in recent decades. Between 1993 and 2003, nearly 100,000 nurses left the 
Philippines, with 46,000 going to Saudi Arabia, 16,000 going to the UK and Ireland, and 
only 11,000 to the US (Ball 2008). Since 2003, the US has dropped even further down 
the list: The top ten markets for newly-hired Filipino nurses in the seven years till 2010 




have been countries in the Middle East, Asia and Europe, and not the US (Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration 2011).  
Most of my Filipino nurse interviewees had come to the US directly from the 
Philippines in 1990 or even earlier when entry into the US was significantly easier. But 
my most recently-arrived interviewee, Jane, had entered the US in 2001 after waiting for 
four years for her application to be processed and approved. Prior to securing her US 
visa, Jane had worked in the UK for three years. She had adopted this multistate 
migration trajectory on the advice of her brother (a nurse in the US) and her aunt (a nurse 
in the UK) who told her to find an RN job in the UK while waiting for her employer-
sponsored US permanent residency application (submitted in 1997) to be approved.  
The advice Jane’s relatives gave her is a reflection of trends occurring within the 
nursing industry that parallel the trends I observed in the domestic worker industry in 
several countries: Labor shortages in many high-income countries that have forced them 
to increase their reliance on foreign-trained nurses; a similar hierarchy of overseas 
markets for nurses (with Western countries at the top, followed by Asian countries, and 
lastly the Middle East); the emergence of a transnational labor market for foreign-trained 
nursing graduates (especially for those who had passed internationally-accepted 
credentialing examinations like the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing 
Schools, an international authority on the evaluation of foreign nursing professionals); 
increasing restrictions that limit the entry of foreign nurses into the US; a culture of 
migration among the major suppliers of nurses for the global market (e.g. the Philippines, 
India and Sri Lanka); and finally, the expansion of the for-profit migration industry that 
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supports the placement of foreign nurses overseas but using a sliding scale fee structure 
that makes jobs in the West initially out of reach for many migrants.  
 
Working-Class Cosmopolitans 
What does the experience of working and living for long periods of times in 
various overseas destinations do to individual migrants? I have coined the term “working-
class cosmopolitans” to describe migrants such as those of my study participants who 
were multistate migrants employed in low-status occupations such as paid domestic 
work. Unlike the picture of cosmopolitanism that is popular in the media—that of jet-
setting, globe-trotting, consumption-driven, elitist Westerners moving from country to 
country at will (Calhoun 2002; Robbins 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 2002)—, the 
working-class cosmopolitans I interviewed originated from Asia, had acquired their 
multifaceted knowledge of the world through their low-paid and menial labor in various 
countries, and received little societal recognition in their host countries for their hard-
earned knowledge and experience. As James Clifford has noted about cosmopolitanism 
among the Victorian era bourgeoisie:  
A host of servants, helpers, companions, guides, bearers, etc. have been discursively 
excluded from the role of proper travelers because of their race and class, and because 
theirs seemed to be a dependent status in relation to the supposed independence of the 
individualistic bourgeois voyager (1992:106). 
	  
But cosmopolitanism represents not only the condition of having lived in multiple 
locations during one’s lifetime (Vertovec and Cohen 2002; Appadurai and Breckenridge 
1988). It is also a form of skill—a muscle, if you will—that select well-traveled 
individuals can exercise in different national contexts. Ulf Hannerz describes it as “a 
personal ability to make one’s way into other cultures, through listening, looking, 
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intuiting and reflecting” (1990:239). Few individuals have to perform this process of 
immersion into a new culture as much as migrant domestic workers who have to live in 
the homes of their foreign employers, learn to cook a different cuisine, sometimes speak a 
different language and navigate the different systems of meaning that exist in their host 
country. A migrant domestic worker who was born and raised in the Philippines and then 
worked in, say, Hong Kong, Cyprus and eventually Canada, has become expert at 
adapting to multiple cultures.   
Even though they are cosmopolitan through their experiences and abilities, they 
are rarely treated as such in their host countries.4 Their low status as domestic workers 
still trumps their wide-ranging experience and adaptive capabilities. In addition, because 
of the many years these capital-constrained migrants had invested into their multistate 
journeys as domestic workers, they often remain trapped in low-status occupations. The 
significant deskilling they experienced while domestic workers means that it is difficult 
for them to find work in more reputable sectors of the economy.  
In the case of Canada, the live-in caregivers I interviewed were almost all still in 
the process of applying for permanent residency (PR) and had not yet started other types 
of work. But my background interviews with immigrant activists and grassroots workers 
indicate that the post-PR life for these workers is not a bed of roses. Their Philippine 
degrees and pre-migration professional qualifications are rarely recognized, making it 
difficult for them to find a new occupation that is commensurate with their educational 
qualifications. Sponsoring their families to join them in Canada takes a great deal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The situation is very different in their home countries where the stories they tell of their experiences in 
various foreign countries and the diverse consumer goods they send back home from different corners of 
the globe, secure them a high status among their relatives and friends. At home, they are more likely to be 
recognized as modern cosmopolitans despite their low-status occupation. 
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money as well: CA$450 for their own application, CA$550 each for their spouse and 
parents, and CA$150 for each dependent child under 22 years of age, and a host of other 
application fees. There is also a minimum annual income requirement that varies 
depending on how many family members are being sponsored.5 When they considered all 
the added expenses of housing, food and transportation required to support an entire 
family, some participants thought twice about their initial plans to sponsor their families 
to join them in Canada. A few participants told me that they had decided not to sponsor 
their husbands because they feared their husbands would not be able to handle the 
downward mobility and cultural shock that would inevitably occur. One participant had 
even decided not to bring her children to Canada but have them continue their education 
in the Philippines instead. 
Still, Canadian-based interviewees remained excited about the possibility of 
upward mobility for themselves. Former nurses and other health professionals were 
taking Canadian licensing examinations or signing up for online courses that would 
facilitate their return to their earlier professions. Others spoke about their dreams of 
working in the hospitality industry or in early childhood education, both areas where their 
work experience as live-in caregivers in Canada and elsewhere might be recognized and 
rewarded to some extent.  
Migrants in Singapore and Hong Kong, who were unable (or unwilling) to climb 
any higher up their destination hierarchy, had resigned themselves to a very different 
future. They had shifted their focus to building a comfortable (albeit less than full) life for 
themselves as migrant domestic workers in their host country. They looked for an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/applications/guides/5196ETOC.asp#5196E9. Retrieved on July 
2, 2012.  
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employer who was flexible, generous and supportive, and once they had built a strong 
relationship with such an employer, they tried to make their employment last as long as 
possible in order to give themselves a sense of financial and emotional security even as a 
temporary migrant worker.  
Domestic workers in the United States who had entered on tourist visas or short-
term work contracts were in an even worse situation. Not only did they have very little 
likelihood of becoming permanent residents of the US in the future, but they also were 
working illegally in the present. These factors kept them in the shadows of American 
society, fearful of jeopardizing their situation in any way. Some of the participants I 
talked to in New York, spoke of having never visited their relatives on the West Coast 
because they did not want to risk taking a plane in case their passport was checked and 
their visa was found to have expired. Some had been in the US for several years at a time 
without ever having returned to the Philippines to see their family because they knew that 
once they left, they could not come back. Undocumented domestic workers in the US 
also focused their efforts on finding good employers who would not ask questions about 
their immigration status or who might even be willing to sponsor them for a visa. Their 
efforts highlight the continuing power of immigration and labor policy to constrain 
migrants’ lives despite all the talk of globalization flattening the world.  
These stories demonstrate how multistate migration in and of itself is not a 
panacea to all the difficulties of life as a migrant domestic worker. Only a tiny proportion 
of all migrant domestic workers leaving the Philippines each year are able to eventually 
gain access to countries like Canada where they have a shot at securing permanent 
resident status and a chance at upward mobility. Other multistate migrants are still 
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frequently able to improve their circumstances, finding better-paying jobs in countries 
that provide more protections for domestic workers and migrants, and building a 
supportive community of friends for themselves. And few interviewees expressed any 
regrets over the migration and destination decisions they had made. But the lives of all 
these women in Canada and elsewhere remain marked by vulnerability. All it would take 
is an abusive or overly strict employer, an unethical, mercenary recruitment agency, or a 
major illness that makes them unable to perform their job, to remind these women of just 
how tenuous their situation in their host country truly is. It is for this reason that despite 
the multistate migration success stories I witnessed that highlight the agency and 
ingenuity of individual migrant domestic workers, my main takeaway from the interviews 
is the continuing need for greater reforms in all host countries, so as to guarantee 
sufficient workplace protections, better living conditions and greater respect in general 
for all migrant domestic workers, whether they are multinational maids or not. 
  
Future Research 
 As already mentioned, I did not interview many live-in caregivers in Canada who 
had completed their 24-month full-time employment requirement and become permanent 
residents of Canada. As such, I do not have sufficient data to discuss the long-term 
prospects for upward mobility for these migrant domestic workers. This is a project that I 
hope to initiate upon graduation. 
A second research area that I plan to pursue is the role of recruitment agencies in 
fostering multistate migration flows. Despite being critical traffic wardens and 
gatekeepers of international migration flows over the last 50 years, for-profit migrant 
382 
agencies are an understudied aspect of global migration patterns. This is most likely 
because these agencies—many of whom work illegally, over-charging their clients—shy 
away from explaining their business practices to researchers. Given the expected 
difficulty recruiting study participants, I hope to be able to conduct a small-n 
ethnographic study of these agencies and their role in fostering multistate migration not 
only among migrant domestic workers but also migrant laborers from other industries. 
It is also my hope that other migration scholars will take the model of multistate 
migration I have proposed in this dissertation and apply it in their own research on 
multiple international migrations. If my dissertation serves to delineate and define this 
































Asian Interview Protocol:  
Questions for Existing/Former/Prospective Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines 
 
MIGRATION DECISION 
1. What made you look for work overseas?  
• What kind of work were you doing in the Philippines before you left? 
• What kind of work did you think you would probably end up doing? 
• What did you think would be the benefits of working overseas?  
• What did you think would be the disadvantages? 
• Before you migrated, did you know anyone who had worked overseas?  
• Had they told you anything about working overseas? 
 
2. Do you ever regret deciding to migrate? 
 
DESTINATION DECISION 
3. How did you end up working in Hong Kong/Singapore/Country X? 
• Was this the first overseas destination where you’ve worked?  
• Where else have you worked? 
• Was this your first choice? 
• Did you think about other countries before or after coming here? 
• What do you think of Hong Kong/Singapore/Country X compared to when you 
first arrived? 
• What do you think of Hong Kong/Singapore/Country X compared to before you 
arrived? 
• Do you ever regret coming to this country? 
• How would you describe your life here? 
[Instructions: Repeat Q3 for as many countries as the migrant worked in.] 
 
4. If you could choose your preferred country, where would you like to work most? 
Why? 
• Do you know of anyone who has worked in any of these countries?  
• What do your friends and family say about these countries? 
• What have you heard or read about any of these countries in general? 
• What have you heard or read about Filipinos working in any of these countries? 
• (If not working in Hong Kong) Have you heard or read anything about working in 
Hong Kong compared to Singapore? 
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• (If not working in Singapore) Have you heard or read anything about working in 
Singapore compared to Hong Kong? 
• Have you heard anything about the Middle East? 
• Are there any countries where you absolutely refuse to work? Why? 




4. When you decided to work overseas, how did you go about securing an overseas job? 
• Did you go through friends or family? Why or why not? 
• Did you go through a recruiting agency? Why or why not? 
• Did you look in the newspaper for job ads? Why or why not? 
 
5. What kind of information about the country or the job do you wish you had before 
you signed the contract to work overseas? 
 
HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION PATTERNS 
6. When you decided to work overseas, did you go on your own or with other people?  
 
7. When you decided to work overseas, did you need to seek permission from someone 
else? Who? 
 
8. Did you consult with or seek advice from other people? Who? 
• Did you have any family members who were already overseas or had been in the 
past? 
• Did you communicate with any of these family members? 
• How often did you communicate with them? What did you talk about? 
• Did anyone tell you not to go overseas? Why didn't you follow their advice? 
 
9. Did anyone help you leave the Philippines? If yes, how? 
 
10. Has anyone asked you for help to leave the Philippines? 
 
FINANCES 
11. How much did it cost you to get a job overseas?  
• How much did you think it would cost you? 
• Where did you get the money to pay for these expenses? 
 
12. How much have you earned from working overseas? 
• How much did you think you would earn? 
• How much have you saved from working overseas? How long did it take you? 
• How much did you think you would save? 










North American Interview Protocol: 
Questions for Existing/Former/Prospective Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in 




1. Tell me about your life in the Philippines before you left. What kind of work were 
you doing in the Philippines? 
⇒ Did you go to college? What did you study? 
⇒ Was life comfortable growing up? Would you say that your family was middle-
class?  
 
2. What made you decide to leave the Philippines and work overseas?  
⇒ How did you first get the idea? Did someone suggest it to you? 
⇒ What did you think would be the benefits of working overseas?  
⇒ Did you think there would be any disadvantages? 
⇒ Were there any particular factors you weighed in making your decision? 
⇒ Where did you get your information about overseas life? 
⇒ Did you need to seek permission from someone? Who? 
 
3. What was your migration plan? 
⇒ How long were you planning on staying overseas? 
⇒ What kind of work did you think you would end up doing overseas? 
⇒ Did you have a particular country you wanted to emigrate to? 
⇒ Did you think you would work in one or more countries? 
⇒ How did you think you were going to get into those countries? 
 
4. Did you ever consider working overseas for a few years and then returning to the 
Philippines, instead of leaving for good? 
 
5. Please walk me through the process you went through to leave the Philippines the 
first time? 
⇒ Did you go through an agency? If yes, how did you go about selecting the 
agency?  
⇒ Did you go through friends or family?  
⇒ Was there any paperwork or tests you had to complete? 
⇒ Did you have to pay any money? Where did you get the money? 
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⇒ Were there any difficulties that came up while you were trying to leave the 
Philippines? 
 
6. Have you lived in any other country besides the US/Canada after leaving the 
Philippines? 
⇒ If yes, what countries and what jobs and for how long? 
⇒ How did you secure each job? 
⇒ Did you have to make any payments? 
⇒ What was your experience like working and living in each country? 
⇒ Was your experience different from what you had expected? 
⇒ Why did you decide to leave each country? 
⇒ How do the communities of migrants in these two (or more) countries compare? 
⇒ Is it better or worse where you are now? In what way?   
 
THE ROLE OF CAPITAL 
7. Did you ask any of your friends or family for any kind of help migrating? 
⇒ Did any of them say yes? If yes, who were they and what kind of help did they 
provide? 
⇒ Did any of them say no? Who said no and what reasons did they give for not 
helping? 
 
8. Did you have any special skills/training that made it easier or harder for you to leave 
the Philippines? 
 
9. Do you think there were any particular personal characteristics you had that made it 
easier or harder for you to leave the Philippines? 
 
10. Did you have to pay any money to leave the Philippines? 
⇒ If yes, how much? 
⇒ How did you find the money? 
⇒ Was it hard to secure the money? 
 
11. Do you think it’s easier for people from the Philippines to come to the US/Canada 
than migrants from other countries?  
⇒ If yes, which countries are you thinking about? 
⇒ Why do you think so? 
 
12. Think back to the people who lived on your street, or the people you went to school 
with. What percentage of them would you say are living overseas now? What 
percentage would you say are in the US/Canada? 
 
13. Compared to some of your neighbors/friends back in the Philippines, how unique is 
your migration story?  
⇒ Do you consider yourself to be luckier than them?  
⇒ If yes, in what way? If no, why not? 
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⇒ What do you think makes you different from them? What do you have (or don’t 
have) that they didn’t have (or do have)? 
 
14. What would your life be like now if you had never left the Philippines? Would you be 
comfortable? Would you be happier? 
 
15. Do you ever regret deciding to migrate to any of these countries? Were there other 
mistakes that you made? 
 




NETWORK MIGRATION PATTERNS 
17. Before you left the Philippines, did you have any close friends or relatives who 
lived/worked overseas? 
⇒ If yes, in which countries/cities?  
⇒ What kind of work did they do? 
⇒ What did they tell you about those countries? About their jobs? About the 
overseas life? 
⇒ Were they supportive of your decision to migrate? 
 
11. Did you consult with or seek advice from any of these people before migrating? 
⇒ If yes, who? 
⇒ How often did you communicate with them? What did you talk about? 
⇒ Did anyone tell you not to go overseas? Why didn't you follow their advice? 
 
12. Do you know anyone else who has worked/lived in multiple countries? 
⇒ Were they stepwise or onward migrants? 
⇒ Do you think stepwise migration is a popular strategy among Filipinos? Why or 
why not? 
⇒ Do you think onward migration is common among Filipinos? Why or why not? 
⇒ Do you know why they chose that particular migration trajectory?  
 
DESTINATION HIERARCHIES 
13. Before you first left the Philippines, what was your “dream destination” where you 
most wanted to work? Why? 
⇒ Did you know of anyone who had worked in that country?  
⇒ What did your friends and family say about that country? 
⇒ What had you heard or read about that country from the media? 
⇒ Did you think it was possible to ever work in that country? Why or why not? 
⇒ If yes, how did you plan on getting to that country? 
 
14. Were there any countries where you absolutely refused to work? If yes, which 
countries and why? 
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15. If you could choose your dream destination now, where would you like to work most 
and why? 
⇒ Do you know of anyone who has worked in that country? What do they say about 
it? 
⇒ What had you heard or read about that country from the media? 
⇒ Do you think it is possible to ever work in that country? Why or why not? 
⇒ If yes, how do you plan on getting to that country? 
 
16. Now I am going to mention some other common destinations for Filipino migrants. 
Please tell me what you think of each of them and where you got your information: 
⇒ Hong Kong, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Italy 
 
17. Why did you want to live in the U.S./Canada? 
⇒ Was that the plan all along? 
⇒ Did you try coming here earlier? What happened? 
⇒ When you were a child growing up in the Philippines, what was your impression 
of these two countries? Where did you get these ideas? 
 
18. How did you end up working in Canada/U.S.? 
⇒ Were there any difficulties gaining entry? If yes, how did you overcome them? 
⇒ Was this country your first choice? Why or why not? 
⇒ Did you think about other countries? 
 
19. How does the US compare with Canada? 
 
20. Have you ever thought of moving to any other countries after coming here? 
⇒ If yes, which countries and why? What have you heard about those countries? 
⇒ What disappointed you about your life now? 
 




22. Do you know anyone who travelled stepwise to the US/Canada? 
 
23. Do you have any idea how popular that approach to getting to the US is? 
 
24. [If a multistate migrant] How did you first get the idea of traveling this way to the 
US/Canada? 
⇒ Do you know anyone else who lived in an intermediate country before getting to 
the US/Canada? 
⇒ Do you think that’s very common among immigrants here? 
 
POST-MIGRATION EXPERIENCE 
3. Did you know anyone in Canada/U.S. before arriving here?  
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⇒ Did they help you when you first arrived? With housing? Finding a job? Food? 
Getting around?  
 
4. What were the initial days and months of your first job here like? 
⇒ Were they difficult in any way? Were you homesick? Did you experience culture 
shock? 
 
5. How have you adjusted to life in Canada/U.S.? 
⇒ How do you spend your off-days? 
⇒ What is your daily work routine like? 
⇒ How do you deal with loneliness or being homesick? 
 
6. What do you think now of Canada/U.S. as a place to work and live? 
⇒ Was your opinion different before you got here? Has your opinion changed since? 
⇒ Do you ever regret coming to this country? 
⇒ How would you describe your life here? 
⇒ What kind of information about Canada/U.S. do you wish you had before coming 
here? 
⇒ If working in US, what do you think of Canada as a destination? Is it better or 
worse than the US? Did you ever think of migrating there? 
⇒ If working in Canada, what do you think of the US as a destination? Is it better or 
worse than Canada? Did you ever think of migrating there? 
⇒ If they mentioned healthcare as a reason for staying in Canada, why is healthcare 
so important to you? 
 
FUTURE PLANS 
7. Do you want to change your occupation in the future? How easy do you think it will 
be do that? 
 
8. [For interviewees on temporary visas or undocumented] What do you think life after 
gaining your permanent residency (or citizenship or legal status) will be like? What is 
(or will be) the difference between life before and after? 
 
9. Do you think you’ll change in any way after you get your PR/citizenship/legal status? 
 
10. Do you plan on sponsoring any of your family members to join you here? Why or 
why not? 
 
11. [If going to be reunited with family members] How easy do you think it will be for 
your family to adjust to life overseas? 
 
12. Do you ever wish you had a better, higher-status job? How would you go about 
getting it? 
 
13. Do you ever think of moving onto another country? 
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PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO OTHERS 
14. Has anyone asked you to help them to emigrate to Canada/U.S. or somewhere else 
since you left the Philippines? 
⇒ If yes, who asked, how many and what kind of help have they asked for? 
⇒ Did you help them? Why or why not? What kind of help have you provided? 
⇒ Do you enjoy providing this kind of assistance? 
⇒ If no, why not? What did you tell them? 
⇒ Is it hard to help people emigrate? Why or why not? 
 
ROLE OF POLICY 
38. Do you think the US/Canada should be more or less strict in letting people enter and 
work in the country? 
 
39. Do you think Filipinos should get priority when it comes to entering the US/Canada? 
 
40. Do you think there are a lot of Filipino migrants living and working here illegally? 
 
41. Do you think the US/Canadian government should legalize the status of 
undocumented workers? 
 
42. How do you think the immigration policies of the US/Canada affected your journey 
to this country? 
 
43. Do you think these policies have changed over the years? If yes, how do you think 
this has affected the chances of other Filipinos who want to emigrate here? 
 
44. What kind of immigration policies would you like to see in place?  
 
STATUS OF FILIPINO AMERICANS/CANADIANS 
45. What do you think the status of Filipinos in the US/Canada is? 
 
46. How do you think other Americans/Canadians think of Filipinos? 
 
47. Why do you think there are so many Filipinos working/living in the US/Canada?  
 















Online Recruitment Survey of Filipino Migrants  
(used in the US) 
 
Instructions 
Hello. My name is Anju Mary Paul and I am a doctoral student at the University of 
Michigan conducting research on the migration paths of Filipino immigrants in the 
U.S./Canada. To qualify for this survey, you must: 
1. Be over 18 years old, 
2. Have been born in the Philippines, 
3. Now live in the US/Canada, and 
4. Have worked in the past or are working now as a nursing professional, caregiver, 
babysitter or domestic worker. 
 
Please fill in this survey to the best of your ability. It should only take a couple of 





1. What is your gender? (Please circle)  
• Male  
• Female  
2. How old are you? ______ (in years) 
3. Of which country are you a citizen? ___________ 
4. Are you a permanent resident of any country? If yes, which country? ________ 
5. Where were you born in the Philippines? __________________  
6. Where did you live in the Philippines before leaving? __________________ 
7. What is your highest education level? (Please circle)  
• Bachelor’s Degree and above 
• Some College (did not complete Bachelor’s) 
• High School Diploma 
• Some High School (did not complete High School) 
 










MIGRATION INFORMATION  
 
10. In what year did you first leave the Philippines? _________ 
11. What was your last job in the Philippines? _________________ 




13. Since what year have you been living in the US? ___________ 
14. Please list all the countries (not including the Philippines) in which you have 
worked/lived, the years you worked there, and the jobs you held.  
e.g. Hong Kong, 1993-1998, Domestic Helper 
Country Years Job 
   
   
   
 
Would you be willing to talk more about your migration experience? All interviewees are 
paid $10 for their time. Interviews are completely confidential and can be conducted over 
the phone or face-to-face. If you are interested, you can email me at anjupaul@umich.edu 













Please fill in this survey to the best of your ability. If you do not know the exact answer, 




1. How old are you (today)? ______ 
 
2. Where were you born?  
City/Municipality_____________ Province_____________ Country ____________ 
 
3. Where did/do you live in the Philippines?  
City/Municipality_____________ Province_____________ 
 
4. What is your highest education level? (Please circle)  
• Bachelor’s Degree and above 
• Some College (did not complete Bachelor’s) 
• High School Diploma 
• Some High School 
 
5. What is your marital status? (Please circle) 
• Single  
• Married  
• Separated/Divorced  
• Widowed 
 
6. What was your last job in the Philippines before you left? ___________________ 
 
7. In what year did you first leave the Philippines? _________ 
 
8. Since what year have you been living in the U.S./Canada? ___________ 
 
9. What is your current job? ____________ 
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HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION  
 
11. How big is your household in the Philippines?  
# Adults (including self) _____  # Children ____ 
 
12. How old are your children? ___________  
 
13. Please indicate how many of your relatives/close friends live in the Philippines and 
overseas. 




















a. Parents       
b. Brothers       
c. Sisters       
d. Children       
e. Uncles         
f. Aunts       
g. Male cousins       
h. Female cousins       




14. How much do you earn a month currently? _____________ (Currency________)   
 
15. What is your monthly household income in the Philippines (from all sources except 
remittances from abroad)? ___________________ pesos 
 
16. Does your household in the Philippines receive any foreign remittances? (Please 
circle) 
Yes           No 
 
17. If yes, how much each month ? ________________    
From which country? ___________________ 
 
18. Do you currently send remittances to any country? (Please circle) 
Yes           No 
 
19. If yes, how much do you typically send, how often, and to whom? 
Amount________  Frequency_______    
Recipient ________ Recipient’s country ________ 
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COMMUNICATION WITH PEOPLE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
20.  How often in the last 12 months have you used the following to talk to, see, or 

































































Letter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
Landline or Cellphone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
Internet based telephone  
(e.g. Skype) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
SMS/Text Message 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
Email 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
Instant Message 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 
















Please fill in this survey to the best of your ability. If you do not know the exact answer, 
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2. Where were you born?  
City/Municipality_____________ Province_____________ Country ____________ 
 
3. Where did/do you live in the Philippines?  
City/Municipality_____________ Province_____________ 
 
4. What is your highest education level? (Please circle)  
• Bachelor’s Degree and above 
• Some College (did not complete Bachelor’s) 
• High School Diploma 
• Some High School 
 
5. What is your marital status? (Please circle) 
• Single  
• Married  
• Separated/Divorced  
• Widowed 
 
6. What was your last job in the Philippines before you left? ___________________ 
 
7. In what year did you first leave the Philippines? _________ 
 
8. Since what year have you been living in the U.S./Canada? ___________ 
 
9. What is your current job? ____________ 
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HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION  
 
11. How big is your household in the Philippines?  
# Adults (including self) _____  # Children ____ 
 
12. How old are your children? ___________  
 
13. Please indicate how many of your relatives/close friends live in the Philippines and 
overseas. 




















a. Parents       
b. Brothers       
c. Sisters       
d. Children       
e. Uncles         
f. Aunts       
g. Male cousins       
h. Female cousins       




14. How much do you earn a month currently? _____________ (Currency________)   
 
15. What is your monthly household income in the Philippines (from all sources except 
remittances from abroad)? ___________________ pesos 
 
16. Does your household in the Philippines receive any foreign remittances? (Please 
circle) 
Yes           No 
 
17. If yes, how much each month ? ________________    
From which country? ___________________ 
 
18. Do you currently send remittances to any country? (Please circle) 
Yes           No 
 
19. If yes, how much do you typically send, how often, and to whom? 
Amount________  Frequency_______    












A Timeline of Philippine History and Migration 
 
900s Chinese mercantile traders visit the Philippine islands to trade with the 
native population. 
 
1200s Islam is brought to some of the Philippine islands in the south by Muslim 
Malay and Arab traders who encouraged a peaceful religious conversion 
by the native population. 
 
1521 Ferdinand Magellan arrives in the Philippine islands, giving them the name 
the “Archipelago of Saint Lazarus” (Barrows 1925) and peacefully 
converting several hundred natives to Christianity. A Spanish trading post 
was established on the island of Cebu. 
  
1542 Another Spanish expedition under Lopez de Villalobos sets out for the 
Philippines. It is Villalobos who names one of the islands “Felipina” in 
honor of Philip the Second, the heir apparent to the Spanish throne. This 
name for the archipelago—Las Filipinas—grows in popularity over time. 
  
1565 A third expedition from Spain, under Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, arrives in 
the Philippines and begins the permanent occupation of the Philippines by 
Spain (Barrows 1925). 
 
1570 The Spanish King appoints Legazpi governer of the Philippines and grants 
his soldiers encomiendas, dividing up land and villages into administrative 
units that were required to pay regular tributes in cash and kind to their 
Spanish overlords. This begins the restructuring of the Philippine economy 
to support Spain’s colonial ambitions. The most onerous of these tributes is 
the repartimento system which requires all Filipino men between the ages 
of 16 and 60 to provide labor the state for 40 days each year. Filipinos are 
put to work building and repairing roads, and building ships for the galleon 
trade (Tyner 2009).  
 
1571 Legazpi captures the fortress city of “Maynilad” and renames it Manila. 
The King grants Manila the royal title of city. 
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1574 Chinese pirates attempt to violently take control of Manila but are defeated 




The first Spanish missionaries arrive (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). 
1760s 
 
The Spanish galleon trade plies between Manila and Acapulco, bringing 
silver from Mexico to Manila where it is traded for Chinese silks and 
porcelain, and ivory and spices from India and other parts of Southeast 
Asia. Some Filipino crew on these boats settle in Mexico and eventually 
some find their way to Louisiana where they create the “oldest continuous 
Asian American communities in North America” (Okihiro 1994:38 citing 
Espina 1988:1). 
 
1762 Following the conclusion of the Seven Year War, Britain occupies Manila. 
 
1764 A negotiated withdrawal has the British returning the Philippines to 
Spanish rule. (Abinales and Amoroso 2005) 
 
1778 The dwindling galleon trade compels Spain to reorient the Philippines’ 
colonial economy towards export agriculture. Large-scale production of 
export-driven cash crops such as sugar, cacao, coconut, tobacco, fruits and 
spice is initiated (Abinales and Amoroso 2005).  
 
1800s The internal displacements that resulted from the establishment of a 
plantation-based, export-oriented economy result in mass migrations of 
landless, indebted peasants from rural parts of the Philippines to Manila 
(Abinales and Amoroso 2005:80). 
 
1896 José Rizal, considered the “First Filipino”, for his anti-colonial writings 
and his founding of a Philippine nationalist group, is executed. The first 
open rebellion by anti-colonial groups is launched in Manila but is quickly 
stamped out by Spanish forces. However clashes between nationalist 
groups and the military continue in other parts of the country. 
 
1898 The United States declares war on Spain in April after the sinking of the 
American ship Maine in Havana, Cuba. In December, the Treaty of Paris is 
signed ending the war with Spain. Cuba’s independence is recognized, and 
America takes possession of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. The 
Philippines is included in the deal after the payment of US$20 million by 




The United States fights a guerrilla war with Filipino nationalists which the 
US eventually wins.  
 
1900s Free elementary and secondary school education in English is mandated 
for all Filipinos. 
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1903 Under the Pensionado Act, the United States begins sending students from 
the Philippines to the US for training. 
 
1906 Recruitment of Filipino labor for Hawaii’s sugar plantations begins. 
 
1934 The Tydings-McDuffie Act passes which sets up a 10-year waiting period 
before Philippine independence can be granted. It also limits Filipino 
immigration into the US, setting the annual quota at only 50 individuals. 
Until this point, Filipinos were considered American nationals and “their 
movement into the US was relatively free” (Palumbo-Liu 1999:40). 
 
1935 Congress passes the Filipino Repatriation Act providing free transportation 
for any indigent Filipino who wants to return to the Philippines.  
 
1942 Japanese forces occupy Manila. 
 
1943 Japan declares the Philippines’ independence and establishes a puppet 
regime called the “Second Republic.” 
 
1944 US forces return to the Philippines and successfully expel Japanese troops. 
 
1946 The US grants independence to the Philippines but imposes several 
unequal trade and military agreements on the Filipinos. US businesses are 
given the right to export goods to the Philippines duty-free for eight years, 
after which tariffs will be incrementally increased over a 25-year period. 
Philippine exports to the US however have strict quotas they are not 
allowed to exceed. The Philippine peso is pegged to the dollar and can not 
be devalued to increase exports. And US businesses are given “parity 
rights” to invest in Philippine natural resources and public utilities. 
Meanwhile, the US military is given the right to set up military bases on 
99-year leases. 
 
1958 The Import Control Act introduces an import substitution industrialization 
program in the Philippines to build the country’s manufacturing base and 
move its economy away from export-oriented cash crops. However, this 
program is unable to absorb the rapidly growing labor force or the 
continuing subsidies enjoyed by US firms in the Philippines. 
 
1965 US immigration and Nationality Act is passed.  
 
1960s Under advice from the World Bank and the IMF, President Marcos 
introduces an export-oriented industrialization program that provided 
generous tax credits to producers to establish factories in the Philippines 
for export-oriented manufacturing. The country’s national debt and 
unemployment problems continue to worsen. 
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1972 President Marcos declares martial law and rules by decree from that point 
onward. All economic planning comes directly under the control of his 
office. 
 
1970s Various presidential decrees are passed to weaken the negotiating ability of 
organized labor within the country, and establish “export processing 
zones” where private manufacturers can set up factories. 
 
1974 The new Labor Code mandates the Philippine government to actively 
support the employment of Filipino workers overseas. This initiates the 
development of the Philippines’ migration bureaucracy, comprising three 
main entities: the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the 
National Seaman Board (NSB) and the Bureau of Employment Services 
(BES). In addition, the Labor Code requires all overseas Filipino workers 
to remit a part of their earnings (ranging from 50% to 80%) to their 
families in the Philippines. 
 
1978 The Marcos government is forced to give up its state monopoly over the 
placement of overseas Filipino workers, and allow private recruitment 
agencies to participate. The government migration apparatus begins to shift 
its focus more towards regulating the emerging migration industry.  
 
1982 The OEDB, NSB and BES are merged to form the Philippine Overseas 
Employment Administration (POEA) tasked with the promotion and 
regulation of all overseas employment for Filipino workers. A secondary 
goal is the diversification of overseas employment streams to encompass 
more destination countries and more occupations (particularly higher 
skilled professions). 
 
1986 A popular uprising—the People’s Power revolution—results in the ouster 
of President Marcos. Opposition leader, Corazon Aquino, becomes the 
next President. 
 
1987 Despite the change in government, overseas employment continues to be a 
central economic strategy for the Philippines’ national development. The 
Aquino government attempts to reframe overseas workers as “heroes and 
heroines” rather than the “victims” portrayed by domestic critics of the 




A Filipina domestic worker in Singapore, Flor Contemplacion, is charged 
with the murder of another Filipina domestic worker and a four-year-old 
Singaporean boy. She pleads guilty to both charges—some say under 
duress—and is sentenced to death. The Philippine government requests a 
stay of execution which is denied and, in 1995, Contemplacion is executed. 
Filipino migrant communities worldwide protest the handling of the case, 
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criticizing the Philippine government’s inability to protect its citizens 
abroad. 
 
1995 Another Filipina domestic worker in the United Arab Emirates, Sarah 
Balabagan, kills her 85-year-old employer after he allegedly attacked and 
raped her. She is found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to seven 
years’ imprisonment. Under appeal, she is first resentenced to death, and 
later, to 100 cane lashes and a 12-month imprisonment. The Balabagan 
case, following on the heels of the Contemplacion case, ignites worldwide 
protests against the Philippine government’s migration bureaucracy. 
 
In response, President Fidel V. Ramos signs into law Republic Act 8042, 
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, which explicitly 
states that the government “would not promote overseas employment as a 
means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development”. 
  
1990s The Philippine government adopts a neoliberal stance toward the overseas 
employment of Filipino workers, framing labor migration as a personal 
choice adopted by autonomous individuals seeking self-fulfillment. The 
government argues that while it does not explicitly promote out-migration, 
it would not infringe upon the natural desires of Filipino citizens to work 
abroad, thus implicitly transferring responsibility for any subsequent 
abuses and exploitation to the individual migrants. 
 
2000s Under the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, an annual goal of a 
million Filipino workers deployed overseas is set. The Philippine 
government moves to increase the efficiency and transparency of the 
overseas placement process, with the express goal of reducing any 
bureaucratic hurdles private recruitment agencies might face when placing 
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